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1. Background and subject matter  
The banking sector, which is at the forefront of academic research and public 
debate since the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, as well as having sparked 
renewed interest with the  introduction of the European Directive on recovery and 
resolution procedures applicable to banks (BRRD)1 in 2014 and its more recent 
amendments in 2019 (BRRD2)2, allows for research in the highly complex and 
relevant area in which financial regulation and competition policy become strictly 
interwoven. This interconnection is particularly evident when considering the 
management of bank failures involving recourse to public funds. In this respect, the 
BRRD was introduced with the aim of restructuring systemically important and 
interconnected banks in an orderly manner, by enabling public authorities to 
distribute losses among banks' shareholders and creditors (bail-in), rather than relying 
on taxpayers (bailouts). Yet, recent cases of bank rescues approved in Europe after 
the introduction of the Directive show that some degree of public intervention is still 
possible, despite the intended shift from bailout to bail-in. This provides the starting 
point for a study focusing on the interaction between resolution rules and State aid 
control.    
1.1 Public support to banks during the global financial crisis  
The latest financial crisis and the consequent sovereign and banking crises 
within the eurozone had pushed national governments to support the balance sheets 
of multiple banks in distress by way of extensive bailouts, the expense of which was 
inevitably shouldered by taxpayers.   
 
 
1 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms, (Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive, “BRRD”). 








The unraveling of the crisis was spurred on by a long-standing tendency 
towards banking sector nationalism observable in most European States3, justifiable 
partially on grounds of credit allocation control - believed to be instrumental for 
economic development and competitiveness - as well as cover from external 
economic shocks, and control over monetary policy. Such parochialism has persisted, 
despite the increased internationalisation of operations carried out by many of the 
biggest banks. 
The unprecedented costs faced to bail out domestic banks, especially to cope 
with the losses due to foreign exposures, brought to light one of the risks of financial 
globalisation and the harm incurred by domestic creditors and savers as a 
consequence of the failure of foreign banks highlighted some of the criticalities of an 
imperfect transnational integration.4 In order to make do with the extraordinary 
circumstances, the European Commission relaxed its approach in State aid control 
cases involving the financial sector specifically, choosing to forgo a strict application 
of the relevant branch competition law, in a situation in which financial stability was 
 
3 Véron (2013), also highlighting how, after the global financial crisis, market integration went sharply 
backwards compared to the period before the crisis outbreak in mid-2007. 
4 A prime example is offered by the bust of Icelandic bank Landesbanki: British and Dutch depositors, 
having accessed the bank’s branches in their countries, had to be bailed out by their respective 
governments, due to Iceland only guaranteeing its own national deposits. 
3 
 
primarily at stake.  
1.2 Post-crisis regulatory reforms 
As part of the regulatory overhaul following the financial crisis, within the 
broader framework of the establishment of a European Banking Union, the BRRD 
and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR)5 were introduced in 2014. 
The new regulatory system has introduced both higher capital requirements and new 
rules on bank resolution, which should - at least theoretically - establish the credible 
belief that shareholders and creditors would carry the full burden of the losses of a 
failing bank, primarily by way of the new bail-in instrument, rather than making 
recourse to public resources. This was also in line with strengthened core capital 
requirements for banks and an enhanced role for Additional Tier 1 instruments 
brought about by the update of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR2).6   
The intended consequences of such a mechanism for the management of bank 
failures are threefold. Firstly, moral hazard of banking managers should be erased by 
removing the so-called ‘implicit subsidy’ for big banks, which had provided 
encouragement for bankers to take on excessive risks in their exposures as well as to 
over-borrow, due to the expectation of being bailed out in case of a crisis to avoid 
stability disruptions. The second aim is to allow for a system in which even large 
banks can be allowed to “fail” without triggering a systemic chain reaction on 
aggregate financial stability, while minimising the need to rely on public funds for 
the purposes of crisis avoidance. The third goal is to harmonise different national 
approaches to bank rescues, so as to tackle the issue of regulatory arbitrage and 
manage not to undermine the internal single market with differences in funding costs 
for banks with comparable creditworthiness that are located in different countries.  
In addition, the framework for State aid control was also updated in order to 
account for the evolution of the crisis, especially considering the persistently high 
volatility of the financial markets as well as the uncertainty concerning the economic 
outlook, which resulted in a constant risk of having new serious disturbances manifest 
 
5 Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014. 
6 Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 as amended by Regulation (EU) No. 876/2019. On this point, see 
Lamandini and Ramos Muñoz (forthcoming) in Handbook on Capital and Liquidity Requirements for 
European Banks: CCR2 and CRDV, Oxford University Press. 
4 
 
themselves once again for some Member States. This justified the preservation of the 
possibility for Member States to grant support measures as a safety net in times of 
crisis, on the basis of the conditions laid out in Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, for what 
concerns the financial sector. In clarifying the applicability of the updated framework 
for crisis rules for banks, the Commission underlined that financial stability remains 
the overarching objective in carrying out its assessment of aid schemes, necessarily 
reflecting the related macroeconomic considerations as well. 
The potential need for public support to banks in distress is a recurring theme, 
since banking crises are cyclical, and it is of particular interest now, due to the likely 
effects on banks’ balance sheets of the economic downturn originated by harsh 
governmental actions adopted to mitigate the Covid-19 pandemic. Lessons learnt in 
the recent past in dealing with instances of bank distress may thus prove of great 
relevance in tackling future challenges. 
2.    Problem Definition 
The enforcement of competition law in the banking sector is well established 
as an issue of interest and policymakers have long struggled to define the right 
combination of competition rules and regulations specific to the banking industry.  
The crisis of 2008 sparked two common but different reactions concerning 
the role of antitrust policy in the field of banking. One has considered financial 
stability as taking priority over all other concerns, including those of traditional 
competition policy, and therefore, that the normal rules needed to be suspended for 
the duration of the crisis.7 The opposite view has been to fear that intervention to 
restore financial stability would bring about significant distortions of banking 
competition, and therefore to advocate that competition rules should be applied even 
more vigorously than usual, with the receipt of State aid being considered 
presumptive grounds for suspecting banks of anti-competitive behaviour. A middle 
ground is represented by those views which call for the persistent, simultaneous 
application of both set of rules (those meant to preserve financial stability and those 
meant to preserve a competitive market), by means of a proportionate use of structural 
 
7 See, among others, Kokkoris and Olivares-Carminal (2010). 
5 
 
and behavioural measures as conditions for the State aid and antitrust approval of any 
rescue scheme.8    
When dealing with State aid, financial regulation and competition policy must 
be considered as inevitably intertwined. Therefore, it is important to put such policy 
responses in the context of the overarching architecture of regulatory policies, 
because the question of the link between competition and stability in the banking 
industry depends on the ability of prudential regulation to prevent excessively risky 
behaviour by bank managers and shareholders.9 Theoretical models have made 
contrasting predictions concerning the relationship between bank concentration, 
competition and stability. Even empirical studies have brought forth mixed evidence 
concerning the effects of State aid on the degree of competition in different banking 
sectors.10 
European State aid provisions had remained mainly unchanged since their 
introduction in the Treaty of Rome of 1957, which was aimed first and foremost at 
avoiding the conferral of any undue advantage stemming by state interventions. State 
aid control has traditionally been kept separated from the pursuit of other economic 
policies. However, crisis aid measures have been aimed at ensuring that Member 
States were implementing more efficient and rational economic policies. The 
European Commission itself has advocated that public spending should be made 
more efficient and effective, while also being targeted at policies that can promote 
growth, thus fulfilling common European objectives. With such new emphasis being 
put on the efficiency of public support, State aid should now be thought of as one of 
the instruments that can help heighten budgetary discipline and enhance the quality 
of public finances. It is in this sense that State aid control has increasingly become a 
State aid policy, bringing about a constitutional shift in the allocation of supranational 
regulatory competences. This shift in the conception of State aid implies that 
 
8 Lowe (2009) highlights how this balancing approach was meant to reconcile an immediate 
stabilisation need with a need to ensure the long-term viability of institutions without State support. 
9 Theoretical studies have been carried out by Collie (1998; 2002; 2005), Dewatripont and Seabright 
(2005), who have applied well-known concepts of contract theory and industrial organisation to the 
assessment of State aid. According to the prevailing belief among policymakers, more competition in 
banking leads to more instability and failures, all else equal (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005). 




particular attention should be devoted to assessing how different policy mandates are 
balanced when managing the failure of financial institutions.  
Since 2008, most Member States have provided some sort of support to their 
banking system, which has allowed the European Commission to exert an 
unprecedented control over the use of taxpayers' money under State aid rules. In 
particular, individual restructuring and resolution plans have been instrumental in 
fostering the reform of the European banking system and anticipating the adoption 
and implementation of what is known as the ‘Banking Union’, which was absent at 
the beginning of the crisis. Building on the ‘Crisis Communications’11, all State aid 
decisions taken by the Commission have been based on three pillars: viability, 
burden-sharing and competition. In order to minimise distortions of competition, the 
Commission imposed significant structural and behavioural measures, aimed at 
sanctioning, among others, risk-taking and mismanagement, and at restructuring the 
banking sector as a whole.  
On 10 July 2013, the Commission adopted a Communication on State aid 
rules on support measures in favor of banks granted in the context of the financial 
crisis, which is applicable as of 1 August 2013. Its burden-sharing requirements apply 
to all State aid granted to banks. Banks intending to resort to State aid should now 
undertake all measures to minimise public intervention. As a consequence, the 
enriched regulatory framework composed of rules governing bank resolutions- both 
at EU-wide and eurozone level12- and the updated rules for crisis aid, have opened a 
 
11 The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context 
of the current global financial crisis [2008] OJ C270/8 (‘2008 Banking Communication’); The 
recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum 
necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition [2009] OJ C10/2 (‘Recapitalisation 
Communication’); Communication from the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the 
Community financial sector [2009] OJ C72/1 (‘Impaired Assets Communication’); Commission 
communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial 
sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules [2009] OJ C195/9 (‘Restructuring 
Communication’); Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2011, of 
State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis [2010] OJ 
C329/7 (‘2010 Prolongation Communication’); Communication from the Commission on the 
application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the 
context of the financial crisis [2011] OJ C356/7 (‘2011 Prolongation Communication’). These 
Communications set out how Member States could support financial institutions while still abiding by 
EU competition rules and thus avoiding undue distortions of competition. See Doleys (2012), arguing 
that such guidance helped preserve competition in the banking sector as well as providing a policy 
resource for Commission authorities to rely on to restructure the banking sector. 




new venue for further studies on regulation. Indeed, the framework for bank 
resolution has effectively introduced several resolution tools not previously available 
to the authorities of most Member States to manage the failure of their financial 
institutions. The evidence from recent cases of bank rescues in Europe shows that (i) 
some degree of public intervention is still possible despite the intended shift from 
bailout to bail-in introduced by the BRRD13; and (ii) different combinations of 
resolution tools and public support measures entail different restructurings of 
institutions, which need to be scrutinised by competition authorities both under State 
aid rules and merger rules.14  
Therefore, a crucial issue to tackle is whether the rules on State aid and those 
on resolution- including the prescriptions on burden-sharing, principally applied 
through bail-in- are sufficiently flexible, so as to allow Member States to adopt the 
policy measures that are deemed to be necessary in the public interest. Whether the 
balancing exercise between financial stability and competition concerns has remained 
consistent in the assessment of aid schemes during the global financial crisis up to 
today is up for discussion.15 As a matter of fact, the approach taken to the application 
of the new integrated framework for bank resolution and State aid control suggests 
that maybe it is not the case that measures enacted with a view to preserving financial 
stability completely rule out the possibility that competition concerns still arise, even 
though the regulatory framework should have decreased reliance on public support. 
At the very least, the mechanics that allow for the recourse to public funds in case of 
a bank failure- and the willingness to allow for deviations from statutory bail-in- 
make it difficult to believe that there is sufficient flexibility to account for the 
peculiarities of specific countries and their banking sectors.  
 
13 Including, among others, the precautionary recapitalisations of National Bank of Greece and Piraeus 
Bank (2015) and of Monte dei Paschi di Siena (2017); the liquidation of Banca Popolare di Vicenza 
(2017). 
14 Merger control is necessary in those cases where an acquisition of control of a bank by another party 
comes about as a result of rescue and restructuring schemes, in order to curb potential anticompetitive 
effects. This can entail State acquisitions, as in the case of precautionary recapitalisations, or 
acquisitions by market competitors, for instance, in resolution transfer schemes such as sale of business 
or bridge banks.  
15 This also poses a fundamental question of legal certainty and non-discrimination. See, for instance, 
the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) of 7 July 2020 in case Albert and 
Others v. Hungary (application no. 5294/14), negating the existence of a violation of the property 
rights of the shareholders of banks integrated into a State-controlled scheme, as the banks’ 
shareholders lacked standing before the ECtHR. 
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As for the regulatory and supervisory developments of the latest years, the 
establishment of the Banking Union provides an important backdrop against which 
to evaluate how a greater degree of sectoral integration in banking at EU level has 
influenced the approach to the management of banking crises. In this respect, one 
relevant distinction needs to be made between idiosyncratic and systemic crises and 
the (“desirability” of) application of the new prescriptions on resolution to either of 
the two instances. This constitutes a crucial point, as it appears that the recourse to 
bail-in would be suited only to the context of the former type of bank crisis and this, 
in turn, prompts the making of new considerations on which avenues for aid grants 
are still open. Indeed, while the Banking Union gains its footing16, large segments of 
the EU banking sector still require a substantial restructuring through recapitalisation 
measures, but the market may not be able to provide by itself all the needed resources, 
when profitability appears to be permanently depressed and economic growth is 
scarce. Therefore, a systemic market failure might only be fixed by resorting to 
temporary forms of public support. However, the risk of large write-offs of capital 
instruments that comes with the new prescriptions on burden-sharing and bail-in 
could potentially set in motion a phenomenon of investors’ flight, which would 
prejudice the new system itself, by requiring once again public support.   
It follows from the discussion on bail-in applicability and the remaining scope 
for aid granting that some considerations must be made on the setting of prudential 
requirements on bank capital as well. As a matter of fact, the design of prudential 
rules on bank capital requirements interacts with the industrial organisation of the 
banking sector and, in particular, with the level of competition among banks.17 
Increased competition can lead to excessive risk-taking by banks, which may need to 
be counteracted by imposing tighter capital requirements. When capital requirements 
are set uniformly at an international level, but the levels of competition among banks 
in different countries do not parallel such uniformity, international spillovers 
inevitably arise for what concerns the financial integration of these countries.  
 
16 Only the first two pillars of the Banking Union are currently in place, namely, (i) the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), for harmonised and centralised supervision of euro area financial 
institutions, and (ii) the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), for harmonised resolution of failing 
banks. The third pillar, i.e. a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) is still to be established. On 
the benefits of the EDIS and why it is needed for a fully functioning Banking Union, see, among 
others, Huertas (2019) and Gortsos (2019). 
17 See Joosen et al. (2018), arguing that a “one size fits all” approach to setting capital requirements 
hinders the development of smaller banks by creating competitive distortions. 
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This is relevant, in particular, in relation to MREL18 and TLAC19 capital 
requirements, which are expressly devised for the purposes of making bank resolution 
a sustainable process.20 Global and European regulatory bodies and authorities 
developed, or even directly enshrined in law, a number of minimum standards for 
‘bail-inable’ liabilities that financial institutions are required to hold, so as to ensure 
that banks maintain sufficient levels of bail-inable capital in face of a potential 
resolution scenario. The prescription of holding sufficient capital available for bail-
in is one of the means chosen to sustain the achievement of the objective of 
maintaining financial stability, by enabling smooth proceedings in resolution and 
avoiding that investor runs be triggered when a bank’s distress becomes apparent. 
More specifically, these requirements ensure that they are well equipped to continue 
their critical functions without threatening the stability of financial markets and 
minimising the need to resort to further taxpayer support. With respect to TLAC in 
particular, the Financial Stability Board has declared that: “[t]he objective of this 
standard is to ensure that G-SIBs have the loss-absorbing and recapitalisation 
capacity necessary to help ensure that [...] critical functions can be continued without 
taxpayers’ funds (public funds) or financial stability being put at risk.”  
On the basis of these considerations, it seems that there is a need to reconsider 
the interrelation between measures taken for stabilisation purposes and their 
competitive implications, in light of a regulatory framework for bank crises 
management which combines resolution rules and State aid rules.  
3.    Research Question 
This PhD study will provide a comprehensive and rigorous analysis of the 
rules on bank resolution introduced in Europe by the BRRD in their interaction with 
the regulatory framework disciplining State aids.  
 
18 Minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (Art. 45 BRRD and Art, 12 SRMR, 
further specified in BRRD2 in Artt. 45 to 45f and SRMR2 Artt. 12 to 12f). 
19 Total loss-absorbing capacity. Financial Stability Board, ‘Principles on Loss-Absorbing and 
Recapitalisation Capacity of G-SIBs in Resolution – Total Loss Absorbing Capacity’ (2011). 
20 High enough TLAC coupled with capital requirements represent the means to preempt future 
banking crises. Along these lines, see, inter alia, Gordon J.N. and Ringe W.-G., ‘Bank Resolution in 
the European Banking Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What It Would Take’ (2015) 115 
Columbia Law Review 1297; Admati A.R. et al., ‘Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the 
Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive’ (2013) 23.  
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The central question of this research project is whether the interaction between the 
European regulatory framework for bank resolution, as introduced by the BRRD, and 
State aid rules allows to minimise (potential) competition distortions when dealing 
with bank failures.  
Answering this question requires a detailed analysis of two issues. In the first 
place, it entails an assessment of the legal framework and its practical 
implementation, to identify which are the avenues still available to grant public funds 
to failing banks, both within and outside the perimeter of resolution rules, and which 
are the competitive concerns that may arise as a result. The second aspect is strictly 
related to the first and concerns how different tools and strategies available to manage 
bank failures entail different restructuring requirements for ailing institutions, and to 
what extent these can alter institutions’ ownership and operational structures. 
Tackling these issues is relevant not only from a positive perspective, but also 
from a normative one. Indeed, from the positive side, this analysis should provide 
clarity on the complexity of the interactions between the frameworks for bank 
resolution and State aid control and highlight the role of public fund granting in 
affecting institutions’ market conduct, as well as public authorities’ incentives in 
choosing which rescue strategies and tools to apply to different instances of bank 
distress. Then, as different rescue measures shape the structure and operative models 
of institutions in different ways, there is a possibility that the competitive structure of 
banking markets is altered as a consequence of bank restructurings. In this sense, the 
analysis has normative implications as well, by pinpointing the extent to which the 
regulatory framework as set and applied can actively shape institutions’ and markets’ 
conduct and structure, to assess whether its intended regulatory and policy objectives 
are met, and advance policy proposals in case improvements are necessary in this 
respect. In particular, this will concern the manner in which the State aid and 
resolution frameworks should be aligned and coordinated, for the purposes of 
efficiency, in order to facilitate risk sharing.   
This study aims at providing a thorough examination of the crisis 
management framework, to be used as a basis upon which further research could 
build to empirically estimate how different measures may differently influence the 
competitive structure of banking markets. An updated analysis of the most recent 
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cases of management of banks’ failures will also be offered, in order to address 
potential issues for attention in the implementation of the norms. Particular attention 
in the study will be devoted to Italian banks, insofar as they offer recent examples of 
the application of different crisis management procedures, but the analysis must also 
be grounded in the comparison with other European States and the comparable 
measures enacted to rescue their national banks. 
In this sense, this PhD study can be seen as offering a new perspective on the 
relationship between considerations and on financial stability and on competition in 
dealing with bank failures. Indeed, the focus of this work lies in the different 
measures and strategies deployed for stabilisation purposes, to assess whether and to 
what extent safeguards might be necessary to prevent undue competitive distortions, 
as well as how the competitive structure of banking markets might be affected as a 
result of failing banks’ restructuring. 
4. Methodology 
The methodology chosen to tackle the research questions is functional to 
addressing and combining issues related to the different areas of banking regulation 
and competition policy, specifically with reference to State aids and to a lesser degree 
also to merger control. 
First, the theoretical framework draws from the economic literature in the 
field of competition in relation to State aids and the rationale for their control, with a 
specific eye to their application in the banking sector. The theoretical analysis hinges 
on both legal and economic insights in order to pinpoint how the design of the 
regulatory framework could give rise to competition-relevant concerns. In this 
respect, different crisis management tools/strategies are assessed in each chapter.  
Then, the question regarding the impact of the regulatory framework for bank 
crisis management and its practical application on competition indicators and the 
structure of European banking markets is an empirical one. Yet, this study does not 
intend to produce empirical estimates of such an impact through statistical and 
econometric exercises, due to a number of factors. In the first place, not all necessary 
funding cost and bank-level data are publicly available for all rescued banks21, thus 
 
21 This is partly due to the fact that not all rescued institutions were listed at the time of intervention. 
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not enabling full consistency and comparability across the sample of institutions. 
Moreover, some of the banks relevant for the purposes of analysis are still in the 
implementation phase of their restructuring schemes, and thus their ownership and 
organisational structures are not yet “finalised”. In addition, the geographical and 
product markets of activity of most of the institutions considered have a regional or 
even province-level relevance, the competitive structure of which cannot be fully 
gleaned from publicly available data.22 Lastly, the fact that the implementation of the 
resolution framework is still relatively recent and its full application is still under 
development implies that the sample size of banks undergoing some form of crisis 
restructuring is limited to date.  
In light of the above, a qualitative approach is preferred, with a view to 
making the analysis more flexible and better suited to provide an understanding of 
the complex workings of the current regulatory framework for bank crisis 
management. To this end, a case study is carried out, making use of all publicly 
available bank-specific data, decisions of the European Commission in relevant State 
aid and merger cases, as well as decision of national competition authorities. Indeed, 
while qualitative methods are applied to address the research questions, empirical 
evidence and studies drive the analysis, ground the discussions and inform the policy 
proposals advanced.  
5. Motivation and relevance  
On the basis of the reflections of the previous sections, such a study would be 
relevant (i) for financial institutions, in providing clarity on the regulatory framework 
and how it applied in practical cases, (ii) for resolution authorities, to take into 
account also competition-relevant implications of the bank restructuring schemes 
they are called to devise and implement, and (iii) for regulatory authorities, insofar 
as it addresses potential weaknesses in the current regulatory framework and its 
interpretation, in order to pinpoint aspects that could be streamlined or made more 
coherent.  
In addition, it is worthwhile to strike the relevance of carrying out a study on 
the relationship between banking competition and financial stability considerations 
 
22 Granular data in this respect are available to competent authorities, but subject to confidentiality.  
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arising from the management of cases of bank distress and how the interplay of the 
rules on resolution and State aid is faced with such considerations when restructuring 
requirements are imposed on financial institutions. 
In practice, banking competition might lower interest rates and therefore 
improve the quality of loan applications, while at the same time lowering the need 
for banks to ration credit. In turn, more profitable bank customers may themselves 
have a lower incentive to take on risks that would potentially lead to the loss of their 
own charter value, therefore lowering the probability of default on loans and 
increasing bank stability. On the contrary, lower levels of competition could lead to 
higher interest rates being set, which in turn will be likely to attract riskier loan 
applicants (adverse selection), as well as induce borrowers to choose riskier projects 
(moral hazard).23  
Systematic analyses of the relationship between the objectives of financial 
stability and competition now that the new resolution framework is in place in 
conjunction with State aid rules would be necessary to evaluate how the EU banking 
environment can be shaped by decisions on public financing, which should be the 
result of a ‘compromise’ between these two objectives.24 The consolidation of the 
sector has also raised major questions on what are the instruments that can preserve 
financial stability best, while effectively addressing the problems posed by 
mismanaged banks at the same time.  
It is straightforward to see that a preservation of the essential activities of a 
bank, in spite of its distress, would be beneficial both for the individual depositors 
and investors and for the sector at a systemic level, however one should take care to 
consider who is effectively bearing banks’ losses in such instances. Being aware of 
the costs of financial instability is essential for assessing when more flexibility is 
 
23 However, this market process would be dampened by highly expansionary monetary policy, which 
is necessary for reasons of systemic financial stability preservation.  
24 Limitation of public aid to the minimum and preservation of financial stability are the concurrent 
objectives in the State aid framework and in the resolution regime of the SRM framework. The 
minimisation of (undue) distortions of competition is also among the objectives of the State aid 
framework. As the BRRD/SRMR are indissolubly linked with the State aid regime by design, the 
objectives of both regimes come into play concurrently whenever some form of public support is 
involved in an instance of bank crisis management. In addition, considerations on limiting potential 
distortions of competition are explicitly embedded in the BRRD in relation to use of resolution tools, 
business reorganisation plans for post-resolution restructuring, and funding arrangements (see whereas 
61, 66 and 69 in the preamble to the BRRD). 
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required in applying bail-in rules, especially when the threat of spillovers is relevant. 
In addition, if the combination of resolution tools now available actually manages to 
decrease the costs of dealing with bank crises, some public money would be freed up 
for the pursuit of other social objectives.   
A review of the main strands of economic and legal literature on the matter 
of granting public support to failing banks and the implications of the introduction of 
new rules for bank resolution lays out the necessary background arguments upon 
which the analysis of this PhD study will build. 
6. Public support to failing banks: an overview of the literature 
It is well established in the literature that State aid can bring about both 
beneficial and harmful effects. On the one hand, granting aid can help correct forms 
of market failure, be they the result of externalities, market power, or informational 
asymmetries, thus striving to achieve efficiency. As for the potential harm, on the 
other hand, aid can increase the risk of creating static and dynamic inefficiencies, 
insofar as it may encourage continued production by inefficient firms or alter firms’ 
expectation and their consequent behavior. Likewise, it could lessen the degree of 
competition in the targeted market structures and the opportunity cost of state funds 
must also be taken into account, since “a euro can only be spent once”.25 Beck et al. 
(2010) provide an extensive review of both positions, by focusing on the specific 
implications they raise for the financial sector.  
A growing strand of literature has been exploring the various economic trade-
offs that result from bank bailout decisions, with a specific focus on the moral hazard 
issue and risk-taking behavior resulting from expectations and actual receipt of 
financial support.26 Some works started to incorporate an important factor that could 
impact upon bank bailout choices, which is represented by the personal interest of 
 
25 Friederiszick H.W., “European State Aid Control: an economic framework”, in Handbook of 
Antitrust Economics, (Paolo Buccirossi, ed.), MIT Press 2007. 
26 Among many, see: Hellman T.F. et al., “Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential 
Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?”, 2000, American Economic Review, 90, 1, 147-165; 
Demirgüç-Kunt A. and  Detragiache E., “Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? 
An empirical investigation”, 2002, Journal of Monetary Economics, 40, 8, 1373-1406; Dam L. and 
Koetter M., “Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany”, 2012, Review of Financial 
Studies, 25, 8, 2343-2380; Brandao-Marques L. et al., “International evidence on government support 
and risk taking in the banking sector”, 2013, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1086, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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very same politicians involved in taking such decisions.27Especially in the aftermath 
of the recent crisis, several papers have focused on examining how financial industry 
legislation is affected by lobbying of special interest groups and voter interests.28 
Some authors argue that politicians sometimes engage in wasteful spending not out 
of negligence, but rather out of a desire to improve their chances of re-election: such 
decisions would stand as a signal of their commitment to supplying public goods, 
with the precise purpose of keeping both past and new potential voters satisfied. In 
addition, lobbying activity by financial institutions indeed affects the regulatory 
environment and might even have negative repercussions on financial stability.29 The 
strong political connotations of the choice to rescue failing banks with public money 
become evident when evaluating the latest bank recovery measures adopted in Italy 
in the latest years.30    
6.1 Trade-off between stability and competition 
The impact of State aid on competition in the banking system is more 
complicated and ambiguous to assess than it is for most other sectors of the economy. 
On the one hand, the failure of a single bank can actually be enough to bring about 
negative repercussions for its competitors through direct contagion channels. An 
indirect impact can also be generated through the effects on financial and collateral 
markets. Therefore, State aid for insolvent banks can have positive repercussions for 
their competitor peers insofar as it prompts contagion in reversing adverse price 
trends on financial and collateral markets.   
On the other hand, State aid can have negative consequences for competition, 
 
27 See Behn M. et al., “The Political Economy of Bank Bailouts”, 2016, SAFE Working Paper No. 
133. The authors examine how institutional design can affect the outcome of bank bailout decisions. 
Their findings show that banks bailed out by local politicians in Germany tend to undergo less 
restructuring and perform considerably worse than other peers backed by the savings bank association. 
In addition, the authors have found that larger distance between banks and decision makers acts to 
alleviate distortions in the decision-making process, which then has ramifications in designing bank 
regulation and supervision itself. 
28 Mian A. et al., “Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial 
Crises”, 2014, Americal Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, 6(2), 
1-28; Mian A. et al., “The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion”, 2013, 
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 8(4), 373-408. 
29 Dewatripont M. and Seabright P., “Wasteful” Public Spending and State Aid Control", 2005, Journal 
of the European Economic Association, 4, 2-3, 513-522.  
30 For instance, the decision on the liquidation of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza, which 
included recourse to public funds, made specific reference to the need to support the orderly exit of 
the institutions from the market to avoid generalised instability, while also needing to spare senior 
creditors and depositors. 
16 
 
in that it has the ability of distorting aggregate banking activity in inefficient ways 
and skewing the allocation of activity across banks, to the extent that some of them 
receive more aid than others do. The distortive effects can come about mainly in two 
ways: through the reduction of the private marginal costs of certain banking activities 
below their true social cost, and by encouraging excessive risk-taking, which is 
undesirable from a social point of view.   
However, international experience seems to suggest that generous 
recapitalisation of viable banks, together with the winding-down of non-viable ones, 
can be a good and even ‘profitable’ use of taxpayer money in terms of crisis 
resolution, so as to rapidly restore stability in the financial system. Dewatripont 
(2014) compares the European banking crisis with two other crises considered to have 
been dealt with successfully- the Swedish one of the 1990s and the recent US 
financial crisis- and two that have not- the US Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s 
and the Japanese crisis that began in the early 1990s. His results point to affirm that 
procrastination is costly, speedy recapitalisation with public money is crucial. This 
goes in support of the view that, in extraordinary circumstances of distress where 
systemic contagion is highly likely, the objective of stabilisation should be 
prioritised, instead of relying on a strict application of competition preservation rules. 
According to Beck et al. (2010), competition and financial stability are not 
incompatible, thus voiding any claim that weaker competition policy criteria should 
be applied to banks during a crisis.  
Even though no unilateral consensus has been achieved in the economic 
literature on the fact that a trade-off between financial stability and competition is 
indeed present in practice, both theoretical and empirical studies on the matter have 
highlighted the presence of a strong interaction between competition and the banking 
regulatory framework. However, many of the results available were obtained for 
'normal' times,31 while the global financial crisis has proven that there may be new 
mechanisms and channels at play through which market structure can affect system 
fragility.   
 
31 Empirical studies generally concern time spans preceding 2007, thus encompassing merely one part 
of a long-term economic cycle. 
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6.1.1 Charter value hypothesis  
What is commonly referred to in the literature as a 'charter' or 'franchise' value 
view of banking predicts that more concentrated and less competitive banking 
systems are more stable.32 The rationale for this is that profits- which can only be 
extracted in situations other than perfect competition- act as a buffer against fragility 
and provide incentives against excessive risk-taking.  
Bank owners have incentives to shift risks to depositors, since they would 
only participate in the upside part of this risk taking, under the protection of the 
limited liability. Banks have greater incentives to take on excessive risks, when 
competition to secure depositors is tougher and puts pressure on profits, thus causing 
greater fragility to arise. On the other hand, in those systems where entry is restricted 
and therefore competition remains limited, banks have better profit opportunities, 
greater availability of capital cushions, and, consequently, fewer incentives to keep 
an aggressive stance by taking excessive risks, with positive repercussions for 
financial stability. In addition, in more competitive environments, banks manage to 
extract lower informational rents from the relationship with their borrowers, thus 
having reduced incentives to properly screen borrowers, which again increases the 
risk of fragility. Thus, these models predict that deregulation bringing about more 
entry and competition33 would lead to a higher degree of systemic fragility.  
The payment system and the interbank market represent an additional channel 
through which competition can have a negative impact upon stability. Allen and Gale 
(2000) show that perfect competition can prevent banks from providing liquidity to 
other banks hit by a temporary liquidity shortage.34 In fact, since all banks are price-
takers in a competitive market, no single bank has an incentive to provide liquidity 
to a troubled peer, with the result that the bank in distress will eventually fail, having 
a negative ripple effect for the whole sector.  
A somewhat different argument follows the rationale according to which 
more concentrated banking systems have larger banks, which are in a position to 
 
32 See, inter alia, Keeley (1990) and Demsetz et al. (1996). 
33 As was the case in the U.S. in the 1970s and 80s. 
34 Allen F. and Gale D., “Financial Contagion”, 2000, The Journal of Political Economy, 108, 1, 1-33. 
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better diversify their portfolios.35 While the 'large-bank' argument does not rely 
directly on competition, it is a relevant side effect of market structure to take into 
consideration. However, more recent theoretical works have shown that such 
diversification can have negative systemic stability repercussions, if banks become 
increasingly interconnected and become more and more similar to each other, even 
though its initial effect would be beneficial in enhancing the stability of individual 
banks.36 Subsequently, this could also have further repercussions on the risk-taking 
attitude of banks and create a tendency towards herding behavior.  
One final argument is usually made with regards to the number of banks to be 
supervised by the authorities. If a more concentrated banking system indeed implies 
a smaller number of banks, this might reduce the supervisory burden and enhance the 
stability of the banking system overall.37 As in the case of bank size, this argument 
concerns the market structure in banking, not the degree of competition that this 
entails.   
6.1.2 Critique to charter value hypothesis  
The opposing viewpoint posits that a more concentrated banking structure 
brings about more bank fragility. Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) argue that the standard 
argument upholding that market power in the banking sector acts to boost profits- 
and hence bank stability- disregards the potential impact of that very market power 
on bank borrowers' behavior.38 The authors find that it is the borrowers who choose 
the riskiness of their investments undertaken with bank loans, rather than banks 
choosing the riskiness of their assets. Therefore, in addition to the asset allocation 
problem posed by the choice of borrowers, banks also face a contracting problem, as 
the interest rates they charge have an influence upon borrowers' behavior. They also 
note that concentrated banking systems enhance market power, which in turn allows 
 
35 Many models predict the formation of economies of scale in intermediation. Among them, some 
examples are the ones elaborated by Boyd and Prescott (1986), Allen (1990) and Wagner (2008), as 
also referenced by Beck et al. (2010). 
36 Wagner (2008), supra. 
37 Allen and Gale (2000) find that the United States, with their great number of banks active in the 
market, support this particular argument, since it has had a history of much greater financial instability 
than the UK or Canada, whose respective banking sectors are dominated by fewer larger banks instead. 
38 Boyd J.H. and De Nicolò G., "The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited”, 2005, 
Journal of Finance, 60, 3, 1329-1343. 
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banks to raise the interest rate they charge to firms.39  
Thus, in contrast to the charter-value hypothesis, the prediction made by Boyd 
and De Nicolò (2005) is that banks' actions will result in more risk-taking and 
ultimately greater fragility when banking systems are more concentrated and less 
competitive. Even if more competition induces banks to take greater risks, 
competition can still increase stability overall in the event that banks increased their 
equity capital as a compensation for the higher risk-taking, or that they took other 
kinds of risk-mitigating measures. 
Moreover, advocates of the 'competition-stability' view argue that, relative to 
diffuse banking systems, concentrated sectors generally have fewer operative banks, 
and policymakers are more concerned about bank failures when the only present 
banks are few. As a consequence, banks in concentrated systems will tend to receive 
larger subsidies through implicit 'too big to fail' or 'too important to fail' policies that 
amplify risk-taking incentives and, in turn, increase banking sector fragility.40 Having 
larger banks in a concentrated banking system could also increase the risk of 
contagion, resulting in the reinforcement of a positive link between concentration and 
systemic fragility, for which the latest financial crisis seems to provide quite a strong 
evidence.  
Proponents of this paradigm would also disagree with the proposition that a 
concentrated banking system in which only a few banks detain control over the whole 
market is easier to monitor than a less concentrated banking system with many 
operators. The countervailing argument that is usually advanced against this view is 
that bank size is positively correlated with complexity, so that large banks are in 
reality harder to monitor than small ones- this can be observed in the latest crisis. In 
addition, the most recent trend towards consolidation in the sector has also led to the 
creation of financial conglomerates that are able to offer a wide array of financial 
services, which were previously offered exclusively by specialised institutions, and 
this gives rise to an ulterior factor of complication in banking supervision.41  
 
39 The model they propose shows that higher interest rates might induce firms to assume greater risks, 
which, in turn, would increase the probability that banks’ loans become non-performing. Similarly, 
higher interest rates may attract riskier borrowers through an effect of adverse selection.  
40 See Mishkin (1999), Beck et. al (2010) and Huertas (2015) in this respect.  




Some tentative evidence was also found according to which banking 
competition does not hurt financial stability, that market structure indicators, such as 
bank concentration, are not good predictors of the intensity of bank competition, and 
that there is an important interaction between the regulatory framework and 
competition.42 Data on the situation of the European banking sector pre- and post-
crisis only seem to reinforce the difficulty to identify a strong univocal trend in the 
relationship between stability, competition and concentration- as is evident from 
Figure 1.2 below43- despite pointing to a move towards increased consolidation, thus 
calling for further studies on the matter.   
 
Figure 1.2 - Concentration ratios of EU banking sector (2001-2009) 
 
Source: ECB, Commission Services 
 
42 Keeley M.C., “Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking”, 1990, American Economic 
Review, 80, 5, 1183-1200; Beck T. et al., “Bank concentration, competition, and crises: First results”, 
2006, Journal of Banking and Finance, 30, 5, 1581-1603.  
43 The majority of Member States do not appear to have experienced significant changes in 
concentration between 2007 and 2009- whether such index is measured by the CR5 ratio or the HHI. 
On the contrary, the Irish market displayed a significant concentration increase during the same period, 
with a raise of 13 percentage points in market share for the top five institutions, going from 46% to 
59%, and the HHI index being almost doubled, compared to the pre-aid level. Spain, Germany, Finland 
or Slovakia experienced an accelerated concentration as well, though not with the same intensity 
observed in Ireland. Differently, Austria, Belgium, France and Poland experienced a de-concentration 
phase of their respective banking sectors during the crisis. As an example, the HHI of the Belgian 
banking sector decreased by more than 20% in the two years from 2007 to 2009, and its CR5 fell down 
around 6 percentage points.  
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As for the practice of the European Commission in assessing State aid 
schemes during the crisis, commentators tend to agree on the effectiveness of the 
measures taken in reigning in significant cross-country spillovers and returning aided 
banks to viability, in spite of the difficulties faced in assessing schemes and taking 
proper consideration of the specificities of different national banking sectors.44  
6.1.3 Empirical literature and the data  
As is the case for the theoretical one, the empirical literature studying the 
relationship between competition and stability has not yet reached a firm conclusion 
on this point either. However, there is some tentative evidence that bank competition 
does not hurt stability, that market structure indicators, such as bank concentration, 
are not good predictors of the intensity of bank competition, and that there is an 
important interaction between the regulatory framework and competition.45  
In addition, there is cross-country evidence that regulatory policies that are 
devised to restrict entry and banks’ other activities are negatively associated with 
bank stability. In particular, Beck et al. (2006) find that banking systems in which 
banks’ activities are more restricted and barriers to bank entry are in place are more 
likely to suffer systemic banking distress, whereas no significant association is found 
between capital regulations and the likelihood of suffering a crisis. Limiting 
contestability of the banking sector appears to weaken bank stability, rather than the 
opposite, thus contradicting the charter-value hypothesis already discussed herein. 
Data on the situation of the European banking sector pre- and post-crisis only seem 
to reinforce the difficulty to identify a univocal trend in the relationship between 
stability and competition, thus calling for further empirical studies on the matter.   
 
44 Koopman G.J., “Stability and Competition in EU Banking during the Financial Crisis: The Role of 
State Aid Control”, 2011, Competition Policy International Vol. 7 No.2; Collinet J.F., “State Aid in 
the Banking Sector: A Viable Solution to the ‘Too big To Fail’ Problem?”, 2014, Global Antitrust 
Review, 7, 137-162. 
45 Keeley (1990) provided evidence that increased competition after the relaxation of State branching 
restrictions imposed in the United States in the 1980s reduced banks' capital cushions and increased 
risk premiums- this further reflected in higher interest rates on certificates of deposit. Overall, this 
suggests that higher competition in the US eroded charter values and resulted in greater bank fragility 
in those years. There exists also an extensive strand of literature relating to the experience of the United 




Part of the reason why studies come to different conclusions is that they define 
and measure competition in different ways.46 Colvin (2009) argues that finding an 
appropriate empirical measure that manages to be simultaneously sensitive to 
theoretical concerns and the reality of the actual measures that can be obtained in 
practice is fraught with difficulty. Standard paradigms of competition appear to be 
inappropriate for an analysis of the banking sector due to the presence of strong 
informational asymmetries that are specific to financial markets. 
6.2 State aid practice during the crisis 
Most of the analyses made on the State aid schemes approved at the height of 
the latest crisis come from European Commission officials themselves, giving 
assurances on the effectiveness of the measures in reigning in significant cross-
country spillovers and returning aided banks to viability. The part of the issue that is 
usually brought forth in studies on this point is the difficulty that governments faced 
in designing appropriate measures, which, in turn, has made those very same 
measures difficult for the Commission to assess. Yet, this particular argument sounds 
unsatisfactory (Collinet, 2014).   
Koopman (2011) holds that the European Commission designed a dedicated 
set of rules that took account of the need to respond to a horizontal shock to the 
banking system requiring the disbursement of large amounts of aid in record time to 
prevent a major economic crisis, while also recognising the significant differences 
existing across the banks concerned, thus abiding by the principle of proportionality. 
The author also emphasises that there does not seem to be much evidence that State 
aid control would have had a negative effect on lending to the real economy by 
forcing to deleverage across the board. Given that only banks with problematic 
business models were involved in asset divestitures, there is also no indication that 
 
46 Degryse et al. (2009) provide an interesting discussion and comparison of a number of recent 
empirical papers investigating such competition-stability relationship. They document how a new 
branch of empirical industrial organisation literature has begun to circumvent the problems associated 
with competition indices such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman one, by measuring firms’ conduct more 
directly, without explicitly taking market structure into account. New competition measures used in 
the more recent banking literature include the use of the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic, which 
leads to define competition as the sum of elasticities of the total interest revenue of banks with respect 
to their factor input prices, and the relative profit differences measure introduced by Boone (2008), 
who models firms as being punished more harshly for inefficiency, the more competitive is the market 
in which they operate.   
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State aid control under the crisis framework has actually exerted a generalised 
downward pressure on lending patterns. 
As for more detailed considerations on the merits of the actual aid schemes approved, 
Faia and Weder di Mauro (2015) provide a limited analysis of some State aid cases 
adjudicated during the latest crisis that showed some use of bail-in procedures. Their 
study, however, has more of descriptive purpose rather than aiming to be a systematic 
assessment of both procedures adopted and results obtained.    
7. Revision of the State aid framework: the 2013 Banking Communication  
The Commission‘s new Banking Communication of 10 July 2013 is the latest 
amendment of the state aid framework for bank restructuring based on the previous 
six Crisis Communications.47 In itself, it replaces the Banking Communication, thus 
signaling a major change in the approach taken to bank restructuring. Indeed, it could 
be argued that its enhanced burden-sharing regime marks the distancing from the 
heavy reliance upon bailouts, impinging on already-deteriorated public finances, in 
favor of a shift towards more extensive use of bail-in tools.  
Five years after Lehman and with the developing improvement of financial 
markets, the goal of revising the previous guidelines on the matter was to bring them 
closer to general State aid control rules, particularly to make them stricter and more 
responsive to timing restrictions. More specifically, the idea was to introduce more 
conditionality for the acceptance of bailouts and recapitalisation plans financed with 
public money: this was achieved by setting a clear order of priority among banks’ 
claimholders in their contributions to burden-sharing, and by requiring the 
submission of a restructuring plan that must undergo approval before any public 
recapitalization can take place, so as to check ex ante the actual necessity and validity 
of the help requested. Yet, exceptions remain possible when financial stability is in 
danger, and when ‘fundamental creditor rights’ are violated. These exceptions may 
turn out to be very significant in fact, but the exact way in which these guidelines will 
be implemented remains largely untested until now. For instance, in case of a new 
systemic crisis, a bank recapitalisation may be needed in the span of a weekend, 
 
47 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to 




which may render the condition of submission of restructuring plans for prior 
validation impossible to satisfy.  
For what concerns recapitalisations and other impaired assets measures, these 
are deemed compatible only if the Member State involved demonstrates that all 
attempts to minimise the need for state aid have been undertaken, namely by:  
1. submitting, before the restructuring plan or as part of it, a capital raising plan, 
which must include issues of new rights, voluntary conversion of subordinated 
debt, asset sales, earnings retention, and other measures envisaged along these 
lines;  
2. changing the management and applying strict executive remuneration policies 
until the restructuring period is over;  
3. preventing the outflow of own funds, through a restriction on dividends, buy- 
backs of hybrid capital instruments, acquisitions, and so on; and  
4. ensuring an adequate burden-sharing: losses should be first absorbed by equity; 
hybrid capital and subordinated debt holders must contribute next to reducing the 
capital shortfall to the maximum extent possible, through the conversion or write- 
down of the principal of their instruments.  
Among State aids, recapitalisation and impaired assets measures in particular 
are irreversible and may entail serious fiscal implications on the health of public 
finances, thus warranting a structural evaluation by the Commission. For these 
reasons, under the new guidelines, Member States are under an obligation to submit 
a capital raising plan as well as a restructuring plan, before going forth with the 
completion of any aid granting. For what concerns guarantees and liquidation 
support, instead, these schemes are no longer available for banks having a capital 
shortfall. The necessity of the introduction of the new communication was justified 
by the fragile recovery of the Member States’ economies from the crisis, with 
continued stress on the sovereign debt market leading to financial market volatility, 
enabled by a generalised loss of confidence by investors, and persistent risks of 
contagion.  
Finally, one should also take into account the exceptional macroeconomic 
circumstances experienced in the euro area today- especially in the context the new 
economic downturn triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic and the measures taken by 
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national governments to curb its spread- as they imply that banks are in part also 
victims of their environment and not always the culprits in economic crises. Like in 
the first years of the latest crisis, while punishing outliers can be justified, it could be 
argued that it makes sense to be more lenient towards ‘average’ banks, which tend to 
suffer relatively more from severe macroeconomic downturns.48   
8. Interaction of State aid and resolution rules 
As the Banking Union has been established, one key element that goes to its 
support is represented by the shift from bailout to bail-in. It is inevitable that someone 
must pay for the losses when banks make mistakes and find themselves on the brink 
of failure. The options available to this end would be sovereigns, shareholders and 
creditors, or the financial sector as a whole. Now, sovereigns cannot be the first 
choice, if the intention is that of breaking the vicious circle that ties them to the 
banking sector and reinforcing the protection of taxpayers. Then, if one decides that 
the burden of losses must be borne by shareholders and creditors, or by the financial 
sector, the consequences will be the application of bail-in and the use of resolution 
(or DGS) funds respectively.  
Within this new scenario, State aid control will remain a central element of 
the Banking Union, as State aid rules will continue to be applied alongside the BRRD, 
in order to also ensure a level playing field between eurozone Member States and the 
other EU States that will not adhere to the Banking Union. Any kind of public 
financial support- uses of deposit guarantee schemes or resolution funds therein 
included- will be subject to State aid control and will need to comply with these rules, 
both within and outside resolution procedures. Moreover, any State aid measure or 
resolution scheme that calls for the use of the resolution fund will need prior approval 
from the Commission under State aid rules before it can be effectively granted or the 
scheme adopted.  
8.1 Exceptions to the ‘resolution rule’ 
Under the BRRD, due to the particular decision taken by the co-legislators, 
the granting of any State aid support is relegated to exceptional and extraordinary 
 
48 Dewatripont M., “European banking: Bailout, bail-in and state aid control”, 2014, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 34, C, 37-43. 
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circumstances, as it would imply that an institution is deemed to be failing or likely 
to fail, therefore triggering the resolution of the entity concerned. Thus, the granting 
of State aid to a bank would lead to its resolution, except for very specific 
circumstances and conditions. 
As a matter of fact, three narrow exceptions to this general ‘resolution rule’ 
have been included in the BRRD: State guarantees to emergency liquidity assistance 
from central banks, State guarantees of newly issued liabilities, and precautionary 
recapitalisations. The latter exception should be interpreted very narrowly, since the 
general rule for banks in distress is that either liquidation or resolution should be 
applied, meaning that such precautionary injections into the bank involved can only 
be used to cover capital shortfalls identified under the adverse scenario of a stress test 
or similar supervisory exercises.49 Where any of these exceptions are used, State aid 
rules are the only ones that apply. Therefore, under the BRRD, State aid can only be 
granted in resolution scenarios, with the only exceptions being the measures 
mentioned above. Public support is still available in principle, but only as a last resort. 
To this end, any use of resolution funds- including the Single Resolution Fund- must 
be in compliance with State aid rules.50  
8.2 The role of the European Commission 
As from 1 January 2016, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has taken over 
its responsibility for bank resolution within the Banking Union, but at the same time 
State aid control continues playing an integral role within the Union itself. More 
specifically, it is not for the Commission, but rather for the respective supervisor or 
resolution authority, to apply the existing EU law on the subject and start the 
resolution procedure for the bank in question. It is a responsibility of the Commission, 
instead, to ascertain that State aid used in resolution procedures does not unduly 
distort competition in the market. This means that the SRB has effectively become 
the ‘privileged speaker’ and collaborator of the Commission in many resolution 
cases. Consequently, the two will need to work closely together, since a state aid 
 
49 An in-depth analysis of the precautionary recapitalisation option and its implications for banks’ 
competition incentives and the competitive structure of banking markets is provided in Chapter 3 of 
this study. 
50 Article 19 SRMR establishes that the Commission will assess whether the use of the Single 
Resolution Fund is in line with State aid rules by issuing Decisions. 
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decision must be taken by the latter before any draft resolution scheme that includes 
the use of the Fund can be adopted by the SRB on any specific case.  
It is also important to recall that the Commission’s deliberations on the 
granting of public aid will always be based on the resolution scheme prepared by the 
SRB, which includes information on the exercise of bail-in powers. Therefore, its 
decisions, which will be taken by making all relevant State aid considerations, will 
not need to extend to the design of burden-sharing arrangements applicable to 
shareholders and creditors. Rather, the Commission will only have to assess whether 
the proposal made by the Board under resolution rules also abides by the requirement 
of sufficient burden-sharing under the State aid framework. While this may leave 
open some room for discussion between the competition and resolution authorities, 
there seems to be no inherent contradiction in the exercise of the two activities.  
Still, the preconditions and the scope of burden-sharing to be shouldered by 
bank creditors under State aid rules do not fully coincide with the ones prescribed for 
resolution procedures. Thus, there is a need to verify whether the two sets of rules are 
appropriately coordinated. In addition, questions have been raised as to whether the 
guidelines on State aid to the banking sector take sufficient account of systemic 
stability considerations when imposing the conversion or write-down of creditor 
claims.51 Indeed, there may not be absolute confidence in the fact that bail-in 
provisions will not hamper financial stability. To this end, it is also critical to prevent 
that even the fear of predictable bail-in operations induces bank investors to run. To 
be able to do so, it is of paramount importance that a sufficient long-term loss 
absorbency capacity be accumulated, so as to reassure short-term claimholders.  
9. Bail-in introduction and implications 
The academic debate on the implications of the introduction of bail-in within 
the new resolution framework is also developing. The first observation in this sense 
relates to the fact that a non-negligible risk of investor flight from the banking system 
exists in certain countries, which can potentially bring about repercussions for the 
Eurozone at large, resulting in a crisis that might eventually entail costs for the 
 




taxpayers that can be even higher than they would have been under the previous bail-
out regime. The stabilising effects that are attended with the systematic introduction 
of the new burden-sharing and bail-in requirements would not be as easily attainable 
as expected and the crucial distinction that must be made lies between idiosyncratic 
bank shocks and systemic ones (Bruzzone et al., 2014; Persaud, 2014; Avgouleas and 
Goodhart, 2015; Gardella, 2015). 
Some empirical studies are also starting to be carried out with the aim to 
provide quantitative estimates of the impact of the resolution tools that are now 
available after the introduction of the European framework for bank rescues on the 
costs that would need to be shouldered to solve a bank crisis. These works have been 
limited mainly to econometric simulation exercises, which, nonetheless, take quite 
well into account the tools introduced by the new norms. Schäfer et al. (2017) found 
that bailout expectations have been reduced since the introduction of the restructuring 
regime of the BRRD, mandating bail-in.52 The FSB (2020) found evidence that credit 
spreads of holding companies (holdcos) of significant institutions have increased 
relative to their operating subsidiaries (opcos), suggesting that resolution reforms 
have become increasingly credible, which is also reflected in holdcos being rated less 
highly than their principal opcos after the implementation of the reforms. 
As for the potential reduction in crisis costs brought about by the resolution 
framework, Benczur et al. (2016) model a micro-simulation of the impact of the 
combination of bail-in tool, resolution funds and Basel III capital requirements on 
bank loss mutualisation at EU level. According to their study the potential costs of a 
crisis similar to the latest one for public finances would decrease from approximately 
3.7% of EU GDP, without any of the tools now available to 1.4% with the application 
of bail-in, and to 0.5% when all three of the modelled elements are considered 
simultaneously. This could be considered as being a hefty cost reduction. 
According to these specific findings, bail-in would appear to be the one tool 
that contributes most to the reduction of the burden on public finances. This goes in 
support of the results obtained by Breuss et al. (2015), who find that bail-in is indeed 
effective in reducing the fall of GDP in the core countries of the eurozone, and thus 
brings about advantages from a macroeconomic perspective as well. Thus, 
 
52 A similar conclusion was also reached by Bellia and Maccaferri (2020).  
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preliminary empirical studies seem to point to the fact that bail-in provisions can 
potentially have a positive impact in trying to fight moral hazard, but Dewatripont 
(2014) argues that this must not mean that bank restructuring should be delayed, since 
this would end up raising the final cost of financial distress for taxpayers anyway, 
due to lower growth in GDP. 
As for the broader social implications of the new rules, Götz and Tröger 
(2016) and Hadjiemmanuil (2017) makes the case for the exercise of discretion in the 
application of bail-in to particular cases like the Italian one, where there is a sufficient 
volume of bail-inable junior debt, but its positioning with small retail investors- 
especially families- makes it socially costly to write-down those securities for the 
purposes of bank restructuring.53    
10. Why a State aid control regulatory system is still relevant  
At the time of the global financial crisis, the State aid control system then in 
place was not properly geared to deal with the financial system specifically,54 but the 
principles and mechanisms under which State aid granting is evaluated seem to have 
remained largely unvaried until today. However, given the new enriched regulatory 
framework that is now available for bank resolutions, the time is ripe to consider a 
re-evaluation of the State aid rules for the financial sector.  
Some suggest that the way forward would entail the abandonment of the 
current State aid control rules for failing financial institutions in favor of a system 
that relies entirely on the use of resolution tools- bail-in at the forefront- to deal with 
significant banks in distress.55 This argument is built on the fact that the introduction 
 
53 On this aspect, however, the EBA and ESMA have highlighted that “the presence of a large stock 
of retail holders does not in itself constitute an impediment to resolvability and does not per se justify 
an exemption under Article 44(3) of the BRRD or Article 18(3) of the Single Resolution Mechanism 
Regulation (SRMR)”. Therefore, where there is a material presence of retail investors such holdings 
must be given attention to in the resolution planning phase.  Further, “[a]n exemption [of such 
liabilities from the application of bail-in] would be justified, based on BRRD/SRMR provisions, if 
there are reasons to conclude that bailing in such liabilities would (i) not be possible within a 
reasonable timeframe, (ii) cause contagion, (iii) impair the continuity of the institution’s critical 
functions or (iv) cause a disproportionate destruction in value. All these circumstances have to be 
regarded as exceptional”. See the Statement of 30 May 2018 of the EBA and ESMA on the treatment 
of retail holdings of debt financial instruments subject to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(EBA/Op/2018/03).  
54 Collinet J.F., “State Aid in the Banking Sector: A Viable Solution to the ‘Too big To Fail’ 
Problem?”, 2014, Global Antitrust Review, 7, 137-162. 
55 Gordon J.N. and Ringe W.-G., “Bank Resolution in Europe: The Unfinished Agenda of Structural 
Reform”, 2015, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 
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of a resolution instrument such as the bail-in should make a State aid control 
regulatory system lose relevance, insofar as banks would be pushed to self-insure by 
way of emission of bail-inable securities that can be called on to face potential crises. 
This should exclude the scenario of State interventions backed by public funds being 
used to rescue failing banks.56 
However, recent examples of bank restructurings57 demonstrate that a full 
shift towards bail-in, not relying on State resources, is very difficult to achieve, at 
least in the immediate future, and it may even be never fully possible. As such, the 
latest cases involving Italian, Greek, Cypriot and Portuguese banks in particular offer 
interesting insights on the continued relevance of the regulatory regime on State aid 
control as a complement to the newest resolution rules.  
In addition, the unexpected economic downturn brought about by the 
governmental measures aimed at stemming the spread of the Covid-19 pandemic in 
Europe starting from the early months of 2020 has opened a scenario, according to 
which it is reasonable to assume that Member States would be ready to support banks 
in distress if a new crisis were to materialise in the short- to mid-term. 
10.1 Public support in the context of the Covid-related crisis 
On March 19 2020, the Commission adopted a new Temporary framework 
for State aid to support the European economy in the context of the coronavirus 
outbreak, based on Art. 107(3)(b) TFEU.58 In acknowledging that the EU economy 
is experiencing a serious disturbance, the Temporary Framework enables Member 
States to make full use of the flexibility foreseen under State aid rules to support the 
economy, while aiming to limit negative consequences to the level playing field 
within the internal single market. 
Point 7 of the Temporary Framework sets out that, if due to the Covid-19 
outbreak, banks come to need direct support in the form of liquidity, recapitalisation, 
 
282/2015; Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 507; Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 4/2015. 
56 Ringe W.-G., “Bail-in between Liquidity and Solvency”, 2017, University of Oxford Legal Research 
Paper Series, No. 33/2016.  
57 For instance, involving Italian banks Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Popolare di Vicenza and 
Veneto Banca, among others, analysed in depth in Chapter 5 of this work. 
58 Communication C(2020) 1863 of 19 March 2020 from the Commission establishing a Temporary 
Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak. 
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or impaired asset measures, the assessment of resolution and competition authorities 
will focus on addressing whether the measures meet the conditions of Article 32(4)(d) 
(i), (ii) or (iii) of the BRRD. At the same point, the Commission also clarifies that, in 
such an instance, the institutions concerned would not be deemed to be failing or 
likely to fail, implying that resolution would not be triggered. More importantly, 
insofar as such support measures would be needed to address problems linked to the 
Covid-19 outbreak, they would benefit from the burden-sharing exception of point 
45 of the 2013 Banking Communication, which allows to spare shareholders and 
subordinated creditors from contributing to avoid endangering financial stability. 
This opens a short- to mid-term scenario in which bank failures might still need to be 
dealt with (at least partly) through public funds, in order to sustain the recovery of 
the private sector.  
Yet, in addition to the difficulties stemming from the current economic 
downturn, national banking sectors still have to fully deal with some of the 
repercussions of the global financial crisis and past mismanagement- multiple 
financial institutions may be unable to comply with bail-in capital requirements 
within the imminent future and who actually holds bail-inable securities may imply 
significant social costs in the event of resolution. Indeed, the critical mis-selling and 
placement of bail-inable securities with “frail” investor categories (i.e. retail, such as 
families) must be addressed, as was made evident in recent resolution and rescue 
cases concerning Italian banks in distress, possibly through a restriction of the sale of 
bail-inable debt to retail investors.59   
State aid control must cope with such difficulties, which should have ideally 
been prevented ex ante, but must now be dealt with ex post through the application 
of individual bank restructuring schemes. If triggering bail-in entails important social 
costs, for instance due to the involvement of retail investors and it brings about 
instability caused by ever-present and significant bank cross-holdings in bail-inable 
securities, one might argue in favor of a State aid control regime that allows for rescue 
 
59 See: Götz M. and Tröger T.H., “Should the marketing of subordinated debt be restricted/different 
in one way or the other? What to do in case of mis-selling?”, 2016, SAFE White Paper No. 35; C. 
Hadjiemmanuil, “Limits on state-funded bailouts in the EU bank resolution regime”, 2017, EBI 
Working Paper Series 2017-No.2. The authors make a case for the exercise of discretion in the 
application of bail-in, taking into account those cases in which bail-inable securities are held by small 
retail investors, so as to minimise the social costs that a write-down of such securities would imply.  
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measures to still be applied with public funds in an expedited manner. 
Therefore, the application of the new integrated framework for bank 
resolution and State aid control suggests that the tension between the objectives of 
stability and competition is still very much a central factor in the rescue of institutions 
in distress, and it also affects banking markets, in terms of number, structure and 
ownership of market players after restructuring schemes are enacted.  
It seems unlikely that a resolution system that purely relies on bail-in would 
be in the cards, at least in the short- and medium-term, due to the looming threat of a 
new banking crisis within the economic crisis triggered by the development of the 
Covid-19 pandemic, especially if an institution’s distress were to be caused by 
generalised liquidity shortages or asset deterioration directly linked to the extension 
of Covid-related loans, due to the difficulties that banks would incur in accessing 
private capital sources when economic conditions are dire. 
11. Structure of the study  
The next chapters of this book delve into the details of the different resolution 
tools and other crisis management strategies made available by the current regulatory 
framework, in order to assess how are applied to deal with bank failures in practice, 
where some leeway for granting State funds has remained, and what are the potential 
implications in economic terms for the competitive conduct of banks in the market, 
with the final aim of putting forth some policy proposals to improve upon the 
credibility and sustainability of the framework. 
More specifically, Chapter 2 addresses how the objectives of financial 
stability and competition have been balanced by the European Commission in 
authorising State support measures to failing banks during the global financial crisis, 
as well as analyse the interconnections between the rules on bank resolution with 
those on State aid control. This provides the background upon which the research is 
built. Chapters 3 to 6, instead, lay out the core of the analysis of this PhD study, by 
addressing in turn different tools and schemes made available by the crisis 
management regulatory framework. 
Chapter 3 will focus specifically on precautionary recapitalisation, as an 
exception to resolution, and its implications for the competitive incentives and 
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conduct of banks, as well as its implications for the credibility of the resolution 
framework overall. Chapter 4 will identify the competition-related implications 
arising both in resolution planning and at the stage of resolution execution, by 
detailing the characteristics of the different resolution tools that authorities can 
deploy, including the use of resolution funds and deposit guarantee funds in 
resolution. Chapter 5 will provide a detailed and updated examination of the latest 
cases of management of bank failures, which entailed different degrees of State 
support and different restructuring strategies for institutions, to explore how crisis 
management measures may affect bank structures and, as a consequence, the 
competitive structure of the markets in which they operate. Chapter 6 will detail the 
competition-relevant considerations stemming from the use of backstops for capital 
and liquidity assistance to banks in distress, while Chapter 7 will draw some overall 













































As highlighted in Chapter 1, the latest financial crisis, together with the 
subsequent sovereign and banking crises, have pushed governments to support a 
number of banks in distress by way of extensive bailouts shouldered by taxpayers. 
European State aid control rules have been adapted along the years of the 
crisis and even later on, in order to cope with the rapidly evolving conditions of the 
European banking industry. The reform process developed during and after the 
financial crisis has tried to address major questions on what instruments can preserve 
stability best, while effectively avoiding competition distortions and tackling the 
problems posed by mismanaged banks. 
In order to address the central question of this study, the bank rescue packages 
approved by the European Commission during the global financial crisis provide a 
natural starting point to assess how financial stability considerations were squared 
with competition ones in practice. In particular, a critical issue to assess is whether 
the rules on State aid and those on bank recovery and resolution are made flexible to 
allow Member States to adopt policy measures in the interest of preserving stability.  
Studies tackling this issue rarely refer to the State aid control practice to assess 
whether it reflects the orientation of the legal rules in effect. Rather, scholars directly 
try to estimate the impact of banking competition or concentration on financial 
stability.60 Moreover, another aspect that is generally overlooked in the literature is 
 
60 This stream of literature is referred to as “empirical industrial organisation”. Compare, among many: 
Hellman T.F. et al., “Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital 
Requirements Enough?”, 2000, American Economic Review, 90, 1, 147-165; Demirgüç-Kunt A. and 
Detragiache E., “Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical 
investigation”, 2002, Journal of Monetary Economics, 40, 8, 1373-1406; Dam L. and Koetter M., 
“Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany”, 2012, Review of Financial Studies, 25, 
8, 2343-2380; Brandao-Marques L. et al., “International evidence on government support and risk 
taking in the banking sector”, 2013, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1086, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  
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the wording of the relevant legal sources with reference to whether one objective (and 
possibly which one) must be prioritised.  
In order to address this gap, an analysis of the European treaty provisions on 
State aid control will be carried out in this chapter. This will serve the purpose of 
identifying what is the legal relevance of addressing such a trade-off. In this sense, 
this study should hopefully set some of the basic building blocks for a State aid 
evaluation of bank rescue schemes in Europe.  
Indeed, until now relatively limited importance has been attached to ex post 
evidence on what has been achieved with public funds or on the impact of State aid 
on competition, when applying EU State aid rules.61 Nonetheless, it is essential for 
decision makers both at the national and EU level to consider the determinable results 
of State aid granted in the past, and the consequent lessons learnt. This will be helpful 
in improving the effectiveness of schemes financed with public funds and 
diminishing distortionary effects in the markets involved. It should also improve the 
efficiency of future schemes and, possibly, even future rules on State aid granting. 
This gains particular relevance in view of the introduction of the Temporary 
Framework for State aid to cope with the extraordinary crisis circumstances triggered 
by the Covid-pandemic. Indeed, if bank failures were to materialise as a result of the 
Covid-related crisis in the short- to mid-term, a scenario would arise in which public 
interventions would take foot anew to rescue financial institutions, without even 
imposing the application of burden-sharing measures (see Chapter 1). This will then 
raise questions regarding the safeguards and remedies which would be best suited to 
minimise distortions of competition. 
For these purposes, the aid granting practice should be examined from the 
latest financial crisis, during which State aid grants significantly spiked,62 to the 
present day. Such analysis will need to be backed by an assessment of the progressive 
 
61 European Commission, “Common methodology for State aid evaluation”, Commission Staff 
Working Document, 28 May 2014, SWD (2014) 179 final. A part of the issue that is usually brought 
forth is the difficulty faced by governments in designing appropriate measures, which, in turn, makes 
them difficult for the Commission to assess. Yet, this particular argument sounds unsatisfactory. On 
this last point see: Collinet J.F., “State Aid in the Banking Sector: A Viable Solution to the ‘Too big 
To Fail’ Problem?”, 2014, Global Antitrust Review. 
62 European Commission, “State Aid Scoreboard”, autumn update, COM (2010) 701. Support directed 
at banks in the timeframe from October 2008 to October 2010 corresponded to approximately 39% of 
EU GDP. This proved to be a very sharp reversal in the trend of state aid granting, which had 
experienced an extreme low just before the crisis outbreak (from 1% of GDP in 1992 to 0.5% in 2007).  
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adjustment of State aid rules to address banks’ distress. This will be instrumental to 
identifying why the State aid rules in place at the outset of the crisis were ill-suited 
to addressing the specificities of banks and an unprecedented systemic crisis. 
In addition, heterogeneity in aid schemes must be taken into account. Hence, 
this work shall provide a description of the categories of aid that are made available 
by European rules concerning support to failing financial institutions. In addition, the 
anticompetitive effects that may result from the application of different schemes will 
be accompanied by an assessment of which stabilisation benefits that may bring 
about.  
Having set the theoretical background, attention will be devoted to which 
remedial measures are imposed by the European Commission upon rescued 
institutions. Indeed, if one expects every aid scheme to bring about the same anti-
competitive effects on the market, there should be evidence of the same remedial 
measures being requested of aided banks. This amounts to trying to answer whether 
the Commission’s approach in this respect makes economic sense. The findings on 
this point should still complement the few existing studies, which appear to find that 
the Commission’s control of public assistance to EU banks between 2008 and 2010 
has had a positive impact on both financial stability and competition in the internal 
market.63 
Lastly, attention will be brought to the adaptations made to European State 
aid control rules and how they interact with the new prescriptions on bank resolution. 
The aim will be to assess whether financial stability considerations still maintain a 
primary role with respect to competition concerns when a bank fails. This should 
raise the question of whether distinctions should be made in the application of bank 
restructuring and rescue measures, depending on the differences in stability concerns 
arising from idiosyncratic and systemic crises.  
 
63 See European Commission, “The effects of temporary State aid rules adopted in the context of the 
financial and economic crisis”, Commission Staff Working Paper, 5 October 2011, SEC (2011) 1126 
final; Koopman G.-J., “Stability and Competition in EU banking during the financial crisis: the role 
of State aid control”, Fall 2011, Competition Policy International, Vol. 7 No.2. 
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2. Legal basis for state aid control in the financial sector and its adaptations 
2.1. Treaty provisions on State aid control 
State aid control is unique to Europe and it is designed to maintain an even 
playing field between large and small economies, thus ensuring an equal treatment 
across countries and firms within the European single market. Principles referring to 
the control of state aid are enshrined in the treaties: articles of the Treaty of Lisbon 
ranging from 107 to 109 lay down the dispositions for the assessment of aids and the 
potential applicability of exemptions.  
According to Article 107(1) TFEU, any aid that affects trade and distorts 
competition between Member States is unlawful, unless it falls within one of the 
exceptions provided in the second and third paragraphs of the same article. The ratio 
legis is straightforward on the basis of Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, which refers to the 
competition rules that are necessary for the establishment of the internal market.64 
Based on case law, distortions of competition are assumed to be present in most cases 
where selectivity in aid granting is shown.65 
When appraising aid directed at firms in the credit sector, the relevant 
category of grants that “may be” compatible with the internal market is that of 
remedies to “a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” (Art. 107(3) 
letter b). Most of the measures taken after 2007 as a response to the unprecedented 
crisis situation have been approved on this basis. 
2.2 State aid rules adaptation during the crisis 
In multiple instances the European Commission has confirmed to be aware of 
the peculiarity of the banking sector and the sensitivity of financial markets to one 
bank or another, which would warrant consideration when applying the rules on State 
aid.  Likewise, even before the 2008 crisis broke out, the Commission had affirmed 
that the rules on State aid have to be applied to the banking sector by taking into 
 
64 In particular, former Article 3(g) of the TEU highlighted the need for “a system ensuring the 
competition in the internal market is not distorted”. Thus, even though state intervention favors some 
firms over others, thereby possibly having distortive effects in the market, it may be allowed as long 
as such distortion is not “excessive”. 
65 On the existence of such a negative presumption, see: DG Comp Chief Economist Team, “The 
Economics of European State Aid Control”, 2005, LEAR Conference on Advances in the Economics 
of Competition Law, Rome. 
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account that an intervention can become necessary in order to avoid a systemic 
contagion and the emergence of panic in the financial markets.66 
The Commission had already developed its experience in dealing with 
restructuring aid to ailing companies. State aid rules for this purpose were governed 
by the Community guidelines on rescue and restructuring aid to companies in 
financial difficulties (Rescue and Restructuring aid guidelines, “R&R”).67 These rules 
had been applied to bank restructuring cases in normal times.68 However, they had 
remained untested for a situation of systemic crisis in the financial sector.69 
In the context of the crisis and in relation to the financial sector, the 
Commission reviewed its rules. Nevertheless, the underlying principles of the R&R 
guidelines were confirmed: (i) restoration of long-term viability without State 
support; (ii) minimisation of the aid and adequate burden-sharing; (iii) measures to 
limit competition distortions.  
The role of the financial system in providing funding to the whole economy 
and the possible systemic effects arising from the need for a number of European 
banks to restructure at the same time were also taken into account. In those 
circumstances, State intervention in banks’ rescue and restructuring was driven by 
the vital need to ensure financial stability and restore market confidence.70 
2.3 Crisis Communications 
The European Commission adapted the pre-existing R&R Guidelines to cope 
with a situation that required large amounts of support to be directed at banks in order 
to preserve the stability of the financial system. Six Crisis Communications71 were 
 
66 European Commission XXIV Report on Competition Policy of 1994. 
67 The Commission adopted its original Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and 
restructuring firms in difficulty in 1994 (1994/C368/02). Newer versions of the guidelines were 
introduced in 1999 (1999/C288/02) and 2004 (2004/C 244/02). 
68 See cases such as Crédit Lyonnais, C 26/95, 17 May 1995, Banco di Napoli, C 2495/98, 4 May 
1999,  Bankgesellschaft Berlin, C 28/2002, 14 June 2002. 
69 In spite of this, the Commission’s decision in the Crédit Lyonnais case (supra) already evoked the 
potential systemic considerations stemming from the distress of even a single institution, 
acknowledging that “[i]f factors beyond the control of the banks provoke a crisis of confidence in the 
system, the State may need to support credit institutions in order to avoid the damage which would be 
caused by a systemic crisis”.  
70 Bomhoff A., Jarosz-Friis A. and Pesaresi N., “Restructuring banks in crisis – overview of the 
applicable State aid rules”, 2009, Competition Policy Newsletter no. 3. 
71 Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial 
institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (‘2008 Banking Communication’) (OJ 
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adopted for this purpose, taking into account the specificities of the banking sector. 
Taken together, they establish a comprehensive framework for coordinated action in 
support of the financial sector, so as to ensure financial stability while minimising 
distortions of competition between banks and across Member States. 
The Crisis Communications, as well as the individual decisions on aid 
measures and schemes falling within their scope, were adopted on the basis of Article 
107(3)(b) of the Treaty, which exceptionally allows for aid to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State. Under the Crisis Communications, 
financial stability has been the overarching objective for the Commission, while also 
trying to ensure that distortions of competition between banks and across Member 
States were minimised. Financial stability considerations entail the need to prevent 
negative spillover effects that could flow from the failure of a single credit institution 
to the rest of the banking system. In addition, there is also a need to ensure that the 
banking system as a whole continues to provide adequate lending to the real 
economy.72  
Moreover, the choice of soft law in the form of communications to execute 
the Commission’s State aid responsibilities provides a politically palatable way to 
address government behaviour in what is a sensitive policy domain.73 In this way, the 
Commission has effectively self-constrained its actions, stating how it would act in 
particular circumstances. Such self-binding was (and should remain) credible on the 
grounds that failing to apply its own guidance would open the floor to legal challenge 
for violating the principle of legitimate expectations.74 
 
C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8); Communication on the recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current 
financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions 
of competition (‘Recapitalisation Communication’) (OJ C 10, 15.1.2009, p. 2); Communication from 
the Commission on the treatment of impaired assets in the Community financial sector (‘Impaired 
Assets Communication’) (OJ C 72, 26.3.2009, p. 1); Communication on the return to viability and the 
assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid 
rules (‘Restructuring Communication’) (OJ C 195, 19.8.2009, p. 9); Communication from the 
Commission on the application, from 1 January 2011, of State aid rules to support measures in favour 
of financial institutions in the context of the financial crisis (‘2010 Prolongation Communication’) (OJ 
C 329, 7.12.2010, p. 7) and Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 
2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of financial institutions in the context of the 
financial crisis (‘2011 Prolongation Communication’) (OJ C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 7). 
72 See recital 7 of the 2013 Banking Communication. 
73 Doleys T., “Managing State Aid in a Time of Crisis: Commission Crisis Communications and the 
Financial Sector Bailout”, 2012, Journal of European Integration, 34, 6, p. 549-565. 
74 Pursuant to established court practice, the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations applies to any individual in a situation in which an institution of the EU, by giving that 
person precise assurances, has led him to entertain well-founded expectations. On the judicial review 
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3. Expectations on the anti-competitive effects of different State aid measures  
It is also relevant to assess how different aid schemes were and still are 
addressed in practice, in accordance with the Commission’s Communications. 
Indeed, potential distortions of competition resulting from aid schemes must be 
addressed. More precisely, State intervention in the banking sector can possibly 
entail: (i) the creation of an uneven playing field (with respect to bank cost of capital 
and the perception of safety and soundness); (ii) moral hazard, in the form of future 
excessive risk taking by the management and owners of the aided (and possibly also 
non-aided) banks; (iii) the distortion of the dynamic incentives to compete for non-
aided firms; (iv) long-term effects in market structure; and (v) the protection of 
potentially non-viable institutions. 
However, no State aid scheme is precisely the same. More specifically, public 
aid can be granted to financial institutions under four main forms: (1) guarantees on 
deposits, bonds, or the whole of a bank’s liabilities; (2) recapitalisations; (3) “bad 
bank” solutions; and (4) nationalisations. Then, (5) other support measures can also 
amount to State aid. These will be addressed in the following paragraphs. 
3.1  Government guarantees 
Guarantees were the first kind of aid scheme to be deployed for banks, with 
the purpose of improving funding access and restoring the liquidity of the wholesale 
market. Newly-issued75 short- and medium-term debt instruments76 are also eligible 
for guarantees, with a view to bolstering banks’ solvency ratios and enabling them to 
continue lending to the real economy.  
 
of the 2013 Banking Communication relating to these aspects, see Tadej Kotnik and Others v. Državni 
zbor Republike Slovenije, C-526/14 of 19 July 2016 ECLI:EU:C:2016:570 (hereafter: Kotnik), Gerard 
Dowling and Others v. Minister for Finance, C-41/15 of 8 November 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:836 and  
Ledra Advertising Ltd and Others v. European Commission and European Central Bank, C-8/15 P of 
20 September 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:701. In those cases, the CJEU held that the principle of 
legitimate expectations would not have protected the shareholders and subordinated creditors affected 
by the burden-sharing measures, due to the lack of precise, unconditional and consistent assurances. 
In its judgment the CJEU also posited that in areas such as State aid to banks, where EU institutions 
enjoy discretion, there cannot be a legitimate expectation that an EU institution will exercise its 
discretion in the same way in the future (see Kotnik, paras. 63-66). 
75 Within six months, but this window-frame was extended as State aid rules were adjusted, see van 
Lambalgen (2018).  
76 With maturity from 3 months to three years. 
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A guarantee can be granted ad hoc or in the context of a scheme. Under the 
latter scenario, eligible banks can enter into an agreement with the State, which would 
guarantee their newly-issued debt instruments, or specific bonds and loans. Such 
targeted guarantees must be appropriately remunerated through the payment of a fee 
to the State. In general, guarantees are used to cover the bank’s short- and medium-
term refinancing needs, thus having a limited duration, so as to restrict their use to 
the achievement of this specific purpose.77  
3.1.1 Compatibility evaluation and remedies 
The Commission tends to authorise State guarantee measures as compatible 
with State aid rules, when the State remuneration is adequately embedded in the asset 
purchase price.78 In addition, behavioural measures are required of aid beneficiaries 
to avoid distortions of competition. However, only some of the devised schemes that 
were approved during the financial crisis included restrictions on balance sheet 
growth79 or made guarantees available only to solvent institutions. Some of them 
prescribed the application of restrictions on executive pay in aided institutions.80  
 
77 In most cases their duration is limited to six months. Sometimes, a provision is included for the 
Commission to evaluate a potential further extension to the scheme (up to a total of 36 months), 
depending on the needs of the specific institution concerned. 
78 Paragraph 21 of the Impaired Assets Communication stresses the fact that correct remuneration 
(guarantee fee) is an essential element of the burden-sharing requirement. In the case of Parex Banca 
(C 26/2009 of 15 September 2010), the Commission noted that “[t]he objective of requiring 
remuneration (including, where applicable, a claw-back) is two-fold: to ensure burden-sharing and 
to ensure a level playing field”, thus minimising distortions of competition (para. 124). In the case of 
Anglo Irish Bank/INBS (SA.32504, 29 June 2011), no fee was applied for a guarantee on the basis of 
the fact that (i) the merged entity would only carry out the activities necessary to work out the loan 
book and (ii) both AIB and INBS would disappear from the Irish lending and deposit markets (para. 
137). 
79 Cypriot guarantee scheme, SA.35499, 6 November 2012, para. 42; Danish guarantee scheme, NN 
51/2008, 10 October 2008, para.26; Finnish guarantee scheme, N 567/2008, 13 November 2008, 
para.14; Greek guarantee scheme, N 560/2008, 19 November 2008, paras. 19 and 29; Italian guarantee 
scheme, N 520a/2008, 13 November 2008, para. 14; Dutch guarantee scheme, N 524/2008, 30 October 
2008, paras. 14 and 41; Portuguese guarantee scheme, NN60/2008, 17 December 2008, para. 18; 
Swedish guarantee scheme, N 533/2008, 29 October 2008, para. 14; UK guarantee scheme, N 
507/2008, 13 October 2008, paras. 12 and 21. 
80 Cypriot guarantee scheme, SA.35499, 6 November 2012, para. 42; Finnish guarantee scheme, N 
567/2008, 13 November 2008, para.16; Hungarian guarantee scheme, N664/2008, 12 February 2009, 
para. 27; Irish guarantee scheme, NN 48/2008, 13 October 2008, para. 27; Latvian guarantee scheme, 
N 638/2008, 22 December 2008, para. 18; Dutch guarantee scheme, N 524/2008, 30 October 2008, 
paras. 12 and 44; Polish guarantee scheme, N 208/2009, 25 September 2009, paras. 19 and 23; 
Slovenian guarantee scheme, ; Swedish guarantee scheme, N 531/2008, 12 December, para. 14; 




States can also decide to offer equity support to strengthen the capital base of 
financial institutions, by way of recapitalisations. A recapitalisation is completed 
with a capital injection into the failing bank, which is carried out either ad hoc or in 
the context of a scheme. Through such a programme, governments supply funds to 
banks in exchange for direct equity, preferred stock, subordinated debt or other hybrid 
capital instruments. This capital injection ensures that the beneficiary bank’s 
compliance with regulatory capital requirements is restored. Indeed, in a situation of 
serious distress, banks may need fresh capital, which can be difficult, if not 
impossible to obtain due adverse to market conditions. With an eye to this issue, bank 
recapitalisations can improve the functioning and stability of the banking system and 
keep open financing flows to the economy.  
The Commission takes into account the irreversible nature of capital 
injections, as it requires recapitalisation schemes to be accompanied by clear ex-ante 
behavioural safeguards on the side of the aided institutions. These must be monitored 
and enforced by Member States in order to avoid undue distortions of competition.81 
Such safeguards usually include: (i) balance sheet growth restrictions; (ii) acquisition 
bans; (iv) bans on advertising State support; (v) remuneration restrictions; and (vi) 
coupon or dividend bans.  
3.2.1 State remuneration 
Generally, the Commission has been reluctant to allow Member States to buy 
financial assets from banks, due both to valuation difficulties caused by the credit 
crisis and to a higher perceived risk of granting undue advantages to rescued banks.82 
However, the main difficulty with recapitalisation schemes concerns the calculation 
of the proper remuneration rate for the State granting the aid.83 This difficulty stems 
 
81 For instance, competitors of Fortis Bank and KBC in Belgium and of ABN AMRO in the 
Netherlands complained that those banks introduced more aggressive offers after having benefited 
from capital injections by the Belgian, French, Dutch, and Luxembourg authorities.  
82 In the case of Spain, the Commission’s reluctance was overcome by limiting such purchases to 
highly rated covered bonds and asset backed securities by means of an auction process. See 
Commission press release IP/08/1630 of November 4, 2008: “State aid: Commission approves Spanish 
fund for acquisition of financial assets from financial institutions”.  
83 On the calibration of State remuneration, the Recapitalisation Communication defers to the 
recommendations of the ECB recommendations of 20 November 2008: the rate of return for 
fundamentally sound banks should be based on a price corridor, with the rate of return on subordinated 
debt as a lower bound and the rate of return on ordinary shares as an upper bound. Distressed banks 
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from the diversity of objectives that can pursued through recapitalisation schemes. 
Indeed, such schemes may be aimed at: (i) avoiding the insolvency of individual 
credit institutions; (ii) strengthening banks’ capital ratios to facilitate the recovery of 
inter-bank lending; and/or (iii) preventing a reduction in credit supply to the real 
economy.  
3.2.2 Remedies 
In turn, they may also raise different competition and systemic concerns, 
insofar as they may confer undue competitive advantages to the aid recipients or 
complicate the return to normal market functioning. In order to account for this 
variety of objectives and concerns, the Recapitalisation Communication points to two 
key elements which should be factored into the remuneration rate of capital 
injections, namely: (i) closeness to market prices; and (ii) exit incentives, i.e., 
incentives to redeem the State as soon as possible.84 In turn, it introduces a distinction 
between fundamentally sound, well-performing banks, on the one hand, and 
distressed, less performing banks, on the other hand. The lower risk profile of the 
former category of institutions would justify a lower remuneration rate than for those 
belonging to the latter category.  
The Commission takes into account the irreversible nature of capital 
injections, as it requires recapitalisation schemes to be accompanied by clear ex-ante 
behavioural safeguards on the side of the aided institutions, as indicated by the 
Restructuring Communication.85 These must be monitored and enforced by Member 
States in order to avoid undue distortions of competition.86 Such safeguards usually 
 
would require a higher remuneration, instead. However, remuneration is no longer an issue when State 
capital injections are combined, on equal terms, with significant participations (30% or more) by 
private investors. In those circumstances, the Commission accepts the remuneration set in the deal as 
reflecting the market price (Recapitalisation Communication, §21). The Lithuanian bank support 
scheme (cases N 200/2009 and N 47/2010, 5 August 2010) deviated from the ECB recommendations, 
by basing the remuneration on sovereign CDS spread rather than the bank one. The Commission 
approved it, since the remuneration exceeded the one that would have arisen from ECB 
recommendations (para. 104).  
84 Recapitalisation Communication, §19. It is in a similar vein that Art. 31 CRR should also be read. 
More specifically, the provision allows for some redeemable capital instruments to be included in 
CET1 capital instruments, with the aim of striking a balance between prudential requirements on 
capital adequacy and the need to ensure the temporary nature of public support granted.  
85 Commission communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures 
in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules (OJ C 195, 19.8.2009). 
86 For instance, competitors of Fortis Bank and KBC in Belgium and of ABN AMRO in the 
Netherlands complained that those banks introduced more aggressive offers after having benefited 
from capital injections by the Belgian, French, Dutch, and Luxembourg authorities.  
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include: (i) balance sheet growth restrictions; (ii) acquisition bans or claw-back 
mechanisms, e.g. in the form of levies on the aid recipients; (iv) bans on advertising 
State support; (v) remuneration restrictions; and (vi) coupon or dividend bans. Banks 
are usually also prohibited from offering their customers terms (rates) that cannot be 
matched by their un-aided competitors. The latter prohibition may take the form of 
price-leadership clauses or limitations on the bank’s position in league tables.87 
Additional measures to limit distortions of competition are usually also 
required in the form of structural remedies. These can amount to divestments of 
stand-alone viable businesses, or carve-outs of business entities potentially capable 
of entering as new market players, which is especially relevant when the reference 
markets are relatively concentrated.  
3.3 “Bad bank” solutions 
A specific form of loss absorption for institutions in distress can be achieved 
through the creation of so-called “bad banks”. With the establishment of such entities, 
banks are granted a delay on reimbursements due to their creditors until the financial 
system stabilises once more and assets recover value. Bad banks can be privately held 
 
87 Price leadership bans were generally imposed when the aid beneficiary was already in a “privileged” 
position in the market, creating the risk that the aid would enable them to adopt aggressive commercial 
practices. On the legal literature on State aid to banks, including also descriptions of price leadership 
bans, see Laprévote et al. (2017). Lyons & Zhu (2012) note that price leadership bans limit the 
beneficiary bank’s ability to compete and, as a consequence, should also dilute rivals’ incentives to 
compete. Dijkstra and Schinkel (2019) found evidence that the price-leadership bans imposed upon 
rescued Dutch banks shifted the Dutch mortgage market from a competitive to a collusive price 
leadership equilibrium. Price leadership bans were imposed with respect to: Fortis, (case NN 42/2008, 
3 December 2008), Commerzbank (case N 244/2009, 7 May 2009), Northern Rock (case C 14/2008, 
28 October 2009), ING (case C 10/2009, 18 November 2009), KBC (case C 18/2009, 18 November 
2009), Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (case C 17/2009, 30 June 2009), Aegon (case N 372/2009, 
17 August 2010), Sparkasse KölnBonn (case  C 32/2009, 4 November 2009), ABN AMRO (case C 
11/2009, 5 April 2011), OVAG (case SA.31883, 19 September 2012), Hypo Tirol (case SA.34716, 4 
October 2012), DMA (with respect to Dexia, in the decision of 28 December 2012), FIH (case 
SA.34445, 11 March 2014). In the case of KBC, the Commission also made another relevant point, 
observing that a price leadership ban may not be necessary in markets where significant pro-
competitive structural commitments have already been made, proving the interrelation of structural 
and behavioural commitments in stemming competition concerns. However, as also observed in the 
literature by Lyons & Zhu (2012), no clear pattern was followed by the Commission in imposing 
behavioural measures on pricing. Indeed, among the cases mentioned, different bans implied, 
alternatively, that (i) the bank could not offer more favourable rates than its cheapest or best priced 
competitors, (ii) could not offer more favourable rates than its largest competitors, (iii) or could not 
offer more favourable rates than the best priced competitor among the top 10 market players. From an 
analysis of more recent bank rescue cases, it seems that after the introduction of the 2013 Banking 
Communication (Section 5), the  Commission is no longer requiring price leadership bans, possibly 
on the crest of criticism of such measures for the distortionary potential.  
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by the bank in trouble88, the banking sector at large, or the State. Nevertheless, they 
are to all effects completely separate legal entities.  
Relieving financial institutions of their impaired assets can contribute to a 
strengthening of their balance sheets, a renewal of access to liquidity and a reduction 
in leverage. The downside risk that ex post losses on the impaired assets will turn out 
to exceed ex ante expected losses is borne by the bad bank/SPV, i.e. possibly from 
the State. Hence, such measures allow the bank to remove uncertainty about possible 
future losses on a given portfolio of impaired assets and further rating migrations. 
This in turn frees up capital, as it no longer needs to be held to the same extent in 
order to cover possible unexpected losses. However, bad bank schemes raise 
fundamental competition policy problems also as regards the determination of the 
new book value of the transferred assets.  
3.3.1 Compatibility evaluation 
As for the compliance of asset relief measures with State aid rules, the 
Commission assesses such schemes under the Impaired Assets Communication, 
which lays down the methodologies for the valuation of the impaired assets, as well 
as the necessary State remuneration for the aid provided, and the reference criteria to 
evaluate the aid granted. Among all criteria set for State aid rules compliance, the 
Commission assesses how the measures implemented abide by requirements on ex 
ante transparency and disclosure of asset impairments.89 The adequacy of the burden-
sharing of the costs related to the transfer of assets between the government and the 
bank’s shareholders and creditors is also verified as part of the assessment. The 
Commission tends to consider the measures involving State guarantees and asset 
transfers as compatible with the internal market when the State remuneration is 
 
88 As in the German bad bank scheme, in accordance with the “Bad Bank Act” that came into force on 
23 July 2009 (Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Finanzmarktstabilisierung). In particular, the Act set 
out three distinct models for asset relief: a special purpose vehicle (SPV), a federal law resolution 
agencies model and a state law resolution agencies model. 
89 Transparency is intended as vis-à-vis the Commission, as well as the national authorities and 
independent experts involved. In the case of Northern Rock (case C 14/2008, 28 October 2009), the 
Commission noted how this served the twofold purpose of identifying the amount of aid embedded in 
the asset relief measure and evaluating whether the aid addresses a temporary problem or the 
beneficiary bank is technically insolvent (para. 107). In addition, in the decision on Banka 
Celje/Abanka (case SA.38522, 16 December 2014), the Commission looked positively at the fact that 
independent consultants had been involved in the review the quality of assets within the 2013 Asset 
Quality Review exercise conducted at national level, and that the asset valuation had been performed 
by the Bank of Slovenia (para. 115). 
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embedded in the asset purchase price. In line with the Commission’s decision-making 
practice on asset relief measures, the assessment of the necessary remuneration for 
capital relief is based on a transfer at the real economic value (REV) of the portfolio 
at stake, even if lower than the actual transfer value. If the transfer price of the assets 
is equal or lower than the market value at the time of the transfer, the creation of an 
asset management company for the purposes of asset disposal does not imply State 
aid. Differently, when the transfer price exceeds the market price, the impaired asset 
measure involves State aid, and it can be declared compatible if the transfer price of 
the assets is not higher than their real (or underlying long-term) economic value.90  
The REV of a portfolio can be estimated as the sum of the discounted 
expected cash flows accruing from holding the portfolio until maturity. In other 
terms, it corresponds to the net present value (NPV) of the stream of expected cash 
flows, reflecting the losses that can reasonably be expected to materialise over the 
remaining life of the assets, without considering market failures related to confidence 
crises resulting in liquidity shortages, excessive risk aversion or excessive product 
complexity. The appropriate discount rate (and risk premium) is then determined by 
relying on an estimation of cash flow volatility.91  
3.4  Nationalisations 
In the case of nationalisations, instead, the State takes over all (or a significant 
part) of the assets of a bank in distress. In most cases, the aim pursued through such 
programmes is to recover banks’ health, so as to hopefully return it to the private 
sector at a later stage. 
 
90 The burden-sharing principle requires that losses on impaired assets (i.e. the difference between the 
nominal value and the real economic value) are borne by the bank, rather than by the State. This is 
achieved through a write-down of the assets from their nominal value to their real economic value. 
See, as an example, impaired asset measures to the benefit of ING (case C 10/2009, 31 March 2009, 
para. 72) and Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (case C 17/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 75). Where 
impaired asset measures entail the use of asset guarantees, burden-sharing can be achieved through 
the retention of a first loss that would be commensurable to a write-down. This was highlighted, again, 
with respect to Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (case C 17/2009, 30 June 2009, paras. 75-76). 
91 Conceptually, the REV can be estimated by averaging the NPV over a long list of possible scenarios 
(for example through a Monte Carlo simulation). The different outcomes of the scenario analysis 
constitute a distribution of possible realisations that allows an assessment of the riskiness of the 
underlying portfolio (the uncertainty around the expected loss and the tail risk, i.e. the probability of 
ending up with very large losses).  
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However, a nationalisation in itself is not a form of State aid. Rather, the 
capital injected through into the troubled bank through nationalization measures can 
give rise to State aid concerns. Insofar as the capital injections can be assimilated to 
recapitalisations, the crucial requirements which banks are expected to abide by are 
those on adequate burden-sharing and State remuneration.  
3.5 Other measures that may amount to State aid 
3.5.1 Bond loan schemes 
Bond loan schemes are one form of measure available to bolster banks’ 
liquidity position.92 Banks usually obtain funds on the money market, where the main 
participants are other banks and the European Central Bank (ECB). However, if 
banks lack assets qualifying as eligible collateral, they may experience problems in 
obtaining funds on the money market. Such liquidity issues can be addressed through 
bond loan schemes, which entail a loan by the State of government bonds that can be 
used as collateral in interbank and refinancing transactions of the ECB, to enable the 
aid beneficiaries to tap into the money market for liquidity. In this respect, the 
Commission explained that the economic effect of such schemes is similar to that of 
guarantees, thus calling for the application of a fee calculated in the same manner as 
guarantee fees.93 
3.5.2 Emergency liquidity assistance 
Central banks can provide emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to failing 
banks, acting as a lender of last resort (LOLR). Within the Eurozone, the decision to 
grant ELA is at the discretion of national central banks, but the ECB has veto power 
on such decisions. This raises the question whether ELA can be considered as a 
national measure and whether it constitutes State aid. The Commission has held that 
liquidity assistance does not constitute State aid, if the following cumulative 
conditions94 are met:  
 
92 These were introduced by Greece (bond loan scheme), Cyprus (special government bonds scheme) 
and Poland (support measures related also to treasury bonds).  
93 See case N 560/2008 for the Greek bond loan scheme. 




i) the financial institution is solvent at the moment of the liquidity provision 
and the latter is not part of a larger aid package; 
ii) the facility is fully secured by collateral to which haircuts are applied, in 
function of its quality and market value; 
iii) the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary; and  
iv) the measure is taken at the central bank's own initiative, and in particular is 
not backed by any counter-guarantee of the State.  
ELA is discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of this work. 
3.5.3 Deposit guarantee schemes  
In several cases concerning State aid to banks, Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
(DGSs) are also used to rescue and restructure ailing credit institutions. Since DGSs 
are designed for the protection of retail depositors and are limited to a fixed maximum 
threshold amount, they do not generate any State aid issue. However, when a deposit 
protection fund is used to bail out a bank, EU State aid control rules actually apply.95  
In addition, DGSs are often financed through contributions of the banking 
industry. This raises a question of whether DGS-related support measures involve 
State resources. The determinant factor to discern this is whether the funds employed 
for the aid measure are under public control.96 This is the case, for instance, when the 
contributions are compulsory under State legislation and are managed in accordance 
with it.97 In that regard, the Commission has held that “the mere fact that resources 
are financed in part by private contributions is not sufficient to rule out the public 
 
95 This concerned the cases of Banesto (case M 455/1994) and Banco di Sicilia (case C 16/1998), for 
instance. More recently, See also Tercas (case SA.39451, 23 December 2015, paras. 41 and 112). The 
General Court overturned the decision of the Commission in the Tercas case, as (i) the aid granted to 
Tercas had a purpose other than the repayment of the depositors of a bank placed under compulsory 
liquidation procedure and did not fulfill a public law mandate, but rather the intervention was in the 
interest of the DGS members; (ii) the DGS was a private law consortium whose corporate bodies were 
appointed by the general meetings of its members, thus having no structural link with public 
authorities; and (iii) the Bank of Italy did not have power to require the DGS to grant financial support 
to ailing banks and there was no definite proof that its representatives influenced the DGS’s decision 
to intervene. Other cases in which DGS funds were involved in bank restructurings in the recent past 
include NordLB (case SA.49094, 5 December 2019), as well as Italian Carige Banca and Banca 
Popolare di Bari (cases discussed in detail in Chapter 5). 
96 Compare AB Ukio Bankas, case SA.36248, 14 August 2013, para. 55; Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank, 
case SA.40441, 16 December 2015, para. 82. See also Asimakopoulos (2019) in relation to the Tercas 
case. 
97 Compare case N 407/2010, 30 September 2010, para. 28; case SA.36248, 14 August 2013, para. 54; 
case NN61/2009, 29 June 2010, para. 97. 
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character of those resources since the relevant factor is not the direct origin of the 
resources but the degree of intervention of the public authority within the definition 
of the measure and its method of financing”.98 
4. How did the Commission strike the balance between stability and competition 
during the financial crisis? 
Guarantees, recapitalisations and impaired asset measures deployed during 
the crisis years aimed to (i) restore the viability of beneficiary banks; (ii) underpin 
the supply of credit to the real economy; and (iii) reduce counterparty risk, thus 
preserving financial intermediation activities impacting upon the real economy. More 
particularly, the objective was to remove uncertainties around banks’ assets 
exposures, while improving banks’ solvency position and access to market funding, 
and to avoid negative feedback loops, whilst increasing bank lending to the real 
economy.  
As a matter of fact, despite capital injections, uncertainties regarding the 
exposure of banks continued to undermine confidence in the banking sector and 
weakened the effect of the government support measures. Then, the complexity of 
several bank structured securities and the asymmetric information problems that 
came with it, together with widespread financial panic and the drying up of funding 
channels, led to excessively low market values for bank assets, overshooting expected 
losses.99  
Another market failure that aid measures aimed to tackle was the possible 
feedback loop between the real economy and the financial sector, giving rise to 
contagion and second-round effects. Given banks’ approach of targeting relatively 
stable capital and leverage ratios, when losses occur, available capital decreases and 
leverage increases. In the absence of private capital providers, banks will tend to sell 
assets or stop renewing or rolling over loans, in order to restore their original leverage 
levels. This puts downward pressure on the asset prices, prompting a further round of 
 
98 Banca Romagna Cooperativa, case SA.41924, 2 July 2015, para. 36. 
99 Krishnamurthy A., “How Debt Markets Have Malfunctioned in the Crisis”, 2010, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 24(1), p.  3 – 28.  
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losses, which may trigger yet another round of asset sales. These negative 
externalities hamper the supply of credit to the real economy.100  
4.1 Assessment of aid compatibility  
In accordance with the Restructuring Communication, in order to be 
compatible with the internal market under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, the restructuring 
of a financial institution must: lead to the restoration of the long-term viability of the 
bank; include a sufficient own contribution (burden-sharing) by the aid beneficiary 
itself; and contain sufficient measures that limit any distortion of competition. To this 
end, the Commission conditioned the authorisation of rescue schemes and individual 
measures to a range of behavioural and structural conditions. Among these were: 
divestitures of non-core business activities and other downsizing; commitments to 
prevent distortive behaviour by the rescued bank; and replacement of senior 
management, sometimes combined with the setting of salary caps. When burden-
sharing could not be ensured ex ante institutions were bound to contribute at a later 
stage with the introduction of claw-back clauses and the completion of in-depth 
restructuring.101 
In general, these conditions impacted different actors including shareholders, 
other investors, managers and the beneficiary institution itself. The fact that the EU 
State aid control system has provided for restructuring measures, also produced the 
side effect of avoiding moral hazard, in addition to protecting competition. This 
additional benefit entails that the incentives of bankers to take excessive risk in the 
expectation of a bailout should have been limited.102   
 
100 Adrian T. and Shin H., “Liquidity and Leverage”, 2010, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19(3), 
p. 418–37.  
101 For example, see the decision on asset guarantees to the benefit of BayernLB (case SA.28487, 5 
February 2013), where the Commission required a claw-back to reimburse the amount above the REV 
covered by the guarantee (para. 147), and allowed the claw-back to be completed over a timespan of 
six years (paras. 148-150). As for the imposition of far-reaching restructuring, instead, an example is 
offered in relation to UNNIM Banc, to which the Spanish State had granted an asset protection scheme 
(case SA.33733, 25 July 2012). In that instance, the Commission deemed that a claw-back clause 
would have been incompatible with the sale of the bank to a third party, since the bidders in the tender 
offer would have been compensated in advance the potential cost of the claw-back, by incorporating 
demands on additional support measures in their offers (para. 132). Therefore, in-depth and far-
reaching restructuring was required instead to approve the measure as compatible with the burden-
sharing principle (para. 133).  
102 Vives X., Competition and Stability in Banking: the Role of Regulation and Competition Policy, 
2016, Princeton University Press. 
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The rationale of these counter-measures requested of aided banks was to reach 
a tentative approximation of the “normal” market conditions that would have 
occurred in the absence of State aid. As a general objective, the rules on banks’ 
restructuring aimed to balance short-term financial stability and long-term concerns 
for the preservation of normal market functioning, a single market in financial 
services and undistorted competition.  
This balance also reflected the development and evolution of the crisis. 
Indeed, at the beginning of the financial turmoil, safeguarding financial stability was 
the overarching objective. Therefore, a wide range of rescue measures, 
comprehensive of loans, guarantees and recapitalisations, were temporarily allowed. 
However, the objective of restoring financial stability in effect ruled out the 
possibility for the Commission to prohibit the proposed rescue measures. As a matter 
of fact, with the crisis framework the Commission departed from the “one time, last 
time-principle” for the granting of rescue aid.103   
4.2 Different forms of burden-sharing 
Conditions for access to aid measures were laid down in order to ensure a 
coordinated approach and a level playing field, but this was only partially achieved. 
Indeed, the Commission has shown some differentiation among aid schemes in 
requiring slightly different remedial measures depending on the type of aid 
deployed.104 However, eligibility requirements for access to aid were mostly left to 
the discretion of the single Member States. The underlying intention was to 
accommodate and reflect country- or institution- specific circumstances.105 
More specifically, burden-sharing by shareholders, as well as hybrid and 
subordinated debt holders took different forms. As for shareholders, these 
 
103 Point 7 of the Restructuring Communication stipulates that provision of additional aid during the 
restructuring period should remain a possibility if justified by reasons of financial stability. 
104 Capital injections were accompanied by stronger behavioural commitments by aid beneficiaries, in 
view of their irreversibility. The approval of guarantees and asset relief schemes, instead, was more 
reliant on the application of a proper State remuneration. 
105 Gerard D.M.B., “Managing the Financial Crisis in Europe: The Role of EU State Aid Law 
Enforcement “, in M. Merola M., Derenne J. and Rivas J. (eds.), Competition Law at Times of 
Economic Crisis - In Need for Adjustment?, 2013, Bruylant, Brussels. 
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encompassed: (i) dilutions;106 (ii) write-downs107; (iii) capital raising;108 (iv) being 
left at the bad bank, in case of entity separations;109 (v) nationalisations;110 or even 
(vi) dividend bans.111 As for hybrid and subordinated debt holders, instead, burden-
sharing was completed112 by means of: (i) liability management exercises (LMEs)113; 
(ii) being left at the bad bank, in case of entity separations114; or (iii) coupon bans.115 
4.3 Discretion in the choice of remedial measures  
The Commission also endeavoured to leave a margin of discretion to Member 
States in devising remedial measures to avoid or correct distortions of competition 
arising from aid granted. Remedial measures ranged from structural measures (e.g. 
 
106 The most common burden-sharing mechanism, which ‘penalises’ shareholders by heavily reducing 
their stakes (possibly until complete wipe-out). See some examples in: Dexia (case C 9/2009, 26 
February 2010, para. 200); Aegon, N 372/2009, 17 August 2010, para. 110); SNS REAAL (case N 
371/2009, 28 January 2010, para. 77); Catalunya Banca (case SA.33103, 28 November 2012, para. 
82); Allied Irish Banks/EBS (case SA.29786, 7 May 2014, para. 121); Bank of Ireland (case N 
546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 216); Royal Bank of Scotland (case N 422/2009, 14 December 2009, 
para. 216).  
107 See Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg, case N 344/2009, 9 July 2009, para. 72. 
108 Capital raising can be a form of burden-sharing insofar since it entails additional capital 
contributions from shareholders. See, as examples, the cases of Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (case 
C 17/2009, 30 June 2009, para. 97), NordLB (case SA.34381, 25 July 2012, para. 156).  
109 This implies that shareholders lose control of the bank and their stakes in it without financial 
compensation. Among others, see Amagerbanken (case SA.33485, 25 January 2012, para. 125).  
110 Entailing acquisition of control by the State through a complete wipe-out of existing shareholders. 
Among others, this was enacted, among others, for Northern Rock (case C 14/2008, 28 October 2009, 
para. 149), Anglo/INBS, (case SA.32504, 29 June 2011, paras. 165-166), Banco Português de 
Negócios (case SA.26909, 27 March 2012, para. 18: “nationalised [...] at zero price”), Parex Banka 
(case C 26/2009 of 15 September 2010, para. 53) and Hypo Real Estate (case C 15/2009, 18 July 2011, 
para. 121).  
111 Among others, see FIH (case SA.3444511, 11 March 2014, para. 133), Royal Bank of Scotland 
(case N 422/2009, 14 December 2009, para. 217). KBC (case C 18/2009, 18 November 2009) offers 
a specific example of burden-sharing of shareholders can only be reconducted to a dividend ban, as 
no other explicit mention to burden-sharing is made in the Commission’s decision. 
112 In a number of cases, the Commission’s decision did not make any mention of burden-sharing by 
subordinated shareholders. This applied to: SachsenLB (case C 9/2008, 4 June 2008); Fortis (case NN 
42/2008, 3 December 2008); IKB (case C 10/2008, 21 October 2008); WestLB (case C 43/2008, 12 
May 2009); Kaupthing Bank Luxembourg (case N 344/2009, 9 July 2009); UNNIM Banc (case 
SA.33095, 30 September 2011); Quinn Insurance (case SA.33023, 12 October 2011); FHB (case C 
37/2010, 22 February 2012). 
113 See, as examples, Bank of Ireland (case N546/2009, 15 July 2010, para. 217) and Allied Irish 
Banks/EBS (case SA.29786, 7 May 2014, para. 122), where subordinated debt was bought back by 
the banks involved at a discount over the instruments’ book value. 
114 Examples include Northern Rock (case C 14/2008, 28 October 2009, para. 150); Dunfermline (case 
NN 19/2009, 25 January 2010, para. 120); Parex banka (case C 26/2009, 15 September 2010, para. 
148) and TT Hellenic Postbank (case SA.31155, 16 May 2013, para. 51). 
115 Cases include, among others, ABN AMRO (case C 11/2009, 5 April 2011, para. 315); Bank of 
Ireland (case SA.33443, 20 December 2011, para. 160); Banco Português de Negócios (case 
SA.26909, 27 March 2012, para. 239). On the ban of coupon payments, BAWAG (case N 640/2009, 
22 December 2009) offers a surprising example, as the coupon ban appears to have been deemed by 
the Commission as sufficient means to absolve burden-sharing requirements. 
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sale of assets or subsidiaries) to behavioural constraints (e.g. acquisition bans, price 
leadership bans, bans on advertising on the back of state support). Such measures 
were imposed not only to limit distortions between aided and non-aided banks, and 
between banks in different Member States, but also create conditions for the 
development of competitive markets after the crisis.116 
Structural remedies, which serve the purpose of reducing the market presence 
of the aid beneficiaries117, took different forms, encompassing (i) divestments118, (ii) 
downsizing119 (either through balance sheet reductions120 or reductions of branches 
and staff121), and (iii) focus on core activities.122 Behavioural constraints also varied 
across rescue schemes. More specifically, with respect to recapitalisation schemes, 
(i) restrictions on remuneration123 and (ii) bans on advertising the receipt of State 
aid124, were imposed with the highest frequency, followed by (iii) dividend and 
coupon bans125, (iv) acquisition bans126, and (v) limitations on balance sheet 
 
116 Point 32 of the 2009 Restructuring Communication highlighted that the balance of structural and 
behavioural remedies to aid was to be struck in consideration of the size and the relative importance 
of the bank on its market, and the measures must be tailored to market characteristics (i.e. 
concentration levels, capacity constraints, the level of profitability, barriers to entry and to expansion), 
in order to preserve competition.  
117 This is particularly relevant in cases where the aided bank continues to exist as a standalone entity 
after rescue, rather than in rescues that split institutions into more entities, for instance, as, in the latter 
case a downsizing of the beneficiary should already occur by virtue of the rescue itself. 
118 As examples: Lloyds (case N 428/2009, 18 November 2009); ING (case C 10/2009, 18 November 
2009, para. 143);  Royal Bank of Scotland (case N 422/2009, 14 December 2009). 
119 In instances where the aided banks were small, the Commission waived downsizing, on the 
assumption that the limited size would limit competition distortions. As an example, see T Bank (case 
SA.34115, 16 May 2012, para. 56). 
120 As examples: ING (case C 10/2009, 18 November 2009, para. 143); HSH Nordbank (case 
SA.29338, 20 September 2011, para. 266); Bank of Ireland (case SA.33443, 20 December 2011, para. 
179). 
121 See, Lloyds (case N 428/2009, 18 November 2009) as an example of imposition of branch 
divestments; ING (case C 10/2009, 18 November 2009) and Royal Bank of Scotland (case N 
422/2009, 14 December 2009) for  internal headcounts. 
122 To overhaul the strategic direction of the beneficiary with a view to ensuring its viability (see, in 
this sense, BayernLB - case SA.28487, 5 February 2013, para. 50) or to free up liquidity and fund the 
restructuring (WestLB - case C 43/2008, 12 May 2009, para. 77). 
123 Making State aid less attractive, by restricting the remuneration of beneficiaries’ senior 
management. Such remedies were imposed in almost all State-wide recapitalisation schemes, with the 
exception of Austria, Portugal and Spain. 
124 Aimed at preventing institutions from using the aid to expand their activities. See, as examples: 
Greek recapitalisation scheme (N 560/2008, 19 November 2008); German recapitalisation scheme 
(case N 625/2008, 12 December 2008); Polish recapitalisation scheme (case N 302/2009, 21 December 
2009).  
125 With the aim of incentivising banks to reimburse the capital injected: see the Slovak bank support 
scheme (case N 392/2009, 8 December 2009, para. 65) and the Greek bank support scheme (case N 
560/2008, para. 61). 
126 See, among others: the Spanish recapitalisation scheme (case N 28/2010, 28 January 2010); the 
Portuguese new recapitalisation scheme (SA.34055, 30 May 2012); KBC (case C 18/2009, 18 
November 2009); Lloyds (case N 428/2009, 18 November 2009). 
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growth.127 Guarantee schemes, instead, were mostly accompanied by combinations 
of advertising bans, remuneration restrictions and balance sheet growth limitations.128  
Table 2.1 summarises the conditions for the approval of different aid schemes 
by the Commission, prior to the update of State aid requirements (Section 5). Annex 
3, instead, provides a structured overview of the remedies and burden-sharing 














Table 2.1 - Compatibility and remedies related to different aid measures 
Aid Compatibility Remedies 
 
127 Only applied in the context of the Greek and UK recapitalisation schemes (respectively, case N 
560/2008, 19 November 2008 and case N 507/2008, 13 October 2008). 
128 See, among others, the Swedish guarantee scheme (case N 533/2008, 29 October 2008), the Dutch 
guarantee scheme (case N 524/2008, 30 October 2008), the Finnish guarantee scheme (case N 
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- Dividend/coupon 
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Recapitalisations Burden-sharing 
State remuneration 
- Divestments  
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- Focus on core 
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- Advertising ban 
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- Dividend/coupon 
ban 











- Focus on core 
activities 
- Advertising ban 
- Acquisition ban 
- Dividend/coupon 
ban 




- Pricing restrictions 
Source: own elaboration 
Such flexibility in approach has been a key element in the Commission’s 
strategy to use competition law enforcement as a means for stabilisation. In particular, 
the Commission has endeavoured to provide legal certainty to market operators by 
acting swiftly according to exceptional procedures. The aim in taking such a stance 
was to restore confidence in the market, on the one hand, while preserving the 
possibility and legitimacy of its own role in the management of the crisis.129 
To sum up, the severity of the crisis pushed the Commission to extensively 
approve bank rescue plans, in an attempt to stabilise the financial system and restore 
market confidence. In order to minimise competition distortions to some extent, 
behavioural and structural measures were required of aided banks, trying to mimic 
“normal” market conditions somehow. However, when the burden-sharing of the 
costs of failure from the banks themselves was deemed difficult to achieve, more 
 
129 See supra note 104. 
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leniency was applied to allow aided banks to “make up” ex post for the aid received. 
This flexibility in approach also served the purpose of keeping the Commission stably 
in control of its crisis management role.    
However, the stabilisation objective effectively ruled out more in-depth 
economic analysis regarding the impact of rescue measures on banking market 
structure and competition. The choice to leave some discretionality to Member States 
also led to differences in approach and reach of the rescue measures adopted. This is 
likely to have had different consequences on market structures in different countries, 
possibly reinforcing the already existing structural differences among banking 
sectors.  
5. State aid control rules update: 2013 Banking Communication  
After the critical phase of the financial crisis, one would expect the balancing 
of the objectives to start tilting towards the creation of conditions for the return to 
normal market functioning, since risks to financial stability have decreased. In this 
vein, the Commission‘s new Banking Communication of 10 July 2013130 provided 
the latest amendment of the state aid framework for bank restructuring.  
It lays down the ground rules for a “new normal” in State aid rules applicable 
to instances where bank support is needed. One could argue that its enhanced burden-
sharing regime marks the distancing from the heavy reliance upon bailouts, 
impinging on already-deteriorated public finances, in favour of a shift towards more 
extensive use of bail-in tools.131 Burden-sharing means that any aid is kept to a 
minimum, and the bank and its capital holders contribute to the restructuring costs as 
 
130 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of updated State 
aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (“Banking 
Communication”) (2013/C 216/01). 
131 On the strengthening of burden-sharing, see point 13 of the 2013 Banking Communication: “The 
adapted Crisis Communications can also ensure more decisive restructuring and stronger burden-
sharing for all banks in receipt of State aid in the entire single market”; and again point 41 more 
specifically recites that “adequate burden-sharing will normally entail, after losses are first absorbed 
by equity, contributions by hybrid capital holders and subordinated debt holders. Hybrid capital and 
subordinated debt holders must contribute to reducing the capital shortfall to the maximum extent. 
Such contributions can take the form of either a conversion into Common Equity Tier 1 or a write-
down of the principal of the instruments”. This is certainly more definite than the provision embedded 
in the 2008 Banking Communication, which laid down the following in point 22: “Aid should be 
limited to the minimum necessary and an appropriate own contribution to restructuring costs should 
be provided by the aid beneficiary. The bank and its capital holders should contribute to the 
restructuring as much as possible with their own resources.” 
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much as possible with their own resources.132 This should contribute to addressing 
moral hazard and creating appropriate incentives for their future behaviour. As moral 
hazard is tackled, the assumption is that the reduced need for aid will in turn lessen 
competition concerns.  
5.1 Assessment of compatibility 
The assessment of the compatibility of aids still relies on balancing their 
negative effects on trade and competition in the common market with the positive 
effects in helping to achieve well-defined objectives of common interest. Balancing 
these effects takes into account the impact of the aid on the social welfare of the EU. 
Such a balancing exercise is aimed at checking whether a specific aid measure is 
necessary in the public interest, whether it produces an incentive effect (i.e. the aid 
solves the problem), and whether it is proportionate to address the problem (i.e. the 
same result could not have been achieved with less aid and in a shorter time horizon).  
Thus, when it is necessary and proportionate in order to address market 
failures, aid measures may be considered compatible with the common market. The 
European Commission has wide discretion in such compatibility assessment,133 but 
its decisions remain subject to review by the EU Courts. Such assessment must 
involve “the appreciation and weighting of different elements of an economic and 
social nature within a pan-European context”. However, due to a lack of legislative 
power, the Commission cannot lay down general and abstract binding rules governing 
which aid may be considered compatible with the internal market on the grounds of 
Art. 107(3)(b) TFEU.134 Rather, an act of ‘soft law’ such as the Banking 
Communication will not be de jure or de facto binding upon Member States135, thus 
entailing that “a Member State might be able to show that, despite the lack of burden-
sharing (or the non-fulfilment of any other criterion laid down in the Banking 
 
132 Indeed, write-down of subordinated and hybrid debt holders took hold as a burden-sharing 
mechanism after the introduction of the 2013 Banking Communication, which increasingly aligned 
approaches to rescues. Cases imposed a “wipe-out” or “full write-down”, aligning the treatment of 
such instruments to equity, in this respect. Only some of the many examples in this regard include: 
Nova Ljubljanska Banka (case SA.33229, 18 December 2013, para. 154); SNS REAAL (case 
SA.36598, 19 December 2013, para. 92); Banif (case SA.43977, 21 December 2015, para. 131); 
Abanka (case SA.38228, 13 August 2014, para. 140). 
133 Granted in line with art. 108(3) TFEU, as acknowledged by the European Court of Justice in the 
Kotnik case (Case C 526/14). 
134 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in Kotnik, para. 36-37. 
135 For a discussion on this point, see also Bouchagiar (2017). 
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Communication), aid to an ailing bank still meets the requirements of Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU”.136 It would then be for the Commission to analyse the aid’s 
compatibility on the basis of the principles of the Treaty. 
The framework developed with the interpretation of Art. 107(3)(b) was 
explicitly designed as a temporary response to the crisis. Still, it continues to apply 
in revised form on the grounds that “stress in financial markets and the risk of wider 
negative spillover effects persist”. However, as the market conditions have changed, 
the premise that practically all banks need to be rescued is not viable anymore. Thus, 
there is less need for structural rescue measures granted solely on the basis of a 
preliminary assessment, while postponing the in-depth assessment of the 
restructuring plans to a later stage. 
5.2 Restructuring plan requirement 
Indeed, the new Banking Communication establishes the principle that 
recapitalisation and impaired asset measures will be authorised only after approval of 
the bank's restructuring plan. In light of this, public recapitalisation schemes are in 
principle not available in accordance with the Communication, unless they are aimed 
at small institutions or are such as to preserve financial stability. Recital 7 of the 
preamble to the Communication highlights that “financial stability remains of central 
importance in the Commission's assessment of State aid to the financial sector […]”. 
Thus, the Commission appears willing to approve national support measures for 
reasons of financial stability and the objective of financial stability may justify a 
financial institution’s access to State aid. However, it also requires that such aid is 
limited to the minimum necessary and it is granted only after appropriate 
 
136 Ibid., para. 44. For Advocate General Wahl, this could happen in case the proposed solution would 
be less costly than burden-sharing measures for reasons related to procedural obstacles. For instance, 
in the case of Caja Castilla-La Mancha (NN 61/2009, 29 June 2010) due to legal constraints, 
subordinated debt holders had to be transferred to the acquiring entity. So, in order to ensure burden-
sharing, the acquirer was bound to an obligation not to exercise any call options during the period it 
enjoyed financial support from the Spanish Deposit Guarantee Fund. Another example is offered by 
SNS REAAL (case SA.36598, 19 December 2013): considering the involvement of separate legal 
entities with their own capital position and particular commitments on capital transfers, the 
Commission accepted the non-application of burden-sharing to the hybrid debt-holders of REAAL 
Insurance (para. 92). In other instances, the lack of burden-sharing by subordinated debt holders can 
be justified by the fact that no outstanding subordinated debt instruments remains in the banks, which 
automatically makes the application of write-down or conversion impossible to conduct (see Magyar 
Kereskedelmi Bank, case SA.40441, 16 December 2015; Cooperative Central Bank, case SA.43367, 




contributions by the banks’ shareholders and creditors are made.  
5.3 Reinforced burden-sharing  
A somewhat flexible interpretation of the Commission’s discretion may 
justify extensive precautionary recapitalisations of weak banks without making use 
of the bail-in tool if the banking system of a specific Member State is extensively 
undercapitalised and there are no private capital sources that can remedy the 
situation.137 A precautionary recapitalisation consists in the injection of State funds 
into a solvent bank when this is necessary to remedy a serious disturbance in the 
economy of a Member State and preserve financial stability. It is an exceptional 
measure conditional on final approval under the EU State aid framework, without 
triggering the resolution of the bank. A more detailed analysis on precautionary 
recapitalisations will be made in Chapter 3. 
Further indications on the contributions that the banks and their shareholders 
must make are laid down in recital 19 of the Banking Communication, which states 
the following: 
“Before granting any kind of restructuring aid, be it a recapitalisation or impaired 
asset measure, to a bank all capital generating measures including the conversion of 
junior debt should be exhausted, provided that fundamental rights are respected and 
financial stability is not put at risk. […] Therefore, before granting restructuring aid 
to a bank Member States will need to ensure that the bank's shareholders and junior 
capital holders arrange for the required contribution or establish the necessary legal 
framework for obtaining such contributions.” 
Moreover, recital 11 clarifies that: 
“In its assessment of burden-sharing and measures to limit distortions of 
competition the Commission assesses the feasibility of the proposed measures, 
including divestments, and their impact on the market structure and entry barriers. 
At the same time, the Commission has to ensure that solutions devised in a particular 
case or Member State are coherent with the goal of preventing major asymmetries 
 
137 On these points see, among others: Micossi S., Bruzzone G. and Cassella M., “Fine-Tuning the Use 
of Bail-in to Promote a Stronger EU Financial System”, CEPS Special Report No 136, April 2016; 
Hadjiemmanuil C., “Limits on State-funded Bailouts in the EU Bank Resolution Regime”, EBI 
Working Paper Series 2017 - no.2. 
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across Member States which could further fragment the single market and cause 
financial instability, impeding recovery within the Union.” 
Recital 20 instead posits that enhanced burden-sharing implies a reduced need 
for measures addressing distortions of competition. This is due to the fact that a 
higher participation in the restructuring costs by the aid recipient lowers the need for 
additional State resources. In turn, this should alleviate competition concerns. In any 
event, such measures should be calibrated in a way that enables to approximate as 
much as possible the market situation that would have materialised if the beneficiary 
of the aid had exited the market without being rescued. Therefore, abiding by the 
more precise burden-sharing requirements of the new Communication would appear 
to be the crucial condition to minimise competition distortions. 
5.3.1 Exception on stability grounds 
However, the Banking Communication also provides for an exception, 
whereby statutory burden-sharing can be derogated from whenever its 
implementation would endanger financial stability or lead to disproportionate results 
(point 45). This could apply to cases where the aid amount required is small in 
comparison to the bank's risk weighted assets and the original capital shortfall has 
been significantly reduced through capital raising measures. The Commission will 
decide about the potential application of the exception on a case-by-case basis.138 
6. How does the interplay between the “newer” State aid rules and the resolution 
regime strike the balance between stability and competition? 
As far as the wording of the 2013 Banking Communication seems to suggest, 
the objectives of stability and competition are kept on equal footing, mainly by virtue 
of strengthened burden-sharing. However, these two objectives are not the only 
relevant ones, as more sweeping measures aimed at tackling moral hazard issues are 
included as well. The latter in particular aim at effectively addressing the long-
acknowledged problems posed by mismanaged banks. Indeed, the focus has been 
shifted on tackling moral hazard through enhanced burden-sharing requirements, 
implying that this should be enough to lessen competition concerns as well. 
 
138 This exception was applied, for instance, with respect to Alpha Bank (case SA.43366, 26 November 
2015, para. 96) and Banco CEISS (case SA.36249, 12 March 2014, paras. 102-104). 
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Moreover, within the framework of the European Banking Union, the updated 
State aid control rules must now interact with the new rules on bank resolution and, 
in particular, the new Directive for bank recovery and resolution (BRRD)139 and the 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) Regulation.140 These were devised to reduce 
the impact of bank failures on the economy and, in particular, to help ensure that the 
costs of failure are not borne by taxpayers, thus reducing the burden on public 
finances.  
The main objective of resolution is to ensure the orderly unwinding of a bank 
that is failing, while preserving the continuity of its critical functions, such as the 
payment system, in order to protect financial stability and depositors. This must be 
achieved by minimising at the same time reliance on extraordinary public financial 
support.141 For this purpose, the BRRD entrusts national authorities with crisis 
management and bank resolution tools, including specific powers to impose losses 
on shareholders and unsecured creditors (“bail-in”). For the euro area, such tools and 
powers are conferred through the SRMR upon the SRB, in its role of central 
resolution authority within the Banking Union. This ensures that the likelihood of 
taxpayer-financed bailouts is reduced and the burden of a bank’s failure costs is borne 
by its internal stakeholders.  
Having established the shift in approach to bank distress, it becomes clearer 
how the State aid control regime becomes intertwined when dealing with failing 
banks. Within this new scenario, State aid control will remain a central element of 
the Banking Union, as State aid rules will continue to be applied alongside the BRRD 
and SRMR, in order to also ensure a level playing field between Eurozone Member 
States and the other EU States not adhering to the Banking Union. Thus, it is now 
worthwhile to delve into specific instances that require the interaction of state aid and 
resolution rules in practice. 
More precisely, the BRRD itself establishes the obligation for Member States 
to ensure that, when exercising resolution actions, the State aid framework is 
 
139 Directive 2014/59/EU. 
140 Regulation (EU) no. 806/2014, which translates BRRD provisions making them directly applicable 
in Eurozone Member States. 
141 As stated in art. 14 of the SRM Regulation. 
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complied with, when applicable.142 Therefore, the use of resolution tools does not 
automatically qualify as state aid.143 The criteria to determine whether the exercise of 
a resolution tool or power constitutes State aid are the same as for any other measure 
under the EU State aid framework. In line with this, the test for the Member State to 
notify that measure as aid to the Commission will be that of the general State aid 
framework.144 However, it is not for the Commission, but rather for the respective 
supervisor or resolution authority, to apply the existing EU law on the subject and 
start the resolution procedure for the bank in question. It is a responsibility of the 
Commission, instead, to ascertain that State aid used in resolution procedures does 
not unduly distort competition in the market. 
Under the BRRD, the particular decision of the co-legislators is to find a way 
to sever the “doom loop” between sovereigns and banks. Such a loop results from 
banks holding sovereign bonds and the sovereign losing market access during a debt 
crisis. When this happens the value of bank portfolios falls and the institutions need 
help from the government to stay solvent. In turn, this increases borrowing pressure 
on the already stressed sovereign. In order to stop this negative feedback effect, the 
BRRD rules establish that the granting of any State support inevitably implies that an 
institution is deemed to be failing or likely to fail. Therefore, this would be an 
automatic trigger for resolution of the entity concerned. In this sense, the granting of 
state aid to a bank will lead to its resolution. However, some instances in which the 
use of public funds is allowed in conjunction with resolution are still envisaged and 
allowed, for instance in the form of precautionary measures pursuant to Art. 32(4)(d) 
BRRD and Art. 18(4)(d) SRMR or financial stabilisation tools within the meaning of 
Art. 56 BRRD. Thus, a distinction should be made between the use of public money 
within and outside resolution proceedings, accompanied by an evaluation of how the 
Directorate General Competition (DG Comp) of the Commission assesses such 
instances. 
6.1 BRRD – use of public funds within resolution 
Under the new framework depicted, losses arising from failing banks must 
 
142 Art. 34(3) BRRD. 
143 Recital 47 of BRRD preamble. 
144 EBA Q&A 2015_2182 published on 10 March 2017. 
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effectively be paid by their own shareholders and creditors, through bail-in, or by the 
industry itself. To enable the latter, a Single Resolution Fund (SRF),145 funded 
through bank contributions, is currently being set up, but recourse to it will only be 
possible after appropriate burden-sharing by shareholders and creditors. Therefore, 
access to the SRF is only possible after an institution’s loss-absorption capacity has 
reached “the minimum amount of bail-in”,146 corresponding to 8% of the bank’s total 
liabilities.  
Any use of the resolution fund must be in compliance with State aid rules. 
This is due to the fact that, even though its resources come from bank levies, which 
are private, the compulsory nature of the contributions, together with the attribution 
of the power to decide of its use to a public authority, and the resulting economic 
advantage for the beneficiary (or other undertakings) may bring about competition 
concerns. The same reasoning applies to the use of deposit guarantee funds, as 
highlighted by the Commission’s decision on State aid to Italian bank Tercas 
(discussed in Chapter 4).147  
Article 19 of the SRMR establishes that the Commission will assess whether 
the use of the SRF is in line with State aid rules by issuing Decisions. In the exercise 
of this assessment, the Commission will base its decisions upon the same substantive 
and procedural rules applying to the use of all resolution aid. Consequently, the SRB 
and the Commission will need to work closely together, since a State aid decision 
must be taken by the latter before any draft resolution scheme that includes the use 
of the Fund can be adopted by the SRB on a specific case.  
It is also important to recall that the Commission’s decisions on the granting 
of public aid will always be based on the resolution scheme prepared by the Board, 
which includes information on the exercise of bail-in powers. Therefore, its decisions, 
which will be taken by making all relevant state aid considerations, will not need to 
extend to the design of burden-sharing arrangements applicable to shareholders and 
 
145 Managed by the Single Resolution Board (SRB), which is the body tasked with ensuring the orderly 
resolution of significant banks in the eurozone. 
146 As per the wording of recital 80 of the SRM Regulation. 
147 Indeed, an intervention qualifies as State aid where the aid (i) is imputable to the State and (ii) it is 
funded through public resources. For the first requirement to be met, public authorities must be 
involved in the decision whether to grant the aid. As for the second point, the funds used for the aid 
must be under the control of public authorities. See General Court, judgment of 19 March 2019, Joined 




Rather, the Commission will only have to assess whether the proposal made 
by the Board under resolution rules also abides by the requirement of sufficient 
burden-sharing under State aid rules. While this may leave open some room for 
discussion between the competition and resolution authorities, there seems to be no 
inherent contradiction in the exercise of the two activities. Still, burden-sharing 
requirements under the Banking Communication are less extensive than BRRD 
ones148, so competition considerations appear to remain somewhat secondary to the 
stabilisation purposes of resolution procedures. 
It is beyond the scope of this specific chapter to address those instances where 
the use of other resolution tools involves State aid considerations. However, this issue 
will be addressed in detail in Chapter 4, in order to highlight the continued relevance 
of the State aid control framework in spite of the introduction of the rules on bank 
resolution. 
6.2. BRRD – use of public funds outside of resolution  
As anticipated, under the BRRD, State aid can only be granted in resolution 
scenarios but for three narrow exceptions. Namely, these are: State guarantees to 
emergency liquidity assistance from central banks; State guarantees of newly issued 
liabilities; and precautionary recapitalisations. As for the latter, such precautionary 
injections into the bank involved can only be used to cover capital shortfalls arising 
under the adverse scenario of a stress test. 
The BRRD does not exclude completely the possibility of a bailout, in that it 
prescribes that any extraordinary public financial support will entail at least some 
bail-in of shareholders and creditors before any external funds can be disbursed to 
the benefit of the distressed bank. The bail-in must be conducted in accordance with 
 
148 Point 42 of the Banking Communication clarifies that “[t]he Commission will not require 
contribution from senior debt holders (in particular from insured deposits, uninsured deposits, bonds 
and all other senior debt) as a mandatory component of burden-sharing under State aid rules whether 
by conversion into capital or by write-down of the instruments.” On the contrary, the resolution 
framework includes senior debt and uninsured deposits among the categories of liabilities that can be 
bailed-in for loss absorption and recapitalisation purposes. However, such a provision in the Banking 
Communication would still not pre-empt banks to extend the scope of liabilities participating in 
burden-sharing measures, if they so decided. This was the case for Piraeus Bank, (case SA.43364, 29 
November 2015) and National Bank of Greece (case SA.43365, 4 December 2015), within their 
precautionary recapitalisation schemes, as also addressed in Chapter 5. 
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the order of their priority claims set for normal insolvency proceedings. 
The only exception to the rule establishing that any extraordinary financial 
support requires the write-down or conversion of the relevant capital instruments is 
indeed the case of a precautionary recapitalisation, as per the conditions set in Article 
32(4)(d)(iii) BRRD and Article 18(4)(d)(iii) SRMR. In particular, this option is 
applicable when the institution concerned is solvent and any injection of capital or 
purchase of instruments involved for the purposes of its rescue is completed “at prices 
and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the institution”. The measures 
detailed in Art. 32(4)(d) BRRD and Art. 18(4)(d) SRMR can be exploited “in order 
to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State and preserve 
financial stability”, to the condition that they “shall not be used to offset losses that 
the institution has incurred or is likely to incur in the near future”. 
In this case, the provision of State aid is external and independent from the 
resolution procedure. Therefore, State aid rules are the only ones that apply. Within 
this framework, competition rules take over in order to mitigate the potentially 
destabilising effects of resolution, with the guaranteed solvency of the bank acting as 
an “extenuating circumstance” for aid granting. This consideration will prove useful 
in the next chapters of this dissertation, as it provides an example of how crisis 
resolution rules interact with different market structures and different bank solvency 
and liquidity positions.149  
6.3. Other exclusions from bail-in for reasons of financial stability 
As a testament to the relevance of financial stability concerns when applying 
resolution tools, some provisions are present in the BRRD and SRMR that allow for 
bail-in exceptions in specific instances. In particular, recital 72 of the BRRD 
preamble establishes that: “resolution authorities should be able to exclude or 
partially exclude liabilities where necessary to avoid the spreading of contagion and 
financial instability which may cause serious disturbance to the economy of a 
Member State”.  
Art. 44(3)(c) BRRD instead provides for the (partial) exclusion from the 
application of write-down or conversion powers in some exceptional circumstances, 
 
149 See, in particular, Chapter 5 for an in-depth analysis. 
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where the bail-in tool is applied. Among such circumstances, there is the inclusion of 
those cases where “the exclusion is strictly necessary and proportionate to avoid 
giving rise to widespread contagion, in particular as regards eligible deposits held 
by natural persons and micro, small and medium sized enterprises, which would 
severely disrupt the functioning of financial markets, including of financial market 
infrastructures, in a manner that could cause a serious disturbance to the economy 
of a Member State or of the Union”. 
Both of these provisions confirm the primary role attributed by the resolution 
framework to financial stability considerations. However, they also raise one 
additional issue regarding the viability of resolution strategies. If the application of 
bail-in, which should be the mechanism effectively ensuring burden-sharing and own 
contributions by the banks and their shareholders and creditors, can be vouched, then 
considerations related to competition will always come second to financial stability 
concerns.  
As a consequence, the question would turn to what bank failure would not 
bring about systemic financial stability concerns. Since resolution is a strategy 
devised for significant banks and these are the very same institutions that tend to be 
highly interconnected, it could happen more often than originally thought that 
triggering bail-in would destabilise the system. Then, the viable alternative would 
once again be to rescue banks with public funds.  
In turn, the choice between resolution (with bail-in) and a rescue with public 
money will critically depend on the ability of banks to build sufficient amounts of 
bail-inable securities that can be easily written down in resolution without causing 
investor flights or contagion among institutions. More on this point will be said in a 
later section of this chapter, trying to distinguish between idiosyncratic and systemic 
bank failures. Indeed, the different stability concerns arising in the two instances have 
different implications for the application of resolution or State aid measures.150    
7. Other “caveats” 
Be it as it may, Article 107 TFEU remains the only binding legal rule for what 
 
150 See Gardella (2015). 
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concerns the substantive criteria for State aid control. In line with this, Member States 
are still free to notify the Commission of any measure that they deem compatible with 
Article 107(3)(b), even if the conditions set out in the Communications are not met. 
In turn, the Commission is bound by duty to evaluate their compatibility with the 
Treaty provisions.  
The compatibility of any aid measure or scheme is assessed through matching 
with the conditions laid down in Article 107(3)(b) and, for it to be verified, it should 
be sufficient to demonstrate the following:  
i. the existence and serious nature of a disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State;  
ii. the power of the disturbance to affect the whole of the economy of the 
Member State in question; and  
iii. the need for the application of the aid measure in the general interest and its 
proportionality to remedy the disturbance, together with the acknowledged 
absence of measures of a less distortive nature able to attain an equivalent 
result.  
Once it is acknowledged that parts of the EU banking industry may still need 
the injection of substantial amounts of new capital in order to clean their balance 
sheets and restore their normal lending activities, and that private sources of capital 
may be insufficient to that end, then the competent authorities should be open to the 
possibility of resorting to well-devised capital injections bolstered by public 
backstops.  
Expectations on the use that will be made of burden-sharing and of the bail-
in tool by competition and resolution authorities are enough to impact directly the 
risk of capital instruments in the banking sector. As a consequence, if not properly 
governed, they may actually become a source of instability, rather than steadying the 
system. In light of the considerations made, it is also useful to examine whether the 
described framework would follow the same steps in dealing with both idiosyncratic 
and systemic bank crises.  
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8. Idiosyncratic vs. systemic crises  
Although not easily established in practice, the distinction that is worth 
making is the one between an idiosyncratic shock only concerning one bank and a 
liquidity or confidence crisis that troubles many banks at the same time. In these 
circumstances, weakness in balance sheets may create expectations of widespread 
banking crises possibly prompting bail-in, which can end up being a self-fulfilling 
mechanism. However, as the banking sector develops a more interconnected and 
cross-border dimension, even an idiosyncratic risk can be difficult to disentangle 
from generalised negative effects that extend beyond the single bank in financial 
distress. Both size and level of interconnectedness of a bank must be taken into 
account, when assessing the detrimental effects stemming from mismanaged 
expectations on the handling of resolutions.  
Even though it would be the preferred option, the assumption that a private-
market solution to higher capital requirements for solvent banks will always be 
accessible cannot be taken for granted. If the need for some form of public support 
ever arose, in the interest of preserving systemic financial stability, the ability of the 
relevant authorities to take full account of the market settings and systemic 
repercussions of the chosen measures are of critical importance.151 
This becomes particularly relevant when one considers the complex tangle of 
cross-holdings in place among European financial institutions. Figure 2.1 depicts the 
degree of interconnectedness reached by the European global systemically important 
banks in terms of assets and liabilities cross-exposures. 
 
151 Tröger (2018) acknowledges that a relaxation of the assumption of investor rationality might trigger 




Source: European Banking Authority (EBA), End-2016 G-SIIs Disclosure Exercise Fig e 2.1 - Intercon ectedness of European Global Systemica ly Important Institutions (G-SIIs) 
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According to the data provided by EBA with its end-2016 G-SII Disclosure 
Exercise, multiple banks (and other financial institutions) hold subordinated debt 
instruments issued by other banks for roughly €30 billion. Subordinated debt 
instruments of banks can be easily written down and converted into equity, in 
accordance with the rules on resolution. Therefore, such a tangle of cross-exposures, 
especially in Member States with stagnant economies, could end up triggering 
systemic contagion in the event of a bank failure. As a consequence, the unintended 
result is that the use of the bail-in tool could actually endanger the soundness of the 
system at a ‘macro’ level if the crisis is not idiosyncratic in nature.152 If financial 
stability indeed has primacy over other public policy considerations where bank 
crises are concerned, a deviation from bail-in back to bailout solutions may be 
considered. 
Therefore, it is important to make sure that the goal of replacing bailouts with 
bail-in does not lead to instability: in the words of Dewatripont (2014), “financial 
stability can be very costly, and in fact much more so than bailouts”.153 In this sense, 
it is critical to prevent that even the fear of predictable bail-in operations induces bank 
investors to run. To be able to do so, it is of paramount importance that a sufficient 
“long-term loss absorbency capacity” be accumulated, so as to reassure short-term 
claimholders. Such difficulties in the balancing of different objectives point to the 
fact that regulation can alleviate the trade-off between stability and competition but 
not eliminate it.154 
Another lesson worth keeping into consideration in the future is that 
procrastination usually entails considerable costs, when it comes to dealing with 
banking crises. Instead, swift recapitalisations through bailouts that use public money 
may actually end up being a good investment for taxpayers if they act to jumpstart 
economic growth (Dewatripont, 2014). In addition, if such bailouts were shouldered 
with the use of previously accumulated funds and they helped protect average banks 
against exceptionally adverse macroeconomic shocks, while punishing their poorly 
 
152  See De Bandt O., Hartmann P., “Systemic Risk in Banking: A Survey”, in Goodhart C. and Illing 
G., “Financial Crisis, Contagion, and the Lender of Last Resort”, 2002, Oxford University Press, p. 
249 and ff. 
153 Dewatripont M., “European banking: Bailout, bail-in and state aid control”, 2014, International 
Journal of Industrial Organization, 34, pp. 37-43.  
154 See supra note 101. 
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performing peers, their adverse impact for what regards moral hazard concerns could 
be restrained. 
Therefore, even in its primacy, the objective of financial stability preservation 
is not as straightforward to define as one might expect. Indeed, the choice of a 
resolution strategy, which is based upon the aim to avoid contagion effects between 
banks from the failure of a single institution, could in itself destabilise the system. 
This is due to a legacy of cross-holdings and interconnections in securities among 
European financial institutions. Thus, the issue could be traced back to a question of 
choosing between bail-in and bailout once again. This is also in line with Bernard, 
Capponi and Stiglitz (2017) who find that, with a large amplification of a bank shock 
due to a high degree of interconnectivity in the network, the state (social planner) 
“cannot credibly threaten the banks not to intervene himself and a public bailout is 
the only incentive-compatible rescue option”.155 A similar argument was also echoed 
by Haldane (2012), stating that “if governments are risk-averse and wish to smooth 
the pain across taxpayers and across time, then bail-out may look attractive on the 
day”.156  
9. Concluding remarks  
European State aid control rules applied to the banking sector take into 
account the specificities of banks and the different anti-competitive effects that 
different rescue measures for failing institutions can bring about. 
The severity of the financial crisis pushed the European Commission to 
extensively approve bank rescue plans, in an attempt to stabilise the financial system 
and restore market confidence. There was a general convergence between the 
conditions imposed on aided banks to tackle moral hazard and to prevent restrictions 
of competition, even though eligibility requirements for access to aid were not 
homogeneous across countries.  
 
155 Bernard B., Capponi A. and Stiglitz J.E., “Bail-Ins and Bail-Outs: Incentives, Connectivity, and 
Systemic Stability”, 2017, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-45. 
156 “On being the right size”, speech by Mr. Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director, Financial 
Stability, Bank of England, at the Institute of Economic Affairs’ 22nd Annual Series, The 2012 
Beasley Lectures, at the Institute of Directors, London, 25 October 2012. 
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Likewise, the objectives sought by the Commission were broader and 
included, prominently, restoring the long-term viability of the EU banking system. 
However, when the burden-sharing of the costs of failure from the banks was deemed 
difficult to achieve, more leniency was applied to allow aided banks to “make up” ex 
post for the aid received.157 This flexible approach taken by the Commission 
effectively kept it in control of its crisis management role.  
The primary objective was the preservation of financial stability, but this went 
at the expense of a more sophisticated economic approach in evaluating the 
consequences of rescue schemes on market structure and competition in the longer 
term. However, in those extraordinary circumstances, timeliness was of essence and 
it is difficult to imagine how else the Commission could have approached such a high 
number of intertwined failures of significant banks.  
As burden-sharing has direct implications for the funding costs of institutions, 
the different approaches applied during the financial crisis might have exacerbated 
differences in funding costs among institutions and countries, depending on the 
approach applied in bank rescues, possibly distorting institutions’ competitive 
standing in the relevant markets. Indeed, burden-sharing achieved through a dividend 
ban is much less intrusive and effective than a complete wipe-out or heavy dilution 
of existing shareholders and subordinated debt holders. The fact that more substantial 
structural remedies were imposed through balance sheet reductions and divestments 
upon those beneficiaries that emerged as standalone entities after rescue, compared 
to cases in which entities were split, would appear to be consistent with the 
assumption that no increases in beneficiaries’ market power should have come about 
after rescues.   
On the point of behavioural remedies instead, pricing-related restrictions such 
as price-leadership bans were particularly intrusive in terms of controlling 
competitive conduct of beneficiaries in the market, compared to other behavioural 
compensatory measures; while acquisition bans and balance sheet growth restrictions 
would have had the effect of maintaining beneficiaries’ size unaltered after aid. In 
this sense, such remedies should have contributed to preserving the competitive 
structure of the relevant markets to the greatest extent possible, by limiting 
 
157 See supra note 104. 
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consolidation of entities or stemming increases in market shares. 
After the global financial crisis, State aid control rules have been updated and 
new European rules for the orderly resolution of failing banks have been introduced. 
Yet, it seems to be the case that financial stability concerns still take a front seat when 
facing bank crises, even though “normal times” would call for renewed attention to 
“normal market conditions”, including undistorted competition. This is not to say that 
the State aid control regime has become useless in its application to the banking 
sector. On the contrary, depending on whether a bank crisis can be identified as 
idiosyncratic or systemic, the use of public funds can still be a viable rescue option, 
to which State aid control rules will apply. 
Therefore, one can envisage a situation in which small banks can be helped 
with liquidation aid and then leave the market, whereas the choice of measure to help 
significant banks in distress will depend on considerations related to financial 
stability. Indeed, the ultimate choice of strategy could be traced back to the one 
between bail-in and bailout, with State aid control still retaining its relevance. In order 
to be able to choose resolution (with bail-in) instead of a bailout, banks must have at 
their disposal sufficient amounts of bail-inable securities, whose write-down does not 
bring about systemic contagion or investor flights (see Chapter 4). However, this 
brings back to the issue of having “too big to fail” banks, which are still put in a better 























The resolution rules introduced by the BRRD158 have replaced the assumption 
that a failing bank’s claimants will be reimbursed with public funds (bailout) with 
one of mandatory burden-sharing of the bank’s losses by shareholders and unsecured 
creditors (bail-in). The regulators’ expectation is that such a replacement should also 
reinforce market discipline as a result. Such a shift in preferences from bailout to bail-
in represents some relevant progress for the EU policy framework addressing some 
of the vulnerabilities of the financial sector. However, the experience developed 
along the years in dealing with banking crises suggests that this shift can hardly be 
definitive. Accordingly, the BRRD preserves the possibility of granting public 
support by way of government guarantees and precautionary recapitalisations. 
Precisely the latter will be the focus of this chapter, in which the potential impact of 
such a tool on the conduct of European banks in Europe will be addressed.  
From a policy-oriented perspective, maintaining precautionary 
recapitalisation as a viable rescue option can be justified both on transitional grounds, 
as a means through which flexibility can be applied while the Banking Union is on 
its path to completion, and permanent ones, as a way to still allow public intervention 
in dire crisis scenarios. Additionally, precautionary recapitalisation could also be 
used as an early intervention measure, thus excluding forbearance costs that would 
most likely arise if other solutions were applied at a later stage of more serious 
distress, therefore entailing costs that would be lower than those associated with the 
application of any other resolution tool, bail-in included.  
Having established as much, one core issue remains central within the EU 
regulatory framework for bank crises management: under which conditions should 
 
158 Directive 2014/59/EU. 
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governments still be able to support banks in distress? The EU resolution framework 
is designed to ensure an orderly wind-down of failing financial institutions. Yet, 
surprisingly, the interaction between the EU resolution framework and the EU State 
aid rules raises a number of unresolved questions. In order to start tackling some of 
them, it is worthwhile to consider the literature that explores how the expectation of 
a bailout can influence bank behaviour as concerns risk-taking and competition 
incentives. This will serve the aim of establishing a baseline against which to evaluate 
how bank rescue policies impact banking markets.  
For the purpose of this analysis, after a literature review on the anticipated 
effects of a bailout expectation on bank conduct (section 2), the third section will 
tackle bank recapitalisations and their potential anticompetitive effects. After 
highlighting the legal and economic aspects pertaining specifically to precautionary 
recapitalisations, the following sections draw from those specificities to draw a 
comparison between regular recapitalisations and precautionary ones in terms of 
expected impact on bank conduct. 
2. Literature: the effects of bailout anticipation  
A strand of literature developed before the latest financial and debt crises of 
the period between 2008 and 2013 has focused on investigating the correlation 
between the likelihood of systemic crises and banks’ anticipation of being bailed out 
by their governments. 
Acharya and Yarulmazer (2007) show that while the too-big-to-fail guarantee 
is explicitly a part of bank regulation in many countries, bank closure policies also 
suffer from an implicit too-many-to-fail problem: when the number of bank failures 
is large, the regulator finds it optimal ex post to bail out some or all of them. When 
the number of bank failures is small instead, failing banks can be acquired by the 
surviving banks. This gives banks incentives to herd and in turn magnifies the risk 
that many of them may fail together. 
Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2010) look at how policy interventions to 
resolve bank failures affect the ex-ante choice of bank liquidity. They show that 
liquidity support to failed banks (bailout) decreases banks’ incentives to hold 
liquidity, as such a policy limits fire-sale opportunities. Thus, even though 
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interventions to resolve banking crises may be desirable ex post, they affect bank 
liquidity in subtle ways.  
Farhi and Tirole (2012) show that, where monetary policy is non-targeted, 
banks choose to correlate their risk exposures, and private borrowers may choose to 
increase their interest-rate sensitivity following bad news about future needs for 
liquidity. 
Chari and Kehoe (2013) develop a model through which they show that, 
without commitment, governments have incentives to bail out firms by buying up 
their distressed debt and renegotiating their contracts with managers. From an ex ante 
perspective, however, such bailouts are costly because they worsen incentives and 
thereby reduce welfare. Chari and Kehoe show that limits on the debt-to-value ratio 
of firms mitigate the time-inconsistency problem by eliminating the incentives of 
governments to undertake bailouts. 
Keister (2016) studied the issue of choosing between a bailout or a bail-in 
intervention in a model of financial intermediation with limited commitment. When 
a crisis occurs, policymakers will arrange fiscal transfers that partially cover 
intermediaries’ losses. The anticipation of this bailout distorts ex ante incentives, 
leading intermediaries to become excessively illiquid and increasing financial 
fragility. However, the outright prohibition of bailouts is not necessarily desirable 
either: while it induces intermediaries to become more liquid, it may still lower 
welfare and leave the economy more susceptible to a crisis.  
Nolan, Sakellaris and Tsoukalas (2016) argued that banks and other firms 
which are bailed out should suffer a penalty contingent on that bailout to remove 
excessive risk-taking by internalising the bailout costs. They also show that policies 
such as solvency or leverage constraints are sub-optimal because they are time 
inconsistent just at the point when governments and regulators confront the central 
problem of financial regulation. The government cannot commit not to bail out 
bankers with those policies in place. It follows that the non–zero correlations between 
credit spreads and bond spreads observed during periods of financial crisis reflect 




Bernard, Capponi and Stiglitz (2017) developed a framework to analyse the 
consequences of alternative designs for interbank networks, in which a failure of one 
bank may lead to others. They analysed the conditions under which governments can 
credibly implement a bail-in strategy, showing that this depends on the network 
structure. They found that a bail-in strategy is more credible with more dispersed 
networks. The intuitions behind their findings are twofold: (i) a threat of no-
intervention is more credible in sparsely connected networks when the shock is large 
or interbank recovery rates are low, and (ii) banks can be incentivised to make larger 
contributions to a subsidised bail-in if the network is more sparsely connected.  
Keister and Mitkov (2019) studied the interaction between a government’s 
bailout policy during a banking crisis and individual banks’ willingness to impose 
losses on their investors. In the constrained efficient allocation, banks facing losses 
immediately cut payments to withdrawing investors. In a competitive equilibrium, 
however, these banks often delay cutting payments in order to benefit more from the 
eventual bailout. In some cases, the costs associated with this delay are large enough 
that investors will choose to run on their bank, creating further distortions and 
deepening the crisis. 
The implications of these findings for the implementation of bank rescues is 
threefold. First, the anticipation of government support, including in the form of 
recapitalisations, is costly ex ante as it affects banks’ liquidity choices, distorts 
incentives and reduces welfare as a result. Second, in highly interconnected banking 
sectors, the use of recapitalisations with public funds, through the means made 
available by the regulatory framework after the introduction of the BRRD, might 
become more credible than the application of bail-in to deal with the failure of a bank, 
when there is a risk that it would trigger the subsequent failure of a number of other 
interconnected institutions. Third, a full prohibition of government support can still 
be welfare reducing, thus calling for some degree of intervention to be retained in 
exceptional circumstances, combined with appropriate competitive safeguards and 




In the context of a crisis in the financial markets, bank recapitalisations can 
serve a number of purposes.159 First, they contribute to the preservation of financial 
stability and help restore the market confidence necessary for the recovery of inter-
bank lending. Moreover, the injection of capital into a bank through a recapitalisation 
offers a cushion in recessionary times that enables loss absorption and limits the 
institution’s risk of insolvency. This follows from the fact that capital injections 
address a widespread perception that higher capital ratios are necessary in view of 
the past underestimation of risk in banking activities and the increased cost of 
funding.  
Second, recapitalisations can also have the objective of ensuring continued 
lending to the real economy. Banks that are fundamentally sound may prefer to limit 
their lending activity in order to keep risk-taking under control and to preserve higher 
capital ratios. In this framework, a state capital injection may prevent restrictions in 
credit supply as well as limit the spill over of the financial markets' difficulties to 
other business sectors and the broader real economy.  
Third, State recapitalisations may also be a response to the insolvency that 
some institutions might face as a result of the specific business model or investment 
strategy they chose to pursue, thus being deployed to restructure institutions whose 
failure would be detrimental to the economy, and requiring a restructuring plan that 
modifies the ‘faulty’ or excessively risky business model to ensure renewed viability 
and sustainability. Alternatively, a capital injection through public resources 
providing emergency support to an individual institution may also help to stem the 
systemic spillovers that could arise from its insolvency in the short term. In the longer 
term, instead, recapitalisations could either bolster the return to long-term viability of 
the beneficiary banks or support their orderly wind-up.160  
Additionally, recapitalisations maintain market structures unaltered, as they 
carry ailing institutions through restructuring and leave them operative in the market 
after intervention. Therefore, such measures do not diminish the number of market 
 
159 Beck T. et al., “Bailing out the Banks: Reconciling Stability and Competition”, 2010, CEPR, 
London. 
160 As acknowledged in the 2008 Recapitalisation Communication, para. 6. 
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operators, which in theory should ensure that competitive forces are preserved, but 
they do so in an artificial way, laying the ground for the use of policies relying on 
public funds, which are still eventually liable to distort competition, as described in 
the following section. 
3.1 Competition concerns stemming from recapitalisations 
Since recapitalisations involve the use of taxpayer money, EU State aid 
rules require that public funds are only injected in a bank that is profitable in the long-
term. This implies that the bank must undergo in-depth restructuring so as to ensure 
its long-term viability. Moreover, the state must be sufficiently remunerated for its 
capital injection. As detailed in the European Commission’s ‘Recapitalisation 
Communication’ of 2008161, potential distortions of competition on three different 
levels must be taken into account whenever a recapitalisation scheme or measure is 
proposed. 
First, recapitalisation by a Member State of its own banks should not create 
an undue competitive advantage for those banks over other institutions in other 
member states. Access to capital at considerably lower rates than competitors from 
other Member States, lacking an appropriate risk-based justification, may have a 
substantial impact on the competitive position of a bank operating within the 
European single market. Excessive aid being granted in one country could also trigger 
a subsidy race among member states. Thus, in order to preserve a level playing field 
across states, it is necessary to establish a coherent and coordinated approach to the 
remuneration of public capital injections, and to the other conditions attached to 
recapitalisation. Indeed, uncoordinated and unilateral action in this area may also 
undermine efforts to restore financial stability.  
Secondly, recapitalisation schemes that do not appropriately differentiate 
beneficiary banks on the basis of their risk profiles may confer an undue advantage 
to distressed or less-performing banks compared to their fundamentally sound and 
better-performing peers. If this instance materialises, both market competition and 
bank incentives are distorted, moral hazard increases and the overall competitiveness 
 
161 “The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the 
minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition”, OJ 2009 C-10/2. 
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of European banks might be weakened as a result. Therefore, a proportionate 
approach in the amount of aid granted and the behavioural and structural safeguards 
requested of banks, on the basis of their riskiness, and taking account potential 
underestimation of risk prior to intervention, should ensure the preservation of fair 
competition between banks. 
Thirdly, the remuneration required by the State for a public recapitalisation162 
should not put those banks that do not receive the public funding in question but still 
seek additional capital on the market- in a competitive position that is significantly 
disadvantaged. In addition, the application of a public scheme that crowds out 
market-based operations will hinder the return to normal market functioning.  
Any proposed recapitalisation has the potential to produce cumulative 
competitive effects at each of the three levels just described. In dealing with such 
competition concerns, a balance must be struck between the objectives of restoring 
financial stability, ensuring continued lending to the real economy and containing the 
risk of widespread bank insolvency. Indeed, banks must have terms of access to 
capital that are sufficiently favourable in order to make the recapitalisation measure 
as effective as necessary. At the same time, the conditions tied to any recapitalisation 
measure should ensure that a level playing field is maintained and that a return to 
normal market conditions can be achieved in the longer term. Therefore, State 
interventions should be proportionate and temporary. Additionally, they should be 
designed in a way that provides incentives for banks to redeem the State as soon as 
market circumstances allow it, in order to foster a competitive and efficient European 
banking sector.  
 
162 The 2008 Recapitalisation Communication specified that “[w]here State capital injections are on 
equal terms with significant participation (30 % or more) of private investors, the Commission will 
accept the remuneration set in the deal”. On the basis of the Eurosystem recommendations of 2008, 
the same Communication held that “the required rate of return by the government on recapitalisation 
instruments for fundamentally sound banks - preferred shares and other hybrid instruments - could be 
determined on the basis of a “price corridor” defined by: (i) the required rate of return on 
subordinated debt representing a lower bound, and (ii) the required rate of return on ordinary shares 
representing an upper bound”. The 2011 Prolongation Communication further specified that the 
Commission would assess the remuneration of capital injections on the basis of the issue price of the 
shares, with subscriptions needing to be completed “at a sufficient discount to the share price (after 
adjustment for the "dilution effect") immediately prior to the announcement of the capital injection to 
give a reasonable assurance of an adequate remuneration for the State”. 
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If aid reduces marginal costs, it is more likely to distort competition in the 
short run compared to aid that affects fixed costs. This is due to the fact that changes 
in marginal costs influence firms’ short-run pricing decisions. As State aid often 
enables lower prices, improved quality or innovation, it is possible that the aid could 
benefit consumers in the short term, but have an adverse effect in the longer term.163 
Therefore, the market definition exercise in State aid assessments may need to focus 
more on the long-run effects of the aid. In the event of a recapitalisation, it seems to 
be the case that the application of interest rates lower than market ones would have 
an effect on marginal costs. Therefore, market-oriented pricing of capital injections 
is generally considered to be the best safeguard against the creation of disparities in 
the level of bank capitalisation, as a result of the grant itself, and an improper use of 
the capital received.  
4. “Precautionary recapitalisation” 
The transition from the old ‘bail-out’ to the new ‘bail-in’ regime was correctly 
identified as complex and difficult, not least due to the considerable heterogeneity in 
terms both of legal regimes and of banking sector structures present in different 
Member States.164 On top of this, the incompleteness of the banking union entails the 
need to apply transitory arrangements allowing to deal with potential policy 
mismatches among countries. In this sense, precautionary recapitalisation can be seen 
as a means of applying flexibility to heterogeneous national situations, which are 
bound to impede the full creation of a level playing field under common rules in the 
short term. 
4.1 Defining precautionary recapitalisation 
EU law does not provide a specific definition of the expression “precautionary 
recapitalisation”. Interestingly, such an expression is not even present in the text of 
the BRRD. However, the concept derives directly from the wording of Article 
32(4)(d) of the BRRD, which states that, as a general principle, an institution should 
 
163 European Commission, “Ex post assessment of the impact of state aid on competition”, November 
2017, at www.ec.europa.eu. 
164 Goodhart C. and Avgouleas E., “A Critical Evaluation of Bail-Ins as Bank Recapitalisation 




be deemed as failing or likely to fail if “extraordinary public financial support is 
required except when, in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State and preserve financial stability, the extraordinary public financial 
support takes the form” of “an injection of own funds or purchase of capital 
instruments at prices and on terms that do not confer an advantage upon the 
institution”.165 
In a more precise way, the ECB has provided a definition of “precautionary 
recapitalisation”, identifying it as “an injection of own funds into a solvent bank by 
the state when this is necessary to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State and preserve financial stability. It is an exceptional measure that is 
conditional on final approval under the European Union State aid framework. It does 
not trigger the resolution of the bank”.166 
Similarly, the Bank of Italy has also advanced a definition of precautionary 
recapitalisation in addressing the Monte dei Paschi case recently, classifying it as “a 
measure provided under European legislation (the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive – BRRD) in exceptional circumstances, to remedy a serious disturbance in 
the economy of a Member State and preserve financial stability. In these cases, in 
order to strengthen the capital of a bank, extraordinary State aid of a precautionary 
and temporary nature is permitted as long as the bank is solvent and the intervention 
is compliant with the rules on State aid. These rules mean that a State can only 
intervene after the subordinated bonds have been converted into equity (the burden-
sharing principle)”.167  
According to Article 32(4)(d) BRRD and Article 18(4)(d) SRMR, financial 
support can be provided to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member 
State and preserve financial stability in one of the following forms: (1) a State 
guarantee to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks; (2) a State guarantee 
 
165 The EBA has provided guidance to improve coordination between supervisory and resolution 
authorities in the determination that an institution is failing or likely to fail. See the EBA’s Guidelines 
on the interpretation of the different circumstances when an institution shall be considered as failing 
or likely to fail under Article 32(6) of Directive 2014/59/EU, EBA/GL/2015/07 (May 26 2015).  
166 See ECB, “What is precautionary recapitalisation and how does it work?”, 27 December 2016, at 
www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu. 




on newly issued liabilities; or (3) an injection of own funds or purchase of capital 
instruments. 
These three potential means of financial support cannot be considered as 
alternatives that the authorities can use to solve the same problem, but rather they 
constitute different options for the achievement of two different purposes, namely: to 
either boost liquidity or to increase capital. Accordingly, the use of State guarantees 
to back liquidity facilities provided by central banks under Article 32(4)(d)(i) of the 
BRRD, as well as of State guarantees on newly issued liabilities under Article 
32(4)(d)(ii) of the BRRD are tools aimed at enabling the bank to solve liquidity 
problems that are only temporary. A precautionary recapitalisation, as provided for 
under Article 32(4)(d)(iii) of the BRRD, instead, allows the bank to increase its 
capital to comply with minimum regulatory capital requirements in the event of a 
future significant crisis manifesting itself under a so-called adverse scenario. Indeed, 
these tools appear to have the goal of satisfying different needs of the bank in 
question: the first two address liquidity needs, whereas the latter targets future 
solvency after the failure of the adverse scenario in a stress test. 
Article 32(4)(d)(iii) BRRD and Article 18(4)(d)(iii) SRMR enable Member 
States to support those banks in which a capital shortfall is highlighted by national, 
SSM- or Union-wide stress tests, asset quality reviews or equivalent exercises 
conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB), European Banking Authority (EBA) 
or national authorities, in case of a serious disturbance in the economy. If any of those 
exercises reveals that a bank has a capital shortfall, and the institution cannot rectify 
such a shortfall by raising funds on the market, then precautionary recapitalisation 
can become a viable solution. In this context, State aid can only be granted to prepare 
for possible capital needs of a bank that would materialise if economic conditions 
were to worsen, but it does not trigger resolution of the bank in question. For the 
purposes of precautionary recapitalisation, the ECB has defined a bank as solvent if 
“it fulfils the minimum capital requirements (i.e. Pillar 1 requirements). In addition 






Furthermore, precautionary recapitalisation measures should serve the 
purpose of preventing a serious disturbance in the economy rather than remedying it. 
However, the wording of the Italian, French Portuguese and Spanish versions of 
Article 32(4) of the BRRD is different from the English one, as they also encompass 
the case of avoiding a serious disturbance in the economy. This discrepancy might 
generate the grounds for a different application of the same tool in different countries, 
in particular with regard to the timing of the rescue intervention, thus potentially 
weakening the desired uniformity in approach in dealing with bank crises in Europe. 
4.2 Conditions for application 
For what concerns the applicability of such a tool, the conditions set by the 
BRRD for the granting of a precautionary recapitalisation are fairly detailed. They 
encompass conditions on the balance sheet testing and the ascertained viability of the 
bank in question, as well as the competitive impact of the measure itself, the 
economic and financial stability in the market, while also establishing general 
principles according to which the intervention should be precautionary, temporary 
and proportionate.  
More specifically, the main conditions for a precautionary recapitalisation are 
the following: 
1. The aid is granted “in order to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy 
of a Member State and preserve financial stability”: this refers directly to 
the wording of Art. 107(3)(b) TFEU to possibly find aid to be compatible with 
the internal market.  
2. The extraordinary public financial support consists in “an injection of own 
funds or purchase of capital instruments”: this limits the forms of support 
that can qualify for the exemption at Art. 32(4)(d)(iii) BRRD.  
3. The price and terms of the recapitalisation should not “confer an advantage 
upon the institution”: this seems to suggest that capital injections should be 
concluded on market terms.169  
 
169 The previous stance by the Commission on the use of Art. 32(4) BRRD made reference to an 




4. Precautionary recapitalisations “shall be confined to solvent institutions”: in 
accordance with the clarification offered by the EBA, this means that, 
currently and in the near future, the institution: (i) does not and is not likely 
to infringe the conditions for 86uthorization; (ii) does not and is not likely to 
hold less assets than liabilities; and (iii) does not and is not likely to be unable 
to pay its debts as they fall due.  
5. The measure shall be “conditional on final approval” under State aid 
rules: the measure must obtain an approval by the Commission prior to any 
capital being injected into the bank, thus implying a scrutiny of the 
appropriateness of the burden-sharing arrangements and of a restructuring 
plan.170  
6. Those measures shall be of a “precautionary and temporary nature”: the 
word “precautionary” refers to the fact that past losses cannot be covered 
through the recapitalisation, but rather the measure should be a precaution in 
the face of future unanticipated losses. The “temporary” aspect, instead, 
suggests that the State should be in a position to recoup its investment in the 
future. This can usually be achieved with an injection of capital in the form 
of contingent convertible bonds, which enables the bank to repay the State, if 
its capital position improves later on. Differently, an equity injection in the 
form of ordinary shares would not offer a similar degree of flexibility.171 
7. The precautionary recapitalisation shall be “proportionate” to remedy the 
consequences of the serious disturbance in the economy: the 
recapitalisation must be limited to the amount necessary to address the capital 
shortfall identified in the stress test or equivalent supervisory exercise.  
8. The measure shall not be used “to offset losses that the institution has 
incurred or is likely to incur in the near future”: this entails that past losses 
or losses that will be incurred with a high degree of certainty cannot be offset 
 
170 As per recital 50 of the 2013 Banking Communication. 
171 Such difference between the two categories of instruments, if the conditions for the inclusion of 
capital instruments subscribed by authorities in emergency situations in CET1 instruments (pursuant 
to Art. 31 CRR) and those for the redemption or repurchase of CET1 and Additional Tier 1 and Tier 
2 instruments (pursuant to Artt. 77 and 78 CRR)- in accordance with the procedures delineated in Artt. 
29-32 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 241/2014- materialised simultaneously. The point 
of distinction between CoCo- or equity-based precautionary recapitalisations will be addressed again 
in Chapter 5, where the specificities of the precautionary recapitalisation benefitting Italian Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena is looked at in detail.  
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by a precautionary recapitalisation. Thus, if any losses come to light from an 
asset quality review or the baseline scenario of a stress test, they must be 
covered by private funds. 
4.3 Conditions for the Commission’s approval  
As for the approval under State aid rules in particular, the crisis rules on 
banking laid down in the European Commission’s 2013 Banking Communication 
require that: 
1. the use of taxpayer money is limited through appropriate burden-sharing 
measures. This is ensured through contributions by shareholders and 
subordinated debt holders, while depositors and senior creditors instead are 
not required to contribute172; 
2. a credible and effective restructuring plan to ensure the bank is viable in the 
long-term without further need for State support; 
3. distortions of competition are limited through proportionate remedies. 
As per art. 32(4)(iii), the price and terms at which the recapitalisation is 
completed should also not “confer an advantage upon the institution”. This wording 
seems to exclude any capital injection not completed on market terms that a private 
investor would also accept, as well as to require burden-sharing, achieved also 
through a heavy dilution of existing shareholders of the beneficiary, which results in 
a loss of control. In this respect, the level of dilution would be scrutinised in 
accordance with the State aid framework considered as related to the height of the 
issue price of the shares subscribed by the State for the recapitalisation173: the higher 
the issue price, the lower the number of shares obtained by the State, and thus the 
lower the level of dilution. The 2013 Banking Communication requires full burden-
 
172 Differently, in resolution, senior creditors and uncovered depositors are included among those 
whose holdings can be bailed-in. This creates a mismatch in the scope of instruments that can be 
written down and converted into equity between the State aid framework and resolution rules. This 
issue is at the core of a number of bank restructurings completed in recent years- analysed both later 
in this chapter and in Chapter 5 of this book- which, either through liquidation or through exceptions 
to resolution, managed to escape a full bail-in application, as they underwent scrutiny exclusively 
under the State aid framework. 
173 See, for instance, the Commission’s decision in the restructuring of Irish bank PTSB, case 
SA.33311, 20 July 2011, para. 81, in which the Commission positively evaluated that the chosen issue 
price per share resulted in a high level of dilution. 
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sharing by shareholders174, stipulating that losses are first absorbed by equity (point 
41), which would seem to indicate a required dilution level of 100%.175  
In addition, it is also worthwhile to remember that the very purpose of the 
precautionary recapitalisation provision is to enable a bank, which is “unable to raise 
capital privately in markets” (recital 41 of the BRRD), to raise it from public sources 
without triggering resolution. It is worth noting that in the Commission’s decisions 
on the use of exemptions contained in Article 32(4) BRRD and Article 18(4) SRMR, 
the wording used refers to the conferral of an “undue advantage”, which is “an 
advantage incompatible with the internal market under State aid rules”.176 In this 
sense, the Commission acknowledges to some extent that any recapitalisation granted 
when a bank is unable to raise capital privately in the markets favours the beneficiary, 
thus involving State aid. 
Then, one other crucial point related to the application of precautionary 
recapitalisation is the fact that Art. 59(3)(e) of the BRRD excludes the requirement 
to write down or convert capital instruments into equity in the event of a 
precautionary recapitalisation. This is the caveat that makes the precautionary 
recapitalisation tool become a ‘safeguard’ clause included in the State aid regime to 
spare creditors from burden-sharing, if it can endanger financial stability or lead to 
disproportionate results. Since the holders of debt instruments subject to bail-in have 
mostly been other financial institutions until now, the bail-in tool could transfer losses 
from one institution to another, risking contagion. This markedly highlights the 
fragile nature of the European banking sector. 
 
174 Prior to the introduction of the 2013 Banking Communication, the Commission did not set a specific 
ex ante threshold for burden-sharing, even though it expressed doubts in some cases that the burden-
sharing by shareholders was sufficient. Some examples include: HSH Nordbank, C 29/2009, 22 
October 2009, where the issue price was deemed to be too high and, as a result, minority shareholders 
benefited disproportionately by not being completely diluted (para. 72); Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS), N 422/2009, 14 December 2009, where the issue price of the B shares was above the share 
price of RBS, having a less dilutive effect than a standard ordinary share issuance or rights issue, thus 
going against the concept of burden-sharing, yet compensated by some of the hybrid-like features of 
the B shares (para. 140). See van Lambalgen (2018) for a discussion of the different means through 
which dilution has been accepted by the European Commission in its State aid practice. 
175 However, in practice the Commission has also accepted “almost complete” dilutions, rather than 
full ones. This was the case for the Cypriot Cooperative Central Bank, SA.35334, 24 February 2014, 
where Cyprus acquired 99% of the shares and voting rights of the bank, while the existing shareholders 
were diluted down to a 1% participation, in order to preserve some of the cooperative characteristics 
of the institution concerned (para. 139). The same happened also with reference to the four Greek 
banks rescued in 2015 (see Chapter 5). 




4.4 Justifications for keeping the “precautionary recapitalisation” option 
According to the categorisation used by Schwarcz (2018), precautionary 
recapitalisation can be considered as a form of intervention combining aspects of both 
‘reactive’ and ‘proactive regulation’, as it constitutes a variation to resolution, but 
also to traditional bankruptcy proceedings. As it is envisaged as an exception which 
is pre-defined and acknowledged in the BRRD, it can be seen either as a pre-planned 
enhancement of the framework enabling an intervention to improve resolvability as 
soon as some signs of financial trouble start to materialise, or as rescue entailing a 
partial burden-sharing of losses bolstered by public funds, which avoids putting the 
institution into liquidation. Whether the measure tilts more towards one interpretation 
or the other largely depends on the time at which it is applied. Indeed, the closer to a 
bank’s insolvency it is granted, the more it will resemble a rescue variating from 
traditional bankruptcy. Differently, if it is applied when the financial position of the 
bank is still strong, despite its possible deterioration in case the adverse scenario of 
the stress test materialises in the future, it would veer towards a definition of 
resolvability enhancement, without delaying the application of a full-fledged bail-in.  
The inclusion of the precautionary recapitalisation option in the EU bank 
crisis management toolbox can be justified on the basis of considerations of both a 
transitional and a permanent nature. As a matter of fact, a transitional motivation is 
presumably why the possibility of eliminating precautionary recapitalisation as an 
option177 was included at the end of Art. 32(4) BRRD, by asking the European 
Commission to review its “continued need” by the end of 2015 “and the conditions 
that need to be met in the case of continuation”. However, the European Commission 
did not submit such a report within the 2015 deadline and still has not submitted one 
so far, possibly because it considered it as too early to make an informed assessment.  
A permanent motivation for maintaining the precautionary recapitalisation 
tool instead derives from the experience in the United States in 2008, which 
demonstrated that extraordinary public financial support might be warranted in 
situations of particularly severe financial instability. It is also broadly acknowledged 
 
177 Though not the other options of public support granting via guarantees. 
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in the economic literature that there is a case for public intervention in the event of a 
systemic crisis.178 
4.5 “Public interest test” and “serious disturbance in the economy” 
The rationale that is common to both bank resolution, through the application 
of the bail-in tool, and precautionary recapitalisation is that those failing financial 
institutions whose operations are relevant to the economy of a Member State should 
be saved by way of internal contributions in the former case, or through public money 
when bail-in would bring about financial instability in the latter case. Therefore, it is 
essential to consider the concept of “public interest” that would justify the application 
of either of those crisis management strategies to a bank failure. 
In accordance with Art. 32(5) of the BRRD and Art. 18(5) SRMR,179 the 
public interest criterion for bank resolution is considered to be satisfied if the 
operation “achieves and is proportionate to one or more of the resolution objectives 
specified in the regulation and if the winding up of the entity under normal insolvency 
proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent”. The 
prevailing view among scholars is that the public interest test, which provides the 
justification for resolution, is met only when an economic disturbance or systemic 
risk is clearly demonstrated.180 Still, the vague formulation of the public interest test 
has proven to be problematic in the assessment of the recent bank restructuring cases, 
since it leaves substantial discretion to the relevant resolution authorities.181 
The approach to the assessment of public interest applied by the SRB hinges 
on the definition of “critical functions” present in the BRRD and SRMR, thus 
considering that significant adverse effects on financial stability would exist only if 
such consequences materialised at the level of one or more Member States.182 
However, since national authorities apply different criteria in their assessment, 
different conclusions can be reached on what can entail a sufficient public interest, 
 
178 Avgouleas and Goodhart (2015), supra note 163. 
179 Stated in identical terms in Art. 18(5) of the SRMR. 
180 Alvaro S. et al., “The marketing of MREL securities after BRRD - Interactions between prudential 
and transparency requirements and the challenges which lie ahead”, 2017, CONSOB Legal Research 
paper No. 15. 
181 Binder J.H., “Proportionality at the resolution stage: Calibration of resolution measures and the 
public interest test”, 2017. 
182 See SRB’s “Approach to the Public Interest Assessment”, published in July 2019. 
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such that would justify a resolution action. The existing inconsistency and 
fragmentation, which persist to some degree both within the SSM and within the 
SRM, is not helped by a ‘multi-layered’ system of litigation along national lines, 
which increasing the complexity of the existing regime further. This creates grounds 
for an amplification of uncertainty in the applicability of the rules and contribute to 
magnify differences in crisis management approaches within the European Union.183 
Moreover, the other condition that must materialise in order for a 
precautionary recapitalisation to be justifiable is that the failure of the bank concerned 
might create a “serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State”. On this point, 
Olivares-Carminal and Russo (2017) argue that the lack of a clear and univocal 
definition of “serious disturbance” in the economy and “financial stability” leaves to 
authorities a significant degree of discretion in the determination of the circumstances 
in which aid can be provided. This leaves regulators and supervisors with a degree of 
flexibility in deciding on the need to possibly provide extraordinary financial support 
on the basis of their assessment.184 The expectation that likely would follow is that 
recourse to public finances could be made without particularly relevant hindrances in 
the end. To assess whether this is actually the case, it is important to turn to the actual 
cases of precautionary recapitalisations granted until now. 
4.6 Precautionary recapitalisation in practice: some “theoretical” points for 
attention  
There have been only few actual cases in which precautionary 
recapitalisations under the BRRD have been granted so far: two Greek banks in late 
2015, whose precautionary recapitalisations can currently be viewed as broadly 
successful, and more recently Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) in Italy. A 
precautionary recapitalisation was also requested without success by Italian banks 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, on grounds of a lack of public interest 
 
183 In this vein, see Lastra, Russo and Bodellini (2019), arguing for a specification of criteria to inform 
the development of the choice between resolution and liquidation for ailing banks, as well as for a 
more coherent interpretation of the concept of ‘public interest’ from a financial stability perspective. 
Schillig (2020) argues in favour of removing the public interest test as a trigger for resolution action, 
thereby extending the resolution regime to all institutions irrespective of their size and significance, in 
order to enhance the credibility of the crisis management framework and protect national budgets, thus 
lessening the bank-sovereign feedback loop. 
184 Olivares-Carminal R. and Russo C., “Precautionary recapitalisations: time for a review”, 2017, 
available at: www.europarl.europa.eu. 
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justifying the need to keep the banks in the market. The two banks were then 
liquidated under normal insolvency proceedings, with the addition of public support 
to preserve local financial stability while enabling the market exit of the two 
institutions. Another instance of public support granted in liquidation to smoothen 
the market exit of an ailing bank was also offered in relation to Cyprus Cooperative 
bank. All of these cases are discussed in depth in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
However, some points related the “theory” relevant for the application of such 
measures are worth mentioning here.  
4.6.1 Proportionality and the choice of crisis management measure 
In the first place, one could argue that the issue highlighted by recent cases of 
crisis management in Europe concerns the failure to apply regular insolvency 
proceedings in favour of a bailout scheme. This reflects the lacking uniformity across 
European Member States in setting common standards for dealing with insolvencies 
when banks lie below the “public interest threshold”.185 If this is perceived as being 
politically unacceptable, then one possible solution could be to combine the 
harmonisation of resolution principles applicable to non-systemically relevant banks 
with stricter State aid rules. In this way, the difficulties stemming from the application 
of the resolution toolbox to all banking institutions, irrespectively of their size, and 
to all related insolvency cases could be bypassed.186 Indeed, the European toolbox 
for bank resolution should not be considered as an all-encompassing solution 
applicable to every bank insolvency, regardless of bank size, complexity and 
interconnectedness with other intermediaries. The reasons for some cases to be 
treated differently are rooted in the principle of proportionality.  
 
185 See the European Parliament (2018) for a review of the reasons for harmonising insolvency laws. 
Some of the issues arising from a lack of common standard as regards insolvency proceedings in 
Europe were highlighted by the failure of ABLV, which was managed through a liquidation for ABLV 
Latvia followed by a resolution for its subsidiary in Luxembourg, due to the different liquidity and 
solvency situations of the two group entities (see the statement by ABLV on the decisions by the ECB 
and the Luxembourg Court: https://www.ablv.com/en/press/2018-03-09-the-court-recognises-the-
soundness-of-ablv-bank-luxembourg-s-a-which-can-now-be-sold-to-new-investors). See also 
Valiante (2016) for a review of the areas in addition to the resolution framework where insolvency 
law harmonisation could be beneficial.   
186 Binder (2017), supra note 180. 
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4.6.2 The distinction between liquidity and solvency in the choice of crisis 
management measure  
Some controversial aspects of supervisors’ and judges’ treatment of bank 
insolvency and resolution cases should also be addressed. First of all, they seem to 
take for granted that a bank’s zero valuation is a consequence of the entity’s 
insolvency, which follows from the fact that it must have accumulated more liabilities 
than assets.187 This appears to rule out the possibility of ‘false positives’, i.e. entities 
that are merely illiquid, but are nonetheless treated as insolvent.  
However, liquidity is different from solvency. Indeed, the former indicates 
the extent to which a bank has sufficient cash (or other assets that can quickly be 
converted into cash) to meet immediate and short-term obligations. The latter instead 
measures the ability to pay debts as they come due, as assessed by the holding of 
assets in excess of liabilities. If such a distinction between liquidity and solvency 
were not established, every time a bank or State is illiquid, one would also conclude 
that it is insolvent. Nonetheless, some authors actually dispute the ability of the 
market or public authorities to distinguish between illiquid and insolvent institutions, 
especially in times of crisis or when the valuation of their assets is due to complex 
future predictions.188 This brings to light another critical point in the functioning of 
the crisis management tool of precautionary recapitalisation, which is the ability to 
determine that a financial institution is still solvent but not illiquid. If such distinction 
is not easily established, once again the uniform application of such a tool at European 
level might still be hindered by different interpretations in different countries or 
instances.  
5. Liquidation aid 
As resolution and liquidation become two alternative options to manage a 
bank failure, the two differ substantially also for what concerns the legislation 
applicable to the use of public funds. Indeed, the BRRD applies to the former 
scenario, whereas liquidation is regulated by national insolvency laws and proceeds 
in accordance with the national legal order.  
 
187 Alvaro et al. (2017), supra note 179. 
188 Goodhart C., “Liquidity risk management”, Financial Stability Review – Special Issue: Liquidity, 
2008, p. 35. 
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Differently from resolution, in the case of liquidation, the failing bank is 
unable to return to viability and would anyway exit the market. Indeed, if the drafting 
of an acceptable restructuring plan proves impossible, then the failing institution must 
be “wound up in an orderly fashion”. The 2013 Banking Communication posits that 
liquidation should always be considered when a bank cannot be returned to viability. 
However, there might be instances in which, while the wind-up of a small institution 
may not threaten financial stability at the European level, its exit from the market exit 
may still affect the regions where such a bank is active. Therefore, Member States 
should evaluate whether they consider that the bank exit would have a serious impact 
on the regional economy.189  
In this situation, the 2013 Banking Communication foresees the possibility 
for States to use public resources in order to mitigate the de-stabilising impact of the 
exit of an ailing bank from the market.190 Still, this is subject to the usual burden-
sharing requirements envisaged by State aid rules and clear commitments on the 
effective exit of the ailing institution from the market to ensure that competition 
distortions are minimised. As a matter of fact, in liquidation cases, the Commission 
generally imposes restrictions on the economic activities of the bank involved, in 
order to curb competitive concerns. Additionally, liquidation plans need to abide by 
the criteria set in sections 2 to 4 of the Restructuring Communication, much in the 
same way required for restructuring plans.  
The approach taken to deal with the crisis of the two Venetian banks has one 
main implication, which entails that the risk of a serious economic disturbance within 
a region of an EU Member State may still allow the relevant national government to 
use public funds to curb the risk of a significant adverse effect on the financial system, 
 
189 E.g. impact on SME financing in that region. 
190 Recently, the Italian government has approved provisions to ensure that compulsory administrative 
liquidation processes for small banks with total assets of up to €5 billion (with the exception of 
cooperative credit banks) can be managed in an orderly manner with State support due to the 
exceptional circumstances of the Covid-related crisis (“Decreto Rilancio”, converted into Law 
No.77/2020). Under the Decree, the Ministry of Finance is authorised to grant State aid to facilitate 
the purchase of a failing bank's assets and liabilities, business/business units and account portfolios by 
another bank. These measures include (i) the conversion of the deferred tax assets of the bank in 
liquidation or of the purchaser into tax assets (even if not recognised in the financial statements), (ii) 
the granting of a guarantee to the purchaser on some of the items transferred, and (iii) aid to the 
purchaser if these measures are insufficient. These measures would be subject to (i) confirmation by 
the European Commission that they are compatible with State aid rules and (ii) a Ministry of Economy 
and Finance decree, taking into account any indications by the Bank of Italy.  
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possibly engendering contagion, in a manner that would otherwise be forbidden under 
the BRRD framework.  
In clarifying the link between resolution and liquidation, the BRRD as 
recently amended (‘BRRD2’)191 highlights that banks that are likely to fail but do not 
enter resolution due to the absence of a “public interest” must be “wound up in an 
orderly manner in accordance with the applicable national law”. Thus, the options for 
restructuring institutions in the current combined regime of resolution and State aid 
rules can be visualised in the graph below. 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
In accordance with how the regulatory framework is set now, public funds 
may be provided in the form of liquidation aid in insolvency on terms that are less 
restrictive than those that would apply if resolution funding arrangements were used 
instead. As a consequence, it may be that some creditors receive a better treatment 
under insolvency than they would under resolution. A crucial point to note, then, is 
that there may be distorted incentives for the relevant authorities in their public 
interest assessment, if they have compelling enough reasons to avoid the allocation 
 
191 Amending Directive (EU) 2019/879. 
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of losses to some classes of debt holders under the extensive requirements that the 
resolution framework would entail.192  
Another relevant concern relates to the ‘calibration’ of the public interest 
assessment. If a high bar is set for finding a public interest, a misalignment would be 
established between European supervision of banks carried out at within the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism framework and crisis management, which would remain 
national in nature, due to the fact that SSM-supervised banks may not meet the public 
interest threshold, which would justify a resolution.193 This could generate further 
uncertainty in the applicability of the rules and possibly amplify differences in crisis 
management approaches within the European Union.  
6. Bailout expectations impact on bank behaviour   
It is now worthwhile to turn to the issue of bank behaviour and how the 
expectation of possibly being on the receiving end of a precautionary recapitalisation 
might influence it. To this end, the definitions of bank “significance” and “serious 
disturbance” in the economy caused by a bank failure must be elaborated upon. 
Indeed, these two concepts play a crucial role in the determination of which crisis 
management tool to apply in case a bank is failing. In turn, they might thus affect 
banks’ behaviour in relation to their possible anticipation of a State rescue.  
Insofar as a “serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State” can be 
considered as an exogenous event outside of a bank’s control, then a precautionary 
recapitalisation should not generate a moral hazard problem.194 However, no official 
EU document elaborates on the definition of serious disturbance in the economy or 
on the elements that need to be present in order to assess that such a disturbance has 
indeed materialised. Therefore, due to the flexibility granted to authorities in the 
determination of the existence of such a disturbance, one implication that follows is 
that a bank can still form expectations on the likelihood of being bailed out through 
 
192 This is a point raised, among others, by Restoy, Vrbaski and Walters (2020) and noted in the context 
of the liquidation of the two Venetian banks by Asimakopoulos (2018), with reference to the fact that 
the political reasons for the Italian State to avoid a full-fledged bail-in in order to spare retail investors 
in particular were clearly evident. 
193 Deslandes, Dias, Magnus (2019). 
194 Olivares-Carminal and Russo (2017), supra note 183. 
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a precautionary recapitalisation, if there is the perception that the bank is indeed 
relevant for a State’s economy.195  
Moreover, since banks are supervised on an ongoing basis, the repeated 
interaction with the relevant supervisors might influence their expectations on the 
evaluation they could receive and what (if any) corrective measures would potentially 
be required of them in case a supervisory exercise yielded negative results. In the area 
of State aid, the right to rely on the principle of legitimate expectations presupposes 
that “precise, unconditional and consistent assurances” originating from authorised, 
reliable sources have been given to the person concerned by the competent authorities 
of the European Union.196 The introduction of the rules on bank resolution should 
have eliminated the formation of expectations as regards the potential receipt of 
public aid, thus rendering such a principle ineffectual as grounds for litigation. 
However, the continued presence of an option such as the one for access to a 
precautionary recapitalisation might undermine this assumption. 
Indeed, if a bank is “significant enough”, it might develop ex ante 
expectations that it will be bailed out by the State in case a capital shortfall is found 
after a stress test. Then, the crucial point upon which rests the choice of banks that 
would warrant being rescued lies in the definition of significance of an institution. 
The case of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza, to which precautionary 
recapitalisations were denied, seems to point to a definition of significance that relies 
on the cross-border relevance of a bank’s operations. In this sense, the holding 
companies of the biggest European banking groups with relevant international 
activities could form the expectation to be bailed out in case of a failed stress test, 
posited that they in any case remain solvent.  
Then, national political interests are still prevalent in choices related to 
banking sector rescues, which might imply individual States are not willing to defer 
power to European authorities as regards the management of their own banks’ 
distress.197 In theory, a State could even declare one of its banks to not be systemically 
 
195 Micossi S., Bruzzone G. and Cassella M., “Fine-Tuning the Use of Bail-In to Promote a Stronger 
EU Financial System”, 2016, CEPS Special Report, No. 136. 
196 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl in case C-526/14, Kotnik, 18 February 2016, point 62.  
197 Véron N., “Precautionary recapitalisation: time for a review?”, 2017, Bruegel Policy Contribution 
Issue n. 21. 
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relevant at European level, in order to deal with its restructuring at the national level, 
thus avoiding supranational interference. Even the blurred definition of significance 
or systemic relevance resulting from the “public interest test” grants a leeway for 
different interpretations, which might enable governments to circumvent resolution 
rules, lessening the credibility of the overall regulatory framework devised for the 
management of bank failures as a result. Therefore, competent authorities and 
Member States might still be reluctant to use resolution tools, which were designed 
to protect taxpayers, for fear of hampering financial stability and creating contagion 
instead. In some other cases, national authorities are even reluctant to place their 
banks under resolution. Those fears result from interconnectedness and contagion 
effects in the banking system and the financial system as a whole, as well as from 
legacy problems, such as the sale of bail-inable securities to small retail investors in 
countries such as Italy and Spain, which make resolution less politically palatable.  
7. Stress test results impact on bailout expectations and bank behaviour  
In addition to the concepts of “bank significance” and “serious disturbance in 
the economy of a Member State”, one other element that can trigger a precautionary 
recapitalisation must be addressed, namely the finding of a capital shortfall in the 
adverse scenario of a stress test. There is a whole strand of literature examining 
whether information disseminated through the disclosure of the outcomes of stress 
tests reduces the opacity of banks’ activities (Morgan et al., 2014; Cardinali and 
Nordmark, 2011; Beltratti, 2011; Ellahie, 2012; Petrella and Resti, 2013). Most 
studies conclude that stress tests indeed unveil valuable information for market 
participants, thus playing a role in attenuating bank opacity.198 “Even outside of a 
period of crisis, the disclosure of stress test results and assessments provides valuable 
information to market participants and the public, enhances transparency, and 
promotes market discipline” (Bernanke, 2013). Therefore, on a basic level, the 
recourse to stress tests could have pro-competitive effects, insofar as it enables the 
dissemination of information regarding the bank’s capital position and viability, thus 
 
198 Georgescu et al. (2017) have also assessed the implications of the 2014 Comprehensive Assessment 
and the 2016 EBA EU-wide stress test in this respect, finding that the stress test disclosures revealed 
new information that was priced by the markets and enhanced price discrimination, with the impact 
on bank CDS spreads and equity prices tending to be stronger for those banks that performed worse 
in the stress test exercises. 
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exposing its resilience to economic shocks and its overall “quality” to current and 
potential investors and depositors. 
As for the potential impact of a stress testing exercise on bank behaviour, it 
seems unlikely that a bank can act so that it will be able to fail a stress test ad hoc, 
for the precise purpose of being bailed out. This is made more evident by the fact that 
even the finding of a capital shortfall depends upon a number of different conditions 
being verified at the same time. Indeed, “a capital shortfall with respect to one or 
more of the prudential capital requirements only arises if all of the supervisor’s 
assumptions prove correct”.199 
In addition, stress tests carried out by the EBA, for instance, do not contain a 
pass/fail threshold. Rather, their purpose is to inform the supervisors' ongoing review 
of banks, enabling them to support the repair of banks’ balance sheets, by assessing 
institutions’ ability to meet applicable minimum and additional capital requirements 
under stressed scenarios. This should also imply that the financial institutions 
involved in such an exercise could not anticipate whether they would be at the margin 
between passing and failing. As a consequence, their behaviour before the 
communication of the stress test results should not have been much altered, as 
concerns the anticipation of a potential bailout.  
Along these lines, transparency or stress test exercises possibly carried out by 
supervisors without prior knowledge of the institutions concerned might have even 
less of an impact on banks’ expectations of receiving State support, as they lack the 
element of public disclosure that could push institutions and the market to anticipate 
that a potential intervention - be it private or public in nature- might become 
necessary to bolster the capital position of a bank in the future.  
8. Market structure and competition implications of precautionary 
recapitalisation vs. liquidation aid 
Having established from a theoretical point of view what are the potential 
competitive concerns arising from precautionary recapitalisations and from 
 
199 Alvaro et al. (2017), supra note 179, noting that such an assumption cannot be taken as rule and, 
in any case, if burden-sharing is imposed immediately, it would be hard for the shareholders and 
creditors affected to have a counterfactual on the basis of which they could demonstrate whether the 
shortfall indeed existed or their write-down and conversion was a self-fulfilling prophecy.   
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liquidation aid, it is also worthwhile to compare the two sets of measures to assess 
whether different implications for the competitive structure of the market in which 
aided institutions operate could arise when either of the two is applied. Precautionary 
recapitalisations, like all recapitalisations, maintain the market structure in which the 
aided firms operate unvaried. This is due to the fact that the number of market 
operators is unaltered, with such measures preserving the ailing bank as a standalone 
entity in an “artificial” way, as, in the absence of support, the bank would possibly 
not be able to recoup losses and revert to a sufficient level of capitalisation. In the 
case of liquidation instead, the ailing bank, or a consistent part of it, would be forced 
to exit the market, thus reducing the number of market operators and consolidating 
the market, possibly also transferring portfolios rights and liabilities to competitors, 
in case those would be necessary to curb financial instability or to pursue public 
policy objectives such as the protection of depositors. 
Both kinds of measures would be disciplined by State aid rules as delineated 
in the 2013 Banking Communication, as they escape the resolution framework. Thus, 
in either case, appropriate State remuneration, burden-sharing and behavioural 
safeguards will be required, on the basis of the amount of aid granted, whether the 
bank will exit the market or not after intervention, and the efforts made to minimise 
reliance on public support. 
8.1 Burden-sharing and acquisition of control 
As for burden-sharing, in both cases, no mandatory intervention in loss 
absorption and recapitalisation will be required of senior debt holders and depositors. 
This would imply that, by comparison with resolution, both measures would have 
competitive drawbacks in terms of allowing a reduced scope of contributions by 
shareholders and subordinated creditors to limit the recourse to public support. 
However, there might be a difference between the two measures, as, in the case of 
insolvency, shareholders and subordinated creditors contribute by being left in the 
part of the bank that will be liquidated, thus having their claims fully annulled200, 
while a precautionary recapitalisation, which does not lead to the exit of the 
 
200 See Commission decision C(2017) 4501 of 25 June 2017 (SA.45664 (2017/N) – Italy) on the 
liquidation aid to Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, para. 32; Commission decision 
C(2014) 5682 of 3 August 2014 (SA.39250 (2014/N) – Portugal) in the case of Banco Espiritu Santu, 
with reference to the wind-down of the bad bank, para. 89. 
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beneficiary from the market could be completed on the basis of a less extensive 
burden-sharing consisting of subordinated debt conversion into shares and a 
significant- albeit not complete- dilution of existing shareholders.201 In this respect, 
a precautionary recapitalisation would favour banks’ investors more than liquidation 
aid would and possibly have more distortionary effects on competition, by not 
limiting to a comparable extent the recourse to public funds. 
From the point of view of acquisition of control of the aided entity by a 
competitor, liquidation would lead to a consolidation of activities in the hands of 
other market operators immediately at the time of rescue, while, in the case of a 
precautionary recapitalisation, this aspect would only be relevant in case the 
standalone beneficiary is take over from the State by a competitor, instead of any 
already existing minority shareholders, at a later stage. In this sense, if the latter did 
not occur, an event of liquidation might alter the competitive structure of the market, 
by leading to consolidation, while a precautionary recapitalisation would not. 
8.2 Market impact 
Ultimately, the difference between the two means of intervention in terms of 
impact on the competitive structure of the market in which the ailing bank is active 
will also hinge on: (i) the relative size and market presence of the bank before any 
intervention is applied; (ii) the size and “market relevance” of potential portfolios of 
assets, liabilities, or business lines transferred to an acquiring entity; (iii) the relative 
size and market presence of the acquirer. Indeed, if only small banks were liquidated, 
with little to no relevant critical functions or assets warranting a transfer to remaining 
competitors- which would not establish an overlap of activities between the merging 
entities that would significantly alter market shares- competition concerns from 
consolidation in liquidation would be very limited.  
Along the same reasoning, if only significant banks with functions essential 
to the economy warranted being rescued as standalone entities through a 
precautionary recapitalisation, consolidation achieved through the later acquisition of 
the beneficiary by a competitor could have more serious effects on the competitive 
 
201 This was the case for Monte dei Paschi: see Commission decision C(2017) 4690 (SA.47677 
(2017/N) – Italy) of 4 July 2017, para 17, subpara. iv. 
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structure of the market, potentially calling for remedies such as divestitures and 
behavioural safeguards, depending on the combined market share of the merging 
entities and the existence of other qualified competitors exerting a disciplining effect. 
In this sense, once again, the threshold set for finding the existence of a public interest 
that would justify the preservation of a bank, or its critical functions, will be crucial 
in determining the severity of the (potential) competitive distortions arising from the 
rescue measures and the related remedies applied by competition authorities to avert 
the danger of establishing or reinforcing dominant positions in the market. 
In light of the above, the financial stability justifications for the application of 
the aid measures discussed would go hand in hand with (potential) competitive 
distortions to be addressed with appropriate remedies and with a desirable increase 
in the degree of alignment of burden-sharing impositions across different aid schemes 
approved by the Commission. 
9. Bank recapitalisation prospects in Covid-times  
After the considerations of the previous sections, it is worthwhile to turn to 
considering to what extent the unprecedented circumstances of the economic crisis 
triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic and the lockdown measures put in place by 
Member States to stem its spread could affect, which prompted a relaxation of the 
State aid framework for non-financial firms, could also alter the approach to the 
rescue of financial institutions.  
In this regard, point 7 of the Temporary Framework202 sets out that, if due to 
the Covid-19 outbreak, banks were to need direct support in the form of liquidity, 
recapitalisation, or impaired asset measures, the assessment will rest on whether the 
measures meet the conditions of Article 32(4)(d) (i), (ii) or (iii) of the BRRD (thus 
including the option of a precautionary recapitalisation). The same point clarifies that, 
in such a case, beneficiaries would not be deemed to be failing or likely to fail, thus 
not triggering the condition for resolution. More importantly, however, insofar as 
such support measures would be needed to address problems linked to the Covid-19 
outbreak, they would benefit from the burden-sharing exception of point 45 of the 
 
202 Communication C(2020) 1863 of 19 March 2020 from the Commission establishing a Temporary 
Framework for State aid measures to support the economy in the current Covid-19 outbreak. 
103 
 
2013 Banking Communication, therefore sparing shareholders and subordinated 
creditors from contributing.203 
Some authors have advocated for the organisation of precautionary 
recapitalisation measures at European level by putting the European Stability 
Mechanism in charge of them, in order to support the European banking system in 
these unprecedented times.204 This extraordinary concession of a deviation from both 
resolution and State aid burden-sharing requirements hinges on the reasoning that, 
where asset deterioration concerned mostly Covid-related loans extended or liquidity 
shortages were due to a generalised contraction, it is reasonable to suppose that public 
intervention would be warranted, in order not to exacerbate the economic crisis 
through additional instability potentially brought about by wide-spread requests for 
banks to recapitalise privately when market conditions are already dire. 
Differently, if a bank’s distress were the result of severe misconduct- 
including money laundering- or terrorist financing-related issues, of a single 
institution- then resolution would probably remain a viable option, insofar as the 
crisis remains idiosyncratic, with limited spillover and negative reputational effects 
for other institutions. Indeed, the relaxation of the State aid requirements makes 
explicit reference only to capital or liquidity needs arising as a consequence and in 
the context of the Covid-19 crisis. 
10. Concluding remarks 
The European legislator has provided tools so that banking crises can still be 
managed even in situations in which the application of the bail-in tool could be 
 
203 In Italy, explicit provisions on support measures to preserve financial stability in view of the 
pandemic-related crisis were included in the so-called “Decreto Rilancio” of 19 May 2020 (converted 
into Law No.77/2020). The decree authorises the Ministry of Economy and Finance, until end-2020, 
to guarantee bonds issued by Italian banks, for a total amount of up to €19 billion. The State guarantees 
will be subject to: (i) verification by the Bank of Italy or the ECB that the banks concerned meet their 
capital requirements, and (ii) approval by the European Commission under the State aid framework. 
Even if banks requiring such aid do not meet these requirements, they will remain eligible to receive 
the aid, as long as their equity is still positive and they have an urgent need for a liquidity boost. 
204 See Schularick, Steffen and Tröger (2020) for a discussion on the prospects regarding the 
management of potential bank failures in the context of the pandemic-triggered crisis. Arner, 
Avgouleas and Gibson (2020) suggest a combination of balance sheet restructuring and the use of 
AMCs to manage NPLs to approach systemic bank crises or those caused by unexpected exogenous 
factors, as is the case for the current disruption in economic activity caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, 
holding that these crises call for the preservation of financial stability as the primary goal policy-
makers should pursue, rather than the containment of moral hazard. 
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counterproductive. Indeed, public intervention by way of the so-called precautionary 
recapitalisation is one of the available crisis management tools. However, in this 
regard, it is crucial that the authorities intervene before the bank in trouble ‘crosses 
the line’ of insolvency, as some recent cases of Greek and Italian banks have 
demonstrated. 
The applicability of the precautionary recapitalisation tool is justified on both 
transitional and permanent grounds, in order to facilitate the progress of completion 
of the Banking Union, as well as to account for severe cases of financial instability, 
in which the application of bail-in instead would be undesirable. However, due to 
vagueness in the wording of Art. 32(4) of the BRRD, national governments and 
European authorities are left with a certain degree of discretion in choosing which 
instances and institutions warrant the granting of a precautionary recapitalisation. 
Indeed, the “public interest principle” set out in Article 32(5) BRRD, which justifies 
precautionary recapitalisations, is likely to remain inextricably linked with and 
influenced by national biases, which might result in economically inefficient 
outcomes. 
It seems that the anticipation of receiving a precautionary recapitalisation 
would not significantly alter bank behaviour ex ante, compared to “regular” 
recapitalisations, due to the requirement that the aid beneficiary is solvent and that a 
stress test surely highlights a capital shortfall in an adverse scenario. However, if this 
is considered in the context of the resolution framework, which established 
precautionary recapitalisation as an exception to be applied in specific and 
extraordinary circumstances, it could raise issues concerning the credibility of bail-
in to tackle bank crises, which, in the long term, might imply a re-adjustment of 
banks’ credit ratings205 and a change in funding costs. 
The academic and policy debate regarding the viability of the precautionary 
recapitalisation instrument has built favourable arguments in support of its 
preservation as part of the EU bank crisis management toolkit. Some proposals are 
 
205 On evidence that credit ratings are seen as a high‐credibility tool, helping market investors to better 
exercise market discipline, see, among others, Rocamora, Suárez and Monjas (2020), who have looked 
at MREL-eligible debt instruments in particular. 
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now being advanced, exploring options to improve and strengthen the overall policy 
framework.   
As part of the debate that might concern the text of the BRRD itself, assessing 
anew the necessity of keeping the precautionary recapitalisation instrument available 
might become more pressing for the evaluation of the sustainability of the broader 
framework of bank crisis management rules. This crucially relies on whether 
precautionary recapitalisation can only be justified on transitional grounds or on the 
basis of more permanent considerations. More specifically, the precautionary 
recapitalisation tool kept as a permanent tool in the crisis management framework 
could be effective in ensuring financial stability when there is a threat of a serious 
disturbance in the economy. However, this beneficial effect must be weighed against 
the drawbacks arising from the potential creation of an expectation of public 
assistance for the banks. This point would be crucial for the credibility and 
sustainability of the resolution framework as established. Further considerations on 
avenues for an improved application of precautionary recapitalisations in practice 



























Chapter 4: State Aid and competition-related issues in 





The aim of the BRRD and the resolution framework it introduced, as 
anticipated in previous chapters, is to enable failing banks to be resolved and 
restructured in an orderly manner, without disrupting the financial system or the real 
economy while minimising costs for taxpayers. When exercising their resolution 
powers, resolution authorities should take into account the objectives set by the 
regulatory framework, with the aim to choose the tools and strategies that best 
achieve the objectives that are relevant in the event of a specific bank failure. 
Specifically, the BRRD set out that resolution should (i) ensure the continuity of 
critical functions206; (ii) avoid significant  adverse effects on financial stability, 
especially by preventing contagion, including to market infrastructures, and by 
maintaining market discipline207; (iii) protect public funds by minimising reliance on 
extraordinary public financial support208; (iv) protect depositors covered by the  
Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD) and investors covered by the Investor 
Compensation Scheme Directive (ICSD)209; and (iv) protect client funds and client 
assets.210 
Depending on the single banks concerned, not all resolution objectives might 
be equally relevant, thus calling for tailoring the application of resolution tools to the 
specificities and structure of each banking group. Different resolution tools have 
different implications for how a failing bank is restructured and in which form it 
remains operative on the market after intervention. This is relevant insofar as 
competitive concerns may arise in the application of resolution tools and strategies, 
 
206 Recitals 1, 4, 5, 25, 45, 49, 70, 72, 90, 114, and 125 of the BRRD. 
207 Recitals 3, 4, 11, 13, 14, 18, 24, 29, 38, 40, 41, 45, 49, 63, 67, 92, 97, 99, 102, 108, and 132 of the 
BRRD. 
208 Recitals 1, 5, 8, 31, 45, and 67 of the BRRD. 
209 Recitals 45, 71, 110-112 of the BRRD.  
210 Recital 45 of the BRRD. 
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and the competitive structure of the banking market might be altered after resolution 
on the basis of the restructuring completed.  
Therefore, the focus of this chapter lies on the relationship between aspects 
relating to banking groups’ operative structures and how these may be shaped in the 
planning phase to prepare for resolution as well as in the execution of resolution 
schemes, through the application of different resolution tools under the BRRD. The 
aim is to address the competition-relevant issues arising from resolution execution 
through different tools, as well as how banks might be re-organised and restructured 
both in the preparatory phase to resolution in order to improve resolvability and when 
a resolution action is taken. To this end, the analysis will assess how intrusive the 
powers of resolution authorities may be in resolution planning and execution and to 
what extent they can include impositions on changes to the structure of institutions, 
and, as a by-product, of the banking market. Both resolution planning and the setting 
of minimum requirements on bail-in-eligible liabilities will be addressed, to then 
move to the different resolution tools available under BRRD resolution, and finally 
to the recourse to resolution funds and deposit guarantee schemes in enacting 
resolution schemes.  
2. Resolution preparedness: resolution plans and MREL 
2.1 Resolution planning  
The preparation for a potential failure is one of the key elements of the 
resolution framework. To this end, a first means through which all preparations to 
manage an event of potential distress are laid down in resolution plans. The purpose 
of drafting resolution plans is to ensure a bank’s resolvability, by obtaining a full 
understanding of the institutions and their critical functions, identifying and 
addressing any impediments to their resolvability, and making necessary preparations 
for resolution to be implementable, if needed.211 The resolution planning process 
consists in the first instance of an assessment on the feasibility and credibility of 
liquidation in case of failure, which is the default option for failing banks. If, 
however, the bank has critical functions and core business lines that would need to 
be preserved, thus justifying resolution in the public interest, the resolution strategy 
 
211 For more details, see, as an example, Schillig (2015) in Haentjens and Wessels (eds.), p. 81 and 90. 
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needs to be determined. This usually entails a choice between a single point of entry 
(SPE) or a multiple point of entry (MPE).212 For resolution authorities to be able to 
make an optimal use of the tools at their disposal to either liquidate or resolve a bank 
in an effective manner in accordance with the preferred resolution strategy, all 
substantive impediments to the resolution of a bank need to be identified and 
addressed.213   
Essentially, resolution plans set out options for the resolution of a bank, based 
on the resolution tools provided for in the BRRD, and must not assume any access to 
extraordinary public financing or emergency liquidity assistance from central banks. 
Requirements on resolvability may significantly influence banks’ models of 
operation, affecting a number of aspects encompassing group funding, service 
provision and booking of products. It might be beneficial for banks to make changes 
to their organisational, legal, business, and financial structure also in going concern, 
in particular insofar as the simplification of the various internal structures can 
contribute to improving their resolvability. In practice, a number of banks have 
indeed simplified their structure, based on motivations relating to considerations of 
internal governance, financial performance, as well as to meet regulatory or 
supervisory demands.214  
2.1.1 Powers to address or remove impediments to resolvability 
The assessment of a bank’s resolvability carried out by the relevant resolution 
authority in the context of resolution planning is a two-step process, through which 
 
212 See Fernández Fernández (2020) for a comparative review of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the two approaches to resolution.  
213 Article 17(5) BRRD and the corresponding Article 10(11) SRMR provide resolution authorities 
with a range of powers they can deploy to remove banks’ impediments to resolvability before their 
failure. Such powers to intervene can be used if measures proposed by banks themselves are deemed 
to be insufficient to address or remove resolvability impediments. The EBA has further specified both 
measures and powers to reduce or remove impediments to resolvability in specific guidelines. See 
EBA Guidelines on the specification of measures to reduce or remove impediments to resolvability 
and the circumstances in which each measure may be applied under Directive 2014/59/EU 
(EBA/GL/2014/11) of 19 December 2014. De Groen (2019) analyses the current status of the process 
to identify and address impediments to resolvability of European banks, especially those under the 
remit of the SRB. From the analysis, it appears that the SRB relies more on banks to address 
resolvability impediments, rather than taking on a more proactive role and no notification to the EBA 
has been made so far when banks are not considered to be resolvable, thus raising the issue that 
improvements are needed in this respect to safeguard level-playing field for banks and ensure their 
resolvability, also through heightened disclosures. 




the authority first communicates its assessment to the bank and allows to propose 
measure to address and remove any identified impediments, and then possibly 
requires the bank to implement additional measures, if unsatisfied with those already 
proposed or taken. In this context, resolution authorities have the power to require 
changes to the structure and organisation of banks or banking groups with a view to 
removing impediments to the application of resolution tools and strategies, ensuring 
the resolvability of the entities concerned. The measures that can be imposed upon 
institutions include:  
− limiting maximum individual and aggregate exposures;  
− divesting specific assets;  
− limiting or ceasing specific existing or proposed activities;  
− restricting or preventing the development of business lines or sale of products;  
− changing the legal or operational structures of the entity or any group entity 
under its control, so as to reduce its complexity and ensure that critical 
functions can be legally and operationally separated from other functions, if 
needed;  
− setting up a Union parent financial holding company; and 
− issuing eligible liabilities. 
Such powers should establish sufficient incentives for banks to avoid an 
external imposition of changes to their operational models by investing on improving 
resolvability on their own terms before being forced to do so by resolution authorities. 
The most ‘intrusive’ means of intervention that resolution authorities have at their 
disposal, due to their having direct implications for the structure of institutions and 
how those structures might be reshaped in anticipation of resolution, are those 
providing for asset divestments and changes to operational and legal structures, aimed 
at easing the separability of critical functions in resolution. Since resolution 
authorities’ powers in this respect would apply in a business-as-usual state, the 
intrusiveness of the available measures is less significant than early intervention215 
ones, even though some similarities exist with respect to the limitation of specific 
activities and divestment of (risky) assets. As the practical implementation of 
resolvability assessments by resolution authorities in Europe is still a work in 
 
215 Early intervention measures are applied by supervisory authorities, as disciplined by Art. 104 of 
Directive 2013/36 (‘CRD IV’). 
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progress216, there is no evidence to be drawn yet on the actual willingness and ability 
of authorities to impose wide-sweeping measures to reorganise and restructure 
institutions already in the resolution planning phase, if substantive impediments to 
resolvability are identified. However, it is reasonable to expect that any effect would 
likely be self-contained and mostly concern institutions’ internal functioning, thus 
being less likely to have systemic effects on market structures. 
2.1.2 Resolvability assessment 
Resolvability is a resolution group matter, as the resolution objectives should 
be met at the level of resolution group.217 Indeed, BRRD2 formalises that the 
resolvability assessment should be carried out at the level of the resolution group as 
well as at the banking group level. Annex C to the BRRD lists the factors that should 
be taken into account by resolution authorities in making their resolvability 
assessments. Not all will be given equal weighting as they might be more or less 
relevant to different institutions, depending on the specific characteristics of the bank 
considered. In broad terms, the areas of focus for the assessments should relate to the 
legal, operational and financial structures of a banking group. These entail 
considerations around the following: 
− governance structures; 
− the suitability of liability structures for an effective execution of bail-in; 
− data and management information systems capabilities; 
− intra-group transactions and booking practices; 
− critical functions and operational continuity;  
− legal entity structures. 
A bank’s liability structure is one of the primary determinants of its 
resolvability, affecting the availability of loss-absorbing capacity that can be drawn 
on in resolution, as indicated by the bank’s level of MREL-eligible liabilities, which 
is discussed more in detail in Section 2.3 below. 
 
216 De Groen (2019). 
217 ‘Resolution group’ is defined in Art. 2(83b) BRRD as (a) a resolution entity and its subsidiaries 
that are not: (i) resolution entities themselves; (ii) subsidiaries of other resolution entities; or (iii) 
entities established in a third country that are not included in the resolution group in accordance with 
the resolution plan and their subsidiaries; or (b) credit institutions permanently affiliated to a central 
body and the central body itself when at least one of those credit institutions or the central body is a 
resolution entity, and their respective subsidiaries. 
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Resolution planning requires the mapping of services to critical functions, as 
well as of functions to legal entities, pushing banks to take a more resolution-entity 
focused approach to prepare for the application of resolution tools, if needed. Any 
complexity in the structures delivering critical functions needs to be scrutinised, in 
order to ensure smooth separation at the time of resolution, if necessary.218 
Maintaining critical operations running through resolution and the subsequent 
restructuring of the bank is one of the principal objectives of the resolution 
framework.  
At a minimum, the resolvability assessment relating to operational continuity 
would focus on banks’ analysis and documentation of their service level agreements, 
which must be robust to resolution events. Legal entity structures should also not 
inhibit the application of resolution tools, as resolution powers will be applied at the 
level of resolution entities, with the contracting entities and terms of its contract being 
more relevant than the bank’s internal operating structure. 
2.2 SPE vs. MPE resolution strategies  
In defining which approach to apply for the application of a resolution 
strategy to a banking group, the appropriateness of either an SPE or an MPE approach 
hinges on the operational structure of each bank and on the related spillover risks.219 
If a bank’s operations are highly interdependent and complementary, with direct 
spillovers among entities in different jurisdictions, an SPE strategy would be more 
suitable. Otherwise, for more cross-border banks with a more decentralised structure, 
an MPE approach would be more efficient.220 Yet, in evaluating the two approaches, 
other aspects should be also taken into account, including the likelihood that the 
chosen resolution strategy will actually be implemented in different jurisdictions, by 
different national resolution authorities, and the tension between the autonomy of 
group subsidiaries autonomy, which would enable separability, and the efficiency of 
the overall group.221 
 
218 One option sometimes pursued for the simplification of complexities in this regard entails 
operational subsidiarisation, through the establishment of a standalone legal entity within the group 
not carrying out any regulated activities, but only dedicated to housing the services necessary to 
support critical functions, centralising contracts and services. 
219 For an analysis in respect of global banks, see Bolton and Oehmke (2019). 
220 Ibid. 
221 For a more detailed discussion on this point, see Schoenmaker (2016). 
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However, either at the resolution planning stage or at the time of resolution 
execution, national regulators might find the SPE to be against their individual 
interest, due to the size of the cross-jurisdictional cash flow transfer.222 If then there 
is an ex post failure of the envisaged SPE strategy, host country authorities might 
ring-fence the local branch or subsidiary of the bank involved.223 On the other hand, 
an MPE approach relies on the autonomy of legal entities operating in different 
jurisdictions, enabling separability along national lines within the same cross-border 
banking group. However, it has the downside of producing costly or inefficient 
outcomes where intra-group interdependencies are strong. 
2.2.1 Separability 
One of the aspects addressed in the assessment of resolvability which is 
tightly related to banks’ structure, complexity and interdependencies is the extent to 
which a group is separable. Separation is required for all partial transfer strategies 
and asset deals. There is no legal definition of what separability means in the context 
of an MPE strategy, apart from indications that an MPE strategy is more suitable to 
more decentralised banks. In broad terms, resolvability in the context of an MPE 
strategy is the same as resolvability in the context of a SPE approach, in the sense 
that the objective is to ensure that, post-resolution, the resulting entity can continue 
to operate, following a change of ownership and management. In that sense, it is 
useful to think about interactions between the resolution group or entity to be 
separated and the parent as a relationship between a recipient and the provider of a 
service or function that is being outsourced.  
In devising a transfer strategy, in the first instance, the resolution authority 
should define the resolution objectives in relation to the planned separation. The 
chosen resolution strategy, be it a transfer of assets and liabilities to a bridge 
institution or to an AMC, depends on the specific situation and on the resolution 
objectives that have been identified as being of essence in the particular 
circumstances relating to the institution. The resolution objectives build the 
foundation of all discretionary decisions which have to be taken in determining the 
transfer units and calculating the exact perimeter of the transfer. A transfer unit is 
 
222 Supra, note 220. 
223 Huertas (2014), Schoenmaker (2016). 
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intended here as the smallest possible group of assets, liabilities and rights that should 
be transferred together. In order to determine the transfer units, the core assessment 
should focus on which connections between the transfer items should be protected, 
either due to legal obligations or based on a discretionary decision in order to ensure 
the realisation of one or more resolution objectives.  
2.2.1.1 Practical considerations on separability for the execution of transfer strategies 
The operational and financial continuity of the new legal entity- in particular 
in case of a bridge bank and AMC- have to be taken into consideration when 
optimising the transfer portfolio. This entails accounting, among others, for service 
level agreements (SLAs) for IT continuance, human resources, access to financial 
market infrastructures (FMIs), initial funding and refinancing options. As for how 
these conditions might change depending on the approach chosen for the point of 
entry at which resolution tools will be applied, an MPE strategy could allow for 
separability at the level of group subsidiaries, to address which subset of assets, 
liabilities and rights of a specific subsidiary should be kept together.  
Indeed, MPE strategies may involve the application of multiple SPE 
resolutions to different parts of the firm, such as separable geographical blocs. An 
MPE strategy should then ensure that the resolution actions applied at each point of 
entry are consistent across the banking group. Where an SPE strategy is chosen, 
instead, an identification should be made of the operational subsidiaries that should 
remain open and operative in resolution if losses are upstreamed and absorbed at the 
top of the group and the parent or holding company down-streams capital and 
liquidity in support of subsidiaries. The strategy should also verify whether certain 
group entities are sufficiently separable to be resolved separately, if necessary, for 
instance when the losses of specific subsidiaries exceed the loss absorbing capacity 
of the parent or holding company.  
In case the separation determined by the chosen resolution strategy is 
completed by way of a share acquisition of the separated part of the entity in 
resolution by a third party, it will be the responsibility of the acquirer to ensure the 
operational viability of the transferred entity, as there would be an immediate 
acquisition of control by another already existing institution. Otherwise, where the 
separation consists in the detachment of part of an entity with the final aim to render 
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it self-standing after resolution, all of the appropriate financial, legal and operational 
arrangements to allow the entity to have the necessary means to remain viable should 
already be accounted for at the resolution planning stage. Then, it might be the case 
that the separated entity is acquired by a third party at a later stage.  
Depending on how broad the perimeter of the transfer is set and which critical 
functions or core business lines it includes, the competition-relevant implications of 
the transfer strategies might differ. Where only a reduced portfolio of assets is 
transferred, there might be no significant alteration of the competitive structure of the 
market after resolution. On the other hand, if the transfer perimeter encompasses most 
assets and liabilities of the failing institution, with the exception of non-performing 
loans for instance, then the impact on the market structure could be more pronounced 
and will undergo scrutiny by antitrust authorities on the basis of the market presence 
of both the transferred entity and its acquirer, if the areas of activity of the two happen 
to overlap. In order for an acquisition to be cleared under the applicable competition 
rules, the post-merger market shares should not indicate the existence or creation of 
a dominant position of the entity emerging from the transfer, and, to this end, the 
presence of other qualified competitors active in the same market segments will also 
be evaluated favourably. More details in this respect are highlighted in Section 3. 
2.3 MREL 
Together with effective resolution planning, the setting of a minimum 
requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) contributes to ensuring 
that no public money is required in case of a bank's failure. The BRRD and SRMR 
requirements, which set out for banks to build and maintain sufficient loss-absorbing 
capacity to support the preferred resolution strategy, are intended to facilitate the 
feasibility of bail-in when the time comes for resolution to be enacted. More 
specifically, credit institutions are required to hold a sufficient amount of MREL at 
all times, consisting of own funds instruments and eligible liabilities that can be used 
by resolution authorities to absorb losses and recapitalise an institution that is failing 
or likely to fail.  
The calibration of the requirement is based on two components: (i) a loss 
absorbency amount (LAA), equal to the sum of the bank’s Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 capital 
requirements and its fully-loaded combined buffer requirement, which should ensure 
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the full coverage of losses in the event of resolution; and (ii) a recapitalisation amount 
(RCA), equal to the sum of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 capital needed to maintain a banking 
license together with a buffer to ensure market confidence after resolution, which 
should restore the capital position of the bank. 
To be eligible as MREL, instruments should be (i) issued, (ii) fully paid-up 
(iii) with a remaining maturity of at least one year, and (iv) not guaranteed or funded 
by the institution itself. The BRRD2 has introduced an additional leverage-based 
dimension to compute external and internal MREL requirements. More specifically, 
LAA and RCA should not only be computed as a percentage of the total risk exposure 
amount (TREA), but also as a percentage of the Leverage Ratio Exposure Measure 
(LREM). Therefore MREL will need to be expressed as two ratios to be met in 
parallel: (i) as a percentage of TREA; and (ii) as a percentage of the LREM.  
2.3.1 Computation base 
The choice of the measure for MREL and TLAC computation might have 
different implications for how requirements are allocated across banks, depending on 
whether the benchmark for calibration is based on risk-weighted assets, total assets, 
or leverage exposure.224 Indeed, measures based on risk-weighted assets have been 
found to lead to requirements which are comparatively heavier for smaller banks, 
while total assets and leverage exposures appear to be more aligned across banks, 
irrespective of their size.225 Thus, using a leverage ratio-based requirement would 
allow for an MREL calibration that is proportionate with capital requirements, 
depending on which buffers are included. This approach should also enable to 
implicitly account for total assets, as they are generally strongly correlated with 
leverage exposure. The fact that the BRRD2 and SRMR2 have introduced the 
requirement of a “double” MREL calibration based on RWAs and LREM should 
alleviate size-related biases compared to the previous formulation of the requirement 
and, as a consequence, ensure a more balanced and fair approach. 
MREL is set both on a consolidated basis for the banking group or resolution 
group and on an individual basis for single resolution entities. Depending on the 
 





preferred resolution strategy, MREL levels may vary across entities within the same 
group. The purpose is to ensure that all entities which are relevant for the execution 
of the resolution strategy have levels of MREL which are sufficient and correctly 
positioned within the group to effectively execute the actions envisaged in the plan. 
As MREL is institution-specific, resolution authorities’ calibration of the requirement 
should also take care to ensure a level playing field across different banks in the 
industry and prevent undue competitive distortions. In this sense, MREL calibrations 
must be guided by the principle of proportionality, in order to ensure that the different 
MREL targets for credit institutions, as measured in terms of their risk-weighted 
assets, are comparable with those of similar peers and balanced around the average 
targets of other national and Banking Union banks, as well as being appropriately 
reflective of to the single banks’ size, business model and risk profile.226  
2.3.2 Proportionate calibration of MREL 
Already in 2015, the Bank of England advanced the view that resolution 
strategies should be assigned according to bank size, by requiring banks above a 
certain threshold to hold an MREL consistent with bail-in, and small banks to hold 
an MREL consistent with liquidation, entailing a recapitalisation amount of zero. 
Such a simplification has the purpose of limiting the discretion of resolution 
authorities and clearly signaling which strategy will be applied to recapitalise and 
restructure which banks, in case of distress. The revised BRRD and SRMR have 
effectively incorporated such considerations, allowing supervisors to accept a lower 
bail-in buffer from those banks with limited access to capital markets.  
2.3.2.1 Calibration based on size and choice of resolution tool 
One other relevant aspect to consider is that the BRRD2 and CRR2 effectively 
introduced an harmonised requirement for full MREL subordination applying to G-
 
226 Lamandini and Ramos Muñoz (2019). See also case 8/18 decided by the SRB Appeal Panel, who 
found  “no reasons to reject the Board’s argument that, in such circumstances, an increase of MREL 
to 8% 14 of TLOF would most likely imply a disproportionate approach vis-à-vis peers active in the 
[same national] market but also in the Banking Union and could possibly have unintended 
consequences of serious distortion of the competitive level playing field” (para. 34). As reported by 
the EBA (2020), the National Bank of Romania, in its role of resolution authority has made direct 
reference to the fact that the MREL recapitalisation amount is “benchmarked against the capital 
position of peer institutions” (see annex to EBA Quantitative MREL Report). 
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SIBs and ‘top tier’ banks227 or ‘fished’ banks228, but left discretion to authorities as 
regards other institutions.229 This, on the one hand, allows to retain flexibility in 
adjusting bail-in requirements to different bank models, but on the other hand, affects 
banks’ funding structures in different ways, if no full subordination is imposed with 
respect to institutions other than G-SIBs and ‘top tier’ banks.  
As anticipated, MREL is differently calibrated for small banks, for which no 
recapitalisation amount is required as their preferred resolution strategy will most 
likely consist of liquidation under national insolvency procedures, as their failure is 
less likely to pose systemic risks. However, recent experience of crisis management 
cases230 has proven that the boundary between significant and less significant banks 
is not exactly clear cut. As a matter of fact, what is identified as significant at the 
resolution planning stage could become less so at the point of non-viability (PONV), 
depending on whether the public interest test for resolution is met or not. It may be 
the case that the categorisation distinguishing between systemically important and 
less significant institutions as applied within the framework of the SSM and SRM 
could be accurate at the extremes, but less straightforward for the in-between middle-
sized institutions, blurring the lines between large and small banks.231 
A further example of proportionate MREL calibration accounts for the 
application of different resolution tools and is identifiable in the fact that the 
recapitalisation amount (RCA) of the MREL can be calibrated and scaled down 
where transfer strategies are chosen, so as to reflect the lower recapitalisation needs 
brought about by the transfer and/or liquidation of some bank assets.232 
 
227 Resolution entities part of a resolution group the total assets of which exceed €100 billion, pursuant 
to Art. 45c(5) BRRD. 
228 Resolution entities part of a resolution group the total assets of which are below €100 billion, but 
assessed by the resolution authority as reasonably likely to pose a systemic risk in an event of failure, 
pursuant to Art. 45c(6) BRRD. 
229 The EBA (2020) observed that until now subordination requirements have differed depending on 
the policies of the relevant resolution authorities and on their aversion to the risk of breaching the 
NCWO principle, finding a variation in subordination levels ranging between 68.2% and 100% of total 
MREL. 
230 See Chapter 5 for an in-depth analysis of recent cases. 
231 See Joosen et al. (2018), who also argue in favour of a more proportionate approach to banking 
regulation in Europe. 




2.3.2.2 Institutions’ ability to issue MREL 
Differences are not identifiable exclusively in target calibrations but also in 
institutions’ ability to issue and successfully place MREL-eligible liabilities. On the 
basis of observations on the build-up of MREL liabilities in practice, MREL 
shortfalls vary depending on the type and size of the banks and their resolution 
groups, with larger banks registering a lesser disadvantage.233 Another issue to 
consider relates to the fact that the capacity of the market to absorb the issuances of 
instruments required to meet MREL targets is country-specific and is also dependent 
on the ability and appetite of local investors.234 Hence, existing home biases could 
further hinder the capacity of markets to absorb MREL-eligible securities issued by 
banks established in countries such as the Southern European ones. 
As a consequence, it may be the case that minimum bail-in conditions, and 
the requirements on MREL and TLAC associated with them, could become a binding 
constraint on the sustainability of banks’ business models and affect the competitive 
structure of the banking markets to some extent.235 In particular, those banks whose 
business models do not easily allow them to access capital markets to issue 
subordinated and other convertible liabilities to meet the requirements for a sufficient 
amount of bail-inable debt would probably experience more significant challenges.  
In view of these considerations, it seems that there is a possibility that some 
of the requirements embedded in the resolution framework allow for an effective 
application of the rules to those institutions both meeting the public interest test for 
the use of resolution powers and having a size and business model enabling a 
sufficient issuances of subordinated liabilities eligible to be bailed-in in resolution 
without undue risk of negative impacts.236 In this perspective, the resolution 
framework can be seen as potentially favouring consolidation in the banking sector, 
 
233 EBA MREL Quantitative Report, available at: https://eba.europa.eu/eba-shows-
banks%E2%80%99-progress-planning-failure-encourages-them-issue-eligible-debt-instruments. 
234 On the point of investors’ perspective on MREL, Tröger (2019) argues that it is unlikely that the 
pricing of MREL instruments can reflect an accurate risk assessment by investors due to the many 
discretionary choices that different constituencies are supposed to make and revisit to abide by the 
new regime, and this might lead to inadequate market discipline in relation to bail-inable instruments. 
235 See also the decision of 16 October 2018 of the SRB Appeal Panel in case 8/18, acknowledging 
that “[t]he MREL determination may have far-reaching implications on the return on capital, the 
business model and the competitive level playing field for all involved institutions and cannot be 
considered in isolation from the actual and prospective responsiveness of capital markets to the issue 
of large amounts of MREL-securities” (para. 30).   
236 Restoy (2018). 
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insofar as institutions unable to meet the necessary requirements could be (i) 
liquidated in case of failure, (ii) (partly) absorbed by another competitor in resolution 
or liquidation, or even (iii) aim to merge ex ante with other institutions that are better 
positioned to access capital markets to place bail-inable instruments and, thus, be 
more likely to be kept in the market through the application of resolution in case of 
failure.          
3. Resolution tools     
Resolution authorities enjoy flexibility with respect to the specific tools they 
can use to resolve a failing bank, ranging from the sale of the business to a private 
buyer, to the transfer of the business to a publicly managed bridge bank, to the 
separation of troubled assets from other assets through the creation of a “bad bank”, 
to bail-in. These resolution tools are not mutually exclusive, and are most likely to be 
combined in practice.  
3.1 Bail-in 
Bail-in can be used as a standalone tool or in combination with others, as part 
of a more articulated resolution scheme. The BRRD takes a comprehensive approach 
according to which all liabilities are in principle subject to bail-in; both statutory and 
ad hoc exemptions to this baseline rule can then be granted by the resolution 
authorities.237       
As for the order of priority with which the write-down and conversion should 
be executed, equity instruments must be affected first- starting with Common Equity 
Tier 1, then Additional Tier 1, and Tier 2- followed, in order, by: (i) subordinated 
liabilities; (ii) uncovered senior liabilities; (iii) uncovered deposits; and (iv) the 
deposit guarantee scheme (DGS) to which the bank concerned is affiliated for 
covered deposits. Each class of investors has to contribute before the following one 
can be impacted, and creditors within each class must be impacted pari passu, being 
subject to pro-rata contributions.  
 
237 Art. 44(3) BRRD provides for discretionary exclusions from bail-in. Exemptions may also be 
granted on the basis of Commission Delegated Regulation 2016/860, if there are reasons to conclude 
that a bail-in of specific liabilities would: (i) not be possible within a reasonable timeframe; (ii) cause 
contagion; (iii) impair the continuity of the institution’s critical functions; or (iv) cause a 
disproportionate value destruction.  
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This approach mimics the effects of normal insolvency procedures, in 
compliance with the “no-creditor-worse-off” (NCWO) principle, according to which 
no creditor should be worse affected in resolution than what would be the case in 
liquidation proceedings.238 The counterfactual scenario considered for the purposes 
of applying the NCWO safeguard is the national insolvency regime that would have 
applied to the bank or group entity in question.239 Such safeguard constitutes an ex 
post liability mechanism granting a right to financial compensation to any creditor 
suffering a greater loss in resolution than would have been the case under national 
insolvency proceedings. The subordination of bail-in eligible instruments, especially 
in terms of MREL targets built by banks, is crucial to address the issue of potential 
NCWO claims in the event of the application of a bail-in of creditors.  
Differently from the American Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA), which 
provides for the liquidation of the bank holding company using bail-in to leave 
operating subsidiaries unaffected, the EU has an ‘open’ bank resolution process. The 
latter is reliant on the successful bail-in of the ailing bank. The bail-in tool can be 
used to keep the bank as a going concern and avoid disruptive liquidation or dis-
membering of the financial institution in distress.  
As for how shareholders are addressed by the application of bail-in, existing 
shares will need to be cancelled or transferred to bailed-in creditors. Where the 
institution has a positive net asset value pursuant to the resolution valuation, existing 
shareholders are diluted by means of a conversion of existing capital instruments or 
other eligible liabilities. In such a case, the existing shareholdings must be severely 
diluted by the conversions. Therefore, by way of its write-down mechanism, bail-in 
entails a change in the ownership and control structure of the bank concerned. In this 
sense, who holds bail-inable securities is also relevant insofar as cross-holdings 
among financial institutions can have implications for market power when ownership 
changes as a result of bail-in application.240 Any qualifying holdings or acquisition 
 
238 See Binder (2016) on how the resolution framework has reduced the position of creditors to ex post 
compensation through the NCWO principle, differently from traditional insolvency proceedings. 
239 On the point of the continued relevance of national insolvency law under the BRRD especially in 
this perspective, see Haentjens (2014). 
240 On the point of the relevance of bail-in holdings, Ringe and Patel (2019) found that bail-in powers 
may be increasing the risk arising from banking interconnections, contrary to the regulators’ intention, 
as a consequence of a regulatory gap in the resolution framework, which fails to address concerns 
relating to the counterparties of bank capital. This results in a distortion of incentives for investors 
making investment in interconnected banks more attractive, hence producing more systemic risk than 
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of control in the entities emerging from resolution, after the application of bail-in or 
other resolution tools, would need to be approved by the relevant supervisory 
authority. 
3.2 (Partial) transfer strategies  
The other resolution tools available pursuant to the BRRD include sale of 
business, bridge institution and asset separation, which entail, albeit to different 
extents, transfer strategies to deal with the restructuring of a bank that is failing or 
likely to fail. In order:   
1. Sale of business entails the sale of shares or assets, rights and liabilities of 
the failing bank to a private sector purchaser.241 Only the consent of the 
acquirer is required to execute the sale. The transfer must be made on 
commercial terms in an open, transparent and non-discriminatory process, 
while also maximising the sale price. If this is not possible for reasons of 
urgency, authorities must take measures to redress competition distortions.  
2. Bridge institution is similar to the previous resolution tool in terms of sale 
of assets, rights and liabilities. However, instead of a private purchaser, the 
acquirer is a temporary bridge institution wholly or partially sponsored by the 
government and controlled by the resolution authority.   
3. Asset separation, allowing for the transfer of assets, rights and liabilities 
from a failing bank to a separated asset management company (AMC). The 
AMC has the purpose of managing and liquidating the assets with a view to 
maximising their value. However, this tool can only be applied in 
combination with others in order to avoid undue competitions distortions 
favouring the institution involved.   
 
socially preferable. In this sense, the BRRD2 has brought forth some improvement, by requiring a 
deduction in the MREL of G-SIBs for own eligible liabilities instruments and holdings of eligible 
liabilities of other G-SIBs. On the counterparty risk related to bail-in, see also Bernard, Capponi and 
Stiglitz (2017). 
241 A share deal would be more suitable for those institutions with a high degree of operational 
interconnectedness, significant asset encumbrance, and for which a carve out of assets would lead to 
a significant value destruction. It would require sufficient market capacity and investor appetite for 
the whole bank at stake. On the other hand, an asset deal would potentially be more suitable for 
institutions holding large portfolios of specific types of assets that could also be marketed to non-
financial institutions. Separability is one of the core pre-requisites necessary for an asset deal to be 




3.2.1 Sale of business and bridge institution  
The application of resolution tools such as a bridge bank or a sale of business, 
albeit intended at limiting the recourse to public funds, still might become potentially 
problematic under an antitrust perspective relating to mergers and acquisitions of 
control. This stems from the fact that the business or portfolio of assets and liabilities 
transferred from the failing bank will generally be destined to be acquired by another 
sound entity operating within the same sector as the former, thus completing an 
operation which can be relevant in the context of merger control. Such considerations 
were evidenced in the resolutions of Spanish Banco Popular (Section 3.2.1.1), as well 
as of four small Italian banks (Section 3.2.1.2). In particular, the resolution of Banco 
Popular marked a milestone in the development of the Banking Union as concerns 
the recourse to European tools for bank restructuring. Indeed, the bail-in of its 
creditors and the consequent sale to Santander represented the first time in which the 
SRB used its powers under the SRMR to write down and restructure a bank’s 
liabilities.242  
3.2.1.1 Lessons from the resolution of Banco Popular 
Banco Popular started to show signs of distress in 2016.243 In the course of 
the following year it became clear that the bank needed a capital increase and the 
possibility of a sale to a competitor was advanced. As a consequence of concerns over 
sizable NPLs related to real estate assets ratings plunged and outflows of deposits 
started materializing as increasing alarming announcements on the Banco Popular’s 
health spread. The bank’s share price dropped to 32 euro cents, with capital 
approaching the trigger level at which AT1 instruments would convert into bail-
inable bonds, even though minimum capital levels were not breached before the bank 
was deemed to be non-viable, thus not activating the CoCo’s triggers.244  
 
242 Dombret A., ‘Failing or likely to fail? Putting the European banking union to the test’. Speech at 
the Deutsche Bundesbank's University of Applied Sciences, Hachenburg, 21 August 2017. 
243 These were compounded by a sentence obligating the institution to compensate its clients for a 
violation of consumer protection laws in relation to floor clauses set on home loans. See Europa Press, 
‘Banco Popular, condenado a devolver todos los intereses cobrados de más de una hipoteca con 
cláusula suelo’, El Economista, 21 December 2016. 
244 Below 5.125% or 7% of the CET1 ratio of the bank. The fact that bonds were not converted into 
equity left CoCo investors with worthless securities while resolution was implemented. Such 
interference with the use of CoCos in resolution was a result of the blurred lines between liquidity and 
solvency issues triggering the bank failure. On the latter point, see Schillig M., ‘Resolution and 
Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’ (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
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On 6 June 2017, the ECB determined that Banco Popular was ‘failing or likely 
to fail’, as “the significant deterioration of the liquidity situation of the bank […] led 
to a determination that the entity would have, in the near future, been unable to pay 
its debts or other liabilities as they fell due”, thus meeting the first condition for 
resolution to be triggered. On the next day, with the SRB’s determination that no 
alternative private solution would have been available and it was in the public interest 
to restructure the bank245, Banco Popular effectively entered into resolution. This 
triggered the write-down and conversion of capital instruments prior to the transfer 
of the bank, to address the shortfall in the value of Banco Popular. In particular, all 
existing shares (CET1), and Additional Tier 1 instruments were written down, while 
Tier 2 instruments were converted into new shares, which were then transferred to 
Banco Santander for the symbolic price of 1 euro. The sale of the ailing bank enabled 
its continued operation under normal business conditions as part of the Santander 
group, with renewed solvency and liquidity. 
In the context of the resolution of Banco Popular, no State aid was found, and 
no recourse was made to the SRF, but rather the SRB made use of the sale of business 
tool, in combination with the bail-in tool. Thus, the sale underwent a regular merger 
and regulatory review.246 More specifically, the merger was cleared on the basis of 
the fact that (i) the combined market shares stemming from the transaction would 
have remained below 30% both in Spain and Portugal in the relevant market segments 
where the activities of the two parties overlapped; (ii) where an overlap existed 
between the activities of the merging parties, either the two were not each other’s 
closest competitor, or other important competitors would still remain present, 
exercising strong competitive pressure post-transaction and ensuring substitutability 
of products and services offered, and (iii) possible concerns due to the creation of a 
vertical link between banking services and the market for ATM services were curbed 
by the low combined market share of the parties, making any foreclosure unlikely to 
materialise. 
 
245 These two are the remaining conditions, which, together with FOLTF, build towards a cumulative 
determination that resolution should be triggered. See Ventoruzzo and Sandrelli (2019) for an in-depth 
analysis of how the determination relating to the three conditions for resolution was carried out by the 
SRB. 




Even though Banco Popular was Spain’s six largest lender, with subsidiaries 
in Spain and Portugal and operations in the United States247, it did not qualify as a 
globally significant institution and it had a relatively simple corporate structure and 
business model. If future resolutions cases ever came to concern larger banks, 
properly and fully active at global level, comprising many different legal entities, as 
well as complex relationships with customers and other financial institutions and 
infrastructures, the process might be significantly more complex to complete than it 
already was for Banco Popular.248 Another relevant aspect to consider is that the 
effectiveness of resolution tools entailing a transfer of (part of) a failing entity also 
relies on the availability of a willing competitor to take on the failing bank.249 As a 
result, on the basis of the market positioning of the acquirer, transfer tools in 
resolution will potentially generate competition concerns through an acquisition of 
control, which will need to be scrutinised by the relevant antitrust authorities to 
ensure that no dominant position is created or strengthened, or, otherwise, to impose 
remedies to preserve undistorted competition. 
Another cautionary tale evidenced by the Banco Popular case is linked to the 
fact that the application of the bail-in tool can exacerbate pro-cyclical effects due to 
loss of confidence at the prospect of bail-in being triggered and through potential 
contagion.250 This raises an issue for regulators to calibrate the timing of their 
intervention with an eye to limiting behavioural risk in the market. However, this 
exercise is complicated by the (current) lack of a quantitative theoretical model laying 
down clear cut intervention thresholds and criteria on which to rely. Yet, liquidity 
issues might be worsened by rising funding costs at a time of distress, leading to 
resolution becoming increasingly inevitable. Therefore, a crucial role is also played 
 
247 See SRB, Decision of the Single Resolution Board in its Executive Session of 7 June 2017, 
concerning the adoption of a resolution scheme in respect of Banco Popular Español S.A., available 
at https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/315.  
248 Binder (2017). 
249 This was verified in the case of Banco Popular, through Santander, but it might not always be 
assumed with confidence to be reliably available, which is the reason why a “variant strategy” such as 
bail-in is usually required by the resolution authority to be specified in the resolution plan as a fallback 
option. See Restoy, Vrbaski and Walters (2020) on this point, addressing how this could imply that, 
in such instances, there would be little scope to reduce the MREL requirements of the institution 
concerned, also in view of the policy developed by the SRB. The relevance of the presence of a willing 
buyer was also evidenced by the rescue of Italian Monte dei Paschi di Siena, in which the limits to 
reliance on the market to sustain an ailing bank led to a need for a public bailout (see Chapter 5 for an 
in-depth analysis of the case). 
250 See Schillig (2016) at p. 311. Procyclicality was highlighted by Banco Popular’s investors as a 
contributing cause for the sale to Santander for a merely symbolic amount. 
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by the way in which information is handled in the decision-making process, which is 
another one of the aspects that sparked a controversy in relation to the resolution of 
Banco Popular. Indeed, the preservation of confidentiality in the communications 
among all stakeholders involved in resolution proceedings is identified also by the 
BRRD251 as a key element to ensure a successful resolution, while preventing market 
panic. This calls for an additional balancing exercise between the need for 
confidentiality to avoid leaks of bank-related market sensitive information and the 
protection of creditors’ interests.252  
3.2.1.2 Resolution of four small Italian banks 
As for the effects of bank restructurings on the structure and number of market 
operators, similar considerations arose in the case of the resolution of Italian banks 
Banca Etruria, Banca delle Marche, Cassa di Risparmio di Chieti and Cassa di 
Risparmio di Ferrara in 2015. In that instance, four bridge banks were created to take 
over the good parts of the four failing banks, including rights, assets and liabilities, 
while the shareholders and subordinated creditors saw their claims annulled due to 
burden-sharing requirements. Simultaneously, the asset separation tool was used in 
transferring the non-performing loans of the four banks to a State-controlled AMC, 
aiming for recovery and improving the chances of finding candidate buyers for the 
bridge banks. After a failed attempt at an open sale procedure where no operator 
advanced an offer, BPER finally acquired the new Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara, 
while UBI acquired the other three bridge banks.  
The Italian antitrust authority did not oppose the acquisitions of full control 
of the bridge institutions on the basis of some core considerations. Firstly, where an 
increase was registered in the market shares of the parties it was not particularly 
significant, as the post-merger shares were mostly attributable to the bridge banks, 
which had also shown a decreasing trend in the years preceding intervention. 
 
251 Art. 84 BRRD. 
252 The compatibility of the confidentiality policies of the ECB and SRB with the protection of 
creditors’ interests has been brought into question by the Banco Popular. As a matter of fact, a number 
of investors filed appeals before the SRB Appeal Panel regarding access to SRB documents used in 
the decision-making process finally leading to the resolution of the Spanish bank. The SRB Appeal 
Panel confirmed that full disclosure of the Provisional Valuation Report would raise financial stability 
concerns, which could have had “an impact on other market participants and/or resolution actions in 




Additionally, in the same relevant market segments at the level of province, a number 
of other qualified competitors were also active, and thus able to exert a disciplining 
effect on the new combined institutions. Then, a variation of the “failing firm 
defense”253 was also advanced to approve the operations, by highlighting that, absent 
the two acquisitions, the assets of the bridge banks would have been forced to exit 
the market, thus causing a reduction in the supply of banking products and services 
to the detriment of customers and in any event redistributing the market shares of the 
exiting banks among other existing operators. Thus, the operations also had to be 
considered in light of their stabilisation role, allowing to solve the crisis situation of 
the four institutions.254  
3.2.2 Asset separation  
The asset separation tool under the BRRD is an example of an impaired assets 
measure. While recapitalisations create a buffer of capital against future losses, 
impaired asset relief measures protect the recipient bank from the risk of losses 
materialising in the first place. Asset relief measures generally take one of two forms:  
1. asset purchases, whereby the impaired assets are transferred from the balance 
sheet of the beneficiary to that of another entity, which is often a special 
purpose vehicle owned or supported by the State255; or  
2. asset guarantees, through which the State insures the beneficiary bank against 
losses incurred from the impaired assets, which remain on the balance sheet of 
the bank.256 
After the implementation of the BRRD, asset relief measures should only be 
possible in the context of resolution, as they are not mentioned as permissible among 
the precautionary aid measures listed in Art. 32(4)(d) BRRD. As impaired asset 
measures are structural in nature, they are subject to the same ex ante conditions and 
 
253 According to competition policy, there is the assumption that without a merger the failing firm 
would disappear from the market, implying that even a domestic merger would not result in 
concentration. See, as an example, Malinauskaite (2012) for a review of the development of the failing 
firm defense in the European merger control practice. 
254 See cases C12087 (Provvedimento n. 26552) and C12094 (Provvedimento n. 26621). 
255 This had been the case for NAMA: Impaired asset relief scheme for banks in Ireland, N 275/2009, 
26 February 2010. 




restrictions that the 2013 Banking Communication requires for recapitalisation aid. 
More specifically:   
− the aid beneficiary should bear the losses associated with the impaired assets 
to the maximum extent possible. Generally, this is considered to be achieved 
when the transfer price257 of the assets is below their real economic value 
(REV).258 In accordance with the definition of the Impaired Assets 
Communication259, the REV of the assets is their underlying long-term value, 
as estimated on the basis of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons.  
− The State must receive an appropriate remuneration for the risk it takes on 
that the assets will suffer further impairments below their REV. If the transfer 
price is set at or below market value or the remuneration is calibrated taking 
into account market benchmarks, the European Commission may conclude 
that the measure itself does not entail any aid.260 
− The beneficiary of the impaired asset measure must submit a restructuring 
plan to the European Commission.261 
When an impaired asset relief measure qualifies as State aid, its amount must 
be capped at REV and the measure must respect a number of conditions in order to 
be declared compatible with the internal market by the Commission. The value of aid 
in these cases is calculated as the difference between the transfer price and the market 
price, as shown by Figure 4.1 below. More specifically, the market price reflects the 
value of the assets under the prevailing market conditions at the time of intervention. 
 
257 Transfer price is taken to mean the purchase price, in case of an asset purchase, or the amount 
insured, in case asset guarantees are used. In the case of asset guarantees, the insured amount is the 
book value of the assets after the deduction of a “first loss” that must be borne by the bank before the 
State makes any payment.   
258 As per para. 41 of the Impaired Assets Communication. 
259 At para. 40. 
260 Such was the case, for instance, for the Italian securitisation scheme (known as “GACS”), 
SA.43390, 10 February 2016. 




Figure 4.1 - State aid in impaired asset measures 
 
Source: European Commission 
 
One of the reasons justifying the application of such measures in order to 
restructure ailing banks relates to the fact that impaired assets may be subject to 
higher risk weights, thus consuming more capital in a situation in which an 
institution’s capital position may already be bearing some pressure.262 
The choice of assets to be targeted for separation will contribute to define the 
new bank’s business model, franchise value, and potential future profit drivers. Too 
wide a scope for asset separation might erode the business rationale of the bank, while 
a narrow one incurs the risk that the bank is not fully lifted of its problem assets. As 
for the pricing of the transfer assets, the State aid framework requires banks to provide 
valuations undertaken by an independent expert, which have to be then certified by 
the relevant supervisory authority.263 Therefore, the resolution authority should be 
able to rely on a comprehensive valuation of assets, distinguishing those that will 
remain within the core bank from those that will undergo a workout or foreclosure 
 
262 Galand C., Dutillieux W. and Vallyon E., “Non-performing loans and state aid rules”, 2017, 
European Economy. Banks, regulation and the real sector, p. 141. 
263 The Commission may challenge the valuation, in which case it can appoint its own experts (see 
SNS REAAL case, SA.36598, 19 December 2013) or make use of its own estimates of ‘safe harbour 
values’ (see Banif case, SA.43977, 21 December 2015). 
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by a separate AMC, in accordance with the resolution plan. Due to time constraints 
and potential market upheaval while implementing the measures, valuations will 
most likely be uncertain, particularly where non-traded assets are concerned. The 
other crucial point to take into account is whether a receptive market exists to which 
the assets can be sold or an AMC is in place and available to value and take over such 
assets speedily in a crisis situation. Both potential sources of demand will mostly 
probably be strained once bank distress is more widespread.  
It is challenging to find unquestionable criteria to assess which assets will 
pose significant issues in case of a remote and unpredictable situation in which 
resolution would need to be enacted. Instead, authorities have the flexibility to choose 
the most suitable resolution tool to apply, including, if needed, the asset separation 
tool which ensures that problematic assets can be isolated and liquidated smoothly in 
a given crisis context. It is debatable whether any existing difficulty to evaluate an 
asset for resolution purposes should be a reason for imposing the divestment of the 
asset concerned. If the asset structure implies that certain resolution strategies are 
inapplicable, then other resolution strategies could be chosen, rather than requiring 
an institution to divest assets in a going concern situation in order to address possible 
concerns in a hypothetical resolution situation. On the other hand, divestments would 
certainly be called for if an institution has an asset structure that makes resolution 
impossible. The approach chosen by resolution authorities in this respect will have 
implications for banks’ asset structures which will be more or less significant 
depending on the judgment of which assets constitute a significant impediment to 
resolvability. 
4. Implications of resolution/bail-in introduction for banks’ funding  
After having discussed the different resolution tools, it is worthwhile to 
address another competition-relevant effect that the BRRD might have brought about, 
in terms of how banks’ funding costs might have been altered in reaction to the 
introduction of resolution rules, and bail-in in particular. The introduction of the 
BRRD has a twofold implication for the market pricing of subordinated debt, since 
(i) it sets an explicit hierarchy of subordination to absorb losses in case of bail-in, 
which could increase investors’ perception of the riskiness of subordinated bonds and 
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thus possibly lead to demand higher returns for their investment; and (ii) it requires 
some entities to issue subordinated debt to comply with their MREL targets.  
The European Banking Authority has highlighted how banks’ size and 
country of origin also play a role in affecting funding costs, predicting that 
subordinated debt would cost the same as equity for mid-sized banks not large enough 
to be systemically important, as well as for all banks incorporated in those countries 
that required international bailouts during the global financial crisis, i.e. Cyprus, 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal. 
Banks’ funding costs have been proxied by CDS spreads in a strand of 
economic literature.264 Looking at the evolution of the subordinated and senior 
financial iTraxx indices, which are based on CDS spreads and refer to a sample of 
European banks, allows to have a picture of how the perception of banks’ solidity or 
potential default has varied along the past years, both before and after the BRRD 
came into force.265   




264 See Arnould, Pancaro and Żochowski (2020) for a review. 
265 No direct causal relationship is herewith implied. This exercise has a merely illustrative purpose. 
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Both senior and subordinated iTraxx indices were at their peak during the 
global financial crisis, slowly decreasing in the years of the recovery, as shown by 
Figure 4.2 above. This is consistent with the situation of market turmoil and the 
consequent bailouts necessary to rescue financial institutions. The beginning of 2016, 
time at which the BRRD entered into force, registered a spike in both subordinated 
and senior CDS spreads, even though the former experienced a more marked 
variation, possibly in line with the expectation that the perceived probability of bail-
in was altered, affecting funding markets as a result.266 A slight increase in both 
indices is also observable around the time of both the Council agreement on the so-
called “banking package” reached in May 2018 and its implementation in 2019, 
which further tightened the applicable prudential and resolution rules.267  
Lastly, the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and the imposition of the first 
lockdowns to curb its spread in a number of European countries in the month of 
March 2020 also triggered a sharp increase in both CDS spreads. Many banks will 
need to roll over debt redemptions for the remainder of 2020, also driven by 
requirements to have enough eligible instruments to reach their MREL targets. In 
case the pricing of eligible instruments remained at the heightened levels observed 
with the outbreak of the pandemic for a prolonged period of time, this might entail 
substantially higher costs for the banks concerned, constituting a significant 
challenge towards meeting their required targets.268  
4.1 Requirement to build up MREL 
In principle, bail-in rules should have a greater impact on those banks that 
would have benefited most from an implicit guarantee before the introduction of the 
 
266 This is corroborated by empirical studies in the literature. See, inter alia, Schäfer et al. (2017), 
finding that bailout expectations have been reduced since the introduction of the restructuring regime 
of the BRRD, mandating bail-in. A similar conclusion was also reached by Bellia and Maccaferri 
(2020). Further, the FSB (2020) found evidence that credit spreads of holding companies (holdcos) of 
significant institutions have increased relative to their operating subsidiaries (opcos), suggesting that 
resolution reforms have become increasingly credible, which is also reflected in holdcos being rated 
less highly than their principal opcos after the implementation of the reforms. Rocamora, Suárez and 
Monjas (2020) also found higher levels of risk sensitiveness related to MREL-eligible debt after entry 
into force of the BRRD. 
267 The banking package encompassed extensive amendments to the Capital Requirements Regulation 
(CRR), the Fourth Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR). 
268 See EBA’s Note on the first impacts of the Covid-19 in the EU banking sector, available at: 
https://eba.europa.eu. This has led some resolution authorities, such as the SRB and the Swedish 
National Debt Office, to assess the potential impact of market conditions on MREL transition periods. 
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resolution framework, as they relegate the recourse to public funds to assist banks’ 
restructuring only to exceptional or last-resort circumstances. This should mean that 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and in particular the riskiest 
ones among them, should be more significantly affected.269  
As a consequence of the fact that banks now need to have sufficient liabilities 
eligible to be bailed-in in case of distress, those banks that fall short of bail-inable 
debt requirements will be required to increase their unsecured liabilities. This could 
result in an increase in overall funding costs, as banks would need to adapt their 
liability structure, with a more predominant reliance on costlier debt. Yet, a higher 
share of senior unsecured liabilities could have a positive impact in reducing the level 
of encumbered assets, therefore possibly lowering the overall cost of funding instead. 
Indeed, asset encumbrance makes it challenging for investors to assess banks’ 
riskiness, which may result in higher risk premia for unsecured debt.270 It is also 
possible that a higher cost of senior unsecured long-term debt could lead banks to 
raise more short-term debt, resulting in a higher maturity mismatch and greater 
liquidity and interest rate risks. This could happen in particular for those banks that 
have already a high level of encumbered assets and so are unable to issue long-term 
secured liabilities.271  
4.2 Possible adjustments to banks’ liability structure 
Moreover, strengthened depositor protection, which is recognised by the 
BRRD as one of the core objectives that resolution should pursue, could potentially 
reduce deposit interest rates compared to the rates related to unsecured debt. Deposits 
typically represent a large share of the overall bank debt. As a result, even small 
reductions in the remuneration of deposits could produce a significant impact on the 
overall cost of funding.272 On top of this, banks that already meet the minimum bail-
 
269 Cœuré (2013). Speech available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/. The FSB’s evaluation of the 
reforms to address the too-big-fail phenomenon highlights that funding cost advantages peaked during 
the global financial crisis, remained high for a number of years afterwards, and then dropped. Funding 
cost advantages appear to have fallen substantially since the crisis peak, but still remained at least as 
high as those seen before the crisis. See FSB (2020), available at: https://www.fsb.org/wp-
content/uploads/P280620-1.pdf.  
270 Ibid. This is consistent with the findings by the FSB (2020) related to the existence of a bail-in 
premium for subordinated and senior non-preferred bonds, which are bail-inable. 
271 Such an issue should be curbed by the implementation of the requirements on the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) introduced by Basel III.  
272 Generally, depositors have a low sensitivity to risk, at least in normal times. 
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inable debt requirement may adjust their liability structure to incorporate a larger 
fraction of deposits. Additionally, the removal of an implicit bail-out guarantee 
should imply that bank debt-holders would be incentivized to exert more efforts in 
monitoring banks, thus mitigating moral hazard phenomena, as part of the desiderata 
of regulators justifying the introduction of the resolution framework.273 Such market 
discipline may mean that the expected rise in the cost of bank funding could be 
counterbalanced by an overall reduction in bank risk, hence not increasing the cost 
of funding as a result.274   
The potential effects on banks’ funding costs described above should be taken 
into account when addressing how the European and national banking sectors might 
be affected by the regulatory framework as currently in place. It may be the case that 
the competitive structure of banking markets will be altered by institutions’ capacity 
to adapt to the requirements embedded in the resolution rules, determining which 
banks will remain operative, whether they will need to merge to better cope with 
regulatory requirements, and which will be the strategy or tool more suitable to deal 
with their failure, on the basis of their resolvability.   
5. Access to Single Resolution Fund 
The previous sections highlighted how the resolution framework emphasises 
the use of bail-in to shift the burden of banks’ failures on shareholders and creditors, 
and the related build-up of MREL to provide an ex ante guarantee that bail-in- 
possibly in combination with other tools- will effectively function in resolution. 
However, it might be the case that the liabilities which are bailed in are not enough 
to cover losses and recapitalise a failing bank. In such an instance, having the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF) make a contribution before any additional State aid is granted 
in the form of government financial stabilisation tools would possibly further sever 
 
273 For an analysis of the bail-in risk premium and associated market discipline, see, among others, 
Lewrick, Serena and Turner (2019). The authors find a considerable variability of bail-in premia across 
banks and jurisdictions, depending on the effectiveness of the applicable resolution regimes, the 
approaches to subordination and the differences in banks’ risk-taking, implying that riskier banks 
indeed pay a higher premium. Crespi, Giacomini and Mascia (2018) also looked at the same 
mechanism in relation to Italian banks and found that large institutions and institutions with lower 
ratings, profitability, capitalisation, or higher liquidity faced a higher cost of issuing bail‐inable bonds, 
seemingly finding additional support for the hypothesised improvement of market discipline in the 
primary market for bank bonds. 
274 Cœuré (2013). 
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the link between bank debt and sovereign debt. Alternatively, deposit guarantee funds 
could be used to contribute, also in support of transfer strategies within resolution 
schemes. Both options might bring about State aid- or other competition-related 
considerations. The conditions and potential critical aspects of the latter option are 
delved into in Section 5 of this chapter, while this section focuses on the former.  
The SRF comprises resolution funding arrangements within the banking 
union as well as national resolution funds at Member State level. The Single 
Resolution Mechanism Regulation (SRMR) requires that a failing bank's losses are 
covered through the bail-in of its shareholders and creditors before the SRF can be 
accessed. This may also require bailing-in senior debt and, where necessary, 
uncovered deposits. Indeed, the SRF can only intervene after a bail-in of 8% of 
liabilities has been completed. This requirement provides a first protection to the SRF 
against immediate depletion, which is complemented by the limit of 5% of liabilities 
including own funds which the SRF is authorised to extend as funding at maximum. 
  
If the SRF is used, the Commission will also have to make an assessment to 
authorise its use under EU State aid rules. The same would need to happen for 
interventions of national resolution funds of Member States not part of the Banking 
Union. This mostly relies on the fact that the use of the SRF could constitute a 
measure imputable to the State, depending on which authority administers the 
resolution funds, as otherwise the resources are supplied by the industry.275 There has 
been no example yet of a resolution scheme implemented with support from the SRF 
and no specific indications are offered within the legal framework as regards which 
aspects the Commission will focus on in particular in making an assessment of the 
 
275 This stems from the definition of “extraordinary public financial support” (EPFS), which is another 
term for State aid, as laid down by Art. 2(28) BRRD. More specifically, the BRRD definition of EPFS 
encompasses assistance granted by national resolution funds, assistance granted by the SRF and 
assistance from other national sources such as taxpayers. As a result, resolution resources contributed 
by banks and State resources that primarily come from taxpayers are put on equal footing. This, in 
turn, might cause on overreliance on public finances in instances such as the granting of precautionary 
recapitalisations, instead of tapping into industry resources from resolution funds and the SRF, which 
are relegated to resolution scenarios (see also Nicolaides and O’Connor (2016) along these lines). 
While the automatic equation of SRF usage to existance of State aid might appear counterintuitive 
from a policy perspective, even the most ‘optimistic’ reading of the latest judgment of the General 
Court in the Tercas case (see Section 7 of this chapter) would still imply that the public control over 




existence and consequent compatibility of any aid with the internal market when 
recourse to the SRF is advanced as necessary to resolve a bank.  
5.1 Approval of aid granted through the SRF 
In line with the Commission’s practice developed for other recent cases of 
bank rescues involving State aid, it is reasonable to presume that the approval of any 
existing aid would hinge on the assessment of (i) measures to ensure the long-term 
viability of the bank, (ii) appropriate burden-sharing in order to minimise the recourse 
to public funds, and (iii) measures aimed at limiting distortions of competition. This 
expectation is also supported by the requirements relating to the restructuring post-
resolution, which should be achieved through the implementation of a business 
reorganisation plan. As a matter of fact, such a plan must be compatible with the 
restructuring plan that the institution concerned would be required to submit to the 
Commission under the State aid framework, when applicable. In particular, in 
addition to measures aiming at restoring the long-term viability of the bank, the plan 
should include burden-sharing measures in order to limit any necessary aid to the 
minimum, as well as measures limiting distortions of competition.276 This would 
likely entail a number of efficiency enhancing measures, possibly also including the 
divestment of assets and portfolios and a rationalisation of the geographical presence 
of the bank. Additionally, due to the requirement for a minimum amount of bail-in to 
be completed before the SRF can be accessed, it is possible that the prerequisite of 
burden-sharing would automatically be satisfied.  
On the other hand, the requirement of a minimum write-down before access 
to resolution funds can be granted also implies that, where there are insufficient viable 
assets in the bank in distress that can back a transfer of deposits and other liabilities, 
if necessary for the implementation of a transfer strategy in resolution, it might be 
difficult to secure the funding needed to find a suitable buyer willing to take on the 
deposits and liabilities that authorities may wish to preserve for the benefit of the 
customers and the system.277  
 
276 Art. 52(12) and (13) BRRD. 
277 Restoy, Vrbaski and Walters (2020). 
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The degree to which funding needs from the SRF will be necessary after bail-
in is applied hinges on the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total liabilities, due to the 
fact that a bank’s recapitalisation needs are measured as a percentage of the risk-
weighted assets, while bail-in is based on total assets, which equal total liabilities. 
For banks whose model relies on lending wholly extended to the corporate sector, 
risk weighted assets would be equal to total assets. In such an instance, losses might 
be absorbed by a bail-in, but the bank would still need to be additionally recapitalised 
to an 8% of risk-weighted assets. Differently, for banks with a different business 
model which implies a lower risk weight and a lower ratio of risk-weighted assets to 
total assets, a bail-in up to 8% of total assets would likely be sufficient to cover 
recapitalisation needs without additional support from the SRF. Thus, bail-in would 
be more likely to reduce the funding needs from the SRF for large banks rather than 
smaller ones. Then, a further consequence of the interplay between risk weighted 
assets and total assets in combination with the ceiling of 5% of liabilities for the SRF 
contribution is that the link between losses and funding needs might not be as tight 
as expected.278  
Even though studies have estimated that the SRF would have had enough 
funding to deal with the banking failures observed during the great financial crisis279, 
it is well-acknowledged that no resolution fund can be expected to deal with a major 
systemic crisis on its own. If another large-scale systemic crisis at the Eurozone level 
were to erupt, a fiscal backstop to the SRF will be necessary to operate as an 
additional line of defense in protecting financial stability against systemic crises.280 
  
 
278 De Groen and Gros (2015). 
279 Id. The authors estimate that about €72 billion would have been sufficient in a central case, while, 
under more stringent assumptions about capital requirements for the resolved banks, the sum might 
go up to €102 billion, or down to €54 billion under more optimistic assumptions. They also find that 
the current rules on bail-in would have ensured that a large part of the losses would have been borne 
by the banks’ investors. In particular, for those affected in the first leg of the crisis, the 8% bail-in 
would have covered most of the losses, leaving little need for SRF funding. Instead during the second 
leg of the crisis, the 8% bail-in usually would not have been sufficient, but the 5% ceiling for SRF 
intervention would have implied that only in a few cases it would have covered more than half of the 
losses. 
280 Schoenmaker (2014). For a more detailed analysis on this point, see Chapter 6. 
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6. Deposit Guarantee Schemes  
Deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) are governed by the EU Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme Directive (DGSD). Under the BRRD, DGS must contribute cash to fund 
resolution actions with the aim to preserve deposit access for covered depositors, with 
this contribution being mandatory. Individual annual contributions are calibrated so 
that aggregate annual contributions do not exceed 12.5% of the fund’s target level. 
The role of DGS in Europe is primarily that of paying out deposits, even though the 
DGS Directive also envisages other alternative uses, such as early intervention281 or 
the protection of deposits in insolvency or resolution through means other than pay-
out.282 The role of DGSs in financing affiliated institutions in resolution is disciplined 
by Art. 109 BRRD, with recital 55 of the same directive specifying that the use DGSs 
to assist the resolution of failing institutions should comply with the framework on 
State aid, as is the case when recourse is made to extraordinary public financial 
support or resolution funds. 
DGS contributions are capped at the lower between (i) the loss the DGS 
would have incurred by paying out covered deposits in the bank’s liquidation, at the 
net of recoveries that would have arisen from its subrogated claims in the insolvency; 
and (ii) 50% of its target level under the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive. This 
cap has the protective aim of ensuring that, on the one hand, the DGS is not depleted 
beyond the losses it would have incurred through the pay-out of covered deposits and, 
on the other hand, its capacity is not exhausted as a result of a single bank failure. 
This cap also entails an additional limitation of the extent to which DGS funding can 
be used to support liabilities other than covered deposits, which might be affected by 
the use of any combination of resolution tools applied. This should also have the 
effect of playing a disciplining role from the point of view of the incentives of holders 
of banks’ financial instruments, as they could not rely on the expectation of DGS 
support if a bank’s losses were limited at a level low enough that covered depositors 
would not be affected. Therefore, their expectations as regards the bank potentially 
receiving DGS support should not differ between resolution and insolvency in this 
perspective. 
 
281 This is the case for Inter-institutional Protection Schemes (IPS). 
282 For a comprehensive view of the different functions of DGSs, see Gortsos (2019). 
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When the bail-in tool is applied, the DGS is liable to pay the amount by which 
covered deposits would have contributed to the absorption of the losses of the credit 
institution283, if such deposits had been within the scope of bail-in and written down 
to the same extent to which creditors with the same level of priority under national 
insolvency laws would have. The DGS subrogates protected depositors which are 
excluded from bail-in. In such an instance, the DGS may not be required to contribute 
to the recapitalisation of the bank or bridge institution established. 
6.1 DGS funds in resolution 
When other resolution tools (or a combination of them) are applied, the DGS 
is liable to pay the amount of losses that covered depositors would have incurred, if 
their losses in insolvency were in proportion to the losses faced by creditors with the 
same level of priority under applicable national insolvency laws. In the particular 
case in which eligible deposits are transferred from a bank in resolution to another 
entity through the sale of business tool or the bridge institution tool, depositors have 
no claim against the DGS in relation to any (part) of their deposits left at the 
institution under resolution. Yet, this is applicable only insofar as the amount of funds 
transferred is equal or higher than the aggregate coverage level pursuant to Art. 6 
DGSD. 
Differently from the requirements relating to the use of the SRF, access to 
DGS funding does not depend on a minimum write-down or conversion of liabilities 
or other similar conditions. Therefore, there would not be a regulatory impediment to 
the use of DGS contributions in support of a sale of business transaction in resolution, 
as long as it would also include covered deposits.284 In this sense, it may be the case 
the regulatory framework for bank crisis management is moving towards a FDIC-like 
approach to the use of DGS money in resolution in Europe, comprehensive of both 
cash pay-outs to covered depositors and support to the transfer of a failing bank’s 
deposit book to an acquirer.285  
 
283 Art. 46(1)(a) BRRD. 
284 Restoy, Vrbaski and Walters (2020). For a discussion on who should benefit from DGS payments 
in the different instances where banks’ critical functions are transferred to other institutions or where 
they are retained within recapitalised banks, see Hofmann (2020). 
285 Majnoni D’Intigano, Dal Santo and Maltese (2020) analyse the US regulatory framework and the 
FDIC experience highlighting some factors explaining its superior performance in comparison to that 
of the European Banking Union, including: (i) different functions being centered into one authority; 
(ii) the presence of a single framework for banking resolution applicable to all banks in a flexible 
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6.2 DGS funds in liquidation 
As for the degree of availability of DGS funds to provide financing in 
insolvency proceedings instead, differences exist across Member States. Pursuant to 
the DGSD, Member States can allow the use of DGS funds for purposes other than 
pay-out of covered deposits, but they are not required to do so. Alternative purposes 
can entail (i) the prevention of a bank’s failure (“preventative measures”)286, or (ii) 
the financing of measures preserving the access to covered deposits in the context of 
insolvency proceedings.287 The latter measures can comprise transfers of liabilities- 
including deposit books- from a bank in insolvency to another bank, for which DGS 
funding may be provided to back the transfer in case a shortfall in assets is identified. 
For these types of measures, the costs for the DGS must not exceed those that would 
have been incurred by paying out covered deposits, at the net of the recoveries 
stemming from the subrogation to depositors’ claims in insolvency. Similarly to the 
cap set to DGS contributions in resolution, this cap- combined with the super-
preference for covered deposits- implies that the amount of DGS funds that can be 
pledged for such alternative measures in insolvency is limited. 
If DGS funds are only used to pay out covered depositors in the event of 
liquidation, after which the bank exits the market, then there are no State aid 
implications. On the other hand, State aid implications might materialise if a DGS 
offers financial support to a deposit book transfer during resolution or insolvency, 
with the aim of aiding the restructuring of a bank in distress. The issue lies on whether 
a DGS intervention is used to prevent the failure of an institution which would have 
otherwise exited the market, thus having a public policy purpose, or as a means 
through which to reduce the costs that would have otherwise been incurred in 
liquidation, provided that there are reasonable prospects of recovery. Crucially, a 
finding of existence of State aid hinges on the State having control or influence over 
the resources of the DGS or the decisional process that leads to the approval of 
intervention. This will be delved into in detail in the next section, addressing the 
Tercas case intervention.  
 
manner, regardless of institutions’ size; (c) the possibility to use the deposit insurance fund to protect 
also uninsured deposits, under the least cost principle, when it allows for a reduction of fund 
disbursements in purchase and assumption transactions; and (d) the absence of antitrust constraints. 
286 Art. 11(3) DGSD. 
287 Art. 11(6) DGSD. 
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One other relevant point to consider is linked to the fact that, if the industry 
were called to fund the DGS to then enable its use to repeatedly rescue smaller failing 
banks without the requirement for any form of burden-sharing from the banks’ 
shareholders and creditors, competition concerns might materialise again through the 
mutualisation of losses, insofar as banks in distress would be favoured, at the expense 
of their sound peers.   
7. The Tercas case 
The relevant case highlighting the State aid issues underlying the recourse to 
DGS funds in resolution is the one of Tercas, in which a decision by the Commission 
establishing the presence of aid and its incompatibility with the internal market288 
was later overturned by the General Court of the European Union. Tercas was a 
relatively small Italian bank put under special administration by the Italian Ministry 
of Finance on 30 April 2012. The special administrator started discussions with 
Banca Popolare di Bari (BPB) for a potential acquisition deal, the failure of which 
would have led to Tercas being liquidated under national insolvency proceedings. In 
such a case, the competent Italian DGS, the Interbank Deposit Protection Fund 
(FITD), which constitutes a private banking consortium, would have needed to 
reimburse covered depositors pursuant to the DGSD. However, BPB agreed to buy 
Tercas under the condition that the FITD would cover Tercas’ losses, thus affecting 
shareholders, but sparing creditors. Following a request by the special administrator, 
the FITD voluntarily agreed to intervene and the Bank of Italy authorised the 
intervention plan. 
7.1 The stance of the Commission 
The Commission determined 289 that the FITD’s intervention plan constituted 
unlawful State aid, arguing that the intervention made use of State resources, was 
imputable to the State and could not be cleared on the basis of the 2013 Banking 
 
288 See case SA.39451. The Commission’s decision of 23 December 2015 identified the potential for 
distortions of competition, due to the fact that “the support interventions implemented by the FITD 
provided a selective advantage to Tercas and […] were not carried out by the FITD acting in the 
capacity of a market economy operator” (para. 149) and “the advantages conferred on Tercas by the 
interventions of the FITD distort competition by avoiding bankruptcy and market exit of Tercas”. 
Additionally, as Tercas was “in competition with foreign undertakings [...] trade between Member 




Communication. The decision was challenged before the General Court by Italy, 
Banca Popolare di Bari and the FITD. The General Court annulled the Commission’s 
decision by concluding that the finding of State aid in relation to the measures granted 
to Tercas was incorrect. Such a judgment was reached by assessing the fulfilment of 
the criterion of State origin of aid, as well as the imputability to the State and use of 
State resources, without considering other potential grounds for annulment of the 
decision.290  
The crucial aspects of the case concerned the degree of intervention by public 
authorities in devising and executing the intervention plan. In this sense, the public 
mandate of the DGS in reimbursing covered deposits up to €100,000 in an event of 
liquidation and the influence exerted by public authorities upon the DGS in the design 
and implementation of the rescue scheme were taken into account. As to the first 
point, the private nature of the consortium of banks contributing to the DGS was not 
deemed relevant by the Commission. As to the second point instead, having a special 
administrator appointed by a Ministry of the Italian government sitting as an observer 
in the FITD board meetings and coordinating the contested intervention, coupled with 
the existing requirement on DGS participation for banks’ licences to be authorised 
by the Bank of Italy- which made exiting the scheme impossible in practice- was 
found to indicate the existence of State influence. 
7.2 The findings of the Court 
Building upon the landmark Stardust Marine case291, imputability of aid can 
be inferred from a number of indicators, none of which may be decisive if considered 
singularly. However, the judgment has seemingly raised the standard of proof by 
requiring the Commission to provide decisive proof of imputability, instead of merely 
looking at a number of indicators which might point to its existence. 
In the case of Tercas, if no buyer had been found, national authorities would 
have been forced to liquidate the bank, triggering a statutory obligation for the DGS 
to reimburse all depositors up to €100,000. As was the case, instead, the DGS 
intervened at an earlier stage with a facilitating role for the sale of Tercas through its 
 
290 An example of other grounds could have concerned the compatibility of the aid with the internal 
market, for instance, see Asimakopoulos (2019). 
291 Case C-482/99, judgment of 16 May 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:294. 
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agreement to cover its losses. This option was chosen as the least costly, as the DGS 
would still have been legally obliged to contribute to liquidation. Indeed, lacking a 
requirement to reimburse depositors, it is questionable whether the DGS would have 
voluntarily paid for the rescue of Tercas. Therefore, the Court focused on the form of 
intervention, rather than on its need. The fact that this voluntary intervention cost less 
than the full reimbursement required in liquidation justifies the form of intervention, 
not the intervention itself. 
As regards the State influence on the DGS, the Court found no evidence that 
the special administrator influenced the actions of the FITD. On the other hand, the 
authorisation requirement by the Bank of Italy was only relevant insofar as the 
intervention could have produced an impact the national banking system and 
financial stability, but it did not imply that the intervention itself was mandatory. 
However, the DGS would have had a legal obligation to act in any event and 
regardless of any State influence. 
As regards the State control over the DGS funds, the Court argued that the 
rescue measure hinged upon a common decision of all DGS members to allow 
voluntary interventions, enabled by the articles of association of the DGS, as well as 
on an additional specific decision of the members to intervene in this particular case. 
Thus, the Court concluded that the intervention was not attributable to its legal 
obligation to reimburse depositors.  
7.3 The implications of the case 
Provided the judgment will not be overturned in appeal, its implications are 
twofold. In the context of the State aid framework, the CJEU is departing from the 
landmark Stardust Marine case on the matter of the imputability of State aid deriving 
from private resources, imposing a stricter standard of proof for aids granted by 
private entities, which requires decisive proof for imputability, rather than simple 
indications.292 From the perspective of the regulatory framework for crisis 
management instead, the credibility of the rules on resolution is challenged. This is 
 
292 Vitale (2019) argues that it is appropriate for the Commission to be bound by a more onerous 
standard of proof when the contested measure is adopted by a State-owned or private entity, since in 
those circumstances “merely circumstantial evidence is not enough to prove the existence of a decisive 
influence by the State on the decision-making process culminating in the adoption of the contested 
measure and on the use of the resources through which the measure is financed”. 
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due to the fact that DGS funds could be used either in recovery or resolution as a 
voluntary means of intervention to rescue banks, without requiring creditors to 
shoulder any losses. Such an exception to the rules on bail-in and burden-sharing 
would create fertile ground for moral hazard and threaten financial stability, thus 
going against the same objectives that the bank resolution framework was introduced 
to achieve. 
In conclusion, this case raises an issue of lack of coherence both with the State 
aid framework and with the role that the BRRD and the DGSD have apparently 
designed for DGSs, reinforcing their function of crisis prevention at the expense of 
the usual one of deposit insurance. The reading of the judgment goes in support of 
the use of deposit guarantee funds at an earlier stage and even in resolution with the 
role to assist sales or transfers of liabilities from one failing bank or entity to another, 
whenever not enough quality-assets are available on the balance sheet of the former 
to support the transfer.293 The problem, however, lies in the absence of any 
concomitant requirements on burden-sharing, which would enable the use of (semi-
)public funds without any curbing of potential competitive distortions or limitation 
of the need for external funds to a minimum. 
8. Concluding remarks 
This chapter has analysed the means of preparation for resolution, in the form 
of resolution planning and setting of MREL, and the execution of resolution through 
the different tools made available by the BRRD to highlight State aid and other 
competition-relevant issues arising from the regulatory framework and its 
implementation. 
On the basis of the analysis, it would seem that stricter prudential and 
resolution rules could contribute to the growing trend of bank consolidation in 
the EU. Indeed, bail-in rules in particular, and the related MREL requirements, if 
putting smaller banks at a disadvantage, may prompt banking mergers and 
acquisitions in order to be able to tap into capital markets and prepare for resolution 
rather than liquidation. In this sense, the resolution framework does not necessarily 
drive the consolidation trend on its own, but it might reinforce it.  
 
293 Restoy, Vrbaski and Walters (2020). 
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Resolution tools other than bail-in, which entail (partial) transfer of banks’ 
assets, liabilities and rights also have competition-related implications for the 
structure of banking markets, as their successful implementation hinges on the 
presence of a competitor willing to take over the transferred banking perimeter. Based 
on the market positioning of the acquirer and the potential overlap between the 
merging entities, competitive safeguards will be necessary to prevent the 
establishment or reinforcement of dominant positions in the market. On the other 
hand, operations entailing acquisitions of control and mergers are considered as one 
of the means through which credit institutions’ stability and capital position can be 
strengthened, as well as increasing their operative efficiency through the advantages 
deriving from the establishment of economies of scale. In an ideal scenario, if banks 
could be made systematically safe, independently of their size, then it might not be 
as significant a problem to allow for consolidation of different entities into bigger 
institutions, as long as the usual competitive safeguards are applied. 
As for the role of DGS in bank crisis management instead, recent cases have 
shown a shift in support of the use of deposit guarantee funds at an earlier stage and 
even in resolution with the role to assist sales or transfers of liabilities from one failing 
bank or entity to another. The problem, however, lies in the absence of any 
concomitant requirements on burden-sharing, acting to curb potential competitive 
distortions and to limit the need for external assistance. 
In light of the discussion of this chapter, a two-tier resolution regime appears 
to be shaping in which the failure of bigger banks can be dealt with through the 
currently available resolution tools, while smaller/mid-sized banks could be rescued 
through the DGS and still not be liquidated, if their continued operation is necessary 
to preserve financial stability and their services and operations are essential to the 
market. For the regime to be credible and sustainable, however, this configuration 
should hinge on the condition that any competitive distortions are minimised, before 
support is granted, thus calling for a more consistent application of burden-sharing 













Chapter 5: Drawing lessons from Precautionary 






Having established from a theoretical standpoint which are the possible 
competitive concerns stemming from the availability of the precautionary 
recapitalisation exception, this chapter will offer a detailed analysis of the different 
rescue measures entailing different degrees of burden on public finances, which were 
applied in the last five years, with the regulatory framework for bank resolution 
already in place. 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically assess the practical implementation 
of the EU regulatory framework for crisis management in its development, 
particularly in terms of the provisions relating to State aid control, in order to pinpoint 
the specificities of the various rescue instances and to draw some speculative 
conclusions on the competition-related concerns that the authorities involved might 
need to take stock of in their choice of rescue strategy.   
To this end, all cases of crisis management which were dealt with after the 
introduction of European rules for bank resolution and in which some form of public 
support was granted in support of bank restructuring will be taken into account.294 
The cases will be analysed according to the form of intervention and related public 
support measures applied, distinguishing: (1) direct State recapitalisations, which 
have enabled the beneficiary bank to continue operating in the market as a standalone 
entity; (2) private acquisitions of ailing banks bolstered by State support, which led 
to a consolidation of entities; and (3) rescues bolstered by the intervention of a deposit 
 
294 For this reason, case SA.46558 is not considered in the analysis, as it is limited to temporary 
liquidity support in favour of Attica Bank, without any restructuring consequences for the institution. 
Case SA.48920 (2017/N) in relation to LCCU is not included, instead, because “the need for aid [did] 
not stem from repeated losses but from regulatory changes” (para. 43 of the Commission’s decision), 




guarantee fund, possibly in conjunction with a private investor, for which the market 
outcome is yet to be determined.  
This chapter can be seen as a vehicle through which to discuss the application 
of different tools and solutions to deal with different bank failures, which might bring 
about changes in the structure of banking markets and institutions, and how these 
should be taken into account to assess whether any resulting change in the conduct 
of market players could arise as a result. In this sense, it could be interpreted as 
considering the potential interconnections between market structure and operators’ 
conduct in light of measures for the management of bank crises.295  
The exercise carried out does not intend to produce an empirical estimate of 
the causal impact of the rescue measures on competition indicators and structure of 
the relevant banking markets, since part of the institutions taken into consideration, 
(i) are still in the implementation phase of their restructuring schemes, and thus their 
ownership and organisational structures are not yet “finalised”, and (ii) the 
geographical and product markets of activity have a regional or even province-level 
relevance, the competitive structure of which is not fully gleaned from public data.296 
Rather, the comparative analysis of the most recent cases of support measures granted 
to Greek, Italian and Portuguese banks is meant to highlight any competition-relevant 
issues that the implementation of the available crisis management tools might raise 
in practice. This should offer reasoned grounds for a discussion on the potential non-
neutrality of the regulatory framework as currently set, insofar as it might produce 
different consequences on the structure of banking markets, depending on which tools 
and competitive safeguards are applied to the management of different banks’ failures 
and how banks are left on the market (or not) after rescue. 
 
295 In the economic literature, the so-called “structure-conduct-performance” (SCP) paradigm put forth 
by Mason (1939) and Bain (1956) would posit that the performance of the banking industry depends 
on the behaviour of the incumbent banks, which is influenced by the structure of the market in which 
they operate, as proxied by its concentration level, generally. In accordance with this, more 
concentrated industries would lead to higher degrees of market power for banks, having in turn a 
positive impact on their profits, at the expense of higher costs for customers. Differently, the “efficient 
structure” hypothesis (Demsetz 1973; Peltzman 1977) would posit that differences in the efficiency of 
banks could result in different market structures, as efficiency would enable banks to extract higher 
profits and market shares.  
296 In addition, for some of the institutions included in the analysis, not all funding costs and bank-
level data are publicly available, as not all institutions involved were listed at the time of rescue, thus 
not enabling full consistency and comparability in this respect.  
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Given that different sets of rescue measures considered can entail a burden on 
public finances, it is worthwhile to assess whether there is any difference in the effects 
these measures may produce in the market from a standpoint of competition 
incentives for institutions. In other words, the analysis carried out in this chapter 
compares intervention responses, contextualising them within the national markets in 
which ailing banks operate, so as to discuss a number of competition-related 
considerations which might arise from the application of crisis management tools. 
The different measures applied in the rescue cases analysed in this chapter are 
summarised in Annex 2. Annex 3 instead provides a detailed overview of the burden-
sharing requirements as well as structural and behavioural remedies applied in cases 
of State aid granting approved by the Commission while the BRRD was already in 
place.  
In order to put into context the cases discussed in this chapter, it is worthwhile 
in the first place to have a look at data and figures relating to the structure of the 
European banking sector since the global financial crisis, in particular in terms of 
evolution of the number of institutions in the market and the shares of total assets, 
capital and reserves held by banks in different Member States.    
2. Structure of the European banking sector 
A consolidation trend started in the European banking sector in 2009, with 
the outbreak of the global financial crisis, and is still on-going, although to varying 





Figure 5.1 - Number of EU credit institutions (2007-2018) 
 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
 
More specifically, around 30% of the existing credit institutions are German 
banks, while Italian banks account for 8.3% of the total, with Spain accounting for 
3.3% and the remaining share split by institutions in other Member States. 
There is also a non-negligible degree of variation across national banking 
sectors in Europe in terms of representations of banks of different sizes. Indeed, less 
significant institutions (LSIs) are not equally concentrated throughout Europe, yet the 
LSI sector is composed of over 2,400 institutions297 which are relatively small in size, 
with traditional lending-oriented business models. More specifically, in Luxembourg, 
Germany, Austria and Ireland, the importance of the LSI sector is relatively high, as 
LSIs account for over one-third of assets held in the respective domestic banking 
sector. Differently, the LSI sector is relatively small in countries with a more 
concentrated banking sector, such as in France (7.7%), Spain (4.8%) and Greece 
(2.6%). In absolute value, the LSI sector in Germany is the largest in Europe, with 
over 1,400 institutions, representing altogether approximately 55% of total LSI assets 
 
297 In the first half of 2019, Italy enacted a reform of national credit cooperative banks (“Banche di 
Credito Cooperativo” – BCCs), which led to the incorporation of 228 BCCs into two significant 
institution groups, bringing about a major structural change in the LSI sector. Also elsewhere in 
Europe, a consolidation trend continued in the LSI sector in the last years, with 92 mergers and 
acquisitions involving 184 banks taking place during 2018 (see ECB’s 2020 LSI Risk Report). 
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at the European level. The sector also continues to grow, with its total assets 
increasing by 3.2% in 2018, and the average LSI size reaching €2 billion. 
2.1 Shares of assets, capital and reserves 
 
Figure 5.2 - Share of total assets held by EU banks 
 
Source: own computations based on data from ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
 
Figure 5.3 - Share of total capital and reserves in the EU banking sector 
 
Source: own computations based on data from ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
 
In terms of EU banking assets, the biggest share is held by UK credit 
institutions (almost 21%), followed by France (20.1%), Germany (18%), Italy (8.5%) 
and Spain (6.1%). As regards total capital and reserves, the shares are also similarly 
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distributed by the institutions of those same Member States, as shown by the two 
graphs above.    
2.2 Concentration in national banking markets 
More information can be gleaned also from indicators relating to the 
concentration of some of the principal national banking sectors in Europe, including 
those in which the banks subject of this chapter’s analysis are incorporated (Cyprus, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal). To this end, data on the evolution of national sectors’ 
Herfindahl index298 and level of concentration of total assets within the largest five 
credit institutions of each country give a more comprehensive picture of the structure 
of the national markets, thus building the background against which to consider the 


























298 The Herfindahl index (HI) refers to the concentration of the banking market on the basis of total 
assets, obtained by summing the squares of the market shares of all credit institutions in the banking 
sector. Research by the Deutsche Bank (2019) finds evidence of a pattern between bank profitability 
(ROA) and concentration (Herfindahl index); higher levels of concentration in a national banking 
market are positively correlated with higher returns on assets. 
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Table  5.1 - European banking sectors: Herfindahl index and share of total assets 
of largest 5 credit institutions 
 Herfindahl index for credit institutions 
(based on total assets) 
Share of total assets of largest 5 credit 
institutions 
Country 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Austria 397 358 374 369 369 35.8 34.5 36.1 36.0 36.0 
Cyprus 1,443 1,366 1,962 2,379 2,276 67.5 65.8 84.2 86.9 85.7 
Denmark 1,180 1,224 1,123 1,069 1,170 67.8 68.3 65.7 64.5 66.2 
France 589 572 574 663 654 47.2 46.0 45.4 47.7 48.7 
Germany 273 277 250 245 277 30.6 31.4 29.7 29.1 31.2 
Greece 2,254 2,332 2,307 2,304 2,382 95.2 97.3 97.0 96.8 97.4 
Ireland 672 636 658 632 665 45.9 44.3 45.5 46.1 49.7 
Italy 435 452 519 579 643 41.0 43.0 43.4 45.6 47.9 
Luxembourg 321 260 256 261 277 31.3 27.6 26.2 26.3 27.7 
Netherlands 2,104 2,097 2,087 2,178 2,039 84.6 84.7 83.8 84.7 84.7 
Portugal 1,215 1,181 1,220 1,203 1,225 72.3 71.2 73.1 73.0 73.3 
Spain 896 937 965 1,138 1,110 60.2 61.8 63.7 68.5 67.4 
Sweden 866 845 914 785 787 57.8 56.3 58.2 54.3 54.9 
United 
Kingdom 
438 422 453 353 349 37.0 35.5 36.9 31.8 31.2 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
The degree of concentration of the European banking sector displays 
significant variability across national markets, as highlighted in the table above, with 
the share of assets of the five largest banks at national level also varying between 
26% to over 97%. Germany and Luxembourg have more dispersed banking sectors, 
compared to those of other Member States, while Greece and the Netherlands have 
two of the most concentrated ones. Market concentration has increased in most EU 
countries from the turn of the century to recent years, with some exceptions including 
Austria and Denmark. With the outbreak of the last crisis, consolidation accelerated 
in those countries that suffered most from it and whose banking sectors underwent 
restructuring, as was the case in Greece and Spain, for instance, where increases in 
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HI indices were registered.299 According to a report on financial integration in Europe 
by the ECB (2017), the Lerner index300 for national banking markets suggests that 
banks’ market power has increased in comparison with the crisis and pre-crisis 
periods in most Member States and in the euro area as a whole.  
2.3 Focus on Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Portugal 
Already from 1999 the number of banks operating in the Italian market started 
decreasing, with the total number of credit institutions dropping from 890 to slightly 
above 500 at the end of 2019. This consolidation trend is also reflected in an increase 
of the HI for the national sector, which has risen from 435 to 643 in the past five 
years, and in a higher concentration of total assets in the hands of the biggest five 
Italian institutions. Studies have found that the consolidation process of the Italian 
banking sector in the past years has created no apparent conflict between 
concentration and competition301, excluding any evidence of collusive behaviour 
among Italian banks, with efficiency gains being the main drivers for institutions’ 
profitability.302  
Compared to other national banking sectors, the Greek banking sector is 
among the most concentrated ones in Europe, with its assets being almost fully owned 
by the biggest five national credit institutions. Also before the financial crisis, Greece 
had been maintaining a higher concentration ratio in its banking sector than other 
Eurozone countries, rendering its national banking market a de facto oligopoly, which 
has enabled the maintenance of high loan-deposit interest spreads.303 
As for Cyprus, 30 authorised credit institutions are operative in the country, 
of which seven are local authorised credit institutions, while the rest either either 
subsidiaries of foreign banks from EU and non-EU countries or branches of foreign 
banks. The three primary banks are Bank of Cyprus, Hellenic Bank and RCB Bank. 
Between 2018 and 2020, the national banking sector underwent consolidation due to 
 
299 Maudos and Vives (2019). 
300 The Lerner index is an indicator of firms’ market power, based on the difference between price 
mark-ups and marginal costs. It has the benefit of overcoming criticisms of concentration measures as 
proxies for competition concerning the fact that banks do not necessarily exercise more market power 
after their market share increases. 
301 Coccorese (2005, 2009). 
302 Coccorese and Cardone (2020). 
303 Alexiou and Sofoklis (2009). 
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acquisitions as well as a reduction in branches, which decreased from 458 in 2016 to 
326 at the end of 2019. This consolidation trend is also reflected by the increases in 
HI index, which is among the highest in Europe, and in the share of assets 
concentrated among the five largest credit institutions in the country.  
The concentration of the Portuguese banking sector instead, as proxied by its 
HI index and the share of total assets held by the biggest institutions in the country, 
has remained quite stable in the past five years. At the end of 2018, the Portuguese 
banking system comprised 150 institutions, out of which 60 of were banks- half of 
these being branches of foreign banks. The HI index had been relatively stable in the 
previous years as well, going from 1207 in 2010 to 1164 in 2014. Yet, the higher 
increase in market concentration observed in Portugal compared to other EU 
countries seemingly did not weaken competitive conditions in the national banking 
sector, with banks’ returns on equity and spreads between loan and deposit rates 
remaining stable or even shrinking, at least in the early 2000s.304   
3. Direct State recapitalisations 
A number of recapitalisations have been completed in the last years to the 
benefit of institutions exhibiting capital shortfalls, due to increased regulatory 
requirements or in the adverse scenario of supervisory exercises, such as stress tests 
or asset quality reviews. These schemes involved injections of capital through the 
subscription by the State of either ordinary shares or hybrid instruments, such as 
contingent convertible bonds (CoCos). As these measures fall outside of the scope of 
BRRD resolution, they can generally entail a lower degree of burden-sharing by the 
creditors of the beneficiary institutions and are accompanied by remedies to curb 
competition concerns, as per State aid requirements. 
Such rescue measures can enable the survival of the institution concerned as 
a standalone entity in the market, or possibly facilitate its consolidation into another 
institution at a later stage, depending on the outcome in terms of ownership structure 
following the exit from the State.  
 
304 See IMF (2005), available at www.elibrary.imf.org. 
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3.1 Caixa General de Depositos (CGD)  
One particular example of direct recapitalisation of an ailing bank from the 
part of the State can be observed in the case of Portuguese Caixa General de 
Depositos (CGD), which is the largest banking group in Portugal. At the end of 2011, 
the bank had total assets amounting to €120.6 billion and a leading market position 
in most of the business areas of its activity in Portugal, and particularly in deposits 
and retail loans. Its presence has remained significant along the years also 
internationally, especially in Spain and Portuguese-speaking African countries. 
CGD’s only shareholder is the Portuguese State.   
3.1.1 The 2013 recapitalisation 
In 2012, additional capital needs amounting to €1.65 billion were identified 
for the bank, as linked to increased capital requirements. On 28 June 2012, two 
recapitalisation measures in favour of the bank were approved by the Portuguese 
government, namely encompassing the subscription of ordinary shares for €750 
million and CDG-issued CoCos amounting to €900 million. As the EU Treaties are 
neutral on the type of property ownership, the Commission is bound to give equal 
treatment to publicly and privately owned banks. Therefore, alike to the option for 
privately owned banks to seek capital on the market to increase their capitalisation, a 
State-owned bank can seek capital from the State, in its role of shareholder.305 
In this case, the Commission assessed that the support measures extended by 
Portugal to CGD constituted State aid within the meaning of Art. 107(1) TFEU, on 
the basis of three main points: 
1. a lacking analysis on the return of the return on the State’s investment prior 
to the government’s announcement of the decision to implement the capital 
increase, which would have been required by a private investor on the market 
to substantiate the choice whether or not to invest; 
2. an expected return on the investment below the cost of equity, which a private 
investor would not accept306; 
 
305 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_557. 
306 Even if losses or low profitability could be accepted in the first years after rescue, they would need 
to be compensated by returns above average at a later stage, in order for a private investor in the market 
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3. the capital injection was decided within the same context and at the same time 
as the subscription not only of CGD’s CoCos, but also of those by BPI and 
BCP, thus giving rise to a so-called ‘pollution effect’ on the nature of the aid 
measure.307 
The approval of the State support also hinged on a restructuring plan, which 
aimed at reducing the bank’s labour costs and non-performing loans. Moreover, 
behavioural restrictions were imposed on CGD, including: (i) an acquisition ban, (ii) 
a ban on aggressive commercial practices, (iii) a ban on advertising State support, 
and (iv) a restriction on the remuneration of the bank’s managers. 
At the time of the approval of the first rescue measures for CGD in 2013, the 
2013 Banking Communication had yet to come into force. In accordance with the 
earlier State aid rules308, banks only needed to be prevented from using public support 
as a remuneration of their own funds when profits generated from their activities were 
not sufficient. Thus, the only restriction imposed at the time consisted of behavioural 
remedies including the prohibition to distribute dividends, to hand out bonuses to the 
bank’s managers, and to pay coupons to bondholders.  
The restructuring concluded in 2013 provided for burden-sharing in the form 
of no payment of dividends and interest to preferred shareholders and subordinated 
debt holders. Yet, this restructuring did not achieve its prefixed objectives and a new 
recapitalisation by the Portuguese State became necessary in 2016. 
3.1.2 The 2016 recapitalisation 
The Commission assessed three measures implemented by Portugal to 
strengthen CGD's capital position by €3.9 billion, and in particular:  
1. the internal reorganisation of Portugal's 49% shareholding in Parcaixa, which 
was transferred to CDG and increased its core capital by around €0.5 billion 
was not found to generate new cost for Portugal; 
 
to accept. See Botelho Moniz, de Gouveia e Melo and do Nascimento Ferreira in Laprévote, Gray, de 
Cecco (2017), p. 414. 
307 Recapitalisation of Caixa Geral de Depósitos,  SA.35062, 18 July 2012, para. 38. 
308 2009 Restructuring Communication, 2009/C 195/04. 
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2. the conversion of existing State-held hybrid debt into shares, which was 
worth approximately €0.9 billion, was deemed to have been completed on 
terms that a private debt investor would have accepted as well, thanks to a 
sufficient return; and 
3. the injection of €2.5 billion of new equity into CGD by Portugal was similarly 
found to have been completed at market terms that an investor would have 
accepted. 
In addition, CGD raised internal capital and issued €930 million of additional 
Tier 1 capital to investors unrelated to the Portuguese State. 
Differently from other recapitalisations, the Commission found this injection 
of public money not to amount to State aid, as the recapitalisation was expected to 
generate a return that would be sufficient to satisfy a private investor, thus 
conforming to the market economy investor principle (MEIP).309 Somewhat 
surprisingly, the main justification for not finding State aid did not revolve around 
the application of burden-sharing or the deal being concluded at market terms, but 
rather on the prospect of the institution repaying the aid in the future, by virtue of an 
appropriate remuneration being set for the State. However, the likelihood of 
repayment of public funds is not one of the criteria to assess whether a measure 
constitutes State aid under European law.  
3.1.3 CGD’s market position and balance sheet indicators 
As of September 2015, before the second recapitalisation, CGD had a national 
market share of 24.2% relating to total assets. As of June 2016, its market share on 
total credit stood at 21.9%, whereas the one on total deposits stood at 28.5%. The 
bank had developed a strong franchise as a universal bank, with a leading position in 
the domestic retail banking market, counting with 4 million customers in Portugal 
and €99.3 billion in assets.   
In 2017, CGD preserved its leading position in the domestic banking market, 
with a market share of customer deposits of 26.4% and a market share in the 
individual customers’ segment of 29.9% registered at year-end. Its market share in 
 
309 See P. Nicolaides, Bank Recapitalisation that Conforms to the Market Economy Investor Principle, 
29 August 2017, stateaidhub.eu.  
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loans and advances to customers was 20.8%, with corporate credit and mortgage 
market shares of 17.1% and 25.4%, respectively, as of 31 December 2017. Compared 
to the previous year, the market shares in loans and advances to customers and in the 
individual customers’ segment decreased by 1%, while the market share of 
customers’ deposits dropped by 1.3%. Its share of the mortgage market instead just 
saw a slight inflection from the 26.1% observed in 2016. 
CGD’s asset quality evolved positively as well, with NPE and NPL ratios 
reduced to 9.3% and 12.0% (from 12.1% and 15.8% in December 2016), respectively. 
The amount of NPL decreased to €2.7 billion in 2017, down 25% from the previous 
year, with the coverage by impairments reaching 56.7% at year-end. The phased-in 
and fully implemented CET 1 ratios in December both stood at 14.0%, with phased-
in Tier 1 and Total ratios of 15.0% and 15.6%, respectively, thus is full compliance 
with the regulatory requirements. After net losses of €171 million and €1.86 billion 
registered in 2015 and 2016 respectively, the bank also reverted to profit-making, 
with a net income of €52 million in 2017. This was also reflected in the bank’s ROE, 
which stood at 1.1%, after it had been at -1.3% in 2015 and -32.0% in 2016.  
The recapitalisation effectively enabled CGD to remain operative as a 
standalone entity in the market, while also keeping its domestic market share broadly 
unaltered compared to the pre-rescue situation, with very slight decreases only. This 
is not surprising, given that CGD was State-controlled and the first banking group in 
Portugal, thus not likely to be split up or acquired in full by another financial entity, 
despite lagging behind competitors in terms of insufficient re-pricing and slower cost 
reduction prior to the recapitalisation.310 The rescue package and the restructuring 
plan as approved enabled the bank to recover profitability and improve its efficiency, 
which were good signals in view of attaining a future return for the State’s additional 
investment in the bank. 
3.1.4 Considerations on recapitalisations of State-owned banks 
Having established that no State aid was found in the 2016 recapitalisation, it 
is still worth considering how burden-sharing requirements would have been applied 
in the counterfactual case in which the recapitalisation had not conformed to the 
 
310 Recapitalisation measures for Caixa Geral de Depósitos, SA.47178, 10 March 2017, para. 39. 
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MEIP. This would have entailed a conversion of write-down of instruments, leading 
to a loss of all or part of the capital of the State, as the sole shareholder of the 
institution, but the twofold aim of burden-sharing of preventing moral hazard and 
reducing costs to the taxpayers would have been defeated.311 
While private shareholders would be resistant to bail-in due to the prospect of 
dilution or wipe-out312, the situation would be different for the State, as it would be 
called to contribute in any case, be it through bail-in exclusively or with additional 
State aid, in case bail-in were not sufficient to cover losses and recapitalise the bank 
involved. Therefore, a paradox might arise within the new resolution framework for 
those banks that are already State-owned, where the purpose of severing the link 
between banks and their sovereign through the private intervention of shareholders 
and debtholders might be impossible to achieve in practice. Indeed, for those 
institutions, the burden-sharing requirement would not reduce the burden of a bank’s 
failure for taxpayers.313  
This case offers particular insights into the competition-related intricacies that 
may arise within the new regulatory framework for bank resolution, as a result of the 
specificities of the ownership structure of financial institutions, in case their distress 
requires the application of crisis management measures, independent of whether State 
support is necessary.  
State-owned banks might pose a particular sort of challenge to the 
management of crises, since State involvement will be included by definition, be it 
through burden-sharing, or through potential additional public funds. It is in this light 
that the reasoning of the Commission in its approval of the aid to CGD being based 
on an appropriate remuneration in line with the conditions that a private market 
investor would accept might be read. Indeed, if burden-sharing still implies a 
disbursement of public resources, another possible channel through which to verify 
that aid is minimised is to check that the State’s approach to evaluate its investment 
does not significantly depart from the one private investors would be reasonably 
expected to apply. Still, more emphasis should be put on addressing whether rescue 
 
311 Nicolaides (2017), supra note 310, arguing that the loss for the State would not have amounted to 
State aid. 
312 As shown also by recent cases, as discussed in this chapter.  
313 Nicolaides (2017), supra note 310. 
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deals have been concluded on market terms, in order to give more relevance to the 
degree to which the State might have favoured the institution rescued, compared to 
the conditions the market would have imposed in the same period. 
Considering the fact that States have increasingly come to control what is now 
around 18% of the assets of the European financial sector, the important role of State-
owned banks further complicates reaching a straightforward and non-contradictory 
stance on the application of State aid within the regulatory framework for crisis 
management.314  
3.2 National Bank of Greece and Piraeus Bank 
The first two cases of precautionary recapitalisations completed within the 
meaning of Art. 32(4)(d)(iii) BRRD concerned National Bank of Greece (NBG) and 
Piraeus Bank and date back to 2015. 
3.2.1 Market position and balance sheet indicators of NBG and Piraeus   
At the end of 2014, Piraeus Bank had a market share representing 29% of the 
total domestic deposit market in Greece, in line with the previous year. At the end of 
2015, it accounted for 30.2% of all customer loans issued in Greece, for 27% of 
deposits, and it held a market share of 22.4% in terms of total assets at national level. 
The Bank also held the largest market share in Greece in terms of loans, close to 30%. 
As of 30 June 2015, NBG held a market share of 22% in Greece for loans, and 
accounted for 29.1% in terms of deposits. 
Both Piraeus Bank and NBG incurred losses in the years prior to the capital 
injection. For the period between 2013 and 2015, Piraeus Bank posted €8,007 
millions of losses, against a capital injection of €2,720 million. In the same period 
NBG posted accumulated losses of €5,583 million, against a capital injection of 
€2,706 million. For the €15.7 billion injected in Piraeus Bank and NBG in 2013, the 
sum of the share capital of the two entities was €2.9 billion before the additional 
injections completed in December 2015, meaning that most of the capital injected by 
the Greek State in the two entities in 2013 was lost, even if €8.3 billion of the 
injections into the two banks had been recorded as financial transactions at the time. 
 
314 Along these lines, see Lannoo (2017). 
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The NPL rate for the two institutions was at 40% and the return on assets at -0.82% 
by September 2015, with a need to rebuild the deposit base and stem the deposit 
outflow. On this basis, there was no clear assurance that the two institutions would 
become profitable and able to pay out dividends in the near future.  
In the autumn of 2015, the ECB carried out an asset quality review (AQR) 
and a stress test. According to the results disclosed in November 2015, Alpha Bank, 
Eurobank, NBG and Piraeus Bank reported cumulative capital shortfalls of €4.4 
billion in the baseline scenario and €14.4 billion in the adverse scenario. In response, 
the Greek Parliament approved a new recapitalisation law on 31 October 2015, 
requiring banks to raise private capital by means of share capital increases, bond 
swaps or asset sales. All four banks managed to raise enough capital to avoid being 
resolved, but NBG and Piraeus only managed to address the baseline scenario 
through private funds, despite having completed the conversion of both subordinated 
and senior debt holders. The capital ratios and shortfalls highlighted for the four 





















Table 5.2 - 2015 Comprehensive assessment results 
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- 263 - 339 - 1576 - 2213 - 4391 
adverse 
scenario 8% - 2743 - 2122 - 4602 - 4933 - 14401 
Source: EGOV. 
All four banks accounted for more than 95% of the national market and were 
under restructuring following previous receipt of aid. Requiring commitments from 
the Greek State regarding each of the four institutions to reduce their lending to the 
real economy would have had adverse macroeconomic effects, which led the 
Commission to allow for the restructuring plan not to include a downsizing of 
loans.315  
The Commission also noted that the capital needs of the Greek banks were 
mainly a result of their participation in the Private Sector Involvement (PSI) 
programme of 2012316, rather than being caused by excessive risk-taking or 
mismanagement. Additionally, Piraeus Bank and NBG had a larger exposure to 
Greek sovereign risk than other banks in Greece did.317 
3.2.2 The rescue schemes 
Piraeus Bank and NBG resorted to a precautionary recapitalisation to cover 
the shortfalls identified in the adverse scenario. The Hellenic Financial Stability fund 
injected €2.7 billion in each of the two banks, in the form of contingent convertible 
 
315 Piraeus Bank, SA.34826, 23 July 2014, para. 152. 
316 A significant debt restructuring programme initiated with private creditors of the country in order 
to reduce the debt burden of the sovereign, through which the Greek government amended the 
conditions of bonds under Greek law with a face value of €177 billion. Due to the bank’s large 
exposures to government bonds, they played a key role in the programme, which, in turn, had negative 
effects on their solvency. 
317 Piraeus Bank, SA.34826, 23 July 2014, para. 321; National Bank of Greece, SA.34824, 23 July 
2014, para. 370. 
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bonds (CoCos) for 75% of the amount, and in ordinary shares for the remaining 
amount (25%). The capital injections allowed the two institutions to build up 
prudential capital buffers.318 Table 5.3 below illustrates the specific structure of the 
capital raising exercise used to recapitalise the four major Greek banks in 2015.   
Table 5.3 - 2015 Greek banks’ capital raising exercise 
(EUR mln) Alpha Eurobank NBG Piraeus Total 
Conversion into 
equity 
1011 418 759 582 2769 
Capital from 
private investors 






2706 2720 5426 
(of which shares) - - (676) (680) (1356) 
(of which cocos) - - (2029) (2040) (4069) 
Other capital 180 83 380 291 935 
TOTAL Capital 
shortfall 
2743 2122 4602 4933 14401 
Source: banks’ websites. 
An 8% interest on the CoCos was due and payable at the sole discretion of 
the issuer either in cash or in shares, once again, at the sole discretion of the issuer. 
Therefore, the CoCos injected in NBG and Piraeus Bank had a contingent annually 
payable rate of return, giving them the nature of equity more than of debt instruments. 
The conversion price of the CoCos was fixed at €0.3, equal to the nominal value of 
the ordinary shares. The fact that a conversion takes place at the nominal value instead 
of at market price is a non-market feature indicating prima facie that the CoCos entail 
a gift component, which would materialise at the time of the conversion in case the 
market value is inferior to the nominal value.   
While private investors participated in the capital increase in Piraeus Bank 
and NBG simultaneously with the Greek State, it is arguable whether the same 
conditions were applied compared to the two classes of investors. In particular, Law 
4340/2015, approved by the government on 1 November 2015 for the two 
recapitalisations, ensured that any capital shortfall in the adverse scenario not covered 
 
318 Piraeus Bank, SA.34826, 23 July 2014, para. 168; National Bank of Greece, SA.34824, 23 July 
2014, para. 177. 
165 
 
by private investors would be addressed by the Greek State through the HFSF instead. 
As a consequence, private investors could already be absolutely certain that any 
potential capital shortfall would be covered by the government, in accordance with 
the law approved, before any specific measures for the two institutions were even 
agreed upon. Moreover, the subscription by the government was significantly higher 
than that of private investors in both cases. The instruments used for the capital 
injections were also different, as the CoCos were only subscribed by the HFSF, their 
design may also have entailed a gift component, and they were not freely tradable, 
requiring the consent of the bank and the supervisor for any transfer.319  
For these reasons, it is reasonable to conclude that the capital injections by 
the Greek government in the two systemic banks did not have as the main objective 
earning a sufficient or attractive rate of return, but rather they were undertaken for a 
public policy purpose, due to the fact that private capital was not available to cover 
the shortfall identified in the adverse scenario of the AQR.320  
The Commission listed a number of conditions that would have to be met for 
the State aid to be considered as falling under the exception of precautionary 
recapitalisation pursuant to Art. 32 (4)(d)(iii) BRRD and be declared compatible with 
the internal market. These included the solvency of the beneficiary institution and the 
measure’s temporary and precautionary use in covering the institution’s capital 
shortfall. In light of this, some particularly salient aspects of the precautionary 
recapitalisations granted to the two banks comprise the following points:   
 
1. Burden-sharing was completed by the banks’ shareholders, subordinated 
creditors and even senior bondholders, going beyond the mandatory 
requirements of State aid rules. 
2. Preponderant reliance was made on CoCos compared to ordinary shares to 
inject capital into the two institutions, facilitating the exit from State due to 
the repayable nature of the hybrid instruments. The exit of the State from the 







deemed “temporary”, as per the wording of the requirements of Art. 32(4)(d) 
BRRD. 
3. The capital injection was declared to be used to bolster prudential capital 
buffers, thus seemingly aligning with the “precautionary” sentiment of the 
exception provided for in the BRRD in recapitalising with a forward-looking 
perspective, to prepare for potential future losses that the bank could incur 
with the materialisation of the adverse scenario envisaged in the stress test.  
Additionally, restrictions on remuneration were imposed with a corporate 
governance-related aim321 and within the context of a cost-cutting programme.322 In 
this sense, these measures were not imposed strictly to diminish competitive 
concerns. Apart from the divestment of foreign assets, no other downsizing was 
imposed on the institutions as a remedy to possible distortionary effects on 
competition, but rather additional sales of branches were imposed, in part with a cost-
cutting and efficiency-enhancing purpose.323 Behavioural requirements included an 
acquisition ban and an advertising ban.324 
3.2.3 Post-rescue situation of the institutions 
At the end of 2015, NBG’s CET1 ratio had increased to 14.6%, thus fully 
complying with regulatory requirements. Following approval by the SSM and in 
accordance with the applicable regulatory framework, on 15 December 2016, NBG 
fully repaid the CoCos issued in December 2015 and held by the HFSF for an amount 
of €2,029 million, in accordance with the commitments contained in its revised 
restructuring plan approved by the Commission on 4 December 2015. After the 
repayment of the CoCos, the group’s CET1 ratio as of 31 December 2016 stood at 
16.3%, thus confirming the solidity of the bank’s capital base.325 Piraeus Bank, on 
the other hand, has yet to repay the CoCos issued to the HSFS as part of the 
precautionary recapitalisation measure of 2015, after having skipped their coupon 
payments in 2018 in order to focus on strengthening its capital base. On 2 December 
 
321 See, for instance, Piraeus Bank, case SA.34826, 23 July 2014, para. 140. 
322 Id, para. 346. 
323 The Commission argued that requiring significant downsizing and reduction of lending in a 
situation in which all four big banks in Greece were under restructuring would have had “adverse 
macro-economic effects” (see case SA.43365, para. 161; case SA.43364, para. 152). 
324 Case SA.43365, Annex C paras. 28-29;  case SA.43364, Annex C paras. 28-29. 
325 As reported in the bank’s 2016 financial statements. 
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2019, it paid €165.466 million in cash to the HSFS, thus resuming the payment of the 
coupon of the CoCos for 2019. 
As of December 2016, Piraeus Bank maintained the first position in the Greek 
banking sector, with a 30% market share in terms of loans, while its deposit market 
share stood at 29%, up again to the level reached in the year prior to the 
recapitalisation. Its shares relating to housing loans and consumer loans instead were 
posted at 26% and 21% respectively. The NPL ratio for the group decreased from the 
40.1% registered in 2015 to 37.5%. NBG also kept its market share in 2016, 
accounting for one fourth of the Greek retail banking market. Its NPL ratio contracted 
by 15% to reach 12.5% in 2016. Therefore, the recapitalisation measures applied in 
2016 do not seem to have significantly altered the positioning of the two institutions 
in the market. The recapitalisations achieved their aim of strengthening the capital 
position of the banks concerned, while credit risk also decreased to some extent, as 
evidenced by the improvements in NPL ratios.  
As for the rescue schemes resulting in the preservation of the two standalone 
banks without their merger or incorporation into other existing financial institutions, 
it would have been unlikely to foresee otherwise, due to the structure of the Greek 
banking sector, which is concentrated across four main banking groups.   
3.3 Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS) 
The only other case of precautionary recapitalisation authorised so far 
involves Italian Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS).  
Following the merger of Banco Popolare and Banca Popolare di Milano, MPS 
became the fourth largest Italian bank with a total balance sheet of €153 billion, €65.5 
billion of RWAs, 25,566 employees and 2,032 branches at the end of 2016, with its 
main activities related to the SME segment. In 2009, MPS had participated in a bank 
recapitalisation scheme, in which Italy subscribed €1.9 billion in hybrid bonds (the 
so-called “Tremonti bonds”). The bank also received liquidity support in the form of 
State guarantees. After the implementation of the scheme, which had the purpose of 




3.3.1 MPS’s market position and balance sheet indicators 
 
Table 5.4 - MPS’s financial indicators (2008-2016) 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total assets EUR 
mn 
213796 224815 244279 240794 218886 199106 183444 169012 153.178 
Net income EUR 
mn 
931 225 987 -4698 -3190 
 
-1439 -5347 390 -3231 
Tier 1 ratio % 5.13 7.52 8.37 10.30 9.52 10.62 8.67 12.85 8.17 




% 33.40 43.02 49.08 97.35 187.91 247.83 304.54 214.13 285.87 
Employees  33973 32475 31880 31550 30382 28013 26548 25731 24560 
Branches  N/A N/A 3069 2793 2671 2793 2344 2133 2032 
Source: EGOV 
Most of the losses that MPS started incurring in 2011 and 2012 were for the 
main part related to the acquisition of Banca Antonveneta concluded for €9 billion in 
2008, for which impairments were booked by the bank for around €5.5 billion in 
those two years. Additionally, unclear accounting practices on two structured 
transactions326 led the bank to book further losses for a total of €1.2 billion. This 
called for a second recapitalisation in 2013, approved by the European Commission 
as restructuring aid, through which the Italian government replaced the Tremonti 
bonds with new hybrid bonds- referred to as “Monti bonds”- for an overall amount 
of €4.1 billion.327  
In its financial accounts for 2016, the bank disclosed a net loss of €3,241 
million, mostly due to extraordinary loan loss provisions, and also reported 
significant deposit outflows for €15 billion. As of 31 December 2016, its CET1 ratio 
stood at 8.2% and the total capital ratio was 10.4%. The bank’s results for the first 
quarter of 2017 showed a net loss of €169 million, a CET1 ratio of 6.5% and a total 
capital ratio of 8.9%. As of 31 March 2017, its total assets amounted to €148.8 billion 
and its RWAs were €64.5 billion, with €5 billion in deposits also recovered in the 
 
326 With Deutsche Bank and Nomura. 
327 Thus creating a net increase of €2.2 billion from the previous recapitalisation. 
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first quarter of 2017. At the end of 2016 the bank’s market share on direct funding 
was 3.55%328, whereas the one related to customer loans stood at 6.64%.  
3.3.2 The rescue scheme 
On 29 July 2016, the EBA’s EU-wide stress test exercise were made public 
(see the graph below). 
 
 
In the exercise, MPS showed a gap of around 14.27 percentage points between 
its capital position under the baseline and adverse scenarios, compared to an overall 
average of 4.5 for tested institutions.329 A relevant impact of the stress scenario (7.5 
pp) had also been registered in the 2015 stress test carried out on Greek banks. The 
gap for MPS seemed to stem from the idiosyncratic problems relating to the lack of 
robustness of its balance sheet due to loan loss provisions, capital allowances and a 
decrease in interest margin, rather than from the stress test methodology applied.330 
 
328 Including deposits and repurchase agreements (apart from repurchase agreements with central 
counterparties) from resident consumer clients and bonds net of repurchases placed with ordinary 
resident customers as first-instance borrowers. 
329 The latter was in line with previous exercises: 3.2 pp in the 2014 SSM stress test and 4.67 pp in a 
2015 SSM stress test conducted on 9 institutions. 
330 In its note commenting the results of the 2016 stress test for Italian banks, the Bank of Italy specified 
that: “[a]bout half of the overall reduction in Monte dei Paschi’s capital can be put down to a decrease 
in the interest margin; the other half is due to an increase in capital allowances and loan loss 
provisions and to write-downs on the AFS government securities portfolio. Two thirds of the P&L 
account loss comes from a decrease in net interest income. The idiosyncratic shock (equal to 220 basis 
points), which is proportionate to the bank’s initial rating (B-), is much greater than the shock assumed 
for higher rated banks (25 basis points for banks rated AAA), particularly since its effects continue 
for three consecutive years”. Note available at: 
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After a failed attempt at a capital raise from private investors for €5 billion, the Italian 
government announced it would ask for the Commission’s approval of a 
precautionary recapitalisation. 
Before State aid could be granted, burden-sharing was implemented by means 
of a conversion of subordinated debt instruments into ordinary shares at pre-defined 
conversion rates and a dilution of existing shareholders. To this end, any provisions 
related to patrimonial rights on the bank's shares or other capital instruments subject 
to burden-sharing that hindered the full recognition of the shares or of the capital 
instruments as CET 1 instruments were rendered void.331 The total capital injected 
into MPS amounted to €8.1 billion, encompassing (i) the conversion of junior 
bondholders for €4.3 billion, and (ii) a capital injection of €3.9 billion by the State. 
In addition, the Italian State also pledged an additional €1.5 billion to compensate the 
retail investors to whom MPS’s financial instruments had been mis-sold. The 
difference between the capital shortfall of €8.8 billion calculated by the ECB and the 
final capital injection €8.1 billion was the result of asset sales through which MPS 
disposed of several businesses and stakes in the months of February and July 2017 
and enabling the bank to raise additional capital. 
The Commission considered that the losses recorded by MPS in its accounts 
after the stress test were losses ‘already incurred’, which were covered by private 
means through their charge against the bank’s equity. On the other hand, ‘likely 
losses’ were taken to include: 
1. losses arising from the disposal of bad loans, as a result of the haircut applied 
on their book value; and 
2. additional losses which the supervisor asked the bank to book in the future, 
following an on-site inspection, insofar as its results did not overlap with 




331  Article 22 para. 4 of Law-Decree 237/2016 (Decreto-Legge 23 dicembre 2016, n. 237. Disposizioni 
urgenti per la tutela del risparmio nel settore creditizio. (16G00252) (GU n.299 del 23-12-2016). 




The private resources of the bank, which contributed to cover its losses 
encompassed: (i) proceeds from the sale of the merchant acquiring business; (ii) 
capital generated from the conversion of subordinated debt instruments into equity, 
at the exclusion of those for which compensation was offered due to mis-selling; and 
(iii) other private resources internally available. The Commission also indicated that 
the balance sheet reduction envisaged in MPS’s restructuring plan would contribute 
to the reduction of its funding needs.332 
Additionally, the Italian authorities pledged to sell their investment in MPS 
before an agreed point in time, thereby ensuring that the recapitalisation will only be 
a temporary measure, in compliance with the second subparagraph of Art. 32(4) 
BRRD. Yet, the Italian State333 only received equity in exchange for the injection into 
the bank, making no recourse to hybrid instruments, differently from the approach 
taken in the recapitalisation of the two Greek banks, which relied predominantly on 
the issuance of CoCos to the State. Structural remedies imposed to remedy 
competition distortions included downsizing of the bank in terms of total assets, 
RWAs, geographic footprint, branches and staff.334 Behavioural commitments 
imposed encompassed an acquisition ban, a ban on advertising the State aid and a 
ban to implement aggressive commercial practices.335 Thus, the aim was to contain 
the size of the bank, limiting the advantage received through the aid, in view of its 
continued operation in the market. 
3.3.3 Post-rescue situation of the institution 
At the end of 2017, the bank’s market share on direct funding stood at 3.78%, 
up 23 bps compared to the previous year336, while the market share on customer loans 
remained stable from 2016. In 2018, MPS’s market share on direct funding was 
3.66%, slightly below the one observed at the end of 2017. The one related to loans 
to customers instead stood at 5.30%, decreasing by 120 bps compared to the previous 
year, due to transfers. The bank’s profitability largely improved, as shown by its 
positive ROE of 2.9%, compared to the negative -41.6%. The gross NPL ratio also 
 
332 Ibid, para. 71. 
333 Through the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). 
334 Case SA.47677, paras. 66-69. 
335 Ibid., para. 70. 
336 The value of direct funding did not include the effects of the recovery of the subordinated bonds 
subject to burden-sharing.  
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showed improvements, lowering to 17.3% from the 35.8% of 2017, favoured by the 
transfer of an NPL portfolio, for a deconsolidation of approximately €24 billion. 
At the end of 2019, the bank’s market share of customer loans stood at 5.08%, 
while its share of direct funding remained stable at 3.78% at national level. Instead, 
its ROE was negative at -12%, having decreased almost 15% from the previous year. 
One the Italian territory, the bank had 1,422 branches, which was a reduction of 107 
operating units compared to 31 December 2018, as part of the implementation of the 
initiatives included in the Restructuring Plan. 
After the recapitalisation was concluded, MPS experienced a period of 
depressed profits, with profitability recovering in the year immediately after the 
measures, but dropping once again in 2019. At the same time, no significant changes 
were registered in MPS’s national market shares related to its principal activities and 
segments after the precautionary recapitalisation was applied. As the MEF was not 
operative directly or through shareholdings of in-house companies in the same 
markets where MPS was, the operation entailed a mere substitution of one operator 
with another, thus not determining any modification of the pre-existing competitive 
structure of the market. Additionally, in the geographical areas where MPS was 
active, a number of other qualified competitors were also present337, thus 
guaranteeing a disciplining effect on MPS, also in reputational terms. For these 
reasons, the acquisition of control by the MEF did not build or reinforce a dominant 
position in the markets concerned, which might have been liable to eliminate or 
substantially and lastingly reduce competition.338 
At the time of writing, the Italian State has yet to sell its stake in MPS, which 
amounts to more than 68% of share capital, with the rest being held through 
 
337 Including, among others, Unicredit and Intesa SanPaolo. 
338 In the deposit-taking segment, MPS’s market share was generally below 30%, with the only 
exception of the Siena area, where the bank’s share is approaching 50%. As for the market of loans to 
customers in the Siena and Grosseto areas, MPS held a share above 30%, but still below 50%. Instead, 
in the markets related to consumer finance, asset management, leasing, insurance, and card issuing, 
MPS’s share remained below 5% and even decreased since 2015. Therefore, the decreasing market 
shares were seen as positive elements corroborating a lack of dominant position. This, combined with 
a lack of overlap in activities between MPS and the MEF, led to a non-opposition of the measure by 
the Italian antitrust authority (AGCM). See case C12107, decision of 18 October 2017 (Provvedimento 
n. 26808) available at: https://www.agcm.it/ 
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subsidiaries by BMPS339 and Assicurazioni Generali. This means that, even though 
the bank has been preserved as a standalone entity, the final ownership structure of 
the bank is still to be determined. Depending on who will acquire new stakes in the 
bank after the State will exit, competitive implications might be different based on 
whether a simple privatisation will be carried out or consolidation into another 
national competitor will be necessary in order to preserve critical functions, clients 
and business lines, and to ensure the institution’s sustained viability in the long term. 
In addition, only at the time of the State’s exit, it will be possible to fully observe the 
effective disbursement of public funds to rescue MPS, depending on the difference 
between the expenses incurred and the realisation from the sale of the bank to new 
acquirers. 
3.4 Preliminary policy proposals to improve the application of precautionary 
recapitalisations 
All banks on the receiving end of precautionary recapitalisations in the last 
years have histories of needing State support in multiple instances, albeit to different 
extents and for different reasons. The different financial conditions which the 
different institutions found themselves in while waiting for the implementation of the 
recapitalisations and shortly afterwards, as well as the different mix of instruments 
subscribed by the Greek and Italian States respectively to complete their capital 
injections offer a number of cues to discuss possible issues related with the perception 
of how the measures are applied in practice and potential policy options to improve 
the precautionary recapitalisation tool, to ensure it is effectively used as an exception. 
3.4.1 Precautionary recapitalisations and CoCos 
Comparing the approaches taken by Greece and Italy to precautionary 
recapitalisations, it is clear that the timing at which the measure is decided and 
implemented plays an important role. As shown by the MPS case, in which the bank 
breached capital requirements while waiting for a rescue solution to be agreed 
upon340, the longer it takes for the measure to be implemented and the more uncertain 
 
339 3.18% own shares held by MPS Group following the capital strengthening operations pursuant to 
Italian Law Decree Law no. 237/2016 (as subsequently amended and converted) and Italian 
Ministerial Decree of 27 July 2017. 
340 MPS breached minimum capital requirements under Art. 92 CRR in the first semester of 2017, as 
a consequence of the wait for the precautionary recapitalisation to be approved and completed and the 
related protracted uncertainty.  
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its outcome is, the more likely it may be that the bank’s capital starts being depleted 
while waiting for some intervention to be enacted, possibly breaching regulatory 
requirements as well. In such an instance, it is likely that also the trigger point for the 
conversion of any existing CoCos might be breached already. 
There is currently no reference in the regulatory framework to any 
requirement concerning the most efficient point in time at which a precautionary 
recapitalisation should be enacted. Yet, a precautionary recapitalisation applied to a 
bank closer to breaching its capital requirements could trigger a faster capital 
depletion and possibly runs on liquidity due to uncertainty, which would increase the 
likelihood that (additional) solvency or liquidity support through public finances will 
be necessary, which is precisely what the resolution framework is meant to avoid to 
the maximum extent possible. It is therefore worthwhile to consider whether 
precautionary recapitalisation, built within the resolution regulatory framework as an 
exception under specific conditions and constraints, could be improved by setting 
complementary requirements on how it should be applied by national governments. 
In this sense, consideration could be given to the instruments used by the State to 
complete the capital injection, insofar as there might be some disciplining effect they 
could exert on their new holders once they are sold by the State, with a view to 
increasing the ability of the bank to rely on its internal resources to cover losses and 
recapitalise in the future, if needed. The practical applications of precautionary 
recapitalisations by Greece and Italy differ on this particular point. Greece relied for 
the most part on CoCos in the recapitalisations of NBG and Piraeus Bank, which has 
been noted by the Commission as a positive aspect towards increasing the probability 
of repayment of the State’s investment. Italy instead made exclusive use of ordinary 
shares to complete its capital injection into MPS.   
3.4.1.1 Use of CoCos 
If, indeed, CoCos could be helpful in ensuring the temporary nature of 
recapitalisation measures due their being repayable instruments, it is worth 
considering whether a requirement to complete capital injections pursuant to Art. 
32(4)(d)(iii) BRRD with a mixed subscription of ordinary shares and CoCos by the 
State could be introduced. CoCos341, especially with a high trigger, would create the 
 
341 Perotti and Flannery (2011). 
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conditions for recapitalisations in going concern without delaying them to the event 
of bank failure, in which capital would be already depleted below minimum 
regulatory requirements. This might have the positive effect of reducing the 
probability of public support in the form of State recapitalisations outside of the 
BRRD framework, by involving private CoCo holders in the recapitalisation process 
relatively early, while also diluting risk-taking incentives of the existing 
shareholders.342 However, the possible CoCo-induced debt overhang problems might 
have negative consequences in a situation of broader financial distress, resulting from 
banks with outstanding CoCos possibly having lower incentives to recapitalise.343 
The exceptional nature of precautionary recapitalisations, whose application usually 
concerns a single institution or two at a time, based on practical experience, could 
lessen this risk of a broader distortion of CoCo holders’ recapitalisation incentives, 
as debt overhang issues should not have as strong an impact on the single entity 
issuing the CoCos.344  
3.4.1.2 Trigger and conversion mechanism 
On the other hand, a high trigger set for a CoCo held by the State could prove 
to be problematic if the financial standing of the bank is particularly precarious in the 
period following the recapitalisation preceding the exit of the State. Thus, as an 
alternative approach, a mechanism reminiscent of the one proposed- albeit with a 
different inspiration and purpose- by Gordon (2010) could be devised, according to 
which, once the bank is again stabilised after the recapitalisation, the equity stakes of 
the State will, in whole or in part, be converted into CoCos, making them available 
on the market through an open and non-discriminatory procedure. These CoCos 
should then exert a disciplining effect on the bank’s shareholders, while also 
diminishing the likelihood that State involvement will be needed again at a later point 
in time. Such an effect, however, hinges on the condition that their conversion is set 
with a high trigger point. One other requirement for this option to work is that a 
 
342 See Avdjiev et al. (2017), who find empirical evidence that CoCo issuance results in a statistically 
significant lowering of CDS spreads for the issuer, pointing to the existence of benefits in terms of 
risk reduction and decrease in the cost of debt. The authors also find a stronger impact on CDS spreads 
of the issuance of CoCos for which the loss-absorption mechanism is the conversion into equity, 
compared to those which entail the write-down of the principal. 
343 Goncharenko, Ongena, Rauf (2019). 
344 Ibid. Other critics (see, for instance, Schwarcz (2018)) of the usefulness and viability of CoCos as 
a resolution option highlight their unsuitability as a macroprudential regulatory tool, which, however, 
is not the intended focus for this chapter’s proposal.   
176 
 
relatively liquid market for CoCos exists, so as to be able to position the needed 
instruments. 
Depending on the process through which the State involved in the 
recapitalisation sells its stake in the bank concerned and effectively exits it345, the 
potential effects on the new ownership structure of the bank should also be taken into 
account. In this context, it is also worth highlighting that the complexity of CoCos as 
financial products will likely imply that their holders will not be retail investors, thus 
shifting the ownership towards professional investors instead. As a result, it will also 
be crucial to consistently verify institutions’ compliance with the regulatory 
requirements on product governance, in order to avoid other issues of mis-selling of 
financial instruments. If this is effective, then State support would be limited even 
more, by nipping in the bud instances in which retail investors would need to be 
compensated in case they were mis-sold instruments subject to future burden-sharing 
or bail-in. 
3.4.2 Precautionary recapitalisations applied as regular recapitalisations 
Another point to be made is still linked to the issue of timing of the State 
interventions. Since a ‘wait-and-see’ approach, or difficulties in accessing private 
funding, could imply that precautionary recapitalisation is applied in “limit” 
situations where the bank at stake might already be close to insolvency, then another 
problem might materialise in relation to which losses the public funds end up 
covering and, as a result, whether the recapitalisation is for all effects a 
“precautionary” measure within the meaning of Art. 32(4)(d)(iii) BRRD.   
3.4.2.1 Timing of intervention 
In this sense, the timing of the application of the rescue measures also has 
relevant implications for the sustainability and credibility of the options made 
available by the regulation. Indeed, it could happen that the implementation of the 
rescue measure generates a sort of self-fulfilling mechanism, by which an institution 
that is solvent when the recapitalisation is approved still ends up in breach of capital 
requirements, which would have been a pre-condition to trigger resolution 
 
345 See point (50) at p.12 of the New aid and amended restructuring plan of Banca Monte dei Paschi 
di Siena, SA.47677, 4 July 2017, referring to the State exit happening with the sale of its entire stake 
in the bank in an “open, unconditional and non-discriminatory sales process and on market terms”. 
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proceedings instead. If this is the case, then what should be used as an exception to 
rescue a bank which might come under distress in very specific circumstances, could 
in effect convert into the reinstatement of recapitalisations outside of the BRRD 
framework, as if the rules on resolution had not been introduced or did not apply. In 
fact, the recapitalisation might not be offsetting losses likely to be incurred in the 
future, but actually needing to cover losses that have already started to materialise in 
the meantime after the identification of the capital shortfall, which would seem to go 
against the nature of the exception as a precautionary, forward-looking measure. This 
issue could be further exacerbated by the fact that the estimation of a bank’s capital 
shortfall and the extent to which it is attributable to past losses is not straightforward, 
and it would benefit from harmonised procedures to deal with NPLs.346 Still, for all 
intents and purposes, precautionary recapitalisations are granted to institutions which 
do not manage to raise capital on the market. This in itself creates a selective 
application of the measure, which entails a preferential advantage for the institution 
at stake, which is why appropriate countervailing measures need to be imposed on 
the beneficiary, with a view to diminishing anticompetitive effects. 
On the matter of the timing of intervention, some scholars have also argued 
that the MPS case has highlighted the European Commission’s rigidity in requiring 
burden-sharing by subordinated debtholders, which has caused the protraction of the 
rescue process, with the Italian government seeking a solution agreeable to both the 
Commission and the ECB.347 One consequence of this is that the implementation of 
private solutions for bank rescues might be made harder by the supervisors’ insistence 
on an immediate and comprehensive recovery of capital positions. Indeed, investors 
considering to participate in a capital-raising plan might think twice, knowing that if 
the bank’s private funding is ever less than fully sufficient, bail-in will ensue or public 
funds may still be used if financial stability is at stake. 
3.4.2.2 Political considerations 
On another note, considerations of a political nature also play a role in 
governments’ decisions on how to deal with a banking crisis in some instances. The 
 
346 Along these lines, see Lannoo (2017). 
347 Hadjiemmanuil C., “Monte dei Paschi: A Test for the European Policy Against Bank Bailouts”, 2 
May 2017, Oxford Business Law Blog. 
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Italian situation concerning retail holdings of bail-in-eligible liabilities is illustrative 
of this particular point, as many creditors of Italian banks being families and small 
investors rather than professional investors. Evidence of mis-selling of their 
instruments also came to light in the last years with reference to a number of bank 
resolution and restructuring cases- MPS included-which largely explained why Italy 
sought to avoid a bail-in of these investors, favouring a solution backed by the State 
in order to reduce the scope of liabilities that would have been involved in sharing 
the bank’s losses.348 
Based on these considerations, there are grounds to argue that situations have 
arisen and can arise, whereby a precautionary recapitalisation becomes a “regular” 
recapitalisation in practice, due to the type of losses covered, as also influenced by 
uncertainty and hesitance in the execution of the rescue. Even if the competition 
concerns stemming from the immediate application of the measure are dampened by 
virtue of burden-sharing, other remedies and the submission of a credible 
restructuring plan, those that may arise from the adaptation of market players’ 
expectations of which crisis management tool will be used to deal other potential 
bank crises might be similarly, if not more, relevant. If some sort of implicit guarantee 
is reinstated for bigger banks, which might decrease their funding costs as a result, 
those institutions might gain a competitive advantage compared to other market 
players.  
4. Interventions to support liquidation or leading to a sale and consolidation of 
the failing institution into another entity 
Two rescue schemes adopted for smaller Italian banks in 2017 have been 
applied outside of the perimeter of resolution, leading to the liquidation of the ailing 
banks under national insolvency proceedings, with a concurrent transfer of specific 
liabilities to an external acquirer, backed by public funds. Then, another case 
involving liquidation aid was granted to a Cypriotic bank in the following year. The 
 
348 The public perception of the issue was very critical. National news outlets also reported the striking 
case of a pensioner who committed suicide after he had lost most of his savings as a result of the bail-
in applied to restructure Banca Etruria in 2015. That measure involved four small Italian with a 
combined market share of 1% at the time. As part of the resolution, four temporary bridge banks were 
created, to which all assets and some liabilities were transferred. Instead, the equity and subordinated 




requirement for the Commission’s approval of a sale of a bank in distress- or just part 
of it- to another institution hinges on the viability of the acquirer and its capability to 
absorb the transfer of the ailing bank. The assessment that this requirement is met is 
based on i) the strong financial position of the acquirer, ii) the size of the acquirer, 
which must be much larger than the ailing bank, iii) a good track record of the 
acquirer in generating synergies, and iv) the transfer to the acquirer only of the good 
parts of the ailing bank. 
4.1 Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca 
Banca Popolare di Vicenza (BPVi) was an Italian commercial bank, located 
in the Veneto Region349 and mostly operating in the north-eastern regions of Italy. 
The bank had around 500 branches and a national market share of approximately 1% 
as regards deposits and 1.5% for loans, with total assets slightly below €35 billion at 
end-year 2016. 
Similarly, Veneto Banca was also a Veneto-located commercial bank, 
operating mainly in northern Italy. As of 31 December 2016, the bank had around 
400 branches and a market share at national level of around 1% in terms of both 
deposits and loans. At the end of 2016, it had €28 billion of total assets. Both banks 
had levels of non-performing loans exceeding the national average by around 20 
percentage points350 and had failed to make profits for a number of years. In the 2014 
Comprehensive assessment, capital shortfalls had been identified for the two 
institutions, which led them to be put under ECB-monitoring.  
The two banks had been rescued by the ‘Atlante fund’ in 2016, which had 
been set up to recapitalise weak Italian lenders and purchase NPL portfolios after two 
failed capital raising exercises, which had been fully underwritten by Intesa San 
Paolo and Unicredit for BPVi and Veneto Banca, respectively. Atlante had injected 
€2.5 billion of capital in the two banks in 2016, with an additional €0.9 billion in 
January 2017 in advance of a future capital increase. The two banks had also been 
considering a merger, combining their activities amounting to around €60 billion, 
 
349 Veneto accounts for a non-negligible portion of the Italian GDP, with an industrial sector mostly 
relying on a significant number of SMEs and individual entrepreneurs. It is also one of the richest 
regions of the Eurozone. 
350 37% in the face of an Italian average of 18%. 
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with a view to operating in the same region and exploiting synergies from their 
consolidation in order to increase efficiency and viability of the combined entity. In 
a report to the Italian Parliament, the Bank of Italy held that in the absence of some 
form of State intervention, the liquidation of the two banks could have triggered the 
early repayment of loans due to them by approximately 100,000 SMEs and 200,000 
households for a total worth of around €26 billion, which in turn could have triggered 
a spread of insolvencies and additional losses for BPVi and Veneto Banca’s creditors.  
In March 2017, the two banks advanced requests to the Italian State to benefit 
from a precautionary recapitalisation to address their capital shortfalls. The Italian 
deposit guarantee scheme was not in a position to reimburse the banks’ insured 
depositors at the time without extraordinary contributions from Italian banks. 
Additionally, as a consequence of enforcing the State guarantees covering the senior 
bonds issued by BPVi and Veneto Banca, the government would also have become 
liable to pay €8.6 billion. On 23 June 2017, in its role of competent supervisory 
authority under the SSM Regulation,351 the ECB found the two institutions to be 
“failing or likely to fail” pursuant to Art. 18(1) SRMR, due to lack of capital and an 
inability to offer credible solutions to address its shortfall.352 However, the SRB 
determined that, despite concurring with such an assessment, resolution was “not 
warranted in the public interest”, since “neither of the two banks provided critical 
functions and their failure was not expected to have a significant adverse impact on 
financial stability”.353 
The Single Resolution Board came to the conclusion that resolution would 
not have been warranted in the public interest for either bank, implying that a wind-
down for the two institutions had to be completed under Italian national insolvency 
procedures. In this context, Italy determined that their liquidation would have had a 
serious impact on the real economy in the northern regions where the institutions 
were most active. 
 
351 Council Regulation (EU) no. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 
OJ L 287 of 29 October 2013, p. 63. 
352 See ECB press release.  
353 See SRB, press release: “The SRB will not take resolution action in relation to Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza and Veneto Banca”, 23 June 2017, available at https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/341. 
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4.1.1 The rescue scheme 
The aid granted by the Italian State in order to smoothen the liquidation and 
market exit of the two banks hinged on two measures, namely: 
1. an injection of about €4.785 billion in cash; and 
2. State guarantees for a maximum of approximately €12 billion to bolster the 
acquirer's financing of the liquidation mass, to be called upon if the 
liquidation mass is insufficient to repay Intesa for its financing. 
Both support tools were backed by the Italian State's senior claims on the 
assets in the liquidation mass. As a consequence, the net costs for the sovereign were 
found to be much lower than the nominal amounts of the measures provided. 
After a public tender, the best offerer to which the acquisition was adjudicated 
was Intesa Sanpaolo, a leader in Italy in business areas spanning retail, corporate, and 
wealth management, servicing 11.8 million customers through a network of 
approximately 3,700 branches located throughout the country, with market shares 
beyond 12% in most Italian regions.354 The "good" assets of the two banks, including 
performing loans and tax assets, were transferred to Intesa, together with senior 
liabilities, such as deposits, State-guaranteed bonds and other senior bonds, as well 
as shareholdings in other financial institutions, branches and employees. On the other 
hand, the claims of the shareholders and subordinated bondholders were kept within 
the banks undergoing liquidation. Non-performing loans instead were transferred to 
Società per la Gestione delle Attività (SGA), which is an Italian "bad bank" 
established in 1997 in the context of the restructuring of Banco di Napoli. 
The guarantees enabled the transfer of risks to their acquirer, by way of a 
transfer of assets from BPVi and Veneto Banca, within the operation of orderly wind-
down of the two ailing institutions. The operation entailed the transfer of a portfolio 
of assets and liabilities, the perimeter of which excluded ordinary shares, capital 
instruments, subordinated debt holdings and non-performing loans. Guarantees do 
not constitute a direct expenditure commitment from the part of the State and, where 
granted, the relative disbursement can be at least partially recovered, for instance in 
 
354 Intesa’s 2019 annual report, available on the group’s website. 
182 
 
case revenues are accrued from the non-performing or high risk loans sold or 
disposed of. As a matter of fact, the proceeds from the recovery of any such loans, 
net of costs of the recovery operation, would be returned to the banks in liquidation 
for the purpose of paying their creditors, among which is the State, in accordance 
with the order of priority provided by national insolvency law.  
As for the direct cash injection, instead, it went to support the corporate 
restructuring within Intesa SanPaolo deriving from the acquisition of the two banks 
and the capital need generated by the operation. Yet, this injection did not entail the 
subscription of an equivalent stake in the share capital of the bank by the State. 
Rather, it constituted a purely operative liquidity support that implied cash 
disbursements of public money in effect. Differently, the public guarantees entailed 
potential liabilities, the amount of which identified the maximum potential exposure 
to risk the State could come to face. 
On the one hand, the measures decided by the State as a guarantee of the 
fulfilment of the obligations of the two banks in liquidation in relation to the sale 
contract and the cash injection in support of the restructuring and capital needed for 
Intesa’s acquisition of assets and liabilities were to all effects direct disbursements of 
public money in favour of the acquirer. On the other hand, the guarantees pledged in 
relation to (i) the coverage of the asset imbalance resulting from the due diligence 
performed, (ii) the buyback of high risk loans not classified as non-performing, which 
were returned to the banks in liquidation for transfer to SGA, and (iii) the non-
performing loans transferred SGA for recovery, can all be categorised as risk transfer 
measures. Retail investors and others who had purchased subordinated bonds issued 
by the two banks were compensated through the special fund created by the 
government to compensate the subordinated bondholders of the four lenders resolved 
in November 2015.355  
The measures adopted by the Italian government could be considered as being 
equivalent to an application of the bail-in tool in combination with the sale of business 
and asset separation tools in the context of a resolution within the BRRD framework, 
if it were not for two major differences: (i) the senior liabilities of the two banks were 
not subject to burden-sharing, differently from what could have happened in case 
 
355 Banca delle Marche, Banca Etruria, CariFerrara and CariChieti. 
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resolution had been the chosen strategy; and (ii) the measures applied to the two 
banks were financed with public funds, rather than via a full-fledged bail-in, which 
would have made possible the inclusion of senior liabilities as well, possibly in 
conjunction with resolution funds or deposit guarantee schemes. 
4.1.2 The evaluation by the Commission and the Italian antitrust authority 
The Commission confirmed that the measures did not constitute aid to Intesa, 
because the acquirer was selected through an open, fair and transparent sales process, 
fully managed by Italian authorities to ensure that the best available offer would be 
chosen for the sale, with a view to reinstating the viability of the activities transferred 
from the two ailing banks.356 In addition, Intesa seems to meet the conditions usually 
assessed by the Commission to authorise the acquisition of an ailing bank. These 
encompass, in particular: (i) the bigger size of Intesa, both by comparison with the 
acquired entities and in terms of national relevance; (ii) its reputation of being able 
to extract synergies and generating economies of scale and scope; and (iii) its sound 
financial position, as verified by its capital, liquidity, credit risk, and profitability 
indicators.357 In addition, the small size of the two entities, combined with their 
disappearance from the market through liquidation, led the Commission to conclude 
that no undue distortions of competition would arise, despite the large amount of aid 
in relation to the size of the two banks and the absence of remuneration.358 Therefore, 
the positive evaluation of the safeguards instated to alleviate potential concerns on 
the conferral of a competitive advantage upon Intesa, as the beneficiary of State 
guarantees, was sufficient to conclude that risks of undue distortions of competition 
had been curbed to the extent possible. As a result, the European Commission looked 
favourably upon the concurrent consolidation and orderly market exit of the ailing 
institutions, with the rescue having the additional benefits for Italy of also sparing the 
national deposit guarantee scheme and retail investors.  
 
356 Law-Decree No. 99 of 25 June 2017, which disciplined the operation, also highlighted that the 
choice of the acquirer through the sales process took into account the obligations that the bank would 
have to abide by under the European State aid framework (Art.3(3)). See case SA. 45664, 25 June 
2017, paras. 90-93. 
357 At the end of 2016, Intesa registered a CET1 ratio of 12.7%, a ROE of 6.4%, a ratio of bad loans 
to total loans to customers of 4.1%.  
358 Case SA.45664, para. 116. 
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In this particular instance, the consolidation achieved by the rescue measures 
put in place by the State was relatively contained, as a result of the liquidation of 
BPVi and Veneto Banca, which brought about a limited transfer of activities to be 
restructured and downsized by Intesa, compared to a counterfactual scenario in which 
the two banks could have withstood their distress through a merger between 
themselves, thus remaining in the market.359 The Italian antitrust authority AGCM 
cleared the acquisition also in view of a risk of supply contraction in the absence of 
the operation, due to the lack of alternative market operators interested in acquiring 
the parts of the ailing banks. From a competition stance, the market shares of the post-
merger remained below 30%, with small increases generally below 5%. Where the 
market share of Intesa combined with those of the two banks was more significant, 
the presence of numerous and qualified competitors in the same market segments, 
acting as a disciplining force, contributed to the operation not altering significantly 
the competitive structure of the market.360 
4.2 Liquidation aid for Cyprus Cooperative Bank Ltd 
Another case of liquidation aid granted after in recent years concerns Cyprus 
Cooperative Bank Ltd. Similarly to the aid granted to support the liquidation of 
Veneto Banca and BPVi, the aid granted to the Cypriotic bank was meant to ensure 
a speedy and fully-fledged integration of certain assets and liabilities of the institution 
into Hellenic Bank and to enable the residual entity- renamed Cooperative Asset 
Management Company Ltd., “SEDIPES”- to handle the asset workout. 
4.2.1 The rescue scheme 
Cyprus Cooperative Bank had been created by the merger of cooperative 
credit institutions, becoming the second largest bank of Cyprus in 2018 with a market 
share of 25% in terms of deposits, focusing on retail deposits and lending to local 
residents. Despite two consecutive State recapitalisations in 2014 and 2015, the bank 
did not succeed in returning to viability.  
The difficulties of the Bank led to its exit from the banking market by way of 
(i) a sale of certain assets and liabilities on market terms to Hellenic Bank and (ii) the 
 
359 See Provvedimento n. 26658 of 5 July 2017 in case C12103.  
360 See Provvedimento n. 26658 of 5 July 2017 in case C12103.  
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withdrawal of the banking licence of the residual entity, which solely focused on 
managing its assets before being wound down. Also in this instance, the sale was 
carried out by way of an open and transparent tender procedure, in order to avoid 
granting aid to the acquirer.  
As a result of the prior recapitalisations, the State had become the 99% 
shareholder of the bank, having diluted and left with 1% of the shareholding the 
previous owners, as part of the burden-sharing requirements. The restructuring plan 
for the bank also included structural commitments to sell or wind-down its non-core 
commercial operations and participations in non-core businesses, combined with the 
application of other cost-cutting and other rationalisation measures. In addition, the 
withdrawal of the residual entity’s license after the workout of transferred assets and 
the fact that the buyer took over and fully integrated less than 50% of the branches 
and staff of the ailing bank led the Commission to identify no undue distortions of 
competition, despite the very large amount of aid granted. 
4.2.2 Considerations on the consolidation achieved through the aid measures 
Hellenic Bank, the acquirer, has become one of the two major players in the 
Cypriotic banking sector, together with Bank of Cyprus. The two institutions hold the 
vast majority of deposits in their portfolios and control altogether 67% of the market 
share. This is due to the absorption of the assets and liabilities transferred from 
Cyprus Cooperative Bank, which entailed an increase in Hellenic’s deposit share 
from 11.9% at year-end 2017 to 30.9% at the end of 2018. In the same year, its net 
loans share also increased to 19.5% from the 8.1% it controlled prior to the 
acquisition of parts of Cyprus Cooperative Bank.  
Therefore, differently from the case of the two northern Italian banks, even 
though the Commission determined that actual and potential competitive distortions 
would be minimised by the market exit of Cyprus Cooperative Bank, the market share 
detained by the failing bank, combined with the market presence of  the acquirer, led 
to a significant degree of consolidation in the Cypriotic banking market, through a 
centralisation of banking activities in the hands of a smaller set of market operators. 
Despite the apparent push towards concentration in the market, it is likely that the 
preservation of assets and liabilities of the failing bank was justified on grounds of 
its market relevance prior to its failure. While this is easily understandable with a 
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view to protecting a significant number of national depositors and bank employees, 
for instance, it also begs the question of whether there was also an attempt to preserve 
critical bank functions, which would have instead justified a resolution more than a 
liquidation. In any event, when an acquisition of this sort leads to consolidation in a 
market that is already concentrated, focus should be devoted to achieving a viable 
structure for the entity emerging after intervention, while also limiting any undue 
advantage extended to it, by means of appropriate structural and behavioural 
commitments.  
4.3 Competition-related considerations in the Italian case and credibility of the 
framework 
Some more consideration should now be given to some competition-related 
aspects and credibility issues raised by the application of liquidation aid for Veneto 
Banca and BPVi, also as a result of the different interpretations at European and 
national level of what can constitute a public interest for resolution. In practice, the 
measures enacted in the Italian case enabled the application of less stringent 
requirements on the burden-sharing of losses by senior classes of creditors of the 
failing banks, who would have otherwise been called to contribute in the event of a 
resolution, entailing what looked like a variation of a resolution action, allowing for 
public support to the highest bidder without the application of a full bail-in and with 
reimbursement of junior creditors.361  
In its press release, the Commission explained that Italy had determined that 
the liquidation of the banks would have had a serious impact on the real economy in 
the regions where they were most active.362 This consideration was in line with the 
 
361 See case SA.45664. The scheme was found to grant an advantage to BPVi and Veneto Banca, as 
without public support the activities of the two banks would not have found an alternative buyer and 
would therefore have left the market (para. 88). The cash injection and the guarantees were not 
remunerated in any way and were implicitly collateralised only by the NPLs remaining in the residual 
entities, which were likely to generate further losses at a later stage, implying that the scheme did not 
abide by the MEIP as no private investor would have undertaken the same measures (paras. 60-67). 
Along the same lines, the measures were found to be liable to distort or threaten to distort competition, 
as they allowed the activities of the two banks to be sold to the acquirer with an advantage that 
competitors did not receive, whereas they would have been wound down in the absence of State 
support (para. 69). The compatibility of the aid was confirmed on the grounds that: (i) the aid was 
limited to the minimum amount necessary; (ii) distortions of competition were limited; (iii) appropriate 
burden-sharing was completed; and (iv) there seemed to be no risks to the long-term viability of the 
resulting entity.   
362 The Law Decree underlined how ordinary liquidation proceedings applied in “atomistic” form 
would have severely prejudiced the economy, thus calling for a solution that would have allowed to 
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regulatory approach of taking into account the effects of a bank’s failure within the 
specific macroeconomic conditions in which the bank operates.363 Yet, the claim that 
the exit of the two banks from the market via liquidation would not cause any 
distortion of competition in the European banking market does not seem to be fully 
persuasive, in consideration of the fact that a strong economic and political interest 
in sparing bondholders to the maximum extent possible, due to their mostly being 
retail investors.364 
Additionally, while the SRB found there to be no public interest in resolving 
the two banks under EU rules, the Commission seems to have had a different 
interpretation in effect by approving the compatibility of the Italian Decree with State 
aid rules. There was no indication of the SRB and the Italian regulator having carried 
out two different public interest tests, which could have led to different outcomes. 
Additionally, in the view of some commentators, the legal basis to justify taking into 
account regional effects would have been provided by Art. 107(3)(c) TFEU, which 
was not the one used by the Commission.365 So, the fact that the same assessment led 
to different determinations of what constituted public interest is a potential threat to 
the credibility of a European Single Resolution Mechanism.   
Therefore, the case highlighted a lack of legal certainty and credibility of the 
resolution rules, limiting the capacity and purpose of the recently-introduced 
regulatory framework. Due to the differences in amounts, types, assumptions and pre-
conditions of the different measures applied, they are difficult to sum and compare 
uniformly, in order to provide a conclusive view of which rescue schemes had more 
significant consequences for the use of taxpayers’ money, at least until the State 
involved has exited its ownership stake in the rescued institutions. However, it would 
seem that an application of aid in liquidation alike to the one granted to the two 
Venetian banks could be problematic for the sustained credibility of the regulatory 
 
manage the crisis with “additional instruments”, as in the absence of public support, the liquidation 
would have entailed a destruction of value for the two banks, with serious consequences for non-
professional investors and creditors holding non-preferred debt instruments, as well as for families and 
enterprises relying on credit access by those institutions. 
363 See, in this respect, Grünewald (2017). 
364 Among others, see Lannoo (2017) and Asimakopoulos (2018). The latter highlights how the 
reference to the exact amount of cash needed for the acquisition of the two banks present in the Italian 
Decree laying down the rescue measures is further proof that the scheme was “an effort to apply 




framework for crisis management, insofar as it could create the premise for certain 
classes of creditors to be better off in liquidation than they would in resolution. This 
concern could be lessened by aligning the burden-sharing requirements under State 
aid rules with those of bail-in under resolution. 
On a related note, the threshold for the public interest test is also crucial in 
setting a reference point against which to measure the likelihood of a bank being 
applied resolution measures or undergoing liquidation proceedings, thus calling for 
further clarification and alignment of approaches between the SRB and other national 
resolution authorities.  
5. Rescue measures with contribution by deposit guarantee funds 
The cases related to the rescue measures for the Italian Banca Carige and 
Banca Popolare di Bari (BPB) exemplify a hybrid solution for crisis management, 
which relies on support being granted by the national deposit guarantee fund, acting 
as anchor investor and facilitator with the aim to successfully complete the sale of the 
bank in distress or its incorporation into another private investor at a later stage. Even 
though the final market outcome for the two institutions has yet to materialise at the 
time of writing, the two cases offer the opportunity to formulate hypotheses on how 
different options for restructuring could be devised and what the respective outcomes 
could come to be, depending on the structure of the entities that would be left on the 
market post-rescue.  
In 2017, a similar arrangement was used to complete the acquisition by Crédit 
Agricole Cariparma of a 95.3% equity stake in three savings banks in Cesena (Cassa 
di Risparmio di Cesena SpA), Rimini (Cassa di Risparmio di Rimini SpA) and San 
Miniato (Cassa di Risparmio di San Miniato SpA) from the voluntary arm of Italy’s 
Interbank Deposit Insurance Fund (FITD), the national DGS. Prior to the completion 
of the transaction, the voluntary arm of the FITD increased the capital of the target 
banks to align their fully-loaded CET1 ratios with the criteria of the acquiring group. 
As part of that rescue scheme, a portfolio of NPLs of the three banks, for a gross total 
of approximately €3 billion, was securitised with the help of the Italian Recovery 
Fund (Atlante II) or sold to private investors and deconsolidated from the balance 
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sheets of the institutions. Afterwards, Crédit Agricole Cariparma paid a consideration 
of €130 million to the FITD to acquire its stake in the three institutions.366  
The feasibility of the contribution of the national deposit guarantee fund in 
the cases regarding Carige and BPB must also be read in light of the landmark 
judgment rendered by the General Court in what came to be known as the Tercas 
case367, which set a new standard for the interpretation of the existence of State aid, 
in instances where deposit guarantee schemes are involved in bank rescue schemes.  
5.1 Carige 
The recent case concerning Italian Banca Carige exemplifies rescue measures 
combining State support and interventions from deposit guarantee funds. 
5.1.1 Carige’s market position and balance sheet indicators 
Banca Carige Group is a middle-sized banking group counting with 
approximately 4,300 employees and 500 branches, and €23,960 million in total assets 
at Q3 2018. 
  
 
366 The merger was not opposed on the grounds that the new combined market shares in the relevant 
segments of operation did not show the generation or reinforcement of a dominant position and other 
strong competitors could have exercised a disciplining effect on the new merged entity. See case 
M.8639 of 30 November 2017. 
367 Joined Cases T-98/16, Italy v Commission, T-196/16, Banca Popolare di Bari SCpA v Commission, 
and T-198/16 Fondo interbancario di tutela dei depositi v Commission, 19 March 2019. The judgment 
was extensively analysed in Chapter 4. 
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Figure 5.4 - Carige’s branches and market share by Italian region, as of 31/12/2018 
 
Source: Gruppo Carige’s website, based on Bank of Italy’s data. 
From Figure 5.4, it is clear to see that Banca Carige’s market power is 
concentrated in the Liguria region, where it has a market share of around 35% for 
loans and 23% for deposits. while it remains below 4% in all other regions where the 
bank has a presence. Carige holds a much higher market share in the Liguria region 
than the two Venetian banks did in the Veneto region. However, compared to the 
latter two, Banca Carige is smaller in terms of balance sheet size. 
 
Figure 5.5 - Carige’s assets (EUR bn) compared to national peers, as of 31/12/2018 
 
Source: Gruppo Carige’s website, based on FY2018 reports of national peers.368 
 
368 Unicredit, Intesa San Paolo, Banco BPM, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banca Popolare di Sondrio, 




Figure 5.6 - Carige’s overall funding and net loans (EUR bn) compared to national peers, 
as of 31/12/2018 
 
Source: Gruppo Carige’s website, based on FY2018 reports of national peers. 
The bank’s main source of funding are retail and corporate deposits, with 
current accounts, demand deposits, and time deposits representing approximately 
54%369 of funding in relation to the total balance sheet amount, bank funding coming 
for the most part370 from central banks accounting for 18%, and bonds issued by 
Carige making up 14%. The latter have been placed in the market for an amount of 
approximately €3.5 billion, which appear to be almost entirely held by the bank’s 
own clients. 
In the 2014 Comprehensive Assessment carried out by the ECB, a capital 
shortfall of €1.83 billion was identified for Carige, together with a CET1 ratio of 
2.3% in the baseline scenario of the stress test, hence below the minimum regulatory 
requirement. Between December 2014 and September 2018, the bank incurred losses 
for around €1.6 billion, with additional losses for €189 million booked in the first 
nine months of 2018. Its profitability was weakened by a deterioration in asset quality 
and a decrease in net operating income. As of 30 September 2018, Carige had a total 
balance sheet of €24 billion- out of which €13 billion-, operating with 4,293 
employees and 503 branches.  
 
369 Representing approximately €13.5 billion altogether.   
370 77%, according to information available on the bank’s website. 
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5.1.2 The rescue scheme 
The ECB stress testing exercise of 2018 highlighted no capital shortfall for 
Carige in the baseline scenario compared to a threshold of 8% CET1, but showed a 
significant capital depletion in the adverse scenario by the end of 2020. At the end of 
September 2018, the bank reported capital ratios below the SREP capital 
requirements imposed by the ECB, with a CET1 ratio of 10.8% in face of the 
11.175% required, and a Total Capital ratio of 10.9%, below the required 13.125%.371  
As part of its capital restoration plan, on 30 November 2018, Carige placed 
Tier 2 subordinated bonds for a total of €320 million mainly with the Voluntary 
Intervention Scheme (‘VIS’) of the Italian Interbank Deposit Protection Fund 
(FITD)372, which underwrote an amount of €318.2 million, while a stake of €1.8 
million was undersigned by Banco di Desio e della Brianza. Those subordinated 
bonds were placed with a fixed rate coupon of 13%373- considerably above the bank’s 
average total cost of funding of 0.86% at the end of September 2018. As the 
subscription of Tier 2 bonds was concluded by the voluntary arm of the FITD, which 
entails no use of public funds or any other form of State aid, this initiative raised no 
issues from a State aid perspective. The placement of the Tier 2 bonds was the first 
of two interconnected transactions envisaged in the plan, the second being a EUR 
€400 million share capital increase, to which further capital strengthening measures 
were also associated, including the disposal of a bad loan portfolio approximately 
amounting to gross €0.9 billion through a securitisation backed by the GACS 
scheme.374 However, the capital increase failed after the abstention of the bank’s main 
shareholder from the vote on the capital plan. 
Having considered Carige’s weak capital position, quality of the credit 
portfolio, significant losses, governance instability and fragile liquidity situation375, 
on 2 January 2019, the ECB announced the appointment of three temporary 
administrators376 and a surveillance committee to take charge of Banca Carige and 
 
371 The difference was explained by the subordinated debt issued being merely 0.1%. 
372 An interbank consortium, to which 151 Italian banks contribute. 
373 To be increased to 16% in case the subsequent capital raise failed. 
374 “Garanzia Cartolarizzazione Sofferenze”, the Italian scheme for State guarantees to banks’ senior 
tranches of NPL securitisation structures, cleared by the Commission in case SA.43390 of 10 February 
2016. 
375  Liquidity support to Banca Carige, SA.52917, 18 January 2019, para. 11. 
376 One of the early intervention measures at the ECB’s disposal, pursuant to Art. 29 BRRD. 
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replace its board of directors, following the resignation of a majority of board 
members of the bank. On 8 January 2019, a law decree was approved by the Italian 
government, with the aim to provide a State guarantee for future bonds issued by 
Carige and a guarantee targeted at enhancing collateral quality in order to enable both 
a potential access to Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA)377 and the participation 
in a capital increase. On 25 January 2019, the bank issued €2 billion bonds benefitting 
from a State guarantee.378 The issuance included two bond lines of €1 billion each, 
maturing on 25 January 2020 (with a coupon rate of 0.5%) and on 26 July 2020 (with 
a coupon rate of 0.75%). Those guarantees aimed at boosting the liquidity position of 
the bank, instead of capital, enabling the bank to refinance itself on the market at 
interest rates, which the bank could not have benefitted from in the absence of aid.  
In order to ensure the sustainability of the bank’s funding costs, the bank’s 
temporary administrators also discussed with the managers of the VIS of the FITD a 
revision of the terms of the Tier 2 bonds placed in November 2018.379 The aid was 
authorised as compatible with the internal market on grounds of: (i) appropriateness 
to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy, by strengthening the liquidity 
position of the bank; and a (ii) proportionate limitation of the guarantees to the 
amount and conditions necessary to tackle the liquidity stress of the bank. The 
solvency of the bank was confirmed through a point-in-time and forward-looking 
assessment of compliance by the ECB, which still found a breach of the overall 
capital requirement on total capital level of 13.75%, including the capital 
conservation buffer, and a failure to comply with the Pillar 2 guidance (P2G) on the 
CET 1 capital level (11.80%). This was also accompanied by capital projections 
showing a widening of the breach of the P2G and of the capital conservation buffer 
going forward. Still, in the view of the Commission, the solvency would be ensured 
by virtue of: (i) a three-month temporary administration with the mandate to ensure 
that Carige could meet its capital requirements in a sustainable manner; (ii) Italy’s 
commitment to submit any update of the capital plan submitted by the bank to the 
ECB; and (iii) no indication of the bank’s inability to meet its liabilities.  
 
377 A detailed discussion on ELA follows in Chapter 6. 
378 Instated through the Law Decree of 8 January 2019. 
379 The rediscussion of the terms of the subordinated bonds was in line with the ECB’s early 
intervention powers, pursuant to Art. 27(1)(e) BRRD, according to which supervisors may require the 
management body of a bank to “draw up a plan for negotiation on restructuring of debt with some or 
all of its creditors according to the recovery plan, where applicable”. 
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The guarantees were found to be of a temporary nature, in compliance with 
the requirements of Art. 32(4)(d) BRRD, by virtue of the fact that the maturity of the 
new liabilities to be guaranteed was limited up to 18 months. They were also 
confirmed to be of a precautionary nature, since they only covered newly issued 
liabilities of an institution considered as solvent, but temporarily subject to liquidity 
stress.380  
A restructuring or wind-down plan was also requested, lacking the 
reimbursement of the aid within two months.381 As for the capital raising plan, even 
if the capital raise of €400 million fell through, the Commission still found 
compliance with the requirements of the Banking Communication382 on grounds of 
urgency.383 The safeguards put in place to prevent the outflow of funds from the bank 
included the suspension of dividend and coupon payments. Behavioural safeguards 
were also introduced to ensure that Carige would not use the aid received in order to 
expand its activities, encompassing a ban on advertisements referring to the State 
support, an acquisition ban and a ban on any aggressive commercial strategies that 
would not be possible without the public support.384 Differently from the case of the 
two Venetian banks, for which the State guarantees were used in support of an asset 
transfer within an operation of orderly wind-down and exit from the market, the 
guarantees used for Carige served the purpose of transferring (or mitigating) credit 
risk, with the involvement of the market. The granting of such liquidity guarantees 
did not require the application of burden-sharing measures.  
After multiple failed attempts at recapitalising the institution, first with 
BlackRock and then with private equity fund Apollo, a rescue plan worth a total of 
€900 million was finally approved at the end of July 2019. The scheme consisted of: 
  
 
i. a €700 mln share capital increase, structured in tranches, reserved respectively 
for: (a) the FITD’s VIS in the amount of €313.2 million, against the 
 
380 Case SA.52917, 18 January 2019, para. 71. 
381 As per point 58 of the 2013 Banking Communication. The need for additional scrutiny whenever 
liquidity aid is granted to a bank with a capital shortfall is warranted with the aim of setting additional 
safeguards to limit distortions of competition. 
382 Points 32-34 of the 2013 Banking Communication. 
383 Case SA.52917, 18 January 2019, para. 59. 
384 Ibid., para. 33. 
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conversion of the subordinated bonds it had subscribed in November 2018; b) 
Cassa Centrale Banca (CCB) for €63 million; c) Carige's current shareholders 
for an amount of €85 million, in proportion to their respective shareholdings; 
and (d) the FITD for an amount of €238.8 million. FITD also took an 
underwriting commitment with respect to the tranche reserved for the bank’s 
current shareholders, in the event of full or partial failure of their subscription; 
ii. the issuance of Tier 2 subordinated bonds for a total worth of €200 million, 
partly subscribed by State-controlled Mediocredito Centrale (MCC) and 
Istituto Credito Sportivo.  
 
5.1.3 Post-rescue situation of the institution 
Following the capital raise, the FITD came to detain ownership for 79.992% 
of Carige’s capital385, CCB reached 8,34%, while Malacalza Investimenti was diluted 
from its previous holding of 27.555% down to 2.020%. Since the FITD cannot remain 
a long-term investor in Carige, CCB has an option to buy the FITD’s stake with a 
significant haircut between mid-2020 and the end of 2021.386 According to the rescue 
plan, State-owned SGA purchased almost all of Carige’s impaired loans for a total 
amount of €3.1 billion. Once CCB exercises its call option, its holding in Carige could 
increase to somewhere between 82% and 91%. The acquisition of a stake by unlisted 
cooperative banking group CCB was looked upon favourably also with a view to the 
acquirer’s vocation as a locally-rooted bank, with a focus on households and SMEs, 
possibly enabling the establishment of synergies and economies of scope with Carige.  
The approach taken to the rescue to Carige mirrors the one applied to the 
precautionary recapitalisation of MPS, insofar as a negative result following a 
supervisory exercise triggers a wait for the application of exceptional measures under 
Art. 32(4)(d) BRRD, in the form of a recapitalisation or liquidity guarantees, outside 
of the resolution framework. The difference in the case of Carige lies in the 
concomitant availability of private sector solutions to rescue the bank, including 
 
385 Since the FITD was not active in any of the markets in which Carige was operating, the acquisition 
constituted a mere substitution of a market operator with another. See case C12269, Decision of 27 
November 2019 (Provvedimento n. 28007), available at: https://www.agcm.it/ 
386 This might create the potential for anti-competitive concerns in the form of restrictive agreements 
with CCB, due to the minority shareholding of the latter in Carige, possibly leading to a merger at a 
later stage, if CCB exercises its option on FITD’s stake. 
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contributions from other banking institutions, through the FITD. In practice, the 
measures applied to the benefit of Carige became a rescue by the banking system 
itself. The recourse to the FITD does not in itself involve the use of public resources, 
since the fund relies on industry contributions. No full burden-sharing was applied, 
as ‘voluntary funds’ were involved, but rather the result was a dilution of the previous 
shareholders of the bank and the write-down of subordinated instruments held by the 
FITD as a result of a previous capital injection.  
Another solution could have been devised, with the separation of Carige into 
a bad bank and a good bank, leaving shareholders and debt holders in the bad bank 
to complete the required burden-sharing. However, a bail-in would have wiped out 
the existing shareholders and involved other financial institutions, as the only 
subordinated debt instruments available were the ones already subscribed by the 
FITD, and possibly retail investors would have been affected as well, which might 
have explained why the final scheme approved was different.  
 
5.2 Banca Popolare di Bari (BPB) 
The latest case involving the use of the national deposit guarantee fund in a 
similar fashion concerns Banca Popolare di Bari (BPB). 
5.2.1 BPB’s market position and balance sheet indicators 
The bank is the largest lender in southern Italy, with a customer base of just 
under 600,000, including more than 100,000 firms accounting for around 60% of 
loans, amounting approximately to €6 billion. Customer deposits amount to €8 
billion, of which €4.5 billion are for stand-alone deposits of less than €100,000, thus 
protected by the FITD. Its share in lending and funding markets in the regions of 
Puglia, Basilicata and Abruzzo is around 10%. Along the years, the bank had 
solidified its status as a national cooperative bank, managing to issue and distribute 
financial instruments.387 Private and retail investors held more than two thirds of the 
bank’s senior and subordinated debt, for a total of €300 million.  
 
387 The Bank of Italy reported around 70,000 shareholders holding 2,500 shares on average, 




In the course of 2019, the bank’s capital base needed to be raised in order to 
meet regulatory requirements, as shown by the declining trend in BPB’s capital ratios 
highlighted by Figure 5.7 below.  
 
Figure 5.7 - Banca Popolare di Bari’s capital ratio trend 
 
Source: Bank of Italy 
The decrease in capital ratios observed from 2017 onwards was accompanied 
by a decline in profitability, as reflected in the return on equity (ROE) experiencing 
a sharp drop from 2017 to 2018, going from 0.2% to -63%, which only increased to 
-16% in the first half of 2019, with the cost/income ratio also showing an increase, 
which reached 107% as of June 2019.388 In relation to the bank’s credit risk, the NPL 
ratio of BPB showed an increasing trend 2011 and 2015, going from 12.6% to 27.7%, 
then slightly decreasing to 26.8% and 25.5% in 2016 and 2017 respectively, to finally 
reach 22.9% in 2018 and the first half of 2019. Problems of transparency had also 
come to light in the context of capital raising exercises conducted by the bank, which 
pointed to the value of the shares issued not being in line with the market.389 
 
388 Bank of Italy’s data.  
389 The prospectus related to the capital raise of 2014 contained a reference to the fact that no fairness 
opinion had been given by any independent expert on the determination of the offer price of the shares 
(€8.95, with a 6% discount applied on the issue price of €9.53). Moreover, the Price/Earnings and 
Price/Book Value indicators computed on the basis of the offer price were reported as ‘mis-aligned’ 
with those of a sample of peer banks listed on the market. 
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5.2.2 The rescue scheme 
According to the Bank of Italy, a liquidation involving the reimbursement of 
depositors, without selling BPB’s assets and liabilities to another bank, would have 
had a considerable impact on both the local economy and on savings. This would 
have mainly be driven by the reduction of the value of the shares to zero, in a moment 
where legal disputes with shareholders were already ongoing as a result of the 
placement of the capital raises concluded between 2014 and 2015390, which triggered 
sanctioning proceedings by Consob because of their non-compliance with the 
regulations on investment services.  
The same problem would have materialised with reference to subordinated 
loans, issued for a total amount of €290 million, out of which €220 million had been 
placed with retail customers. The Bank of Italy had estimated that all ordinary 
creditors and deposits of more than €100,000 not attributable to households and small 
firms, and possibly also a portion of deposits above €100,000 of households and small 
firms, would have been affected.391 The FITD would have had to reimburse protected 
depositors around €4.5 billion, against a financial endowment of only €1.7 billion 
come December 2019, requiring the activation of funds worth €2.75 billion which 
had been subscribed in August 2019 by the FITD together with a number of banks, 
in order to equip the Fund with the resources necessary for the reimbursement of 
depositors. However, this could have required extraordinary contributions from the 
banking system, leading to losses.  
On the other hand, a sale of the bank’s assets would have brought about a 
block in operations, to the prejudice of the continuity of funding for households and 
firms, and with a considerable local impact, partly due to the significant share of loans 
extended by BPB to clients located in the regions where it was operating and possibly 
also undermining depositors’ confidence, with a knock-on effect for other similar 
local institutions. The weakness of the local economy would also have probably 
hindered the absorption of BPB’s 2,700 employees.  
 





All of these considerations called for a liquidation with the sale of BPB’s 
assets and liabilities, which turned out to be problematic in view of the difficult local 
economic conditions and the bank’s own situation. The lack of interested 
counterparties made the sale of assets and liabilities unfeasible without the combined 
support of State aid to cover sale losses and, potentially, restructuring costs and 
capital requirements made necessary if capital were absorbed by the asset purchases, 
similarly to what happened in the case of the liquidation of the Venetian banks. 
MCC, also known as Banca del Mezzogiorno, became the main banking 
institution involved in the acquisition of BPB, with the support of a capital injection 
by the State to be used in part for the capital raise for BPB and in part to meet future 
regulatory requirements. MCC was consistently smaller in size compared to BPB392, 
but its intervention was deemed to be in line with the aims  indicated in Italian Law 
Decree 142/2019.393 The approval of the acquisition by the AGCM hinged on a 
number of considerations, including the following: (i) MCC and its holding did not 
detain other controlling stakes in banks, financial institutions, insurance or 
investment companies; (ii) many and qualified competitors were present in the 
market segments where the acquirer and acquired entities both operated; and (iii) the 
post-merger market shares of the new entity remained below 1% for some segments 
or below 15% for others, thus not creating or reinforcing a dominant position in the 
market. On the basis of the above, the operation was deemed to leave unaltered the 
competitive structure of the markets concerned, only enacting a substitution of one 
operator for another. AGCM explicitly highlighted that the approval also took stock 
of the fact that operation was carried out within a crisis context involving a number 
of banks, with the aim of avoiding or remedying a significant disturbance in the 
economy that would have manifested in the absence of intervention, thus preserving 
the stability of the national banking system. 
The FITD committed altogether €1.17 billion to rescue BPB, including the 
€364 million already pledged, while control was acquired by MCC, which 
 
392 As of July 2019, BPB had €1.2 billion in NPLs, which corresponded approximately to half the size 
of MCC’s balance sheet and four times its tangible equity. 
393 Decreto Legge n. 142/2019 recante "Misure urgenti per il sostegno al sistema creditizio del 
Mezzogiorno e per la realizzazione di una banca di investimento". In this perspective, MCC would be 
reinforced to promote the development of financial and investment activities also to the benefit of 
enterprises in Southern Italy, abiding by market conditions and terms. See case C12301, AGCM’s 
decision of 23 June 2020 (Provvedimento n. 28280), para.34. Available at: https://www.agcm.it/.  
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contributed €430 million. One of the conditions of the scheme is that BPB be turned 
into a limited liability company. The approval of the rescue with the intervention of 
the FITD came on the wave of the one applied to Carige, as well as on the finding 
that no State aid was involved in another comparable instance involving 
Norddeutsche Landesbank – Girozentrale (NordLB), due to the measures being 
completed on market terms.394  
Alike to the Carige case, the recourse to the FITD has been the crucial 
instrument employed to ensure the feasibility of the rescue measures to stabilise the 
institutions concerned and preserving jobs, while also facilitating their acquisition by 
other investors, be it through consolidation into another banking entity or not. Both 
for BPB and for Carige, the market outcome of the rescues, in terms of structure and 
ownership of the banks after the FITD will have exited its investments is still pending. 
Different implications might arise depending on whether the other already existing 
investors will acquire the stakes, by effectively consolidating the banks into their own 
groups and possibly relying on economies of scale and scope, or alternative third 
parties will acquire control. 
Deposit guarantee funds’ obligation to reimburse all covered depositors upon 
liquidation serves the public policy purpose of preserving financial stability. 
However, voluntary interventions prior to (and even preventing) liquidation, as was 
the case for Carige and BPB, are outside the scope of this public mandate. So long as 
these types of voluntary interventions are less costly for the DGS than a 
reimbursement of depositors in liquidation, they serve the private interests of the 
DGS members, thus only incidentally affecting public interest as a result.  
If deposit guarantee schemes can be used in recovery and resolution contexts 
as a voluntary means of intervention without any concurrent requirement of burden-
sharing of the shareholders and creditors of the bank concerned, this option has the 
potential to generate moral hazard, distorting risk-taking incentives, due to the 
 
394 The approval of the rescue of NordLB came on 5 December 2019, based on the fact that the German 
State received a remuneration in line with what a private operator would have accepted in the same 
circumstances for its direct investment of €2.8 billion, coupled with investments to downsize the 
institution and bring it back to profitability. 
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assurance that other private resources will eventually cover losses and recapitalise a 
bank in distress.395  
6. Tailoring rescue measures to different types of institutions 
In the four cases in which State interventions took the form of direct 
recapitalisations, the aided institutions were preserved as standalone entities in the 
market, with conditions imposed on restructuring and divestment, aimed at curbing 
distortions of competition, as well as guaranteeing the long-term viability of the 
institution and securing a return to the sovereign for the injections made.396 
Differently, in the Italian cases of liquidation and rescues with intervention 
by deposit guarantee funds, consolidation in whole or only of part of the assets and 
liabilities of the ailing banks within another existing entity was the option sought 
after, with a view to strengthening the institutions and guaranteeing their viability 
after re-organisation and restructuring.  
There is a relevant difference between resolution(-like measures) and 
liquidation or public recapitalisation in terms of which liabilities can be kept in the 
institution at stake after the crisis measures are applied. Indeed, resolution relies 
primarily on a restructuring of the liability set-up of the bank397 to complete an 
internal loss-absorption and recapitalisation. On the other hand, public 
recapitalisations, which are not tied to equally extensive requirements on burden-
sharing398, might entail a broader carry-over of liabilities to the phase post-
intervention, be it by keeping them in the institution as a standalone entity or within 
 
395 See also the considerations made in Chapter 4 in this respect. 
396 Also in the case of the resolution of four small Italian banks in 2015, the good parts of the 
institutions remained as standalone entities as a bridge solution, but later ended up being acquired by 
UBI (Nuova Banca Etruria, Nuova CariChieti, Nuova Banca Marche) and BPER (Nuova Cassa di 
Risparmio di Ferrara). The approval of the two operations involving UBI and BPER hinged on the 
temporary nature of the legal status of the four good banks and the lack of interest by alternative market 
participants in acquiring the bridge banks, which was likely to lead to the exit of the assets of the 
bridge banks from the market, thus reducing supply on the markets concerned. Where the activities of 
the acquirers and acquired institutions overlapped, the post-merger market shares were not found to 
be conducive to a dominant position, also by virtue of the presence of competitors with good reputation 
and a more attractive product offer for customers compared to the merging banks. See C12087, 
decision of 12 April 2017 (Provvedimento No. 26552) and C12094, decision of 18 October 2017 
(Provvedimento No. 26621). 
397 Through the application of the resolution tools such as bail-in the first place. 
398 Differently from the BRRD provisions, State aid rules, as per the 2013 Banking Communication, 
do not impose the write-down and conversion of senior debt instruments. See Chapter 2 for an in-
depth discussion on this point. 
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a new entity in case the failing bank (or part of its assets and liabilities) are 
consolidated into another institution. 
In fact, burden-sharing was applied in all cases analysed in which capital 
support measures were granted, even though not to the extent that would have 
otherwise been required if resolution tools had been applied, with the exception of 
the two Greek precautionary recapitalisations, which applied it more extensively to 
involve senior creditors as well, in order to minimise funding needs to the maximum 
extent possible. Yet, the rescue schemes hinging on the participation of the voluntary 
arm of the national DGS did not complete burden-sharing through a full write-down, 
as they only entailed a dilution of the existing shareholders and a conversion of debt 
instruments already held by DGS. This can have additional competition-related 
implications, as the DGSs are funded through industry contributions, which may 
trigger a mechanism that pushes better performing institutions to rescue their peers, 
with the risk of needing to further contribute to the guarantee fund ex post.   
As for the aid remedies required in the cases analysed, the divestments 
provided for in the different rescue schemes served the primary purpose of improving 
institutions’ efficiency, rather than being strictly applied to limit potential 
competition distortions. This mainly related to closure of branches and sales of 
participations or business lines, which had the additional aim of freeing up capital for 
the banks, in order to minimise the amount of public funds needed. With a similar 
rationale, most schemes also included the disposal of NPL portfolios, seeking to 
increase the chances of recovery while improving the credit risk of the banks 
concerned. 
Those banks that were preserved as standalone entities did not register 
significant changes in the market shares relating to the segments in which they were 
most active even after the rescue measures were implemented, despite the structural 
remedies imposed. This can be partly explained by their market positioning prior to 
the application of the rescue measures, as, in fact, all recapitalised banks were within 
the top five institutions in their respective countries. For concentrated banking sectors 
such as the Greek one, and, to a lesser extent, the Portuguese one, in which market 
power is centered in the hands of a small number of big banks, it would have been 
unlikely to foresee an alternative solution leading to further consolidation.  
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6.1 Significant institutions 
As for MPS instead, which is still under State control, one could hypothesise 
a in which the bank would be absorbed into another significant institution. One of the 
basic requirements for an acquisition to be approved relies on an acquirer being able 
to successfully incorporate the ailing bank, which entails both being financially sound 
and having a size that is sufficient to accommodate the failing bank and integrate it 
into the existing business by exploiting and generating economies of scale and scope. 
This implies that bigger institutions, with a larger degree of market power, would be 
ideally placed to complete such operations. Where market power is already 
significant, an additional absorption of the good parts of another bank might give rise 
to competitive concerns, if there is a risk that a dominant position established in the 
market as a result of the acquisition is then abused. Indeed, the European regulatory 
framework does not condemn the existence of a dominant position in itself, but only 
its abuse.399 
However, if the turnover of the institutions that are consolidated is sufficiently 
high, remedies would become necessary to curb competitive concerns potentially 
arising from their merger in order to guarantee sustained competition in the market. 
Such remedies can entail the divestment of assets or business lines, for instance. This 
might have an impact on the market share of the institutions concerned, depending 
on the magnitude and nature of the divestments and which alternative competitors 
would come to acquire them.  
6.2 Mid-sized banks 
Instead, in the case of mid-sized banks, which might have a significant local 
relevance, even if not at national or even European level, it would seem more 
appropriate to envisage actions of consolidation, through mergers or sale of parts of 
the assets and liabilities. This could serve the purpose of improving their efficiency, 
through the establishment of synergies or economies of scope, in case of 
consolidation with other small institutions, or even economies of scale if absorbed by 
bigger peers. With this perspective, potential competitive concerns should be 
stemmed within the restructuring process, by applying an appropriate level of burden-
 
399 This also has economic justifications relating to Pareto improvements stemming from the existence 
of a dominant firm in the market. On this point, see, for instance, Vatiero (2008). 
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sharing, so as to ensure that certain classes of creditors do not receive a preferential 
treatment compared to what would be required under BRRD resolution, in order not 
to distort banks’ and authorities’ incentives to use one crisis management strategy 
consistently over another. Then, whether consolidation could generate 
anticompetitive results in the national market where the rescued institutions operate 
will depend on the market power and positioning of the consolidating entities and of 
those banks that will be left as competitors. No definite implication exists according 
to which more consolidation in a banking market will automatically lead to 
anticompetitive conduct by the market players. Rather, it is for public authorities to 
take into account whether concentration and competition can co-exist in the market 
of reference when devising rescue schemes and potential remedies for institutions, in 
order to minimise competition-related concerns.400  
6.3 Less significant institutions 
Lastly, as for smaller, less significant institutions, these would most likely 
enter liquidation upon failure, with consolidation into another entity of the ‘good’ 
parts of the bank with a view to preserve critical functions, assets and liabilities, such 
as deposit books, to the extent possible. For these institutions, the expectation of 
rescue could possibly rely on contributions by deposit guarantee funds for covered 
depositors, but it is perhaps less likely that their incentives to compete would be 
distorted ex ante, if the envisaged action to rescue them in case of failure entails a 
loss of control post-liquidation, due to the takeover of an acquiring entity. As such, 
the risk of establishment of quiet life equilibria with collusive outcomes among 
smaller institutions might be diluted as a result of an expected consolidation into a 
bigger institution, which might achieve greater cost-effectiveness, through the 
creation of economies of scale and scope.401 Yet, for this to be the case, the granting 
of public support in liquidation should not favour the senior creditors of the failing 
bank through a limited application of the burden-sharing requirement. 
 
400 In this sense, see Maudos and Vives (2019), holding that “the optimal degree of concentration in 
the industry, dynamic incentives for prudence of incumbents, and the ease of entry” should be 
considered in reviewing mergers. The authors also recognised that a temporary increase in market 
power could be allowed with the aim of reducing excess capacity or rebuilding the charter values of 
prudent banks. 




6.4 Differences in national banking sectors and uniformity of crisis management 
tools application 
Therefore, in this respect, the different characteristics of national banking 
markets can have different implications as far as the application of resolution and 
State aid measures is concerned. For instance, the varying degrees to which LSIs are 
present across national banking sectors in Europe and their different relevance in 
terms of share of assets held will influence the choice of crisis management tool and 
strategy in the event of failure and possibly lead to different approaches, depending 
on the country of incorporation of the ailing institution. Indeed, countries with more 
concentrated banking sectors, where the market operators are in great part significant 
institutions will be more likely to be faced with the application of resolution tools in 
case of a bank failure, as such institutions will be more likely to meet the public 
interest criterion, compared to situations in which a failure would interest an LSI in 
a banking sector where small institutions have a more significant weight in the 
national economy. As a matter of fact, despite not meeting the conditions for a finding 
of public interest that would justify resolution, it may very well be that an LSI within 
a very interconnected network of small banks, whose activities are important to 
preserve stability at local level, would need to be rescued through public resources.  
By means of another example, complications could also arise in the event of 
a failure of a saving bank or a cooperative group part of an institutional protection 
scheme (IPS), depending on the structure of the group itself, as well as on the type of 
solidarity mechanisms in place for intragroup support among the IPS members. An 
integrated cooperative group can amount to a significant institution and be more 
suited to the application of resolution tools in case of failure. By contrast, a failure of 
an institution which is member of a network of smaller and separated banks would 
not call for resolution, but might still require public intervention to stem contagion 
effects and preserve systemic stability at local level. In addition, different stability 
implications will arise where a failure involves an IPS member subject to a mutual 
solidarity mechanism that requires support to other members to be unlimited 
compared to one that is capped at a level that preserves the solvency of the single 
member. In this sense, different structures within national banking sectors and 
different group models might lead to a non-uniform application of crisis management 
rules within the EU. 
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6.5 A tripartite approach? 
On the basis of the considerations above, a tripartite approach could be 
configured, according to which (i) larger, systemic banks would be restructured 
through resolution and the application of a full-fledged bail-in; (ii) mid-sized banks 
could be resolved through sales of portfolios of assets and liabilities to other entities, 
possibly enabled by temporary voluntary contributions of the DGS; while (iii) smaller 
local banks could be liquidated in accordance with national insolvency law, with an 
intervention by the DGS in favour of covered depositors. With a view to limiting 
distortions of competition with reference to the different approaches delineated, the 
degrees of burden-sharing required under State aid rules and under the resolution 
framework should be further aligned. 
The degree of concentration and contestability of the different national 
banking markets and the market power of the institutions involved will need to be 
factored into authorities’ decisions on the best suitable measures to apply, as well as 
into their assessment by the Commission, so as to give appropriate consideration to 
the potential effects that the rescue and restructuring measures chosen might have on 
institutions and on the structure of the national banking markets, in a broader 
perspective.   
7. Concluding remarks  
With the BRRD framework in place in Europe, a number of rescue measures 
applied in the past years have still entailed some degree of State intervention or use 
of public resources. Analysing the cases enatailing the application of crisis 
management measures in Italy, Greece and Portugal in recent years, this chapter has 
provided an overview of the specificities of different crisis management measures 
and how they were deployed to take into account different bank-specific and national 
market characteristics and institutions’ financial performance and perspectives. The 
exercise carried out in this chapter had the aim of highlighting possible attention 
points for authorities to take into account when choosing which crisis management 
strategy to deploy, on the basis of the structure and conditions of the market in which 
the bank in distress operates, and determining which possible remedies or 
countervailing measures should be applied in order to curb potential risks of 
distortions of competition.    
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Based on the practical applications of the precautionary recapitalisation 
option envisaged by the BRRD, some points of attention have been highlighted, with 
a view to proposing improvements in the implementation of the exception for 
recapitalisation. In particular, there might be a case in favour of using precautionary 
recapitalisations as soon as a capital shortfall is identified through a supervisory 
exercise, in order to prevent further capital deterioration of the institution to the extent 
possible, thus minimising at the same time the amount of public support needed. 
Moreover, there is leeway to revisit the requirements to grant a precautionary 
recapitalisation or to consider how to improve its application in practice in terms of 
instruments used, in order to ensure that it remains a one-time exception to resolution 
only applicable in very specific circumstances and within a limited timeframe, by 
reducing the likelihood that similar State support will be necessary again for the same 
bank, while possibly diluting the risk-taking incentives of the existing shareholders 
at the same time. To this end, the burden-sharing requirement could be accompanied 
by capital injections through financial instruments which should maximise the 
flexibility for the State to exit its investment in the short to medium term, while also 
creating the conditions for their future holders to cover eventual new losses and 
recapitalise the bank if needed, without making recourse to another public 
recapitalisation. 
As to the potential consolidation of institutions post-rescue, it seems that 
larger significant institutions can expect to be left as standalone entities in the market, 
while mid-sized and smaller banks would more probably be merged or acquired by 
an external entity, in order to improve efficiency, through synergies and economies 
of scale and scope. Therefore, two scenarios can be envisaged, in which either the 
institutions maintain, build up or reinforce market power and possibly pass this 
through to customers via higher rates, or they can leverage their synergy-creating 
abilities and achieve greater levels of efficiency, which could ultimately benefit their 
customers. Indeed, there is no straightforward implication that larger institutions or 
more concentrated banking sectors will certainly and systematically exhibit signs of 
anticompetitive conduct in the market. Consolidation may entail a number of 
benefits, mostly through the establishment of economies of scale of cost efficiencies 
contributing to a profit boost, and in the way of fostering private risk-sharing 
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mechanisms. However, it can also create tension with the objective of ensuring a level 
playing field among market players.   
If, instead, any ex ante quiet life equilibria existed prior to the failure for 
smaller institutions, they would be difficult to count on after the rescue, as the burden-
sharing and possible acquisition of portfolios of assets and liabilities by an external 
acquirer would not guarantee that the owners of the ailing bank would remain 
unaltered in whichever entity remains after rescue. As a matter of fact, some degree 
of contribution from shareholders and subordinated debt holders at minimum would 
be required under State aid rules, as applicable in cases of liquidation aid or 
precautionary recapitalisation. The situation might however be different, in case other 
rescue schemes alike to those of Carige and BPB were put forth without imposing 
any burden-sharing requirement on the existing shareholders and debt holders.   
In general, an issue might arise in relation to the perception of the credibility 
of bail-in and the resolution framework at large. If exceptions to full-fledged bail-in 
become the regular way in which bank failures are dealt with, institutions might start 
adjusting their expectations relating to the possibility of a public bailout. This 
problem could be heightened for significant banks, which can rely on the knowledge 
of their essential role at national and European level and their higher degrees of 
interconnection, to reasonably expect that liquidation would not be a credible strategy 
for them. If this were the case, the market would also react and possibly re-price 
banks’ financial instruments, by adjusting their rating as well.    
The reasoning behind the continued granting of aid to struggling institutions 
is clear, since bank failures can have serious, long-lasting consequences for a national 
or regional economy. However, the position of the Commission on the instances in 
which to allow such aid might turn out to be self-defeating. Indeed, instead of being 
able to grant aid early on, in order to lessen the degree of losses that will need to be 
covered if the bank’s situation further deteriorates in time, aid beneficiaries and 
national authorities run through multiple options and possible regulatory hoops, 
before ending up receiving some form of public support either way. In other cases, it 
is uncertain that rescued institutions could absolve the commitments made at the time 
they received the aid. 
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Additional emphasis in the rules on the need for aid interventions to be prompt 
and well-circumscribed, rather than deployed closer to a bank’s insolvency402, 
coupled with the imposition of credible structural and behavioural commitments on 
institutions with a view to reducing competition distortions, could go some way 
towards improving the sustainability of the crisis management framework. Solving 
the mismatch in burden-sharing requirements between State aid and resolution rules, 
as well as a clarification building towards a consistent application of the public 
interest assessment across different resolution authorities would offer another 
significant contribution to diminishing the potential for distorted incentives to 
materialise when choosing which tools to apply to restructure an ailing institution. 
 
402 On the need to ensure prompt intervention, see Bodellini (2017), arguing that the Greek and Italian 
precautionary recapitalisations have highlighted how crucial it is for authorities to intervene before 
































Chapter 6: Liquidity and Solvency Backstops: State 





It is well-established in the economic literature that the presence of a credible 
ultimate safety net backed by governments is key in guaranteeing the soundness of 
the banking system. Indeed, banking assets are inherently risky. Rumours about the 
quality of a bank’s assets can cause a bank run, which regulators try to prevent with 
the introduction of deposit insurance.403 In turn, a privately organised deposit 
insurance fund, funded by premiums paid by participating banks, can run out of 
money, in particular during a severe financial crisis when multiple banks fail at the 
same time. Therefore, to be credible, a deposit insurance fund needs the backing of 
the government. In this sense, a government can reduce but not eliminate its role as 
last resort to the banking system.404 Additionally, credit agencies recognise the 
presence of a sufficiently strong and credible fiscal backstop, which is a “safety net”. 
This is directly reflected in the overall ratings given to financial institutions, which 
also embed the expected amount of government support. 
However, when dealing with this issue, focus is usually limited to 
acknowledging the need for a deposit guarantee scheme (DGS), rather than 
considering how authorities, institutions or governments can intervene at an earlier 
stage to address banks’ solvency and liquidity problems. In order to try filling such a 
gap, this chapter instead intends to address the somewhat grey area between the 
application of resolution, through the tools made available by the BRRD405, and the 
use of a deposit guarantee scheme as a last resort option to avoid bank runs during a 
crisis. This in-between area can be identified with those measures enacted by central 
banks and other European bodies to guarantee sufficient liquidity both during and 
 
403 Diamond, D. W., Dybvig, P.-H., (1983), “Bank Runs, Deposits Insurance, and Liquidity”, The 
Journal of Political Economy, 91, 3, p. 401-419. 
404 Gros, D., Schoenmaker, D., (2014), “European Deposit Insurance and Resolution in the Banking 
Union”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52, 3, p. 529-546. 
405 Directive 2014/59/EU. 
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after a bank’s resolution, or the recourse to government financial stabilisation tools 
aimed at bolstering solvency.  
Another aspect that is often overlooked and that should also be clarified is the 
link between funding in resolution and funding before resolution. In most cases, 
before reaching resolution, a bank already has a considerable exposure vis-à-vis 
central banks, be it through regular monetary operations in normal times, or through 
“lender of last resort” (LOLR) facilities, such as emergency liquidity assistance 
(ELA)406, as market-based funding dries up. The establishment of a mechanism for 
funding in resolution needs to take into account this connection and must clarify the 
role of the central bank before, during and possibly after resolution.  
Indeed, the new resolution regime enshrined in the BRRD, which requires 
losses to be absorbed by shareholders and creditors instead of taxpayers, is 
incompatible with the “ambiguity” that has traditionally characterised the LOLR 
framework, which is one of the crucial roles central banks have in protecting financial 
stability.407 Indeed, the resolution regime revolves around the idea of recapitalising a 
bank by applying several tools, among which the most prominent one is bail-in. 
However, the need to also ensure that enough liquidity is available to guarantee a 
smooth and successful resolution process has been mostly neglected so far.408 
Additionally, most banking crises lie in a grey area between liquidity and 
solvency problems.409 When the authorities take a decision on whether to intervene 
or not they normally do not have full information about the solvency situation of the 
bank in question. Very often the trigger for intervention is a liquidity problem, as the 
bank loses access to funding when the rumors of solvency problems propagate. 
Moreover, the provision of liquidity is crucial for the success of a bank resolution 
process. Even if a bank is well recapitalised after the implementation of a resolution 
tool- be it bail-in or another- and can continue operating, it still needs liquidity to pay 
its debts as they come due. Indeed, the main resolution tools are aimed at restoring 
 
406 ELA is a framework put in place by the ECB in 1999 and subsequently revised (the last time being 
2017). See Hallerberg and Lastra (2017). 
407 The concept of “lender of last resort” dates back to the XIX century (Bagehot dictum).   
408 See Eurogroup (2018). Letter from President Centeno to President Tusk. Eurogroup, 25 June 2018, 
Brussels. 
409 Fernandez de Lis, S., Pardo, J. C., Martin, G., (2018) “Funding in resolution: the lender of last 




banks’ solvency, rather than liquidity. In particular, the bail-in tool is meant to ensure 
loss absorption and, where needed, recapitalisation.410 
A lack of liquidity could ultimately lead the bank into a bankruptcy process. 
The ensuing liquidation of assets and the discontinuation of critical services could 
put at risk the financial stability of a country, which is exactly what the new resolution 
regime intends to avoid. In a situation of bank distress that calls for restructuring 
through resolution, the first problem is not necessarily how to lend ex novo to the 
entity in resolution or who should do it; how to renew the existing positions to 
maintain market confidence during the period immediately after resolution, so as to 
recover market access as soon as possible is also a crucial issue. As a matter of fact, 
the assumption that the market would quickly provide the necessary funding after 
losses have been imposed on investors isn’t realistic.411 This transition is complicated 
by the fact that most central banks are prohibited from lending to insolvent banks. In 
a liquidity crisis it is crucial to have sufficient ammunition to stop a speculative attack 
or a bank run. The central bank is the only institution with this firing capacity. Even 
if the institution in charge of funding in resolution is not usually the central bank, the 
latter acts as a backstop.  
In this regard, the eurozone is an exception due to its peculiar institutional 
configuration. As a matter of fact, there is currently no clarity around the provision 
of funding to a bank in resolution and there is no credible public sector backstop in 
place. As it happens, the BRRD is more focused on how to recapitalise an entity 
rather than on how to ensure liquidity during a resolution.412 A clear regime of 
funding in resolution, including a credible public backstop mechanism, would also 
contribute to guaranteeing a level playing field for banks in the eurozone, also in 
comparison to peers in other third countries, and to providing clarity to investors in 
bail-inable securities, thus raising the credibility of the whole resolution framework 
as a result. 
 
410  Demertzis et al. (2018). 
411 See the speech by SRB’s Elke Koenig (2018), “Gaps in the Banking Union regarding in resolution 
and how to close them”, Eurofi, available at https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/621. 
412 This is not the case in other jurisdictions such as the UK, USA or Canada where frameworks for 
the provision of liquidity are in place.  
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The use of the fiscal backstop and the specific type of assistance it will offer 
will be dependent upon the resolution strategy previously chosen. Indeed, different 
resolution tools might lead to different implications in terms of backstop recourse. 
With a view to this, it is also important to understand the distinction between liquidity 
and loss absorption. Indeed, the suggestion of a public sector liquidity backstop 
should not be confused with taxpayer-funded bail-outs, or losses being placed upon 
public institutions. As a matter of fact, the BRRD framework requires banks to have 
sufficient loss absorbing capacity to enable losses to be covered and the institution to 
be recapitalised. However, this is distinct from the question of liquidity funding for a 
bank in resolution. Provision of liquidity to banks is a well-established principle and, 
if done correctly, does not involve the public sector taking on losses of the institution. 
This is reflected in the words of Ben Bernanke in his comment piece on the Orderly 
Liquidation Authority (OLA), which provides a liquidity backstop facility for firms 
in resolution in the U.S. “A temporary liquidity backstop is likely to be necessary to 
maintain critical operations as the firm is restructured […] Importantly, though, 
these loans are limited in size and are temporary funding, not permanent capital. 
They are backed by first claims on the firm’s assets and—if that is not enough—by 
an assessment on other large financial firms. The one group that is guaranteed not 
to see losses in an OLA is taxpayers.”413   
On the basis of the above, after a distinction of the different backstop-like 
measures for solvency and liquidity support to banks, the analysis of this chapter will 
move to an assessment of what form of backstop is proposed to enact them and 
whether one could reasonably expect competitive distortions to come about in the 
banking market as a result.   
2. Solvency assistance: extraordinary public financial support 
First of all, it is worthwhile to address whether additional interventions aimed 
at solvency restoration might be required even after resolution has already been 
implemented. In principle, the new framework for crisis management establishes an 
automatic relationship between the “point of non-viability” (PONV) of a bank, the 
 
413 Ben Bernanke’s speech available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-
bernanke/2017/02/28/why-dodd-franks-orderly-liquidation-authority- should-be-preserved/  
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moment at which the institution is failing or likely to fail (FOLTF), and its solvency 
and liquidity positions.  
According to the BRRD, the PONV should be understood as the point at 
which the relevant authority determines that the institution meets the following 
conditions for resolution: i) it has been deemed to be failing or likely to fail; ii) there 
are no private alternatives to rescue it and iii) resolution is necessary in the public 
interest. At an earlier stage, an institution should be considered as FOLTF when: (i) 
it is in breach of its capital requirements, i.e. infringes or is likely to infringe the 
requirements of continuing authorisation or when its assets are or are likely to be less 
than its liabilities; (ii) it is illiquid, thus is or is likely to be unable to pay its debts as 
they fall due; or (iii) it requires extraordinary public financial support, with the 
exception of “precautionary recapitalisation” as per Art. 32(4)(d) of the BRRD. 
2.1 Government financial stabilization tools 
The notion of State intervention is captured in the concept of ‘extraordinary 
public financial support’ (EPFS), defined in Art. 2(28) of the BRRD, stating that it is 
“State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, or any other public financial 
support at supranational level, which, if provided for at national level, would 
constitute State aid”, that is granted in order to preserve or restore the viability, 
liquidity or solvency of a banking institution covered by the BRRD itself. As such, 
this notion is broader than that of State aid. Indeed, this definition of EPFS captures 
assistance granted by national resolution funds, by the SRF (see Chapter 4) and from 
other national sources such as taxpayers. It also includes support granted by 
supranational public organisations, which could arguably encompass the ESM, the 
European Investment Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.  
Nevertheless, in accordance with the goals of the new regulatory framework 
for bank resolution, State aid is relegated as an option to be tapped into only in 
exceptional circumstances. One such example is the recourse to “government 
financial stabilisation tools” (GFSTs). If resolution financing arrangements (e.g. 
recourse to resolution funds) are not sufficient, then alternative financing sources like 
GFSTs can be available. As means of direct financial support from national public 
funds, they can only be granted under strict conditions and must comply with the EU 
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State aid framework. More specifically, they must be used as a last resort tool to avoid 
a systemic crisis. Member States may provide extraordinary public financial support 
through GFSTs in accordance with Articles 56(3) and Article 37(10) of the BRRD 
and with the EU State aid framework, including direct intervention to avoid the wind-
up of the institution, with a view to meeting the objectives for resolution referred to 
in Article 31(2) of the same directive.  
Financial stabilisation tools can take any of the following forms: (a) public 
equity support where the State participates in the recapitalisation with CET1, AT1 
and T2 instruments, as referred to in Article 57 BRRD; or (b) temporary public 
ownership by a Member State nominee or Member State-owned company, in case 
such an injection is insufficient, as referred to in Article 58 BRRD. They can be used 
as a last resort after having assessed and exploited the other resolution tools to the 
maximum extent practicable whilst maintaining financial stability, as determined by 
the competent ministry or the government after consulting the resolution authority. 
When applying the GFSTs, Member States shall ensure that their competent 
ministries or governments and the resolution authority apply the tools only if all the 
conditions laid down in Article 32(1) as well as one of the following conditions are 
met: 
a) the competent ministry or government and the resolution authority, after 
consulting the central bank and the competent authority, determine that the 
application of the resolution tools would not suffice to avoid a significant 
adverse effect on the financial system; 
b) the competent ministry or government and the resolution authority determine 
that the application of the resolution tools would not suffice to protect the 
public interest, where extraordinary liquidity assistance from the central bank 
has previously been given to the institution; 
c) in respect of the temporary public ownership tool, the competent ministry or 
government, after consulting the competent authority and the resolution 
authority, determines that the application of the resolution tools would not 
suffice to protect the public interest, where public equity support through the 
equity support tool has previously been given to the institution. 
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On this basis, resolution authorities have the option of seeking alternative 
funding through those tools in the event of a systemic crisis- which qualifies as a 
“very extraordinary situation”414- provided that a minimum bail-in contribution of 8 
% of a bank’s liabilities and own funds has been made and that the financial 
stabilisation tool itself is cleared under State aid rules. In this sense, it is clear that the 
tools are not resolution tools in themselves, but rather an alternative to other 
resolution financing arrangements. Such tools must be implemented under the 
leadership of the competent ministry or government of the country where the failing 
bank is located, in close cooperation with the relevant resolution authority.415 
However, they are only available if the competent ministry or resolution authority 
determines inter alia that (i) the use of the resolution tools by themselves would not 
suffice to avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system, or (ii) it would 
not suffice to protect the public interest. 
Therefore, as seems to be the case for the use of other tools made available 
by the current regulatory regime, financial stability remains the overriding policy 
interest that justifies instances of direct government intervention. This is also 
reflected in the concept of public interest to be preserved.416 Then, it remains relevant 
to understand how this is balanced with the competition policy concerns that may 
arise from the potential competitive distortions arising from State intervention. At 
least in principle, though, it appears that government support is not ruled out, but 
rather still acknowledged as the only viable option to avert systemic contagion and 
to preserve stability.  
3. Liquidity support measures  
Not only solvency measures must be considered within the resolution 
framework, though. Indeed, a number of liquidity support schemes for banks in need 
have been put in place in some EU Member States, including, but not limited to, 
Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Poland and Portugal, in recent years. Their purpose is to ensure 
 
414 See Art. 37(10) BRRD. 
415 In order to give effect to the government financial stabilisation tools, Member States shall ensure 
that their competent ministries or governments have the relevant resolution powers specified in 
Articles 63 to 72, and shall ensure that Articles 66, 68, 83 and 117 apply. 
416 On the finding that financial stability is an “overriding and inviolable public interest, which 
becomes a pivotal European value that may prevail over the principle of legitimate expectations and 
over the need to protect investors”, see Raganelli (2017). 
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that banks have no difficulties in funding their operations and to guarantee access to 
deposits. Under EU State aid rules, banks with a capital shortfall cannot benefit from 
general liquidity support schemes, meaning that the Commission must take decisions 
on a case-by-case basis. In accordance with the 2013 Banking Communication, these 
aid measures can still be temporarily approved as rescue aid, meaning that they can 
be granted before the Commission has approved the restructuring plan of the bank 
concerned. However, this is only possible for banks that have no capital shortfall.417 
Instead, if a bank with a capital shortfall needs liquidity support, the Commission will 
require the relevant Member State to submit a restructuring plan.  
The objective of such assistance measures is to provide safety to investors, by 
acting as a safety net that can ensure liquidity for the banks involved. However, they 
are also meant to counteract an international market failure, by which banks that are 
solvent still encounter difficulties in getting access to liquidity. Thus, liquidity 
support measures should establish the “conditions for the revival of the interbank 
lending market and financial markets more generally”.418 State aid implied by a 
liquidity measure is deemed to be compatible with the internal market if it is 
proportionate and commensurate with the need to ensure sufficient liquidity in the 
banking sector in the particular circumstances. In its 2013 Banking Communication, 
the Commission does not envisage a mechanism whereby the ECB would provide 
funding in resolution. However, liquidity assistance from a central bank could be 
considered as State aid if the bank is (i) not solvent, (ii) not backed by collateral and 
(iii) if assistance is backed by a counter-guarantee from a State. Therefore, the 
discussion must also turn to addressing the role of central banks in assisting 
institutions in distress.  
3.1 Liquidity assistance by central banks 
Central banks may act as LOLR by providing emergency liquidity assistance 
(ELA) to failing banks. As acknowledged in the preamble to the BRRD, liquidity 
support from central banks aims to “secure access to funding under equivalent 
conditions for all credit institutions that are otherwise solvent”. Within the eurozone, 
the decision to grant ELA is at the discretion of national central banks. This means 
 
417 Point 58 of the 2013 Banking Communication.  
418 Slovenian guarantee scheme, case N531/2008, 12 December 2008, para. 33. 
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that any costs and risks arising from the provision of ELA are incurred by the relevant 
national central banks (NCBs). Nevertheless, in order to ensure that ELA operations 
do not interfere with the single monetary policy, the ECB’s Governing Council may 
object to or restrict the provision of ELA. 
Then, the question is whether ELA can be considered as a national measure 
and whether it constitutes State aid. As to the first aspect, the provision of ELA to 
solvent but illiquid institutions remains national responsibility. The decentralisation 
of ELA assistance implies that the ultimate credit risk lies with Member States’ fiscal 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, coordination arrangements are in place, through which 
national central banks of the euro area are required to inform the ECB- and to also 
request authorisation when the overall ELA size exceeds certain thresholds- on the 
financial situation of the beneficiary, the systemic implications, and the terms of the 
financial assistance. As for the second point, instead, the Commission has held that 
liquidity assistance does not constitute State aid, if the following cumulative 
conditions are met:419  
i)  the financial institution is solvent at the moment of the liquidity provision 
and the latter is not part of a larger aid package; 
ii)  the facility is fully secured by collateral to which haircuts are applied, in 
function of its quality and market value;  
iii)  the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary; and  
iv)  the measure is taken at the central bank's own initiative, and in particular 
is not backed by any counter-guarantee of the State.  
Therefore, the State aid provisions applicable to ELA are similar to those 
applicable to pure State guarantees. Yet, in addition, banks applying for ELA must 
present a restructuring plan demonstrating their capacity to recover and restore their 
access to market funding in the long term, when public support is no longer available. 
However, there are also some clear-cut situations where no liquidity can be provided 
 




by a central bank, be it under the monetary policy framework or ELA: this is the case 
for entities put into insolvency or liquidation proceedings. 
3.2 Liquidity assistance after the “failing or likely to fail” determination 
As already established, a precondition for a resolution action to be undertaken 
is that the entity needs to be determined as failing or likely to fail. At that stage 
though, it will still be early to know whether there is a reasonable prospect of an 
alternative private sector solution or supervisory intervention, as well as whether 
resolution is in the public interest.420 Nonetheless, the entity’s risk profile will be 
worsened by the very fact of the “failing or likely to fail” determination. In principle, 
such an entity could still have recourse to Eurosystem monetary policy liquidity 
provided that it complies with the counterparty eligibility criteria, in particular that it 
is financially sound and has sufficient eligible collateral. However, to address the 
uncertainty and the associated risk in the Eurosystem’s counterparty framework, ECB 
rules provide that the entity’s access to Eurosystem monetary policy credit 
instruments is frozen at the level prevailing at the time the institution is determined 
as failing or likely to fail.421 
Ideally, the application of one of the resolution tools (sale of business, bridge 
institution, asset separation, or bail-in) would lead to the credit institution recovering 
its financial soundness. In these situations, the restored solvency of the failing 
counterparty will first have to be confirmed by the competent supervisory authority 
before the Governing Council decides to “unfreeze” its access to Eurosystem 
monetary policy liquidity. Such confirmation is also necessary for the provision of 
ELA. Thus, the entity would need to be handed back to the supervision of the relevant 
competent authority, which will provide information on the observation of the 
required ratios. Instead, if the entity is a newly created counterparty, such as a bridge 
bank, it will first have to be licensed to operate as a credit institution. It will then have 
to be accepted as a Eurosystem counterparty. This means it will have to fulfil all the 
eligibility criteria, including the requirement to comply with the relevant capital, 
liquidity and leverage ratios. Therefore, if applying one of the resolution tools 
 
420 Respectively, the second and third cumulative conditions necessary to trigger a resolution action 
for a failing bank. 
421 See ECB’s Yves Mersch’s speech “The limits of central bank financing in resolution”, 30 January 
2018, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180130.en.html 
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restores the entity’s financial soundness, or if combining its business with that of an 
absorbing entity results in the emergence of a financially sound entity or group, 
access to central bank liquidity could resume after the Eurosystem has made its 
assessment.  
3.2.1 Liquidity provision by central banks 
Still, the need remains for banks to be able to plan ahead and obtain liquidity, 
even if determined as failing or likely to fail or if the resolution process has already 
been activated. Indeed, the establishment of a new liquidity source has been debated 
since the Single Resolution Board handled its first big resolution case in June 2017, 
by forcing the sale of Spain’s Banco Popular Espanol SA to Banco Santander SA.422 
The question is then whether and to what extent this liquidity should be provided by 
central banks. The ECB’s position on the matter has been constant: the provision of 
central bank liquidity, be it through monetary policy credit operations or emergency 
liquidity assistance, should not be automatically assumed in resolution planning.423 
Resolution measures should be financed by contributions from shareholders and 
creditors of the bank, or by the State or at Union level, but not by central banks. More 
specifically, central banks can only provide liquidity in the context of pursuing their 
objectives and to carry out the tasks within their mandate. In addition, with regard to 
the monetary financing prohibition, the ECB has repeatedly stated that the financing 
of resolution measures is a government task. This does not necessarily mean that the 
Eurosystem would be prevented from providing liquidity in the context of resolution, 
as long as the provision of liquidity complies with the requirements of any of the two 
sources of central bank liquidity.424  
Liquidity can be provided under the generally applicable monetary policy 
rules and respecting the limits set out in the Treaty and any Governing Council 
decisions. Liquidity provision by central banks in the event of resolution must not be 
assumed ex ante, even though the possibility is not excluded, provided the specific 
 
422 See Chapter 4 for a discussion of liquidity and solvency considerations raised by the Banco Popular 
case. 
423 This is also specified in Art. 10(b) BRRD. 
424 These requirements are stricter in the case of monetary policy liquidity than for ELA. For example, 
in the case of the asset separation tool, liquidity can be provided to the solvent part of the bank that is 




rules and objectives of the Eurosystem are followed. The decision on the provision 
of central bank liquidity will be taken independently and ad hoc by the Eurosystem 
to ensure that potential emergency lending does not interfere with monetary policy. 
However, central banks provide liquidity, not solvency support. This is precisely the 
reason why the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) was established, namely that the 
financing of resolution should no longer come from the taxpayers, but from the banks 
themselves. This is where the provision of liquidity by the SRF actually becomes 
crucial in the euro area. However, since this source of liquidity has yet to be fully 
operationalised, the question remains where to have a backstop come from. This 
source cannot come from the central banks, as resolution financing is a government 
task, complemented by the rules and procedures applied by the SRB and the national 
resolution authorities within the framework of the SRM. Thus, funding gaps that 
cannot be addressed by the industry or through the SRF should ultimately be filled 
by Member States.425   
3.3 Liquidity assistance with the application of different resolution tools  
Different degrees and sources of liquidity will be necessary and available 
depending on the stage of distress of the bank involved and the consequent 
restructuring to be implemented, as well as on the type of entity that needs to viably 
operate on the market. Table 6.1 provides a structured overview of the different 
liquidity sources available to banks under restructuring, according to the different 












425 Mersch (2018), supra note 422. 
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Table 6.1 – Liquidity sources according to timing and entity involved 
 Entity Liquidity source 





by national central 
banks 
Resolution weekend Private bank to which a 
(combination of) resolution 
tool(s) is applied 





● Restructured bank 
(bail-in) 
● Newly owned private 
bank (sale of 
business) 
● Bridge bank 




(renewed credible access 
to markets) 





by national central 
banks 
Source: own elaboration 
If a bank to which the bail-in tool is applied (i.e. open-bank bail-in strategy) 
found itself in need of liquidity, two potential means could be foreseen for it to access 
it, namely: (i) through ELA, provided that resolution has not impacted its levels of 
eligible collateral and bail-in has ensured compliance with minimum capital 
requirements; (ii) through the SRF, provided that the resolution plan explicitly 
provided for the possibility to ask for SRF funding, although it is unclear whether the 
minimum bail-in requirement of 8% would be applicable also in such an instance or 
that would only be required in case of recapitalisation measures426; or (iii) through 
DGS resources. The latter option, however, is not meant as a primary source of funds 
in resolution in the European Union, 
 
426 The SRMR does not explicitly mention this. 
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The same considerations would be valid in case transfer tools were applied. 
Liquidity provision in transfer strategies could also pass through DGS resources427, 
in the form of cash disbursements, guarantees, or monetary grants to a bridge bank 
or acquirer, for instance. As highlighted in Chapter 4, interventions by DGSs in 
resolution could qualify as State aid under certain conditions and, thus, are subject to 
scrutiny under the State aid framework. This will entail an assessment aimed at 
verifying that contributions are made on terms that a market operator would also 
accept, in case there is a finding of imputability of DGS resources to the State. The 
2013 Banking Communication, however, does not specify whether specific 
competitive safeguards would be required of the beneficiary in an instance where 
DGSs intervened.428  
Differently, a bank entering liquidation under national insolvency 
proceedings would not need liquidity injections, as it would exit the market, without 
continuing its operations; however, a transfer of a portfolio of its assets and liabilities 
to another market operator might require some liquidity support.429 In such a case, 
the situation would be comparable to that described with respect to resolution transfer 
strategies, and competition distortions would be redressed by ensuring the exit of the 
beneficiary from the market within a short timeframe.430 
If any of the conditions for access to ELA, SRF or DGS funding were not 
verified, the only remaining option for a bank to access liquidity would appear to be 
guarantee schemes or other forms of liquidity support, as described in Section 3. In 
this sense, it is reasonable to expect that smaller banks would rely more heavily on 
such forms of public support to cover liquidity needs, especially if resolution is not 
the strategy envisaged to deal with their potential failure. In any case, clarification 
and resources would be needed to operationalise mechanisms of liquidity support for 
 
427 The latter option, however, would only be available in some States, depending on the applicable 
regulatory framework and whether DGS interventions can support transfer of covered depositors only, 
or also other liabilities. See Baudino et al. (2019). 
428 Baudino et al. (2019) highlight that, where central bank facilities are available, liquidity provision 
by the DGS is likely to be possible on less onerous terms than ELA, or against collateral that would 
not be eligible under the central bank’s framework. This could create distortive incentives to make 
recourse to DGS contributions whenever possible, to bypass ELA requirements. 
429 This was the case in the context of the liquidation of Banca Popolare di Vicenza and Veneto Banca, 
where liquidity guarantees were extended on bonds of the two banks within a scheme to transfer the 
good parts of the two institutions to Intesa San Paolo, the acquirer. See Commission decision C(2017) 




banks in restructuring, in order to reduce the continued recourse to State resources. 
A discussion of possible policy options in this respect is provided in the next Section.
  
4. Funding in resolution   
One implicit assumption embedded in the BRRD is that once the institution’s 
own funds are restored, it will be possible to access funding to refinance liabilities as 
they come due. Nevertheless, following any recapitalisation, a firm may experience 
heightened liquidity needs generated by market volatility, uncertainty surrounding 
asset valuations, and an asymmetry of information regarding its viability. Then, one 
must turn to considering the ability of resolution funds or other sources and bodies to 
provide such liquidity as needed. 
The resolution process deals with the solvency issues of the bank concerned, through 
the application of bail-in and the use of the SRF, but the latter is not equipped to 
shoulder major liquidity needs for large, globally-systemic banks (G-SIBs), which 
might exceed the size of the SRF and its backstop.431 However, the ECB and national 
central banks are prohibited from providing liquidity in the absence of eligible 
collateral or guarantees. The current resolution framework does not specify who 
should provide liquidity, and against which guarantees, if collateral were to be 
insufficient.432 An additional limitation to the use of the SRF arises because its 
contribution is bound by construction by what is determined in the resolution scheme, 
not being adaptable following a potentially negative market response to the 
restructured entity.433  
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) had also advocated for an effective 
public sector backstop mechanism to be made available to secure liquidity in 
resolution, while banks would need to maintain available non-encumbered assets.434 
 
431 The size of the resolution funds has been questioned to possibly be insufficient in case they have 
to provide temporary funding to financial institutions in exceptional circumstances where access to 
markets is difficult. On this point, see, among others, Hellwig (2014), Hadjiemmanuil (2015) and 
Yiatrou (2016). 
432 Resolution planning and resolvability assessments could contribute to alleviate the problem of 
insufficient collateral, up to a point, by requiring banks to make the necessary preparations that ensure 
the availability of eligible collateral in preparation for resolution and post-resolution viability. 
433 Demertzis et al. (2018). 
434 FSB, (2016) “Guiding principles on the temporary funding needed to support the orderly resolution 
of a global systemically important bank (“G-SIB”)”, available at www.fsb.org. 
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In the eurozone, such a mechanism is on the way to operationalisation by virtue of 
the expected future role of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in committing 
funding to the SRF, enabled by the reform of the ESM Treaty (discussed in section 
5.1). It is important to recall that public financing does not constitute State aid if 
certain conditions are respected435, and must also not be perceived as equivalent to 
government stabilisation tools under BRRD,436 which address solvency issues and 
are subject to different conditions.  
As stated in the European Commission communication on Banking Union 
from 11 October 2017,437 it is important that there is sufficient liquidity available and 
the fund could be used in combination with central bank liquidity. Along these lines, 
the ECB has been considering a new policy tool that would allow it to inject cash into 
banks that are being rescued from the threat of insolvency, tackling a gap in rules for 
dealing with troubled lenders.  
4.1 A proposal for Eurosystem Resolution Liquidity Assistance  
The suggested framework for Eurosystem Resolution Liquidity Assistance 
(RLA) lays out conditions including a far-reaching public guarantee to safeguard 
against central-bank losses. The measure is potentially controversial because it is 
against the ECB’s mandate that it finances actions that should be undertaken by 
public authorities, such as bank resolution. Therefore, it is suggested the RLA should 
be seen as a monetary-policy tool, ensuring the banking system can transmit official 
interest rates to the real economy.  
The RLA would be earmarked for banks that meet temporary funding 
difficulties in resolution and its access would be strictly subject to the following 
conditions:  
− The bank has been recapitalised through bail-in;  
− The liquidity serves the purpose to sustain the credit institution in the 
execution of the resolution strategy;  
 
435 In essence, relying on whether the transaction entered by a public authority is concluded at terms 
that a private investor in the market would also accept (this concept is known as the “market economy 
investor principle”), implying that the support would not grant an undue advantage to the beneficiary. 




− The liquidity is provided at a penalty rate but without deteriorating the 
solvency capacity of credit institutions;  
− The liquidity is secured, with collateral provided by the resolved entity or in 
other cases by the resolution fund (as envisaged by the BRRD);  
− The financing is temporary and must be replaced by private funding as soon 
as possible. 
The RLA would thus enable the stabilisation of the bank after entry into 
resolution by providing confidence to markets and clients. It could also lessen moral 
hazard concerns, given its limited duration and its penalty rate, and the fact that it is 
only available in resolution. Existing monitoring of asset encumbrance enables 
identification of available collateral. Additionally, as a complement to this tool, an 
explicit clarification should be provided in the current resolution framework on what 
precisely the functions of the resolution fund are.438  
Funding under the Eurosystem RLA would still need public backing though, 
because the requirements on bank collateral would be weaker than for the ECB’s 
regular operations. The collateral demand could even be dropped entirely and 
replaced by the euro-area guarantee in “exceptional circumstances”. Having it be 
provided at the European rather than national level would also beneficially go in the 
direction of lessening the discretionality applied at national level and the ensuing 
legal uncertainty, which can also unlevel the playing field across different 
institutions. Still, while this condition is aimed at bolstering the euro area’s attempts 
to break the interdependence of governments and the respective national banks, it 
could run into opposition from countries that are not in favour of debt mutualisation.  
4.2 A mechanism for liquidity assistance: State aid considerations 
The latest ECB policy on ELA439 provides some level of clarity regarding 
funding in resolution. Its principal novelty, compared to its previous policy, is that 
ELA can be provided only to solvent banks (i.e. those that comply with Pillar 1 
minimum capital requirements). Yet, an exception can be made for banks that do not 
 
438 European Banking Federation, (2018) “Discussion paper on funding in resolution under BRRD”, 
available at https://www.ebf.eu 





comply with Pillar 1 requirements, but still have a credible prospect of 
recapitalisation during the 6 months following the determination of non-compliance. 
Therefore, once the entity is declared failing or likely to and a plan to apply a 
resolution tool in order to recapitalise it is approved, the central bank could continue 
providing ELA to the bank, provided sufficient collateral is available to be pledged.  
However, a mechanism could be designed through which temporary ECB 
liquidity support from the ECB could be taken over by the institution responsible for 
the implementation of resolution schemes until the entity regains access to the 
markets. More specifically, the central bank could continue providing the funds 
because it is the most appropriate institution to commit potentially high amounts of 
money in a timely manner. However, the risk could be assumed by the SRF by 
providing guarantees either i) directly to the bank, which could in turn use them as 
“collateral” against funds from the central bank, or ii) to the central bank for the full 
amount of the loan. Consequently, the central bank would not be exposed to losses 
and would only act as a mere provider of funds. This could also solve the problem 
generated by banks not being able to access ELA because they have run out of eligible 
ELA collateral, which is likely to happen during a resolution process. Additionally, 
such a mechanism would be fiscally neutral because the SRF has access to ex post 
contributions from the financial sector if the entity in resolution is unable to 
reimburse its funding, therefore enabling ultimate loss absorption by the private 
sector, without making recourse to governmental support. However, the ex post 
contributions should be calibrated in such a way to avoid excessive pro-cyclical 
effects and competitive distortions also driven by the financial health of the 
contributing institutes.  
To this end, in exchange for such liquidity assistance, authorities might 
impose a tough restructuring plan in order to restore the bank’s long-term viability. 
If the market considers that the business reorganisation plan is credible and realistic, 
this should allow funding needs to recede, and the institution could gradually recover 
to a normal state or ‘business as usual’, where access to market funding would be 
available once again. Such a mechanism would possibly also reduce State aid 
concerns, since: i) the bank could still be deemed solvent when it receives the funds, 
as a recapitalisation plan would be applied in the short term; and ii) no counter-
guarantee from the State would be involved. Therefore, the point to be ascertained 
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under State aid rules would be whether the guarantees from the SRF would constitute 
public aid, by assessing the imputability of the SRF resources. Yet, as the SRF is 
backed by ex-ante funds raised from the industry, and it can be re-insured ex post by 
other industry funds, moral hazard issues should be dampened.  
Within a completed Banking Union, ELA would ideally be provided in a 
centralised manner, further severing the link between banks and their national 
sovereigns, by having a euro area-wide fiscal body with recourse to the SRF 
extending guarantees for liquidity provisioning.440 This implies that a centralised 
treasury would guarantee centralised liquidity provisioning relying on the SRF to 
ensure that losses are ultimately borne by the banking sector, rather than by taxpayers. 
However, so long as the Banking Union is not complete and liquidity provisioning 
still hinges significantly on the extension of ELA by national central banks, 
guarantees from national treasuries, possibly in combination with a larger guarantee 
from the ESM, would remain necessary. As a consequence, scrutiny under State aid 
rules will remain a necessary component to assess the compatibility of liquidity 
assistance measures to banks. In addition to the requirement of setting a minimum 
remuneration for the State441, mostly behavioural safeguards would be required to 
curb undue distortions of competition, including a ban of advertisement related to the 
State support received and a ban on commercial aggressive practices. This entails that 
no significant restructuring or burden-sharing would be imposed.442 However, if 
banks were to call upon the guarantees, an individual restructuring or wind-down 
plan would need to be submitted within two months after the activation of the 
guarantee.443  
 
440 On this point, see also Demertzis et al. (2018). 
441 In line with the formula of the 2011 Prolongation Communication. 
442 Provided that the conditions at points 59 and 60 on the amounts and type of securities to be 
guaranteed are respected. 
443 Point 58 of the same Communication also posits that, where a bank with a capital shortfall needs 
urgent liquidity support, an individual notification to the Commission is required, together with a 
restructuring or wind-down plan, unless the aid is reimbursed within two month. In such an instance, 
burden-sharing would also be required as part of the support scheme, in order to reduce the capital 
shortfall to the maximum extent possible and, as a consequence, the need for public support. 
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5. Which form of backstop for the EU banking sector?  
It is now worthwhile to delve more in depth into what a fiscal backstop for 
the banking sector, as the last step on the ladder of crisis management tools, could 
look like when it must deal with either solvency or liquidity assistance. 
In the context of the Banking Union, the backstop function would be activated 
where, even after imposing losses on the banks’ shareholders and creditors, the SRF 
is temporarily short of resources to facilitate the orderly resolution of the distressed 
banks. In this perspective, it should increase confidence in the European banking 
sector by acting as a last resort in case less favourable conditions materialise. At the 
same time, it would strengthen the resolution mechanism while recovering costs from 
the banking sector, thus making sure taxpayers do not have to pay for failing banks. 
The guiding principles developed by the FSB444, which are generally 
accepted, posit that public sector backstop funding mechanisms should be:  
− credible in terms of size and sufficiently large to support the orderly resolution 
of potentially multiple large banks simultaneously;  
− capable of delivering temporary funding with sufficient rapidity; and  
− the term of funding being sufficient to allow the bank in resolution to regain 
access to private sources of funding.  
5.1 The role of the SRF and ESM 
In the Banking Union, the SRF has been established for the purpose of both 
(i) absorbing losses and compensating creditors and (ii) providing liquidity in 
resolution.445 In the latter case, the SRF may make loans to and guarantee the assets 
or the liabilities of the institution under resolution, its subsidiaries, a bridge institution 
or an asset management vehicle. Yet, the SRM regulation does not specify whether 
and under which conditions liquidity support needs to be backed by collateral.446 It 
 
444 Supra note 435. 
445 Art. 76 SRMR: “to guarantee assets or liabilities of the institution under resolution, its subsidiaries, 
a bridge institution or an asset management vehicle”. 
446 On collateral conditions, recital 33 of the SRMR notes that “Where liquidity support involves no 
or significantly less risk than other forms of support, in particular in the case of a short-term, one-off 
extension of credit to solvent institutions against adequate collateral of high quality, it is justified to 
give such a form of support a lower weight of only 0,5 [to determine the threshold governing decision 
making procedures to avoid first-mover advantages]”.  
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also still does not have access to a credit line and does not have the resources to 
deploy the significant amounts of liquidity that may be required. For this reason, 
together with the current lack of a fiscal backstop, the interaction between central 
bank liquidity in resolution and the role of the SRF should be considered as part of 
the resolution funding framework in the Banking Union. While the SRF itself may 
not be sufficient for the provision of liquidity, it could potentially play a role in 
supporting the provision of private or central bank funding, for example through a 
potential role of guarantor to private or central bank funding, ensuring that any losses 
would be borne by the industry.447  
Mario Draghi, former President of the ECB, commented the following: 
“resolution needs financing, and the Resolution Fund, which is funded by banks, will 
ensure that it is paid for by the private sector. But in a very deep crisis, the resources 
of such funds can be depleted. That is why in all the other large jurisdictions, such 
as the US, the UK and Japan, resolution funds are backstopped by the fiscal 
authority. The aim of such backstops is not to bail banks out: any funds borrowed are 
repaid by the private sector over time. Rather, the aim is to create confidence that 
bank resolution can always be enacted efficiently, which has a stabilising effect in a 
crisis and prevents more banks from being dragged into difficulties.”448  
As for the provision of a backstop for solvency purposes, the SRM Regulation 
explicitly states the possibility for the European resolution fund to seek “alternative 
funding means” be it from “financial institutions”, “institutions” or “other third 
parties”.449 Also, “public financial arrangements” providing financial means to the 
fund are a possibility.450 Admittedly, it remains unclear today which of these bodies 
(if any) would be willing to provide such financial means to the resolution fund in 
extraordinary circumstances. The two most likely sponsors to the resolution fund 
would be the ESM and (one or more) Member States.  
Obviously, whether or not the resolution fund will need “extraordinary 
financial assistance” to cover any resolution or recapitalisation costs in the run up to 
 
447 Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), June 2018, “Liquidity in resolution”, 
Discussion Paper, available at https://www.afme.eu 
448 Speech available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180511.en.html 
449 Art. 73 SRMR.  
450 Art. 74 SRMR. 
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the completion of national contributions will heavily depend both upon the size of 
any future bail-in as well as upon the size of any assistance by affected Member 
States, whether it will be to banks or to the resolution fund. Both variables are subject 
to moral hazardous behaviour, but still remain unknown as of today, making it hard 
to appropriately judge the adequacy of the fund’s financial capability. The means for 
ESM-assistance to the resolution fund have been introduced through the reform of 
the ESM Treaty of end-2019.451 
5.2 The ESM reform  
On 4 December 2019, the Eurogroup agreed in principle, subject to national 
procedures, on a reform to the ESM touching upon a number of aspects, including a 
development of the ESM’s financial assistance instruments and an enhancement of 
the ESM’s role as a common backstop for the SRF. 
In the event that the SRF is depleted, the ESM can act as a backstop and lend 
the funds necessary to finance a resolution, through the provision of a revolving credit 
line. A nominal cap for loans to the SRF is set at €68 billion.452 If the credit line is 
used, the SRF will pay back the ESM loan with money from bank contributions 
within three years, although this period can be extended so that the total maturity is 
up to five years. As a result, it will be fiscally neutral over the medium term. If non-
euro area Member States join the Banking Union, the ESM and non-euro area 
Member States would provide parallel credit lines to act as a common backstop to the 
SRF. At the latest, the common backstop is meant to be in place by 1 January 2024. 
As a consequence, the ESM will be enabled to be involved in the financing of 
recapitalisations through either of the following mechanisms:  
(1) ESM-financial assistance to the SRF, which in turn recapitalises the bank, or  
 
451 Prior to its reform, the ESM-Treaty would have only allowed for loans being awarded to ESM-
Members. An intervention to backstop the SRF would not have been possible. Following Article 19 
ESM-Treaty, ESM-Governors could have allowed for the ESM financing the resolution mechanism. 
Such a decision would have required unanimity and the consent of some national parliaments. 
452 This figure is expected to be above the target level of the SRF in 2024, for an alignment between 
the size of the SRF, which is 1% of covered deposits in the Banking Union (estimated at around €55 
billion), and that of the backstop.  
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(2) ESM-financial assistance to a Member State by an ESM-loan to recapitalise the 
bank.453   
ESM-financial assistance to the resolution fund for recapitalisation purposes should 
be possible only given the following conditions being fulfilled simultaneously:  
- it is only applied to major recapitalisations above 5% of the bank’s liabilities, 
which means that an 8% bail-in and a full write-down of eligible liabilities 
would have already taken place; and  
- the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has made all possible efforts to raise 
contributions or borrow funds from other sources at acceptable rates. 
Figure 6.1 exemplifies how the backstop system would work.  
 
453 Currently, the financial assistance toolkit of the ESM also includes a Direct Recapitalisation 
Instrument (DRI) for banks, which, however, will be removed after the establishment of the ESM 
common backstop. Such an instrument was available for financial institutions: (i) in (likely) breach of 
the relevant capital requirements and unable to attract sufficient capital from private sector sources to 
resolve their capital problems; (ii) for which burden-sharing arrangements, such as bail-in under the 
BRRD, are insufficient to fully address the capital shortfall; (iii) with a systemic relevance or posing 
a serious threat to the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or the requesting ESM Member; 
(iv) supervised by the ECB; and (v) to which the beneficiary Member State cannot provide financial 
assistance without very adverse effects on its own fiscal sustainability, thus making the use of the 
indirect recapitalisation instrument unfeasible. 
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Figure 6.1 - ESM backstop functioning 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
Given the conditions described, the ESM serving as a backstop for the 
resolution fund would serve a number of purposes. Among them, it could diminish 
risks for the taxpayers, since the fund- differently from a single financial institution- 
is backed by a large number of banks. ESM-assistance to the fund would better 
activate national backstops compared to ESM-loans to Member States for 
recapitalisation, thus increasing national responsibility in coping with moral hazard. 
On the downside, however, this would ultimately be at the cost of a higher default 
risk for the ESM, and hence taxpayers. As a possible solution for the latter problem, 
the volume made available for this instrument might be confined.  
It is also important that the ESM should not be the first recourse in case the 
resolution fund encounters any financial problem. In this sense, an ESM backstop for 
the resolution fund could be earmarked for major recapitalisations (above 5%), but 
only after all possible efforts are made by the SRB to tap into other capital sources, 
either by raising contributions or borrowing the necessary funds at reasonable rates. 
This has a twofold implication of (i) increasing the responsibility of the banking 
sector in shouldering losses and recapitalisations of institutions, thus ensuring the 
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fiscal neutrality of support and (ii) further diminishing the expectation of institutions 
to receive public financial support.   
6. Economic considerations on fiscal backstops 
The economic literature has widely acknowledged how fiscal backstops act 
to preserve the stability of financial markets. Some studies have looked at the 
interaction between fragility and market structure and found that panic runs could 
occur in all competitive conditions. Panic runs result from coordination problems 
among depositors and network externalities, and these features need not depend on 
the degree of competition for deposits.454 On the other hand, there might be another 
mechanism at play, too. More competition may worsen bank fragility: by raising 
interest rates on deposits, more competition may exacerbate the coordination problem 
among depositors, leading to a panic run455, and also increase the probability of 
fundamental runs.456  
Competition also affects the functioning of the interbank market. Banks with 
surplus liquidity and market power in the interbank market might face two choices, 
which lead to opposite effects. More specifically, they might deny funds to deficit 
banks, forcing inefficient asset liquidation and increasing the probability of bank 
failures.457 Alternatively they might help troubled banks in need of liquidity in order 
to prevent contagion. However, this can only occur when competition is imperfect, 
as otherwise banks are price takers on the interbank market and cannot influence the 
price level with their action.458 
However, in addition to its stabilisation purposes, the existence of a fiscal 
backstop is crucial for the credibility of the ECB as banking supervisor. Indeed, if 
fiscal funds are not available for resolution, the supervisor may hesitate to initiate the 
 
454 Matutes, C., Vives, X., (1996) “Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance”, Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 5, 184-216.  
455 Ibid. 
456 Goldstein, I., Pauzner, A., (2005) “Demand deposit contracts and the probability of bank runs”, 
Journal of Finance, 60, 1293-1328.  
457 Acharya, V.V., Gromb, D., Yorulmazer, T., (2012) “Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market 
for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking”. 




wind-down or restructuring of a bank in distress.459 However, the provision of a 
credible fiscal backstop to international banks is challenging. The countries involved 
do not take into account any foreign externalities of a potential bank failure, and are 
only prepared to backstop their respective domestic part. More formally, the financial 
trilemma states that the objectives of (1) financial stability, (2) international banking, 
and (3) national financial policies for supervision and resolution are incompatible.460 
Any two of the three policy objectives can be combined but not all three. Freixas et 
al. (2003) also modelled how ex post negotiations on burden-sharing lead to an 
underprovision of recapitalisations. Countries have an incentive to understate their 
share of the problem in order to have a smaller share in the costs.461  
As a matter of fact, the establishment of a fiscal backstop notoriously incurs 
into a free-riding problem. Countries that do not sign up for burden-sharing 
nevertheless profit from it, as the stability of the European financial system is a public 
good. In particular, “stronger” countries would be discouraged from ex ante 
contributions to the backstop, for fear of needing to systematically assist weaker 
countries and their financial institutions. If the benefits of membership to the Banking 
Union are greater than the costs deriving from backstop contributions and the 
necessity for a unified safety net that reflects the uniformity already present in 
supervision and resolution is acknowledged, this problem might be alleviated.  
In this sense, if access to such a backstop is perceived as a limit option that is 
sufficiently “far up” on the ladder of crisis management strategies, combined with 
the assurance that the single banks will need to contribute by themselves first through 
burden-sharing (bail-in) and then the SRF would pitch in, could make it even more 
palatable. The fact that SRF involvement entails contributions by the banking sector 
itself should at the same time dampen concerns on banks’ moral hazard generated by 
the expectation that public assistance will automatically be granted. This effect could 
be further strengthened by the requirement that one national compartment of 
resolution funds contribute to the one of another country if the funding of the latter 
turns out to be insufficient. Yet, such a condition can generate a mechanism of “losers 
 
459 Vives, X., (2016) “Competition and Stability in Banking: The Role of Regulation and Competition 
Policy”, Princeton University Press, p. 240. 
460 Schoenmaker, D., “The financial trilemma”, 2011, Economics Letters, 111, 57-59.  
461 Freixas, X., Parigi, B. M., Rochet, J.-C., “The lender of last resort: a 21st century approach”, 2003, 
ECB Working Paper No. 298. 
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of last resort”, where the banks that are not assisted and need to pitch in to cover for 
others cannot do not even get reimbursed for their contribution. This could bring 
about competitive distortions if the additional ex post contributions are always asked 
of one category of banks: either the relatively smaller ones, because only the biggest 
ones are rescued, or the stronger ones because only the weaker will end up needing 
assistance. 
6.1 Expectations regarding liquidity assistance 
Having established the economic rationale for establishing a fiscal backstop 
and acknowledged some of the reasons for which some countries may be reluctant to 
contribute to it, it is now also necessary to turn to the economic effect that the legal 
rules on last resort assistance by central banks and resolution funds, as extensively 
presented in previous sections, can produce. More specifically, as to the provision of 
ELA, it amounts to a crisis prevention tool that falls within the remit of national 
central banks as part of their mandate to ensure financial stability. This ‘crisis 
prevention’ role is fully recognised in the SRM Regulation which explains that the 
“need for emergency liquidity assistance is not a condition that sufficiently 
demonstrates that a [bank] is, or is likely in the near future to be, unable to pay its 
liabilities as they fall due”462; and therefore does not need to be placed under 
resolution.  
The exemption of ELA from State aid rules is based in particular on the 
assumption that a bank is only temporarily illiquid but otherwise solvent at the 
moment of the liquidity provision. It seems up for debate how to square that 
understanding of solvency (under a ‘point-in-time’ assessment) with that of the ECB 
(under a ‘forward looking’ assessment), as the ECB’s 2017 Agreement463 considers 
undercapitalised banks with a “credible prospect of recapitalisation” to be solvent as 
well. Nevertheless, resolution planning should not assume that central-bank liquidity 
will fill the gaps. Yet, since ELA decisions are taken at national level by national 
central banks, expectations about the likelihood of receiving such liquidity assistance 
may vary from country to country.  This particular concern could be lessened if the 
 






ECB provided ELA directly to the banks, rather than their NCBs. Indeed, ELA 
centralisation would involve a sharing of these future risks and would correct the 
disparities in its application observed in several recent cases of resolution in Spain, 
Italy, Latvia.464 It would also be consistent with the centralisation of supervision, 
monetary policy and bank resolution. 
For what concerns the degree to which the possibility of liquidity assistance 
could be expected in resolution planning and execution, some guidance is offered by 
Art. 10 BRRD and Art. 8 SRMR, which posit that: “the resolution plan shall not 
assume any of the following: any central bank emergency assistance; any central bank 
liquidity assistance under non-standard collateralisation, tenor and interest rate 
terms”. Thus, private sector sources of liquidity are the only ones that institutions can 
consider in their resolution planning. Nevertheless, while limited and circumscribed, 
the provision of ELA seems possible under the 2017 Agreement, not only before 
resolution as a crisis prevention tool, but also during a resolution under specific 
circumstances, namely: i) there has to be a “credible prospect of recapitaalisation”, 
which is the very objective of resolution; ii) banks need to have ‘sufficient’ collateral; 
iii) insolvency proceeding must not have been initiated according to national laws. 
Those conditions are restrictive and only met in specific resolution scenarios.  
A “credible prospect of recapitalisation” seems plausible if a bank can either 
count on a recapitalisation from private sources, or if its capitalisation levels can be 
restored via bail-in; the latter option, however, is only available if the SRB finds that 
there is public interest in taking action. Conversely, if an undercapitalised bank has 
no access to private capital, and if its resolution (bail-in) is not necessary in the public 
interest, it would not have access to ELA. Even banks whose resolution is in the 
public interest may be blocked from using ELA in the event that the resolution tool 
chosen (e.g. in the case of asset transfers) entails the opening of insolvency 
procedures. This all adds to an interpretation of ELA according to which it cannot be 
considered as a ‘generally available’ source of resolution financing that the SRB may 
avail of or count on when resolving a bank. Therefore, risk-taking incentives for 
banks should not be affected in this respect, as no reasonable expectation could be 
formed that central bank liquidity assistance would be automatically available. 
 
464 Concerning Banco Popular, four small Italian banks, and ABLV, respectively. 
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6.2 Implications of the credibility of the backstop 
Then, other considerations should be made as to the role of the ESM in safety 
net provision, instead. On this point, the conditionality set for its support measures 
for recapitalisation requires contributions both by the failing bank (through bail-in of 
minimum 8% of a bank’s liabilities) and by the resolution fund or through other 
arrangements (with an additional 5%). This leads to the hypothesis that any potential 
distortionary effects caused by a solvency backstop by the ESM would mostly be a 
carry-over of the effects produced by the resolution strategy previously chosen to 
cover the losses of the failing bank and to recapitalise it.465 However, it must also be 
noted that the involvement of backstops would only concern very significant banks 
whose failure would have a relevant impact on the economy also by way of contagion. 
In fact, failures of smaller institutions should have been dealt with through other crisis 
management strategies at an earlier point in the crisis “ladder”, either through 
liquidation or through a combination of resolution tools that can cover lower loss 
absorption and recapitalisation needs without needing additional support.  
In any case, the fact that the use of public funds might be an exception to be 
accessed only in extraordinary circumstances and under strict conditionality does not 
change the fact that the perception of the inadequacy of funds of the SRF and the 
ESM not being fully operational yet limits the credibility of the regime.466 The limited 
credibility of the regime has important implications on the cost of funding of banks, 
which might influence bank competitiveness, as well as on the sovereign’s 
willingness to initiate a bank resolution rather than providing public support. 
Increasing the firepower of a resolution fund until its target level is high enough to 
accommodate any given bank’s resolution, so that the credibility of the regime can 
be ensured also entails opportunity costs in terms of the funds set aside for resolution 
purposes. In this sense, the regime as it is currently set could arguably be considered 
as being credible for small banks, thus affecting their funding costs, but it would also 
 
465 See the discussion in Chapter 4 on the competition-related implications produced by the use of 
different resolution tools.  
466 On this aspect, see, for example, Yiatrou (2016) and Hellwig (2014), highlighting that the fiscal 
backstop would be limited in a major systemic crisis because its target level is set too low. That fact 
that the ESM Treaty reform eliminates the DRI, which had a funding limitation, and goes beyond it in 
providing a backstop to the SRF can be read as positive in light of these considerations. 
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affect the funding costs of bigger banks467, insofar as its limited credibility makes 
resolving bigger banks without any recourse to public support potentially more 
destabilising and dangerous. 
6.3 Severing the doom loop between sovereigns and banks 
Lastly, one other relevant point to consider is whether the eventual existence 
of a fiscal backstop, providing assistance in face of solvency and liquidity issues, 
would further sever the doom loop between sovereigns and banks. However, even if 
the central bank as monetary authority can in principle print as much liquidity as 
needed to act as LOLR, ultimately there has to be a fiscal authority behind the central 
bank to compensate for potential losses incurred by the former. This is particularly 
true also in view of the fact that ECB has a very limited mandate for discharging 
LOLR powers, given the absence of fiscal union and centralised fiscal powers within 
the eurozone.468 As such, losses related to LOLR functions are a fiscal matter because 
they have to be borne by taxpayers.469  
On the other hand, the provision of liquidity during a crisis in many cases 
requires the central bank to design and implement operations jointly with the fiscal 
authority, involving some risk-sharing.  Additionally, the LOLR operations can have 
distributive consequences stemming from the decisions to provide liquidity to some 
financial institutions but not others.470 This framework also needs to address the 
problem of moral hazard because banks might engage in risky behaviour if they know 
that the LOLR would step in in case of problems.471  
 
467 Among others, see Bongini et al. (2015), finding that the reallocation of losses of bank failure on 
debt-holders (through bail-in in resolution or depositor preference in liquidation) can alter banks’ 
funding costs, especially when combined with the regulatory changes to capital adequacy standards 
(i.e. higher equity). For a review of the literature on this point, see also FSB (2020), as also referenced 
in Chapter 4. 
468 Goodhart C., “The Political Economy of Financial Harmonisation in Europe”, 2003, in J. Kremer, 
D. Schoenmaker, P. Wierts (Eds), Financial Supervision in Europe (Cheltenham Edward Elgar). 
469 Tucker, P., “The Lender of Last Resort and Modern Central Banking: Principles and 
Reconstruction”, 2014, BIS Paper No. 79b.  
470 Howarth, D., Quaglia, L., “The Political Economy of European Banking Union”, 2016, Oxford 
Scholarship Publishing. 
471 For instance, this has traditionally been a concern of the Bundesbank, which never openly admitted 
its willingness to act as LOLR prior to the establishment of the European Monetary Union. See 
Goodhart, C., “The Political Economy of Monetary Union”, 1995, The Central Bank and the Financial 
System, p. 156-202. 
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Therefore, Member States can limit their involvement into banks’ rescues 
only up to a point. Then, the recourse to national fiscal backstops or the application 
of national precautionary recapitalisations will raise some of the well-known 
questions about the sufficiency of funding and the creation of distortions through 
political choices, namely by maintaining national champions, safeguarding preferred 
classes of creditors and generally “kicking the can down the road” for what concerns 
State intervention in bank rescues. This is where State aid control will still be 
necessary. However, this will also imply that the “too-big-to-fail” problem will not 
be completely eliminated.   
7. Concluding remarks  
It is well-established that a credible ultimate safety net backed by 
governments is key in guaranteeing the soundness of the banking system. Even 
though economic studies tend to focus on deposit guarantee schemes in this respect, 
there are a number of backstop-like measures that European authorities, government 
and central banks can take to ensure banks’ liquidity and solvency. 
In the context of the Banking Union, the backstop function would be activated 
where, even after imposing losses on the banks’ shareholders and creditors, the SRF 
is temporarily short of resources to facilitate the orderly resolution of the distressed 
banks. In this perspective, it should increase confidence in the European banking 
sector by acting as a last resort in case less favourable conditions materialise. At the 
same time, it would strengthen the resolution mechanism while recovering costs from 
the banking sector, thus making sure taxpayers do not have to pay for failing banks. 
A common fiscal backstop is currently not operational yet. In this context, the 
monetary financing prohibition would prevent such fiscal mutualisation through the 
backdoor of the Eurosystem. Yet, there might still be situations where a gap in 
funding could arise. How to fill that funding gap will have to be assessed on a case-
by-case basis, also looking at the responsibilities of governments, which are the other 
source of financial support through State aid. With the prospect of the ESM becoming 
the official backstop to the SRF, conditionality for access to assistance and limitations 
to amounts pledged to recapitalisations should dampen moral hazard concerns and 
potential competitive distortions would mainly be a by-product of the resolution 
strategy previously chosen. 
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Moreover, on the matter of liquidity needs, assistance by central banks must 
not be assumed in resolution planning, but it is an option if the bank is solvent or has 
a reasonable expectation of being recapitalised back to solvency in a short time. 
Therefore, this availability leaves open a window for expectations on liquidity 
assistance to form, thus possibly creating competitive distortions, albeit limited by 
the approach of constructive ambiguity taken by central banks. 
In any case, more clarity should be provided in the current framework on the 
resolution fund functions and what are the accepted means for liquidity provision in 
the resolution process. One could argue that additional clarity in specifying that 
liquidity can be provided could lead stakeholders to rely on and anticipate the receipt 
of State aid, thus raising an issue of moral hazard. However, the fact that banks could 
be called to contribute ex post to replenishing resolution funds used to extend support, 
combined with the condition that no EPFS can be assumed at the resolution planning 
stage, should dampen such moral hazard concerns, as banks should take all necessary 
measures ex ante to ensure that liquidity sources are available internally to the 
maximum extent possible. Generally, a mechanism of funding in resolution in the 
eurozone should hinge on the following considerations: i) it is crucial to acknowledge 
that ELA funding will in most cases be involved at a stage prior to resolution; ii) as 
a further step towards the completion of the Banking Union the ECB should centralise 
the provision of ELA; iii) once the PONV is reached, and as soon as there is a clear 
path to future solvency of the bank, ELA should still be available for the bank. 
However, due to a probable lack of eligible ELA collateral, a funding in resolution 
mechanism should be in place where the SRF could provide guarantees either to the 
bank directly or to the ECB, thus shifting the risk onto the private sector; iv) the ESM 
is well-placed to act as the public backstop to the SRF when the latter runs out of 
funds.  
Even in the case of liquidity support, despite the central bank’s activity as 
LOLR, ultimately there has to be a fiscal authority behind the central bank itself to 
compensate for potential losses incurred by the former. This implies that the link 
between sovereigns and banks will not be fully severed, despite the significant 
improvements introduced with the post-crisis regulatory framework to manage bank 
failures. As a consequence, the check for any potentially resulting competitive 
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1. Aim of the study  
As explained in the introductory chapter of this book, the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD) has introduced new rules and tools to manage bank 
crises in Europe. Yet, recent cases of bank rescues in Europe have shown that (i) 
some degree of public intervention is still possible in managing bank failures, despite 
the intended shift from bailout to bail-in introduced by the BRRD472; and (ii) different 
combinations of resolution tools and public support measures entail different 
restructurings of institutions, which need to be scrutinised by competition authorities 
under State aid rules. This suggests that measures enacted with a view to preserving 
financial stability do not completely rule out the possibility that competition concerns 
could still arise, even though the regulatory framework should have decreased 
reliance on public support. 
Therefore, this study has focused on addressing to which extent the interaction 
between resolution rules (BRRD) and State aid rules allows to minimise (potential) 
distortions of competition when dealing with bank failures. To this end, after looking 
at the approach to bank rescues taken by the Commission during the global financial 
crisis (Chapter 2), the analysis has moved to identifying the avenues still available to 
grant public funds to failing banks, both outside (Chapter 3) and within the perimeter 
of resolution rules (Chapters 4 and 6), to highlight the competitive concerns that may 
arise as a result.  
Another aspect which was analysed to address the research question concerns 
the fact that crisis management tools and strategies entail different restructuring 
requirements for ailing institutions, which can alter institutions’ ownership and 
operational structures. In this respect, Chapter 4 has provided an analysis of the 
specificities of different crisis management measures and how they are deployed to 
 
472 In the desiderata of the regulators, such a shift was meant to shift the burden of banks’ losses and 
failures from the shoulders of taxpayers upon bank shareholders and creditors. Chapter 5 has provided 
a detailed analysis of the most relevant cases in this respect. 
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take into account different bank-specific and national market characteristics, as 
evidenced by recent cases of bank rescues in Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Portugal. 
2. Main findings 
The analysis has produced a number of findings relating to the emergence and 
minimisation of (potential) competition concerns through the application of 
stabilisation measures aimed at rescuing and restructuring financial institutions. All 
in all, while the new rules on resolution have improved the approach to bank crisis 
management compared to that in place during the financial crisis, by reducing 
reliance on public finances, the shift from bailout to bail-in has not been absolute. 
Both the rules and their application have competition-related implications which may 
have not been fully accounted for. In this respect, the core findings of this dissertation 
should be highlighted. 
In the first place, it appears that the regulatory framework for crisis 
management, meant as the combined application of resolution and State aid control 
rules, gives prevalence to financial stability considerations over competition ones, 
even though each bank rescue case entails a balancing of the two objectives, 
whenever recourse is made to public support or there is a change in banks’ ownership 
and control structures. More specifically, burden-sharing requirements (also through 
the application of bail-in) constitute the first check against the emergence of 
competitive distortions while rescuing banks.  
In addition, structural and behavioural remedies are combined with the aim 
of preserving the competitive structure of the relevant banking markets to the greatest 
extent possible, by limiting alterations in beneficiaries’ size and acquisition of market 
power after rescue. More substantial structural remedies are generally imposed 
through balance sheet reductions and divestments upon those beneficiaries that 
emerge as standalone entities after rescue, compared to cases in which entities are 
split, or leave the market through liquidation. This is consistent with the approach 
kept with respect to bank bailouts approved during the global financial crisis.  
As burden-sharing has direct implications for the funding costs of institutions, 
different approaches in this respect might exacerbate differences in banks’ funding 
costs among institutions and countries, depending on the scope and means of burden-
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sharing applied in individual bank rescues, possibly distorting institutions’ 
competitive standing in the relevant markets.473 This concern has been lessened 
through the formalisation of uniform burden-sharing requirements introduced with 
the 2013 Banking Communication. However, the difference in the scope of 
contributions required from banks’ creditors under resolution rules and State aid rules 
creates the potential for distorted incentives to materialise when choosing which tools 
to apply to restructure an ailing institution, since specific classes of creditors would 
be better off with the adoption of crisis management strategies other than bail-in. This 
is true for cases of liquidation aid474, but also in relation to the use of DGS funds in 
support of sales or transfers of liabilities from a failing bank to another entity, due to 
a lack of concomitant requirements on burden-sharing, which would act to curb 
potential competitive distortions and limit the need for external assistance.475  
As a consequence of the above, if exceptions to full-fledged bail-in476 become 
the regular way in which bank failures are dealt with, institutions might start adjusting 
their expectations relating to the possibility of a public bailout. This problem could 
be heightened for significant banks, which can rely on the knowledge of their 
essential role at national and European level and their higher degrees of 
interconnection, to reasonably expect that liquidation would not be a credible strategy 
for them. If this were the case, the market would also react and possibly re-price 
banks’ financial instruments and adjust their rating. Insofar as this could re-integrate 
“implicit guarantees” for systematically significant institutions, it would undermine 
the competitive level playing field in European banking markets and go against the 
very purpose of the resolution regime. 
Another critical issue from a competition perspective stems from the lack of 
clarity around the acceptable sources of liquidity support available to banks 
undergoing restructuring. This creates the conditions for increased recourse to public 
support- be it in the form of guarantees or other liquidity measures- which, in turn, 
increases the risk of competition distortions.  
 
473 The different types of burden-sharing applied to cases of bank bailouts approved before the 
introduction of the 2013 Banking Communication have been detailed in Chapter 2. 
474 Such as in the case of Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza (Chapter 5). 
475 On this point, see the discussion prompted by the Tercas case (Chapter 4). 
476 Either by way of precautionary recapitalisations or through voluntary support by DGS funds. 
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Other relevant findings of the study relate to the fact that the regulatory 
framework for crisis management, as currently shaped by resolution and State aid 
rules, has the potential to affect the competitive structure of banking markets in 
Europe. This comes about mainly through two channels: (i) regulatory requirements 
which might favour specific categories of institutions, while entailing more 
significant costs for others; and (ii) restructuring requirements for institutions, 
stemming from the application of different crisis management tools. 
Indeed, to the extent that bail-in rules, and the related MREL requirements, 
may put smaller banks at a disadvantage compared to larger institutions with easier 
access to capital markets477, they may prompt banking mergers and acquisitions in 
order to be able to tap into capital markets and prepare for resolution rather than 
liquidation. In this sense, the resolution framework could contribute to reinforcing a 
growing trend of bank consolidation in the EU.  
For what concerns resolution tools other than bail-in, which entail a (partial) 
transfer of banks’ assets, liabilities and rights, these also have competition-related 
implications for the structure of banking markets, as their successful implementation 
hinges on the presence of a competitor willing to take over the transferred banking 
perimeter. Based on the market positioning of the acquirer and the potential overlap 
between the merging entities, competitive safeguards are necessary to prevent the 
creation or reinforcement of dominant positions in the market, which might restrict 
competition.  
On the basis of the above and an analysis of recent cases of bank 
restructurings (Chapter 5), it would appear that the regulatory framework could also 
lead to different crisis management measures being applied to adapt to the size, 
interconnection and systemic relevance of the institutions concerned. More 
specifically, (i) larger, systemic banks could be restructured through resolution and 
the application of a full-fledged bail-in- or a precautionary recapitalisation, under 
exceptional and very specific circumstances- preserving them as standalone entities; 
(ii) mid-sized banks could be resolved through sales of portfolios of assets and 
liabilities to other entities, possibly enabled by temporary voluntary contributions of 
the DGS, which would lead to mergers and consolidation; while (iii) smaller local 
 
477 See the discussion in Chapter 4. 
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banks could be liquidated in accordance with national insolvency laws and leave the 
market, with an intervention by the DGS in favour of covered depositors.478 
Therefore, the State aid control framework will remain a relevant and integral 
part of the regulatory framework for crisis management, with the purpose of 
scrutinising bank restructuring schemes to ensure that competition distortions are 
avoided or limited to the maximum extent possible, through a combination of burden-
sharing, and structural and behavioural safeguards. It is with this perspective that a 
number of policy proposals can be advanced starting from this study, as laid down in 
the next section. 
3. Policy implications and proposals  
3.1 Burden-sharing alignment and use of remedies 
In order to limit potential distortions of competition in reference to different 
approaches taken towards bank restructurings, the degrees of burden-sharing required 
under State aid rules and under the resolution framework should be further aligned. 
This should decrease to a large extent the potential for distorted incentives to 
materialise when choosing which tools to apply to restructure an ailing institution, 
which is currently discernible in the application of restructuring strategies outside of 
BRRD resolution.  
Moreover, in view of a short- to mid-term scenario in which public funds 
could be necessary to support banks in distress as a direct consequence of the Covid-
pandemic, and considering that burden-sharing requirements might be waived479, 
increasing relevance should also be given to the imposition of structural and 
behavioural remedies upon rescued banks, so as to stem competitive distortions in 
European banking markets.  
In any case, the degree of concentration and contestability of the different 
national banking markets and the market power of the institutions involved will need 
 
478 Once the restructuring schemes for the banks taken into account in Chapter 5 are completed and 
the ownership structure of the restructured entities becomes known, it would be worthwhile to reassess 
those cases to verify the final impact on the competitive structure of the banking market in which the 
institutions operate. 
479 See Chapter 3 on the provisions of the Temporary Framework for State aid allowing for the 
applicability of point 45 of the 2013 Banking Communication, providing an exception to forgo burden-
sharing requirements for reasons of financial stability. 
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to be factored into authorities’ decisions on the best suitable measures and 
competitive safeguards to apply, as well as into their assessment by the Commission, 
so as to give appropriate consideration to the potential effects that the rescue and 
restructuring measures chosen might have on institutions and on the competitive 
structure of national banking markets.  
3.2 Precautionary recapitalisation implementation 
Precautionary recapitalisations can be an effective crisis management tool in 
ensuring financial stability when there is a threat of a serious disturbance in the 
economy. However, this beneficial effect must be weighed against the drawbacks 
arising from the potential creation of an expectation of public assistance for the banks.  
To this end, some improvements in the implementation of precautionary 
recapitalisations would be necessary in order to increase the credibility of the 
regulatory framework and maximise the moral hazard-reducing effects of the 
resolution rules, as a result. In particular, it is crucial that the authorities intervene 
before the bank in trouble ‘crosses the line’ of insolvency, in order to prevent further 
capital deterioration of the institution to the extent possible, thus minimising at the 
same time the amount of public support needed. To this end, burden-sharing 
requirements could be supported by injections of capital through financial 
instruments which should maximise the flexibility for the State to exit its investment 
in the short to medium term, while also creating incentives and conditions for their 
future holders to cover eventual new losses and recapitalise the bank, if needed, 
without making recourse to another public recapitalisation.480 
With this in mind, European regulators could consider clarifying the rules to 
establish the circumstances and conditions at which circumscribed aid could be 
granted as early intervention, rather than closer to a bank’s insolvency. Prompt 
intervention, coupled with credible structural and behavioural commitments imposed 
on restructured institutions with a view to reducing competition distortions, could go 
some way towards improving the sustainability of the crisis management framework.  
 
480 See Chapter 5 for a proposal on increased use of either (i) CoCo instruments or (ii) equity 
convertible into hybrid instruments. 
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3.3 Public interest assessment 
As observed in the conclusions to Chapter 3, the “public interest principle” 
set out in Article 32(5) BRRD and Article 18(5) SRMR leaves national governments 
and European authorities some discretion in choosing which instances and 
institutions warrant the granting of a precautionary recapitalisation. In this sense, the 
concept of public interest is likely to remain tightly interwoven with national politics 
and biases481, which might lead in turn to economically inefficient outcomes. 
A more uniform approach is needed among the SRB and national resolution 
authorities for performing the “public interest assessment”, which determines the 
choice of crisis management strategy to apply, i.e. resolution or liquidation. If the 
public interest assessment keeps a high threshold to determine the relevance of an 
institution to justify its resolution, small banks will always be caught by national 
insolvency laws disciplining their liquidation, which might not account for the local 
significance of a bank’s operations. This becomes even more relevant in light of the 
lack of harmonisation among national insolvency frameworks in Europe, which does 
not ensure a playing field in the management of liquidations and failures, thus 
possibly creating regulatory arbitrage incentives.482 Ultimately, the challenge lies in 
striking an effective balance between allowing inefficient banks to exit the market in 
an orderly manner and accounting for the fact that the local relevance of an institution 
might fall through the cracks in the assessment of public interest as it currently 
appears to be structured. 
3.4 Liquidity in resolution 
In order to reduce to the greatest extent possible banks’ recourse to public 
resources to obtain liquidity, e.g. in the form of guarantees, more clarity should be 
provided in the current framework on the functions of resolution funds and the 
accepted means for liquidity provision in the resolution process, explicitly laying 
down the sources and conditions for liquidity access. One argument against the need 
for additional regulatory clarification in this respect could be that a more precise 
application of the rules to grant liquidity assistance could lead stakeholders to rely on 
 
481 See, for instance, the different conclusions reached by the SRB and Italian authorities on the 
existence of a public interest in relation to Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza (Chapter 5). 
482 See the speech by SRB Chair Elke König before the ECON Committee of the European Parliament 
in this respect: https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/508.  
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and anticipate the receipt of State aid, thus exacerbating a problem of moral hazard 
that the regulatory framework on bank resolution meant to counter. Yet, on the other 
hand, one could argue that moral hazard issues would be limited by the fact that banks 
could be called to contribute to replenishing resolution funds on an ex-post basis, thus 
repaying to some extent the support received and, since EPFS cannot be assumed at 
the resolution planning stage, they should have taken all necessary measures ex ante 
to ensure that liquidity sources are available internally to the maximum extent 
possible.   
Generally, a mechanism of funding in resolution should take into account the 
following considerations: i) a centralisation of emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) 
provision by the ECB would contribute to the completion of the Banking Union; ii) 
as soon as there is a clear path to future solvency of a bank in resolution, ELA should 
be available. However, due to a probable lack of eligible ELA collateral, a clear 
funding in resolution mechanism should enable the SRF to provide guarantees either 
to the bank directly or to the ECB, thus shifting the risk onto the private sector. 
Bearing this in mind, the ESM is well-placed to act as the public backstop to the SRF 






Annex 1 - Data on national banking sectors (Chapter 5)   
 












Austria 544 845,380 565,048 543,275 78,008 
Belgium 88 1,001,881 601,842 664,939 72,797 
Bulgaria 26 57,133 38,367 41,776 9,266 
Croatia 22 60,202 44,320 43,117 10,973 
Cyprus 32 69,861 48,538 42,784 13,560 
Czech 
Republic 
52 286,090 209,579 166,485 28,729 
Denmark 98 1,056,444 668,793 320,447 64,300 
Estonia 37 26,207 24,608 18,020 3,588 
Finland 257 628,492 374,908 234,683 52,803 
France 409 8,810,390 5,412,610 4,701,364 619,746 
Germany 1,584 7,775,993 4,981,050 4,856,395 599,066 
Greece 37 292,595 190,919 178,114 59,444 
Hungary 60 126,053 65,236 82,234 13,660 
Ireland 327 1,101,935 332,900 302,891 92,430 
Italy 508 3,669,283 2,388,626 2,623,710 380,251 
Latvia 54 22,792 18,128 15,318 3,408 
Lithuania 85 30,064 26,672 24,235 3,144 
Luxembourg 135 1,077,297 470,964 455,247 60,136 
Malta 24 44,435 19,805 23,291 4,297 
Netherlands 93 2,320,609 1,384,483 1,181,180 143,667 
Poland 647 461,749 321,283 316,511 68,786 
Portugal 141 390,771 239,657 283,121 54,456 
Romania 34 104,334 65,301 74,686 15,047 
Slovakia 27 82,005 61,155 61,934 10,466 
Slovenia 17 40,630 28,130 31,942 4,804 
Sweden 153 1,284,115 831,558 509,420 65,685 
United 
Kingdom 
390 9,035,347 4,078,704 3,886,742 37,083 
TOTAL 4,599 38,875,794 18,792,622 18,086,933 2,525,501 























Annex 2 - Summary of measures applied in rescue cases 
(Chapter 5)  
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Annex 3 –  State aid compatibility and remedies – post-







Liquidity support to 
Attica Bank483  
- State remuneration 
based on market data 
and in line with 
Prolongation 
Communication  
 - Advertising ban 




Liquidity support to 
Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza484 and 
liquidity support to 
Veneto Banca485 
- State remuneration 
based on market data 
and in line with 
Prolongation 
Communication  
 - Advertising ban 




Sale of bridge banks 
Nuova Marche, 
Nuova Etruria, 
Nuova Carichieti to 
UBI Banca486 
- Full write-down of 




not transferred to 
new entities 
- Senior claim by 
resolution fund on 
residual entities  
- Withdrawal of 
residual entities’ 
license and exit 
from market 
- Limited lifespan 
of bridge banks 
- No new activity 
by residual 
entities 
- Deposit and loan 
pricing policy on 
bridge banks   
Orderly liquidation 
of Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza and Veneto 
Banca – Liquidation 
aid487 
- Senior claim of 
buyer and State 
exceeding value of 
residual assets 
- Exit from the 
market of the two 
entities after sale 
- Staff and branch 
reduction by buyer  
 
 
483 Case SA.46558 (2016/N) – Greece. Commission decision C(2016) 6573 of 7 October 2016. 
484 Case SA.47149 (2016/N) – Italy. Commission decision C(2017) 331 of 18 January 2017. 
485 Case SA.47150 (2016/N) – Italy. Commission decision C(2017) 328 of 18 January 2017. 
486 Cases SA.39543 (2017/N-2), SA.41134 (2017/N-2), SA.43547 (2017/N-2) – Italy. Commission 
decision C(2017) 3000 of 30 April 2017. 







Sale of bridge bank 
Nuova Carife to 
BPER488 
- Full write-down of 




not transferred to 
new entity 
- Senior claim by 
resolution fund on 
residual entity 
 
- Withdrawal of 
residual entity’s 
license and exit 
from market 
- Limited lifespan 
of bridge bank 
- Reduction in 
headcount and 
branch closure 
- No new activity 
by residual entity 
- Deposit and loan 
pricing policy on 
bridge banks   
New aid and 
amended 
restructuring plan of 
Banca Monte dei 
Paschi di Siena489 
- Deep shareholder 
dilution (to 2.5%) 
through capital 
increase  
- Conversion of AT1, 
T2 and all other 
subordinated debt 
into equity 
- Branch reduction 
in Italy and abroad 
- Balance sheet 
reduction 
- Deleveraging of 
leasing activities 
- Acquisition ban 
- Advertising ban 








- Transformation of 
non-loss absorbing 
additional shares into 
loss absorbing shares 
- Disqualification of 




Liquidation aid for 
the orderly market 




- Significant senior 
claim of State 
- Withdrawal of 
residual entities’ 
license and exit 
from market 
- Buyer taking over 
less than 50% of 




488 Case SA.41925 (2017/N-2) – Italy. Commission decision C(2017) 4564 of 29 June 2017. 
489 Case SA.47677 (2017/N) – Italy. Commission decision C(2017) 4690 of 4 July 2017. 
490 Case SA. 48920 (2017/N) – Lithuania. Commission decision C(2017) 8848 of 18 December 2017. 
No additional measures imposed to limit distortions of competition due to small market share and size 
of LCCU group, as well as low absolute value of aid amount. 







Liquidity support to 
Banca Carige492  
- State remuneration 
based on market data 
and in line with 
Prolongation 
Communication 
 - Dividend and 
coupon ban 
- Advertising ban 




Source: own elaboration 
 































Banco di Sicilia 
C 16/1998 
 
Restructuring aid to SachsenLB 
Commission decision C(2008) 2269 of 4 June 2008 (C 9/2008 (ex NN 8/2008, CP 
244/2007) – Germany) 
 
Financial Support Measures to the Banking Industry in the UK 
Commission decision C(2008) 6058 of 13 October 2008 (N 507 /2008 – United 
Kingdom) 
 
Restructuring aid to IKB 
Commission decision C(2008) 6022 of 21 October 2008 (C 10/2008 (ex NN 7/2008) 
– Germany)  
 
Support measures for the banking industry in Sweden 
Commission decision C(2008) 6538 of 29 October 2008 (N 533/2008 – Sweden) 
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This dissertation analyses the EU regulatory framework for the management of bank 
crises, with a focus on the interconnections between bank resolution and State aid 
rules and their implications for banking competition and market structures. 
 
To this end, the primary step involves an assessment of the EU State aid rules as 
applied to the banking sector, to establish which are the conditions for granting public 
funds to institutions in distress and how these conditions have evolved from the latest 
financial crisis until the recent years. The establishment of the Banking Union 
provides an important backdrop against which to evaluate how a greater degree of 
sectoral integration at EU level has influenced the implementation of State aid rules 
and how bank crisis resolution strategies have been updated. In particular, focus is 
devoted to the balance struck between financial stability and competition policy 
objectives whenever governmental measures are deployed with a stabilisation 
purpose in instances of bank distress. In this respect, this study is grounded on the 
interaction between the 2013 Banking Communication of the European Commission 
and the newer prescriptions introduced by the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD), so as to assess the efficiency of the existing regulatory framework 
and evaluate how the apparent trade-off between financial stability and competition 
is addressed.  
 
As a number of bank crisis resolution strategies and tools have been made available 
by the composite framework of resolution and State aid rules, this dissertation aims 
to assess how the use of different combinations of such strategies and tools can affect 
bankers’ incentives and banking market structures in different ways. To this end, this 
study provides a detailed comparative analysis of the most recent cases of application 
of bank resolution, precautionary recapitalisations and bank liquidation, respectively, 
in order to offer an updated and comprehensive view of the different tools available 




This exercise is relevant both from a positive and from a normative perspective. From 
the former point of view, this study endeavours to shed light on the complexity of the 
interactions between alternative crisis management tools and forms of State aid, 
highlighting the enduring role of public fund granting in affecting institutions’ market 
conduct depending on the choice of bank restructuring tool, as well as public 
authorities’ incentives in choosing which rescue strategies and tools to apply to 
different instances of bank distress. From the latter point of view instead, it highlights 
how the regulatory framework, as designed and/or applied, can actively shape 
institutions’ and markets’ conduct and structure, with the aim of assessing whether 
the intended regulatory goals of the BRRD are met in practice and advancing policy 





























Deze dissertatie analyseert het EU-regelgevingskader voor crisisbeheersing in de 
banksector, met een nadruk op de onderlinge verbindingen tussen de regels voor 
afwikkeling van banken en overheidssteun en de gevolgen daarvan voor concurrentie 
tussen banken en marktstructuren. 
 
De eerste stap daartoe is een beoordeling van de EU-regels voor overheidssteun, 
toegepast op de banksector, om te bepalen wat de voorwaarden zijn voor het 
verstrekken van gemeenschapsgeld aan noodlijdende instellingen en hoe deze 
voorwaarden zich hebben ontwikkeld vanaf de laatste financiële crisis tot recente 
jaren. De instelling van de bankenunie biedt een belangrijke achtergrond waartegen 
kan worden geëvalueerd hoe een grotere mate van sectorale integratie op EU-niveau 
de invoering van de regels voor overheidssteun heeft beïnvloed en hoe de strategieën 
voor afwikkeling van de bankencrisis zijn geactualiseerd. De focus is met name 
gericht op het bereikte evenwicht tussen financiële stabiliteit en de 
concurrentiebeleidsdoelstellingen wanneer overheidsmaatregelen worden toegepast 
met het oog op stabilisering in het geval van in nood verkerende banken. Wat dit 
betreft is dit onderzoek gebaseerd op de interactie tussen de bankenmededeling van 
de Europese Commissie uit 2013 en de recentere voorschriften geïntroduceerd door 
de EU-richtlijn voor het herstel en de afwikkeling van banken [Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD)], om de efficiëntie van het bestaande 
regelgevingskader te beoordelen en te evalueren hoe de kennelijke wisselwerking 
tussen financiële stabiliteit en concurrentie wordt aangepakt.  
 
Nu een aantal bankencrisis afwikkelingsstrategieën en instrumenten ter beschikking 
staan via het samengestelde kader van regels inzake afwikkeling en overheidssteun, 
is deze dissertatie erop gericht om te beoordelen hoe het gebruik van verschillende 
combinaties van deze strategieën en instrumenten de prikkels van bankiers en de 
bancaire marktstructuren op verschillende manieren kan beïnvloeden. Dit onderzoek 
biedt hiertoe een gedetailleerde vergelijkende analyse van de meest recente gevallen 
van toepassing van respectievelijk bankafwikkeling, herkapitalisatie uit voorzorg en 
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bankliquidatie, om een geactualiseerd en uitvoerig overzicht te verschaffen van de 
verschillende beschikbare en geschikte instrumenten ten behoeve van de 
verschillende soorten van bankfaillissementen.  
 
Dit onderzoek is relevant, zowel vanuit een positief als vanuit een normatief 
perspectief. Vanuit het eerstgenoemde oogpunt tracht dit onderzoek een licht te doen 
schijnen op de complexiteit van de interactie tussen alternatieve 
crisisbeheersingsinstrumenten en vormen van overheidssteun, waarbij de 
voortdurende rol wordt benadrukt van het verstrekken van gemeenschapsgelden bij 
het beïnvloeden van het marktgedrag van instellingen afhankelijk van de keuze van 
het bankherstructureringsinstrument evenals de prikkels van overheidsinstanties bij 
de keuze welke reddingstrategieën en instrumenten toe te passen op verschillende 
gevallen van in nood verkerende banken. Vanuit het laatstgenoemde oogpunt wordt 
echter benadrukt hoe het regelgevingskader, zoals dat is ontworpen en/of toegepast, 
het gedrag en de structuur van instellingen en markten actief kan vormen, met als 
doel om te beoordelen of in de praktijk wordt voldaan aan de beoogde 
regelgevingsdoelen van de BRRD en het bevorderen van beleidsvoorstellen voor 
mogelijke verbeteringen in dit verband. 
